

# The Theaetetus of Plato

Lewis Campbell



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THE THEÆTETUS

OF PLATO,

WITH

A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES,

BY THE

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TO  
EDMUND LAW LUSHINGTON, Esq., M.A.,  
PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,  
THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEÆTETUS  
IS GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED  
BY HIS OLD PUPIL  
LEWIS CAMPBELL.

*May, 1861.*



## P R E F A C E.

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THE Text of this Edition differs in some respects from that of the Zurich Editors, from which it has in the main been printed.

1. All conjectural emendations have been excluded, except such as appeared to be absolutely required for the correction of mere clerical errors: and these latter have been enclosed within brackets [ ]. The Student is thus at once enabled to distinguish between the (sometimes corrupt) reading that is found in MSS., and that which has been created by the ingenuity of scholars.

The *guesses* even of the highest genius do not pretend to certainty; and the admission of conjectural readings into the text has this disadvantage, that it tends to lull curiosity asleep, and to put an end to conjecture.

Some of the readings which have been thus removed exist in almost all the editions from Stephanus downwards. He appears to have received them on the authority of Cornarius, who, after long study of the ancient medical writers, translated Plato in his old age. In the execution of this work (according to his son, who published it at Basle in 1561) he

used the three printed editions then extant, and *one* MS. from the Library of Baron Hassenstein. This MS. was probably destroyed with the others in the same Library before the end of the 16th century.

Unfortunately, in the *Eclogæ*, or Select Readings, which he appended to each quaternion of dialogues, Cornarius has not distinguished between the readings of this MS. and his own conjectures, of which, as Fischer says (in an Epistle prefixed to his edition of the *Eclogæ*, Lips. 1771), '*magnam attulit multitudinem.*' The formula '*legendum est*' appears to serve equally for both. In his remarks on the *Theætetus* he only once names the MS., and then to differ from it: and in this case (*ἰπποπλαθῶν* p. 147) the '*Codex Hassenstenius*' is in agreement with the twenty MSS. which have been collated since.

The claim of any single reading of Cornarius to MS. authority, unless supported by other evidence, must be allowed to be very slight indeed. And nothing is known of the value of the MS. in question, beyond what may be gathered from the fact that it was probably bought, towards the middle of the 16th century, for the sum (according to Fischer) of 2000 ducats.

2. Of MS. readings, that of the '*Codex Clarkianus*' in the Bodleian Library has, with rare exceptions, been preferred. The value of this MS., which no editor except C. F. Hermann has yet sufficiently appreciated, is evident from the following facts. '*It was written,*' (so the last page informs us) '*by the*



hand of John,' (well-named) 'Calligraphus, for Arethas the Deacon, of Patræ,' in the year 896. It was brought from Patmos by Dr. Clarke the traveller, from whom it was bought for the Bodleian Library. Thus it is not only considerably superior in known antiquity to any other MS. containing the *Thætetus*, but has probably been preserved from adverse influences to which others may have been exposed. The two MSS., Vat. Δ. and Ven. II. (the latter of the 12th century) are very closely related to the Bodleian (though apparently not copied from it), agreeing as they do with it in its peculiar mistakes, and in the lacuna from p. 208, *πάν μὲν οὖν*, to p. 210, *δοξάσκειν*, inclusive. The errors of the Bodleian MS. (which probably did not originate with John Calligraphus) are of a very simple kind, consisting chiefly either of the repetition of a syllable or initial consonant by a sort of memory of the eye, or the substitution of a word apparently from conjecture, or the introduction of a gloss into the text. Here and there a word is dropped or misplaced (though this is less common than in other MSS.) or the accentuation is at fault, or *ο* and *ω*, *ε* and *η*, *ι* and *ει* are confounded. In one or two instances a marginal reading in the ancient hand seems to indicate that the scribe had several texts amongst which to choose.

The notes contain a few readings of this MS. not mentioned by Gaisford. These are due to a collation made in the year 1856, and have since been verified with the kind assistance of some

friends. Where the readings of all the MSS. appeared corrupt, that of the Bodleian MS. has been printed between obeli, ††.

For a full account of the various readings, the student is referred to the notes of Bekker and Stallbaum, and to Gaisford's *Lectiones Platonice*.

The present editor is under obligations to Heindorf, Stallbaum, Ast, Deycks, Socher, Zeller, Munk, Lassalle, and other scholars and writers, of whose labours he would have availed himself more largely had circumstances permitted. He has not been contented, however, until the data acquired seemed enough to justify him in forming his own opinion on each point.

For valuable information concerning the MSS. of Plato, he begs to express his acknowledgments to the Rev. H. O. Coxe, Bodley's Librarian, Oxford. His thanks are also due to the Rev. Dr. Badham, for having pointed out several difficulties in the text.

## INTRODUCTION.

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GREEK philosophy had passed through several phases before Plato wrote. The reflective and creative impulse, which had long striven with forms of the imagination, experiences of history, and impressions of Nature, and to which Socrates had added the energy of moral life, found its crowning form and development in his mind; while different tendencies of thought, which had till then seemed independent of each other, became woven by him into a kind of unity. This is not, however, the unity of a plan, foreseen by the author himself: or of a system, into which earlier ideas are moulded; nor even such perfect unity of treatment as would result if previous conceptions were seen and handled from an unaltering point of view: it is rather the common impress given by a growing mind to the various surrounding aspects of inquiry which it has made its own. The philosophy of Plato is one long dialogue, in which Socrates (its moving centre) becomes the pupil of each school, and teaches where he seems to learn. Protagorean scepticism, Eleatic transcendentalism, the mysticism of the Pythagoreans, the rhetoric of Lysias, are alike penetrated and weighed by the same searching spirit, which enters every labyrinth without losing itself in any.

In the *Theætetus* some earlier and some contemporary theories are made to converge upon the question, What is Knowledge? The method followed in it, and some of the leading thoughts, are akin to the earlier Megarian philosophy; while in itself the dialogue may be considered as a gradual advance from the consciousness of particular and relative impressions towards the contemplation of the universal and absolute Idea. This progress here takes the subjective form of an attempt to define knowledge; and in the course of it sensation and opinion are analysed, and shewn to be wholly indeterminate.

The antithesis between sense and knowledge, opinion and certainty, appearance and truth, the relative and the absolute,

has never ceased to exercise the human mind since the dawn of reflection. To Plato, and still more to those who preceded him, the antithesis and the problem which it involves were new. The mind of an educated Athenian in the time of Socrates was subtle, imaginative, comprehensive, in all practical and artistic matters fully awake, curious and ready for inquiry, but little familiar with the study of abstract ideas. The youth, who in this dialogue is presented to us as an embodiment of the philosophic nature, childishly attempts to define knowledge by an enumeration of the arts and sciences. Yet he proves capable of following the most sustained philosophical argument. So from crude beginnings the Greek mind was led onwards to discover for itself, by the light of its own young but noble intelligence, thoughts which its experience had not anticipated.

The endeavour to trace the origin of these thoughts, which have been so fruitful since, resembles the investigation of the sources of mythology. As the Homeric poems present a cycle of mythological ideas, the analysis of which, by the help of known analogies, reveals the dim features of an earlier and simpler cycle, so in the writings of Plato there are left many traces of earlier philosophies, by comparing which with their genuine extant fragments, and with the testimonies of later writers, some light is thrown, perhaps on those earlier philosophies themselves, certainly on the intellectual atmosphere in which Plato lived. The same inquiry brings out and illustrates his position in regard to contemporary opinion.

In the following Essay it is proposed in the first place to view some of these historical elements in connexion with the *Theætetus*, and to examine what indications this dialogue itself affords of its relation to them.

The answer to this question will be found useful in considering further, (1) the general scope and purpose of the dialogue, (2) its genuineness (if necessary), (3) its position amongst the other dialogues of Plato, (4) its supposed occasion, and the date of its composition; (5) its relation to Aristotle, and (6) to philosophy in general.

#### § 1. Contemporary opinions.

Although the chief names mentioned in the *Theætetus* are older than Socrates, and "the problem has come down to us

from ancient times," a careful reader is soon led to suspect that the dialogue contains allusions to living men. The 'disciples' of Protagoras, and the 'friends' of Heraclitus, evidently play an important part in it: whilst there are others, the 'hard, repellent,' 'illiterate' persons, who are expressly forbidden to have any share in the discussion. These and the like touches, which may be paralleled from other dialogues, naturally provoke inquiry.

Before entering upon this, it may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato's manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of 'a certain theory,' or of 'certain men.' We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippus, or of Euclides and his band (*οἱ ἀμφὶ Εὐκλείδην*), but 'I have met many such men,' 'there are numbers who keep saying this,' or more familiarly, 'there are certain refined persons, to whom we must shew courtesy.' Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philosopher, who 'knows nothing of his neighbour.' But it is also reasonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. The above remark does not apply to schools already formed, nor to persons contemporary with Socrates himself.—It is from later writers and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age. The chief amongst them in relation to the present subject were three friends or at least companions of Socrates,—Euclides, Aristippus, and Antisthenes.

I. Euclides of Megara, Plato's contemporary and fellow-disciple, seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Eleatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical definitions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His *ἐπιστημὴ* must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar *ἀντιλογισμὴ* so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject in a less degree to the same defects. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premises of an opponent.—One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to

definition by comparison, because if things are unlike, they should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with the thing itself than its resemblances<sup>a</sup>.

The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intelligence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence. Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wisdom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is opposite to, or other than the Good.

His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so far at least as they entered into human language.

It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a tendency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a new element into the Megarian school. At all events he gave a new and not altogether wholesome impulse to its paradoxical side.

The following are the chief points in which the Theætetus affords indications of its connexion with the school of Megara.

1. Its controversial tone.

Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing, but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves in danger of being on a par with "those skilful men."<sup>b</sup> Protagoras is imagined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming it by the reflection, which is dwelt upon also in the Phædo, that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are more-

<sup>a</sup> Cf. Plat. Rep. p. 476: τὸ ἀειρόμενον ἄρα οὐ τὸδε ἐστίν, ἴδεν' ἐν ὅτῃ τις ἴδεν τε θρηνηγότες τὸ δμοῖόν τῃ μὴ δμοῖον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ ἡγήται εἶναι ὃ ὁμοῖον. Ar.

Eth. N. VI. 3 ἀκριβολεγεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ ἀναλυσθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησι.

<sup>b</sup> Theæt. p. 164.



over oppressed throughout the discussion with the fear of an imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons. And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we are compelled to answer 'a negative dialectic.' The first impression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon; which in another aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the man-midwife Socrates. In this sense the *Theætetus* may fairly be regarded as an "eristic" or Megarian dialogue; since, although it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of *μαίευτις*.

And the form of refutation used corresponds to that which is described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and annihilated. Man is not the measure, for if so, then why not every other creature endowed with sense? Motion cannot be the sole principle, for if so, language would be impossible. Protagoras is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines him challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining that they use only negative proof.

2. Besides this correspondence of method, there are also some coincidences of idea.

a. The turning point of the whole dialogue, the fulcrum, by means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of sense, is the mention of the good, expedient, just and honourable, which *Theætetus* had at first unwarily included amongst the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because it regards the future.

This thought is also the occasion of the eloquent digression, in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (*μετὰ φρονήσεως*) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcen-

dent, as in the Republic<sup>c</sup>, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name, (*ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ὠφέλιμον, δίκαιον, δσιον, φρόνησις.*)

β. In its general aspect the Theætetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards absolute being, terminating with the conception of *λόγος* as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (*πρὶν ἢ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων — διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον — κατάρθεται*) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge.

This intermediate character of the Theætetus is indicated by Plato's own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. This position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (*λόγος*). It may be added, that the two conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguishing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophista, but more or less embodied in the Theætetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity.

γ. It will appear in the sequel, that the difficulty about false opinion, which fills such an important place in the inquiry, and the distinction between the *ἐπιστηρά* and *ἄλογα* (p. 201), which occasions the last answer of Theætetus, can be referred with greater probability to the Megarians than to Antisthenes.

3. In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides.

The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it<sup>d</sup>, may be compared with the *ἐγκεκαλυμμένος* of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself,

<sup>c</sup> p. 509. οὐκ οὐσίας ὅτιος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἐπὶ κείνῃ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρᾶ-

σβαίῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἐπερίχορτος.  
<sup>d</sup> p. 165.

*τὸ ἔρεπον ἔρεπον εἶναι*<sup>a</sup>, we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, *ἔρεπον ἔρεπον μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι*. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, 'to part everything from everything,' *τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀνοχμεῖν*. A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three *φάσματα*<sup>f</sup> or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound; or in the repeated difficulty, 'Ἀρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῶν τὸν εἰδότες μὴ εἰδέναι, which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes.

The story that Plato and the other philosophers took refuge with Euclides at Megara, although hardly sufficient ground to build upon, is interesting as illustrating the friendship which clearly existed between Plato and Euclides.

If we add to these coincidences the fact that Plato represents this dialogue as having been preserved by Euclides, and asked for by Terpsion, (the Megarians who were present at the death of Socrates,) and that it is read in the house of the former, we have enumerated the chief points at which the dialogue seems to touch upon Megara.

Perhaps there is no more satisfactory account to be given of variations and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind.

This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding converse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading whole dialogues. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokesman may still be Plato's, although they seem pervaded by an almost pedantic consciousness of method not found in others: a similar remark applies to the *Parmenides*: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is perceivable; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things

<sup>a</sup> p. 190<sup>f</sup> p. 155.

to all philosophies: (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato's, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises: (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative 'elenchus,' was reflected in Euclides of Megara.

11. We scarcely need the testimony of later writers to the fact that Euclides and Aristippus were opposed. It is sufficiently obvious from the statements of their doctrine which remain. They were natural enemies on the metaphysical side, as the Cyrenaic and Cynic were on the ethical. Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the *Phædo* it is emphatically remarked that he was not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the *Republic* [p. 509. *οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὐ γε ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ*], it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries. The tone of Xenophon's representation conveys a similar impression. Attending like Socrates to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled by the impulse of Socratic inquiry to give a philosophical form to the popular doctrine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories: adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea.

Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the *Theætetus* to the hypothesis, Sense is Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the 'disciples of Protagoras,' if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A comparison of the following extracts tends to establish this: although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be

supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers:

Diog. L. II. 86. *Αὐτὸ πάθος ὑφίσταται, πόσον καὶ ἥδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἥδονήν, τὴν δὲ πόσον τραχείαν κίνησιν.*

Aristocles. ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. XIV. 18. *Τρεῖς γὰρ εἴδη καταστάσεις εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρασιν· μίαν μὲν καθ' ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, ἐκείνην τῇ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι, ἑτέραν δὲ, καθ' ἣν ἡδέμεθα, τῇ λείᾳ κίματι ἀφομοιοῦμενοι· εἶναι γὰρ λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἥδονήν, οὐρίᾳ παραβαλλομένην ἀνίμῳ· τὴν δὲ τρίτην μίσησιν εἶναι κατὰστασιν καθ' ἣν οὐτε ἀλγοῦμεν οὐτε ἡδέμεθα, γαλήνῃ παρσπλησίᾳ ὁδῶσα.*

Sext. Emp. adv. Math. VII. 191. *Θαυὼν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναῖοι κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθος καὶ μόνα καταλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάφενστα τυγχάνειν, τῶν δὲ πεπονημένων τὰ πάθος μηδὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάφενστον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκανόμεθα, φασί, καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατόν λέγειν ἀδιαφεινότες καὶ ἀνεξιλέγητες· ὅτι δὲ τὸ ἐμπειρητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκὸν ἴστω ἢ γλυκὺ ἴστω, οὐχ ὅσον τ' ἀποφαίνεσθαι.*

192. *καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοπευθεὶς καὶ ἱκεριῶν ὤχρατικὸς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμίων ἐνυθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπνέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ θνῶν κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ μμηνὸς*

Plat. Theæt. p. 152. *ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κρέσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλα γίγνεται πάντα.* p. 153. *Ἔτι οὖν σοὶ λέγω πηνυμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ θυα τοιαῦτα ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουνσι καὶ ἀπαλλύσσι, τὰ δ' ἑτέρα σώζει.*

See also Phileb. p. 42. *μὴ αἰνουμένου τοῦ σώματος ἐφ' ἑκτέρου—οὐτ' ἂν ἥδονὴ γίγνοιτ' ἂν οὐτ' ἂν τις λύπη.*

Plato Theæt. p. 152. *Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ ἴσται καὶ ἀφενδεί, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὐσα.* 157. *τὸ ποιῶν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αἰ [τῶν] ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως.—ἴαν τί τις στήσῃ τῇ λόγῳ, εὐέλγυκτος δ' τοῦτο ποιῶν.* 154. *ὁ δὲ καλὸς χρῶμα λευκὸν κ.τ.λ.* 156. *λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη.* 159. *Ὅταν δὴ ὁλον πίωσι ἡγαίνων κ.τ.λ.* 167. *οὐτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν δοξάσαι οὐτε ἄλλα παρ' ὃ ἂν πάσχω· ταῦτα δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ.* 178. *ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα εἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἶται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα.*

p. 157. *λείπεται δὲ ἔνθυσις τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μακίας, ὅσα τε παρακοῦεν ἢ παρορᾷ ἢ τι ἄλλο παρασθένεσθαι λέγεται.* 158. *δοκεῖ—πολλοὺ διὲ τὰ φανό-*

§ This argument is met by Aristotle, when he is discussing the theories

of Heraclitus and Protagoras, Met. K. 6. 1063 a: *οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτ'*

δισσὰς ὁρᾷ τὰς θήβας καὶ δισσοὺν φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὴ εἶναι τόδε τι πάσχουσαν, ὡς ἀχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθθαίνονται ἢ διόζονται, ἀληθείς, τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὥχρὸν ἐστὶ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτοῦς ἢ ἐνερτυθῆς ἢ διηλοῦν φεῦδος εἶναι κινώμενται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλῆν τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. 195. ἔστιν οὐδὲ κρηττόν φασιν εἶναι κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὁνόματα δὲ κοινὰ τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασι. 196. λευκὸν μὲν γὰρ τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δὲ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν· ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἰδίου πάθους ἀνταλαμβάνεται.

Diog. L. II. 87. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδοκίαν ἡδονήν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἤρεσκεν Ἐπικουρῶν, ἐκλίεσθαι γὰρ τῇ χροῖνι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα.

Diog. L. II. 88. μηδὲν τε εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροῦν, ἀλλὰ νόμος καὶ ἔθος.

μὴν ἑκάστην ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πῶς τοῦτοῦτον οὐδὲν ἂν φαίνεται εἶναι. 156. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισμάτων, ὅτι δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἀνθρώπων τε τίθεται καὶ λένον καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον ἕκαστον τε καὶ εἶδος. 154. τί δέ; ἀλλὰ ἀνθρώπων ἄρ' ὁμοίον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὐν;

Theæt. p. 166. αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκίμῃ τινὶ σοὶ συγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρ-εῖναι τῇ ἂν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὕτω πάθος, ὡς ἐπεὶ πάσχει, μηκέτι πάσχει; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ.

Theæt. 172. καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχροὰ καὶ δίκαια κ.τ.λ.

The apparent force of the above parallel must be slightly qualified by two observations. 1. Very similar language about the senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. 2. In the early part of the *Theætetus*, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the Cyrenaic theory, and in the Philebus, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, "like the sea in a calm."

But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that Aristippus and those

ἄξιόν ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ἐνὸς τὴν ἑξῆς ἐποβάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιῶσιν ἐκ τοῦ ἰνδὸς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο γ' εἶναι.

ἀλλὰ τὸ φαίνεσθαι τοιοῦτον καὶ πάλιν ἐν. τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινούσι τὴν ἑξῆς ἂν φαίνεται τὸ ἐν.



who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the Philebus affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy Theætetus should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy Philebus should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather Socrates for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspiration from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion.

There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these Pseudo-Socratics in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether Aristippus was really, or only by implication, a 'disciple of Protagoras,' and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the Heraclitean theory of the Universe, are questions which it is perhaps wisest to leave undecided.

III. More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euclides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good-humoured pleasantry. But he boasted justly enough of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen, probably genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous intercourse with Gorgias.

There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (*φρόνησις*) is the chief good, and so on.

But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical: approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian subtleties, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part practical, part logical nominalism. "I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see."—"There is only one term applicable to one thing<sup>b</sup>." Hence controversy is impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition is only a complex term<sup>c</sup>, and accordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the imperfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of Education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy as much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras: denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative, or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things.

1. It has been thought that the *ἤγερεις* of the Sophista (p. 246 sqq.), who are manifestly identical with the 'hard and repellent' persons shut out from discussion in the *Thesetetus*, are meant to include Antisthenes as their chief. More than one critic has even fancied that an allusion to his name lurked in the epithet *ἀντιτύπους*. But (1) the abnegation of physical studies by the Cynics is inconsistent with this. The picture drawn in the Sophista especially contains several features (amongst which we may notice the repeated mention of *body* as

<sup>b</sup> See Isocrates 'Ἐλένης *ἐγκώμιον* ad init. *παροργισμένοι οἱ μὴ οὐ φέροντες οὐδὲν ἴσθαι φευδῆ λέγειν, οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγειν, οὐδὲ δύο λόγους περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντιτιθεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξίδοντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταυτὸν ἔσται, καὶ φύσει μὴ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχουμεν μίαν δ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀπάντων ἐστίν.*

Socrates seems to be alluded to in the latter part of this. In the former part Protagoras and Antisthenes seem to be opposed.

<sup>c</sup> μακρὸς λόγος. In which there is probably the same derisive force as in *Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος, ὅταν μὴδὲν ἔργος λέγωσιν.* Ar. Met. N. 3.

something to be *touched* and *handled*, and the conception of *δύραμις* to which Plato drives them) which seem to indicate rather a physical than a logical materialism. The question thus raised will be discussed presently. (2) It is a fair inference from the tone of the passage in the *Theætetus*, that the 'disciples of Protagoras' would affect contempt and abhorrence of the 'uninitiated' persons in question. At all events there is a marked opposition drawn between the refined sensationalism of the one and the hard materialism of the other. But frequently (as in the *Euthydemus*) the saying of Antisthenes, *οὐκ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν*, is represented as hardly distinguishable from the theory of Protagoras.

The hypothesis, therefore, at least of an exclusive allusion to Antisthenes here, is not altogether satisfactory<sup>k</sup>.

2. When the disciples of Protagoras and the Heracliteans are reduced to absurdity by the negative dialectic of the Megarian Socrates, the position to which they are driven is very much that of Antisthenes, that argument is absurd, and no assertion can be considered false. (pp. 161. 183.)

3. This difficulty emerges afterwards in a more formidable shape in the question, Is false opinion possible? The statement that it is impossible to speak falsely, which Aristotle attributes to Antisthenes, by inference from his saying that controversy was absurd, appears to have been very commonly put forward (*Cratyl.* 429). The deeper inquiry, whether it is possible to think falsely, is seriously raised by Plato as a necessary step towards the true conception of Knowledge. It is shown to be impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood in opinion without the measure afforded by a higher light, viz. Knowledge of true ideas. The difficulty thus raised was certainly felt by others than Antisthenes, and probably by the Megarians, who perhaps disposed of it, as Plato does, to the disadvantage of Opinion in comparison with Knowledge. The arguments and images by which the discussion is conducted are certainly not borrowed from Antisthenes, and are probably Plato's own. The only argument that forcibly recalls what we know of Antisthenes

<sup>k</sup> For a different view, see a paper by Professor Thomson of Cambridge on the genuineness of the *Sophists*

of Plato. — Cambridge Philosophical Transactions, Vol. X. Part I.

is that which proves that right opinion is not knowledge.

## Compare

Antisthen. Aj. ad init. : Ἐβουλόμην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῶν διαΐξαι οἷον καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρήσαν οἶδα γὰρ θεὶ ἐμὶ μὲν ἴδαι σιωπῶν, τοῦτο δ' ἂν οὐδὲν ἢ πλεον λέγοντι· νῦν δὲ οἱ μὲν παραγενόμενοι αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις ἀπεισιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ οὐδὲν εἰδότες διαΐξετε. καίτοι ποῖα τις ἂν δίσκῃ διακρινῶν μὴ εἰδότες γίνονται, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πρῶγμα ἐγίνετο ἔργῳ.

## With

Theæt. p. 201 : ἢ σὺ οἶσι θενοῦς τινος οὕτω διδασκάλου εἶναι ὥστε οἷς μὴ παραγίνοτό τινας ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τοῖσι δὲ δυνατόν πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γινομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν; — Οὐκοῦν ὅταν πεισθῶσι διακρινῶν περὶ ἂν ἰδόντι μόνον ἴστω εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἀκοῇ κρινόντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἂντι ἐπιστήμης ἔκωκαν; —

And here, even if the argument was suggested by Antisthenes, (though it may have originated with Socrates), the application is certainly Plato's.

4. It has been commonly supposed of late that the passage which follows the above (p. 201), in which it is said that knowledge is true opinion with definition (μετὰ λόγου), and that the elements of things are known only in their combinations, contains a direct allusion to Antisthenes. The passage of Aristotle, which is quoted in support of this, is certainly a very apposite illustration of Plato's meaning.

Metaph. II. 3. 1043. b. "On inquiry then it does not appear that the complex (ἡ συλλαβή) consists of the elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων) and their combination, nor is a house merely a combination of bricks. And this is right; for combination and mixture do not result from the things combined and mixed. And the like holds in the case of other processes; e. g. if the threshold is so by position, the position does not result from it, but rather it from the position. Accordingly, man does not consist of animal and biped, but, seeing these are the material part, there is required something over and above them; and that neither an element, nor resulting from elements, but the essential part (ἡ οὐσία), leaving which out of view, they (Democritus and other physicists, see c. 2.) comprise in their definition the material only. Now seeing that this (the essential part) is that which gives being and substance, this must be

meant by those who speak of absolute substance. Now this must be either eternal, or perishable without perishing, and created without creation. But it has been proved and expounded elsewhere, that the Form is not made nor generated by any, but the concrete thing is made, and that which is generated results from particular elements, (*γίνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων.*) Now whether the essential part in things perishable has a separate existence, is not clear as yet, except that it cannot be so in some cases, in which there is no universal, as in a house or an implement. Perhaps indeed we should not even give the name of substances to these, nor to any other (of things perishable) that is not constituted by Nature: for in things perishable Nature alone can be conceived of as the essential part. And hence the doubt raised by the followers of Antisthenes and other narrow minds (*ἀπαθύντοι*) (that the nature of a thing cannot be defined, for definition is a roundabout expression (*μακρὸς λόγος*), but it is possible to indicate by definition what a thing is like, e. g. Silver may be defined not in its own nature, but as being like tin)—is not wholly irrelevant, but may be applied so far as this: That of one kind of substance, viz. that which is composite, (i. e. of matter and form), whether sensible or intelligible, definition is possible: but not of its prime constituent parts: since definition is a species of predication, and this requires the presence both of matter and form."

The paradox referred to is attributed, not to Antisthenes, but to his followers, who may have extended or modified his opinion. How much is attributed to them? This will be best seen by examining the context. Aristotle is speaking of sensible substance (*αἰσθητὴ οὐσία*), which he has shown to be threefold, viz. matter (*ὕλη*), form (*εἶδος*), and their combination (*σύνθετος οὐσία*). Having determined this, he proceeds in his usual manner to the solution of difficulties. It is clear, for instance, how to settle the question whether the complex whole (*ἡ συλλαβή*) is the same with its elements (*τῶν στοιχείων*) or different from them. The elements are only the material part, and no agglomeration of them can create the form. It is this which makes them one. It is clear also, how much ground there is for the difficulty raised by some narrow minds, that real definition is impossible, because definition is only a rignma-role expression for the name. (Aristotle seems to be reminded



of this by the mention of certain things which are not really substances.) As Definition implies prædication, every thing, whether sensible or intelligible, may be defined, in which there is matter and form. But mere matter (e. g. the στοιχεῖα mentioned above) and simple form (e. g. καμπυλότης, cf. Met. Z. 12. 1037 b. 1.)<sup>1</sup> cannot be defined.—Few will doubt that the last sentence, which argues from the nature of predication and from matter and form, contains Aristotle's own opinion. If so, it means that whereas the followers of Antisthenes, improving upon their master's saying, that nothing could be expressed but in one way, said that nothing could be defined, or rather that all definitions were merely nominal, Aristotle thinks that most things can be defined, but some cannot, namely, elements and the most abstract forms. That the Antistheneans are not quoted throughout is evident from the word ἀναβιβροῖ. Aristotle would not have applied this epithet to persons who agreed with him.

To return to the passage of the Theætetus: It may be fairly argued, that several points in it are against a direct or exclusive allusion to Antisthenes. Is the invocation or use of the term ἐπιστηρός consistent with his blunt scepticism? And if it were, which according to him would be more known, that which is named, or that which is defined?—Whatever faults Antisthenes had as a philosopher, mysticism or obscurity was not one of them. Would Plato, then, have spoken of any of his fellow-pupil's tenets as having been heard by Socrates "in a dream?" Then, even supposing that the logical assertions are his, must not a different origin be sought for the physical conception of the elements, of which we and other things are composed? Lastly, Antisthenes' notion of λόγος was probably a very simple one, corresponding to the first of the three meanings proposed to Theætetus, the expression of thought in language. He rather opposed it to reality, (see the passage quoted above, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγον, τὸ δὲ πᾶνμα ἐγίνετο ἔργον,) than identified it with knowledge. All that remains therefore in common between this passage and what we know of Antisthenes is the assertion, that that which is represented by a

<sup>1</sup> This appears to be the meaning of εἰ δὲ αὐτὴν ὑπερέω.

= This argument also excludes De-

mocritus, with whom the ἄνθρωποι were certainly more real (ἰδέσθαι) than their combinations.



name cannot be defined. Now it is manifest that this might be held by persons who inferred from it that names do not convey knowledge, as well as by one who thought that the only knowledge was of names, and that definitions were superfluous.

The further discussion of this passage may be reserved as for the present irrelevant.

δ. One or two places may be referred to, in which a covert allusion to Antisthenes has been, or may be, supposed.

α. The allusion supposed to lie hid in the epithet *ἀντιστρέφους* (p. 156) does not seem to be quite in Plato's manner, even if it were consistent with the language held in the *Sophist*. Contrast the playfulness of *Rep.* 614. *οὐ μέντοι—'Αλκίον γε ἀπὸ λόγον ἐρῶ, ἀλλ' ἀλκίμον μὲν ἀνδρός*—. It might be said with about equal plausibility that the name *Ἀριστείδης* (p. 150.) contained an allusion to Aristippus.

β. *Ἡρακλῆς*, p. 169. Hercules was certainly a favorite hero with Antisthenes, who may be said to have resembled him as one of the physical force logicians—*οἱ τὴν βίαν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ζητοῦντες* (*Ar. Met.* 1. 1011 a.)—Still he was not singular in his choice (compare Prodicus), and probably the annotation of the Scholiast is not far from the truth of Plato's meaning. [*Ἡρακλῆς τε καὶ Θησέας*] *οἱ Θρασύμαχοι, Καλλικλείς, Διονυσόδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι, καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι*. That some allusion is intended appears probable if we compare the spirit of *Euthyd.* 297. *πολὺ γὰρ πού τιμι φαυλότερος τοῦ Ἡρακλέους, ὃς οὐχ οἶδ' ὅτι ἐν τῇ τε ὕβρι διαμάχεται, σοφιστρίᾳ ὄντη—καὶ κακίῃ τινὶ ἐτέρῃ σοφιστῇ, ἐκ θαλάσσης ἀφικμένῃ, νεωστὶ μοι δοκεῖν, καταπεπλευκέντι*.

γ. *Θράττα τις—ἀποσκῶψαι* λέγεται, p. 174. This has been thought to be pointed at Antisthenes, whose mother is said to have been a Thracian slave. The grounds for this conjecture are slight, and the epithets *ἐμμελής καὶ χαλρῆσσα* (more appropriate to the rhetorician than the Cynic) must be allowed to detract from its merit.

δ. One other guess may perhaps be allowed to stand on a par with the two last mentioned. Antisthenes wrote a diatribe called *Ἀρχέλαος, ἡ περὶ βασιλείας*, in which he attacked Gorgias. In the *Gorgias* of Plato, Archelaus the Macedonian usurper is called happy by Polus. Is it possible that in the passage *Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων κ. τ. λ.* p. 175, Plato ridicules the combatants on both sides of such an argument?

The following slight parallels may also be mentioned:

Antisthenes, like Protagoras, is said to have written an *'Αλήθεια*. Perhaps this may be alluded to in the Cratylus, p. 391: *Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν τοῦ Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῶν ὥς του ἀξία.*

As Theodorus calls dialectic *ψῖλοι λόγοι* (p. 164), Antisthenes called the Ideas of Plato *ψῖλαι ἔννοιαι*, 'bare notions.'

The words *ἴππου δὲν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτόμεθα* (p. 195) recall Antisthenes' *ἴππου μὲν ὁρῶ, ἱππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ*, and Plato's retort, 'You see with your eyes but not with your mind.' Lastly, when Theætetus tries to define *σ*, by saying, 'It is *as* if you hissed with your tongue,' we are reminded of the Antisthenean saying quoted by Aristotle, 'You cannot define what silver is: you can only say it is like tin.'

Unless Antisthenes is wronged by Xenophon and Aristotle, the traces of his mind are to be sought rather in the Euthydemus than in the Theætetus, Sophista, or Philebus. It deserves to be said however, that some of the names in the list of his works given by Diogenes Laertius are difficult to reconcile with the general account of him. These are *φυσιογνωμονικός, περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης* and *ἐρώτημα περὶ φύσεως*. But the name of a work gives little insight into its real import, and Diogenes is far from being always trustworthy<sup>n</sup>.

Heracliteans.

IV. Beyond the circle of those who had heard Socrates, the most interesting of Plato's contemporaries in connexion with the Theætetus are the enthusiasts of Ephesus, with whom the exact soul of Theodorus is vexed, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus. They are ridiculed with less than Plato's usual reserve, as a congeries of self-taught heads, who support their master's principle of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. This picture, the Oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the Cratylus (part of which is written in facetious imitation of the same school) where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol fire. By one it is interpreted to mean *the Sun*, by another *the principle of heat*, by another *mind*.

<sup>n</sup> An indication of the nature of these works may be sought in Cic. Tusc. I. c. 13. § 32. 'Atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro, qui physicus in-

scribitur, populares deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens, tollit vim et naturam Deorum.'

Although Heraclitus is mentioned early in the dialogue, these professed followers of his are not adverted to, until the principle of motion is being separately discussed, after the maxim of Protagoras has been dismissed. The arguments by which the same principle is upheld in the opening are almost expressly attributed to the "disciples of Protagoras" and are probably more in keeping with the refined scepticism of Cyrene than with the dark proverbs of Ephesus.

If Plato ever really followed Cratylus, as Aristotle implies (*Met.* I. 6. *Κρατύλῳ συγγενόμενος καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλείτειαις δόξαις*), these passages acquire something of a personal interest, like those sonnets of Shakspeare that touch on theatrical life.

V. The *Theætetus* presents few traces of Pythagoreanism. <sup>Pythago-  
reans.</sup> The only place in which this side of Plato's teaching clearly shows itself is the mention of the region pure from evils, which is to receive the wise and righteous soul at its departure (p. 177). But a re-examination of the passage about the elements just now considered, (*Theæt.* p. 201.) may perhaps justify the conjecture that the person from whom Socrates heard the opinion quoted, 'as in a dream,' may have been some 'Italian or Sikelian man.' This is suggested by the following fragment of Philolaus:

"As concerning Nature and Harmony, the absolute being of things is eternal, and to know nature in its essence belongs to Gods and not to men, except so far as this. Nothing that is and that is known could have been known by us, did not Nature enter into the things, both determining and determined, of which the order of the universe is composed. And seeing that these elements were not similar nor of one kind, they could not even themselves have been reduced to order, had not Harmony arisen between them, howsoever it arose."

That is, The Absolute is not the object of knowledge, but things are known only so far as they partake of it. Without harmony, which is the participation of the absolute, the contrary elements of the universe could not even be combined.

Compare *Aristot. Met.* A. 5. 'Εοικᾶσι δ' ὡς ἐν ὕλης εἶδει τὰ στοιχεῖα τάττειν' ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ὡς ἐννηπαρχόντων συνιστάναι καὶ πεπλάσθαι φασὶ τὴν οὐσίαν. Δ. 7. Ὅσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπενύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἀριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰτία μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ

ὁρθῶς οἶονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτερῶν ἐστὶ προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον.

See also Plato *Philebus* p. 18. Καθορῶν δὲ (ὁ Θεὸς) ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ διενυ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τούτων τὸν θεσμόν αὐ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν πως ποιῶντα μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθίγγατο προσειπών. And compare *Phæd.* 92.

The presumption raised by the comparison of these passages may be strengthened by some further considerations.

In the *Theætetus* the relation of the elements to the whole is illustrated from number and music<sup>o</sup>, as well as from grammar. And in the passage of Aristotle already quoted (*Met. H. 3.*), immediately after the conclusion that the elementary parts of substance cannot be defined, it is added, "And clearly, if substances are numbers, they are so in this way (as combined of matter and form), and not, as some say, of units."

The words λόγος, ἄλογος, ῥητός, in connection with the relation of parts to a whole, are not inconsistent with Pythagorean usage. The word συλλαβή is used by Philolaus, though in a narrower and technical sense.

The union of these examples and expressions with the cosmical turn of thought, has a Pythagorean air. It may be added, that in two other passages where Socrates speaks from hearsay (*Phæd.* 62.), or repeats what he has heard long ago, perhaps in a dream (*Phil.* 20.), the Pythagoreans are probably referred to.

But on the other hand, the logical phraseology, the mention of prædication, the distinction between the name and the proposition, and between αἰσθητά, δοξαστά, and γνωστά, together with the term ἐπιστητός, argue a different origin.

That origin is possibly Megarian<sup>p</sup>. The Megarians, like the Eleatics, waged war against sensations and impressions, and relied solely upon reason (λόγος). It is quite conceivable that the term ἐπιστητός may have been coined by them, in common possibly with αἰσθητής, δοξαστής and ποιότης. In the *Sophist* it is said of the 'friends of ideas,' that they break down the 'bodily

<sup>o</sup> Pp. 204, 206.

<sup>p</sup> This was Schleiermacher's opinion. (*Not. ad. Theæt.* p. 520.) The objection of Deycks, that every fol-

lower of Socrates must have drawn a sharp line between opinion and knowledge, proves too much for those who seek here a reference to Antisthenes.

substance' of their opponents into little bits, and refuse to acknowledge it as 'being.' The extreme analytical tendency animadverted on in the same dialogue (τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποχωρῆσειν) may also be detected in the words οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκεῖνο—προσοιστέον—ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφύρεσθαι, ἕτερα δὲ τα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται (Theæt. 202.) The distinction between *δνομα* and *λόγος* is not unlike Euclides; and it is worthy of a Socratic philosopher to have made capability of definition the test of the object of knowledge. Nor is it inconsistent with the general spirit of his philosophy, to have reduced 'simple ideas' to nothingness, and yet to have attached reality to 'complex' ones. It agrees with his tendency to hold unity and diversity in solution together: *ἐν, πολλοῖς δνόμασι καλούμενον*.

It is true that no doctrine of elements remains amongst the fragments of Euclides, any more than a doctrine of *εἰδη*, which still is probably alluded to in the Sophist. Diodorus Cronus, however, a later Megarian (B. C. 300), argues from the conception of indivisible particles or monads.

But there are two points which it is difficult to reconcile with an exclusive reference to Megara; the cosmical expression, *ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα, καὶ τᾶλλα*; and the distant way in which the allusion is made. Would Plato have spoken of hearing anything from his familiar friends 'as in a dream?' Contrast with this Soph. 248: *Τάχ' οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αὐτῶν τὴν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀπόκρισιν σὺ μὲν οὐ κατακούεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἴσως διὰ συνήθειαν*.

These data lead to the conjecture that here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, Plato has fused together two theories, which from different starting-points appeared to him to meet in one. The more prominent is that of Euclides, which gives the key-note to the remaining argument, that knowledge is right opinion with definition (*λόγος*). According to this, nothing is the object of knowledge (*ἐπιστητόν*) but that which is expressed in a proposition. That which corresponds to a name, is the object, not of knowledge, but of sensation. From the position where the simple sensation was regarded as the only knowledge we have gradually come round to this<sup>9</sup>. And as the hypothesis, Sense is knowledge, was supported by the

<sup>9</sup> See Theæt. p. 186: *Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ δυνάμεως συλλογισμῷ*



theory of change, so this, that definition (*λόγος*) is essential to knowledge, is strengthened by the Pythagorean theory of harmony. The sensible things, which can be named but not represented by a proposition, are regarded as elements, which cannot be known except as they are combined in nature. But this is merely a conjecture. There is still the alternative of falling back upon our ignorance of the time, and saying with truth, that amongst the many shades of opinion on these subjects which existed, a nearer parallel might have been discovered, if more had been preserved. And this impression is rather strengthened by the perusal of the fragments of the old Academy.—Cf. Arist. Met. Δ. 7, quoted above.

VI. Who are the 'impenetrable nay the repellent' men, with whom the 'disciples of Protagoras' will not deign to argue, as ignorant of their Heraclitean mysteries, and utterly illiterate? Who believe only in the existence of what they can clutch between their hands, and refuse to attribute Being to any action or natural process, in short to anything unseen? (p. 155.) They are more fully dealt with in the Sophist, and it has been shewn that the account of them in both dialogues taken as a whole, is unfavourable to the hypothesis that Antisthenes is meant. May they have been in any way related to Democritus? This supposition has been objected to on the ground that the Atomists (according to Aristotle, Met. I. 4.) in upholding their *κενόν*, asserted the existence of the *μη δν*. Whereas Plato (Soph. 246.) says of these men, *τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τις φησι μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονῶντες τὸ παράπαν*. (Here the 'bodiless' is evidently equivalent to the 'unseen' of Theæt. I. c.)

Democri-  
tus.

The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a distinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm



grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity and weight.

It does not seem very hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity: the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of phyaic and metaphysic was not impossible. The 'Plenum' of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature.

The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. 'Being is full of being, it is continuous, for being touches being.' Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchangeable, was also that which has extension, solidity and weight. Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something absolute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (*νόμος*): depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various combinations.

How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may be alluded to in the passages already mentioned of the *Theætetus* and *Sophist*?

1. It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything 'bodiless' or 'unseen.' For the 'bodiless existence' which they are represented as denying is the 'immaterial essence' of the *εἰδῶν* *φύσεις*; and the 'unseen process,' which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the 'void space' of the Atomist, which is only asserted as

the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that *ἄτομον* and *κενόν* together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as τὸ ὑποκειμένον σῶμα.

2. A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally be either seen or handled: but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See *Ar. de Sensu*. c. 4: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτομικάτων τι ποιῶσι· πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀπὸ ποιῶσι.

The sense of touch and resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those 'primary' qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the *Theætetus*, and in language which is much more suggestive of something *hard*. Note especially the words, *Theæt.* p. 155: Ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν λαβέσθαι. *Soph.* 246: Εἰς γῆν—ἔλκουσι, ταῖς χειρσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ ὀρεῖς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διῶσχυρίζονται τοῦτ' εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα. *P.* 247: Πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἀπτόν τι αὐτῶν. *Ib.*: Πᾶν δ' μὴ δυνατόν ταῖς χειρσὶ συμπίεξιν εἶναι.

3. It may be observed further that in the *Sophist* the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (1) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (2) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philosopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system?

They are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being. 'Every thing in which there is either an active or a passive power,' i. e. they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognised surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus.

See Ar. de An. I. 2. Δημόκριτος περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων γλαφυρωτέ-  
ρως εἶρηκεν.

4. It may be urged against the above conjecture (1) that, although Democritus might fairly be called *ἄμωσος*, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to rhetoric and poetry, and *ἀμύητος*, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of *coarseness* which Plato's picture conveys would seem to be unmerited.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(2) That the elenchus of the εἰδὼν φῶαι is described as levelled at the ἀλήθεια of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Protagoras in the *Theætetus*. To which it may be replied, that the account in the *Sophist* appears to be generalised from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of 'sprung from the ground' (σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title 'hard and repellent' in the *Theætetus*. The difficulty must however be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted<sup>\*</sup>.

If these passages really contain any allusion even to degenerate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recognition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle's saying, that Plato's dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies; and of Lord Bacon's, that time brings down the lighter goods of antiquity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view.

5. Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι).

(It is possible that the *δυσχερεῖς* of the *Philebus*, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an ac-

\* Another ἀλήθεια is spoken of in the *Cratylus*, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference

there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory.

count to give of pleasure while they deny its reality, may have been also in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for instance, the fragment *Ἐνόμενοι ἄνθρωποι ἡδοναίαι κ.τ.λ.* and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analysed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words τῷ τὰ συγκεκρυμένα βίῃ διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκρυμένα συγχεῖν, Phil. p. 46. ad fin.)

Semi-Protagoreans.

VII. One other distinct reference to contemporaries remains to be considered. It occurs at what may be called the turning point of the dialogue: where it is remarked that the stronghold of the doctrine—"What appears to me, is to me"—lies amongst sensible things, but that its weak point is in the answer to such questions as, What is wholesome? What is expedient? And it is added, that those who hold a partial Protagoreanism, (οἱ τὰ Πρωταγόρου μὴ παντάπασιν λέγοντες,) while insisting that honour and justice are merely conventional, admit that, in regard to things expedient and good, mistake is possible, and one councillor and one state is wiser than another. These men seem to be brought forward as witnesses to the existence of something above sensation and convention, just as the "fastidious persons" are made to testify in the *Philebus* to the existence of mixtures of pleasure and pain. But it seems impossible to identify them with any known school. Euclides denied reality to impressions. Aristippus admitted no good beyond the present pleasure. Plato here alludes to some intermediate teachers, of whom our knowledge is a blank.

This notice of the relation of the *Theætetus* to contemporary theories may be concluded with a few general remarks.

General remarks.

Such an inquiry must necessarily be scanty in its positive results. Its true value, however, lies rather in the consciousness which it implies, and which it tends to strengthen, that Plato, though in advance of his contemporaries, was not isolated from them, but held living intercourse with the present as well as with the past. In studying any author, it is invigorating even to attempt to breathe the atmosphere in which he moved, and to see with his eyes the men and the ideas surrounding him. Without making this attempt, the modern reader of Plato cannot but lose much. He will be like one reading a letter without knowing to whom it is addressed. Many of the ideas and sentiments may be intelligible to him, but the living tone

and expression which it would otherwise convey are lost. A few cautions however are suggested to us as the inquiry proceeds.

1. In piecing together the fragments of an ancient statue or group, a sanguine and inexperienced eye might naturally imagine some things to fit, which were really independent of each other, and some things to be incongruous which were really not so. Supposing the whole discovered, the mistaken adaptations would be displaced by more perfect symmetry, and the apparent discrepancies harmonised by the intermediate parts. The contemporary remains of Plato's time are such a fragment. The more we study them in the light of his works, the more we feel, that while distinct and opposite tendencies were at work, the various thinkers of that age (especially those who followed Socrates) had much in common; and that many shades of opinion existed besides the opposite extremes. The few names and the few sayings that have been preserved to us by no means exhaust the whole field.

2. Plato's relation to these contemporaries must not be conceived of as closer than it really was. Their theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance, but the occasion. He views them in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves differently according to the point at which we stand.

For instance, the materialist and sensationalist, who in the *Theætetus* are opposed, in the *Sophist* appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. And in the *Cratylus*, the Heraclitean and Protagorean doctrines are contrasted. Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be narrowed to this or that individual, nor extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might so "orb into the perfect star" as to be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought, but from the speculative height from which Plato surveyed the present, rival opinions might at one time be generalised into one view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct.



3. Plato was by no means absorbed in the controversies of the hour. The grand movements of Greek thought, hidden from inferior intellects, were comprehended in one glance by him, not observed as by Aristotle, but consciously realised. Thus in the *Theætetus* he gathers up into a single formula one side of the alternative which philosophy had hitherto presented to the Greek mind. Looking above and beyond Aristippus, and even Protagoras, whose personal influence had hardly yet died away, he fixes his eye upon Heraclitus, who had given the highest expression to the relative side of thought. The struggle, outwardly waged between the Megarian and the Cyrenaic, is in reality a far deeper one, between Parmenides and Heraclitus, or rather between the two opposing streams of Greek Philosophy, which were seeking their unity in the mind of Plato.

## § 2.

Earlier  
Philoso-  
phies.

As after-ages saw amongst Plato's contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Protagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or conceptions and impressions.

In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus and Protagoras really were, it would be necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato. But, although not always brought into prominence, it is of the essence of what they were to him.

This is not the place for a detailed account of the earlier stage of Greek Philosophy. But a brief sketch of it is necessary in order to make Plato's position clear.

It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate, to say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest, Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two.



Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves; inhaled by some in the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous embodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of  $\Delta\acute{\alpha}\kappa\eta$  is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the  $\epsilon\iota\mu\alpha\rho\acute{\mu}\epsilon\nu\eta$  of the one is paralleled by the  $\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\kappa\eta$  of the other.

The endeavour to pierce this veil of language\* is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the common opinions of men. The words of Plato in the *Phædo*,  $\text{οἱ πολλοὶ ψηλαφῶντες ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῃ}$ , might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testimony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being.

With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought. [ $\tauὸ γὰρ πλεον ἐστὶ νόημα$ . *Parm.*] All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of "nought and night;" the fulness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to Divine, and not to human knowledge.

Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of that age, what were the distinguishing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Parmenides; and it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these philosophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a

\* Cf. *Parm.*  $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\alpha}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha\iota \pi\rho\omicron\tau\acute{\alpha}\phi\eta\nu \alpha\pi\omicron \chi\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota} \mu\alpha\lambda\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\alpha\iota$ .

Platonist sees in the Ionian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two: they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences.

**Heraclitus.** I. Heraclitus of Ephesus (B. C. 500) was an Eastern Greek, and it is not merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anticipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew from them some of his happiest expressions; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. "The voice of the Sibyl," says Heraclitus, "although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years." This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and Neo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect.

It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching 'lives after them.' One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate

thoughts in distant ages, and a late sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Eleatic One\*.

Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had "looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the One was God," so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the *Ægean* and said that water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of an homogeneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law.

He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being something in themselves,—'not fluctuating but fixed,'—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. "The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by measures and extinguishing itself by measures;" i. e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as "the invisible harmony" which is "better than the visible," as the "Thought which guides all through all," as the "Universal Word" or "Reason," as the "One Wisdom," as "Time," as "Righteousness," as "Fate," as the "Name of Zeus." This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato, "The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone," viz. the Ionian: Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, "War is the Father of all things:" and in a saying of more doubtful

\* Thus the dialectic of Rep. B. VI. is a sort of *δύο ἐκ αὐτοῦ πλῆν*. See also the Sophist and Parmenides.

meaning, Παλίνοτος ἁρμονία κόσμου, ὡς περ τόξου καὶ λύρας: Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Perhaps it might be paraphrased, "As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cf. Plato Rep. IV. p. 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Universe is the same<sup>u</sup>." Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. "The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger." Each thing is ever producing or passing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: "All coming out of one, and one arising out of all." Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions: Συνάψεται οὐλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐλα κ. τ. λ. \*Εν τῷ σοφὸν γινώσκεισθαι ἐθέλει τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει, Ζηνὸς δνομα.

But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In every thing there is contrariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i. e. between the absolute process itself and the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire<sup>z</sup>, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower and a higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhalations; e. g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other

<sup>u</sup> Hor. Epist. I. 12. 'Quid velit et possit rerum concordia dissona.'

<sup>z</sup> Compare Shakespeare, Antony

and Cleopatra. 'I am fire and air, my other elements I give to baser life.'

upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other's life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (*πῦρ, μέτρα*) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (*κοσμός*); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is inseparable from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them, quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (IX. 8.): *Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν εἰς γένεσιν ἄγον καλεῖσθαι πόλεμον καὶ ἔρυν, τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰρήνην*\*. On the other hand, that which is wearied with the "Eternal process moving on," is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being; and to this is attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, *Her.* vol. I. pp. 123 sqq.)

What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human knowledge, and on human life?

1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a continued act or utterance of mind (*γνώμη ἢ κυβερνήσει πάντα, τὸ ἐν σοφόν, θεῶς λόγος*). This, though more or less personified (as *Ζεὺς, Δίκη, Θεός*) is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance itself is the soul of the World, not exactly "immanent," but ever moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into itself again. Yet while thus pervading

\* Διαφερόμενον δὲ συμφέρεται.

\* Cf. too the words *νόσος ἐγγίγν*

*ἐποίησεν ἡδὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν,—πράττει ἀνάπαντος.*



all things, it essentially holds the upper ethereal region, and embraces all, being opposed to the things beneath it as universal to particular.

2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the best, which most partakes of it; that which lives in its own world of particular impressions and notions, is "nearer earth and less in light." This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expression. "A dry soul is the wisest and the best, flashing through the body as lightning through a cloud" (cf. *ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις*). "The moist soul (e. g. with wine) 'embodies' itself like a gathering cloud" (cf. *ὑγρὰ ἀναθυμίασις*). "The Law of things is a law of universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own." "To live in the light of the universal Order is to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep." "Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not, their speech betrays that though present they are absent mentally." It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory, the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened. As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if a man awakes, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows all through all. Sensation is not annihilated, but is absorbed into the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent medium of true vision. (See the expression *κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαίειν*, where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. *Cratyl.* p. 412. διὰ τοῦ λόγου λέγειν πάντως) distinguishing all things into their true elements (*κατὰ φύσιν διαίρων ἕκαστα ὅπως ἔχει*), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen harmony (*πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὼν κρινεῖ καὶ καταλήφεται*). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for



man, who "lights a taper for himself in the night," and "is but an ape to compare with God." The subtilty of Nature far exceeds the subtilty of the human intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in his Heaven there is no rest, so even in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This however never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but of its revelation to and comprehension by man.

8. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever absorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awaking of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, who toils much and finds little, [cf. Plat. Rep. 450 b.], and often his truest wisdom is to know himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire.

Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The *Λόγος* or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the infinity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is impossible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Heraclitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts,

as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than his own followers had done<sup>a</sup>.

The fate of Heraclitus' teaching at Ephesus<sup>b</sup> reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Universal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylus at length only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the system ended consistently in a kind of war.

<sup>a</sup> Perhaps the two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, *Sophist.* 143: διαφερόμενον γὰρ (sc. τὸ ὄν) διὰ συμφύρεται, φασὶν αἱ συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν, (with which contrast *Sympos.* 187, where the saying is explained away,) and *Cratyl.* 412: ὅσοι γὰρ ἠγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν ποσὶ, τὸ μὲν πολλὸ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οὐκ οἶδεν ἄλλο ἢ χυρὸν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναι τι διεξίόν, δι' οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα γίνεσθαι. εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον οὐ γὰρ ἂν δικάσθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ λόγου λέγειν παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατον τι ᾖ, ὅστις αὐτὸ μὴδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὅστις χρήσθαι ὥστερ' ἰσχύει τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἰσὺ δ' οὐκ ἐπιτρονέειν τὰ ἅλλα πάντα διαίον κ.τ.λ.

<sup>b</sup> This may be illustrated by the continuation of the passage of the *Cratylus* just quoted, μέγιστον μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, δ' οὖν δὴ ἐλέγμεν, παρὰ πολλῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἶναι. ἐγὼ δέ, ὡς ἔρμηνευσε, ἄνευ λισταρῶ ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπίστως αἰνῶ ἀπορρήτως, ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἶτιον—δι' ὃ γὰρ γίνεσθαι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ αἶτιον—καὶ λόγῳ καλῶν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὁρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταύ-

τα· ἰσὺ δὲ ἡρέμα αὐτοῖς ἐκαστορῶν ἀκούσαι ταῦτα μὴδὲν ἦσαν. τί οὖν πού ἐστιν, ἔφησθε, λέγετε, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; ὅσῳ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσήκουτος ἔρατῳ καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἱσαμμένα ἄλλεσθαι. ἰκανῶς γὰρ μὴ φασὶ πεπύσθαι καὶ ἀκηκοέναι καὶ ἐπιχειροῦναι, βουλόμενοι ἀποτιμολόγαι με, ἄλλοις ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκ ἐτι συμφοροῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησι τοῦτο εἶναι εἶναι, τὸν ἥλιον τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαίοντα καὶ πάντα ἐπιτρονέειν τὰ ὄντα. ἰσὺ δὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸ ἀσμενός ὡς καλὸν σὶ ἀκηκοέν, καταγελᾷ μόν οὕτως ἀκούσας καὶ ἔρατῳ, εἰ οἶδεν δικάσειν οἷμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἰσὺ δὲν ὁ ἥλιος διῷ. λισταρῶντος οὖν ἰσὺ δ' εἰ εἰς τοῦτο λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι φησὶ τοῦτο δι' οὗ βέβαιον ἵσθαι εἰδέναι· ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ εἶναι φησὶν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἵσθαι. ὁ δὲ τοῦτον μὲν πάντων καταγελᾷ φησὶν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ εἶναι ὁ λόγος ἀναγκαῖος, τοῦτον εἶναι τοῦτο. ἀπτομαρτέρως γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οἶδεναι μεμνημένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων λόγων. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἰγὼ, ὡς φίλε, πολλὸν ἐν ἐλπίδι ἀναρίθμητον ἢ ἐν ἐπιχειρήσει μαθάνειν περὶ τοῦ εἶναι, ὅ τί πού ἐστιν.

But its influence on the other side of the *Ægean* was far greater, and by warring with other ideas it renewed its vitality. As was fitting, however, before finding its true place in the Platonic Philosophy (see especially the *Parmenides*), it was bound again in the prison of sense, and made to fight the battle of Opinion against the reigning ideal system. Whether or not Protagoras, and after him the Cyrenaics, openly made the Heraclitean dogma the basis of their scepticism, it is certain that Plato, and probable that Euclides also, regarded this as its only real philosophical support<sup>c</sup>.

The peculiarity of the traces of Heraclitus in the *Theætetus* is, that his doctrine is there brought forward in support of a subjective theory; that its influence is partly direct, partly derived through his Ephesian followers, and (possibly) through Aristippus; and that it is carried to its remotest consequences by being subjected to the Socratic or Megarian logic. He thus becomes merely the representative of the principle of the perpetual flux of all things, and their absolute diversity, in opposition to the perfect rest and unity of the Eleatic Being:—the notion that, as it is put in the *Phædo*, like the tides in the Euripus, all things are ever coming and going, and swaying up and down and to and fro. Nothing *is*, everything is ever becoming. That this was a faithful representation of the theory in its later stages, appears from what Aristotle tells of Cratylus, that he found fault with Heraclitus' maxim: *ὅτις ἐστι τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης· αὐτὸς γὰρ ᾤετο οὐδ' ἀπαξ*.

The passage which most distinctly recalls Heraclitus himself, is that in which this doctrine of 'becoming' (*γίνεσθαι*) is first stated and confirmed by proofs, though even this is perhaps coloured by the 'disciples of Protagoras.'

The quotations from the poets (whom the early philosophers despised [*παλαιὰ τὴν διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ*]) and the subtle illustrations from natural and mental phenomena (contrast Heraclitus' "The drunkard has a wet soul") belong rather to the refined philosophers whom Plato is quoting (or to his own invention) than to the prophet of Ephesus. But the mention of the fire which begets and rules all else, and is itself created by motion, is thoroughly Heraclitean, and the

<sup>c</sup> Τὴν λεγόμενον αὐτὸν ἀλλάττει γίνεσθαι ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ προσεγορεύοντι φερομένην τινά. Plat. *Soph.*

word *περιφορά* (which occurs again p. 181) is perhaps used, together with the symbol of the Sun, not without reference to the circling process of the elements<sup>d</sup>, the *ἔδος ἄνω κάτω μία*, which would be reversed if the diurnal motion were interrupted, *καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα*. Cf. *Simpl. in Arist. Categ.* p. 105 b. Bas.: *Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιλείπει, οἴχοιτο ἂν πάντα ἀφανισθέντα. διὸ καὶ μέμφεται Ὀμήρῳ Ἡράκλειτος, εἰπόντι,*

*ὡς ἱμεῖς τε θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιο,*

*οἰχίσσεσθαι γάρ, φησι πάντα*<sup>e</sup>.

In the fuller statement of the doctrine of sense, p. 156, the obscure words (rendered more obscure by the interpolation of Cornarius) regarding the comparative swiftness and slowness of the different motions, are probably to be explained in connection with Heraclitus. Sensation is a process between opposites (*ποιεῖν* and *πάσχειν*). If we imagine it under the image of the *ἔδος ἄνω κάτω*, the process is higher, and therefore swifter than the things between which it moves<sup>f</sup>; they may be contrasted as fire and earth, as the sun and the cloud, as mind and body. (In this case the process itself has an objective and subjective element). E. g. man and stone are slow motions and of the nature of earth, but vision and whiteness are swifter and more of the nature of fire. In modern language, they have a higher power or law<sup>g</sup>. There is probably some intermediate

<sup>d</sup> See Lassalle, II. 114 n. 3. 119.

is differently applied by Milton, *Par.*

<sup>e</sup> The image of the 'golden chain'

L. B. II. l. 1005 (*Chaos loq.*)

Another World

Hung o'er my realm, linked in a golden chain

To that side Heaven from whence your legions fell.

Ib. l. 1051:—

And fast by, hanging in a golden chain,

This pendant world.

<sup>f</sup> Cf. Heracl. fr.: *Ἐφαρσι νῆος καὶ περὶ γένους.*

psychological application of the idea of 'quicker' and 'slower' elements,

<sup>g</sup> Shakespeare has made a fanciful

in *Sonnets* 44, 45.

But ah! thought kills me that I am not thought  
To leap large lengths of miles when thou art gone,  
But that, so much of earth and water wrought,  
I must attend time's leisure with my moan;  
Receiving nought by elements so slow,  
But heavy tears, badges of either's woe.

The other two, alight air and purging fire,  
Are both with thee, wherever I abide;  
The first my thought, the other my desire,

refinement upon Heraclitus which would more completely illustrate the words of Plato. But their interpretation is certainly assisted by a nearer acquaintance with the Heraclitean theory.

In p. 157 the following words forcibly recal Heraclitus : ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα.

And in p. 158 the doubt raised about waking and dreaming reminds us of one of his favourite reflections : τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λανθάνει δκοσα ἐγερθέντες ποιούσιν δκοσα ἐβδοντες ἐπιλανθάνονται.

θάνατός ἐστιν δκοσα ἐβδοντες δρόμεν' ὅσα δὲ ἐγερθέντες, ὕπνος.

In one other passage, where there is no direct allusion to him, an expression occurs which is eminently descriptive of his mind : p. 173.

τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πολεῖ κείται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημῇ, ἣ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγησαμένη συμπερὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, [τῆς] τε γῆς ὑπένερθε, καὶ τὰ ἐπίπαιδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπερ ἀστρονομούσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρυννημένη τῶν δυντῶν ἐκάστου ὅλου, εἰς τῶν ἐγγυὲς οὐδὲν αὐτῇ συγκαθιύσα<sup>h</sup>.

When the doctrine of motion is again taken up and criticised in pp. 180 sqq. the more immediate reference is to the Ephesian followers of Heraclitus, the humorous account of whom has been already noticed. They are compelled to state more distinctly what is meant by motion, and to acknowledge that it comprises not only locomotion (which has hitherto been spoken of, though in a vague sense), but also change. This agrees with what Aristotle says, that the Heracliteans had nowhere defined their principle of motion<sup>i</sup>. The *elenchus* is therefore

These present-absent with swift motion slide.  
For when these quicker elements are gone  
In tender embassy of love to thee,  
My life being made of four, with two alone,  
Sinks down to death, oppressed with melancholy:  
Until life's composition be recured  
By those swift messengers returned from thee,  
Who even but now come back again, assured  
Of thy fair health, recounting it to me:  
This told, I joy; but then no longer glad,  
I send them back again, and straight grow mad.

<sup>h</sup> Cf. Rep. 496: 'Ἡ ἐν σμαρῇ πολιτεία δὴν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φθὴ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίθη.

<sup>i</sup> Phys. Auscult. VIII. 3 § 3: Πρὸς οὗτο, καίπερ οὐ διορίζεται ποίας εἴησιν λίγουσιν ἢ πῶσας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπατηῆσαι.



here applied to them, and their doctrine is exploded by being precisely stated.

Lastly, it should be noticed that the conception of λόγος, with which the *Theætetus* closes, has no connexion with the technical and objective use of the word in the Heraclitean system; it is rather employed in a Megarian, i. e. a semi-Eleatic sense, not without a trace of the definitions of Socrates. This appears from the opening of the *Sophista*. With Heraclitus, *δνομα* and λόγος were symbolical expressions for the same thing.

noni- II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final conception of the Greek mind. While life and death and the succession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the *Ægean*, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in *Magna Græcia*: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato's. Xenophanes had already said—

"There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind." "He is all sight, all thought, all hearing." "He even abides immovable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro."

Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explanation of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere.

The main effort of Plato's dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract



conception it is the problem of the one and the many ( $\tau\acute{\omega}\nu \lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omega\nu \delta\eta\lambda\omega\nu \pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\omicron\varsigma \pi\alpha\rho' \eta\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$ ), or of motion and rest. In this effort he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a sort of middle term in number.

The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the *Theætetus*, from which the discussion of it is expressly excluded: but his influence is notwithstanding present in the Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno (see above), in whose hands the One had acquired a negative power, and was used rather to distinguish than to comprehend, so becoming rather the form than the sole object of thought. This Eleatic influence appears chiefly (1) in the relentless way in which sensation and motion are reduced to nothingness, and because they have no unity are shewn to present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of the dialogue, where it is admitted that there are universal perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar to that of Zeno about motion,—not 'it is impossible for a thing to be in two places at once,' but 'it is impossible to know and not to know at the same time,'—and is solved in the same way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the form of argument with which this paradox is enforced,  $\delta \epsilon \nu \gamma\acute{\epsilon} \tau\iota \acute{\alpha}\rho\omega\nu \delta\nu \tau\iota \acute{\alpha}\rho\eta$ : (5) in the question about the whole and its parts, pp. 203, 204.

But it is rather in the objective side of Plato's teaching that the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno is examined and brought to bear.

III. Protagoras, who gives to the inquiry in the *Theætetus* Protagoras's subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation. The real share borne by him in the dialogue is less than appears at first sight. It is to his "disciples" that the doctrine of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians whom he has left will not defend his "orphan" theory, yet when challenged to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates falls back upon the saying quoted at first, "Man is the measure of all things," and the explanation of it, "Things are to

me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you." The same words occur also in the *Cratylus*. This, then, is all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise *Ἀλήθεια*, the sceptical fragment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as *μεγαλειότητος*, *πολυάρατος*. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples "in a mystery," (cf. *Cratyl.* p. 413, quoted above, p. xliv. n. b), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the *Theætetus*. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the *Theætetus*, and Aristotle. The similarity of the language in which different sensationalist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of that section of thought.

It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one saying of Protagoras which is here preserved: πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὥς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὥς οὐκ ἐστι. Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than the absolute relativity of knowledge? Might it not even be interpreted to mean, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus?" In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Protagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own saying, ὥς οἱ μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίμεναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἐμοί, οἱ δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί. But it may be added, secondly, that the distinction between the race and the individual, between the general term "man," and the singular term "this man," was probably not distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the distinction between abstract and concrete, exhibited, for instance, in the first answer of *Theætetus*, or in the attempt of Meno to define virtue, it

becomes evident that the term *man*, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race collectively, but of "a man," "this or that man," an individual, "you or me," not however conceived of as an individual, nor consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination. [Cf. *τοῦ ἀνθρώπου*, Thuc. I. 140, which does not correspond to the modern generic use of the word.]

Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unattainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for the truth, of which, however, he is not to be supposed a careless lover. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm advocates at Athens, was one purely objective; although beginning and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought into the world of being.

Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, he was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according to the common notion, "many men, many minds."

From the pit of scepticism into which Philosophy was thus in danger of being lowered, the impulse given by Socrates to speculative inquiry rescued it, and by vindicating the unity of truth, and the importance of the search for it to human life, gave to the old philosophies their true weight and significance through the Dialectic of Plato.

As embodied in the *Theætetus*, however, the above doctrine receives some fresh characteristics, first as being made the type of a contemporary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus; secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a sharpness and precision to the term *ἀνθρώπος*, as equivalent to *ἕκαστος ἡμῶν*, which it probably had not

when first used; and, thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only ‘man’ but ‘each man,’ not only so, but ‘every creature,’ and even the same person at different times.

Gorgias.

The name of Gorgias (of Leontini, who flourished B. C. 480, and is said to have been alive at the death of Socrates) does not appear in the *Theætetus*, and there is no distinct allusion to him. But his denial of absolute Knowledge and Being †, in which he was followed by Antisthenes, finds a place in the indirect refutation of Protagoras’ assertion of relative truth. The passages in which this appears most distinctly have been already noticed (*Theæt.* pp. 161, 183.) He would also be included amongst the professors of rhetoric who busied themselves about such questions as, *Is a King happy?*

Other names which might be enlarged upon are those of Euthydemus (who seems to have been a still more worthy predecessor of Antisthenes) and Prodicus.

#### § 4.

Socrates.

But the person of Socrates is more interesting than any further scraps of theory. It is this which almost equally with the spirit of the author himself gives life and depth to what might otherwise be a barren conflict of opinion and method. From behind the ironical mask of the *Elenchus*, as preserved by Euclides, there peep forth characteristics of the man Socrates, which awake the reader’s imagination, and rouse in him a kindred spirit of inquiry. The way in which this negative method is represented as a preparatory exercise, ridding the mind of the lumber of its crude notions, the humorous form in which this is expressed, the courteous, but relentless manner in which the method itself is followed, the eager interest shown in the development of a young mind, the kindly sympathy mixed with playful irony with which *Theætetus* is treated throughout: above all, the enthusiastic joy with which the acknowledgment is welcomed in one so young, that there is something which the mind itself perceives without the senses, belong to Socrates alone. The very soul of the representation is a part of him. Beneath the negative and destructive seeming

† οὐδὲν ἔστιν—οὐ καὶ ἔστιν, ἀπετάλητον ἀσφάλειαν—οὐ καὶ ἀπετάλητον, ἀλλὰ τοὶ γε ἀνέλιπον καὶ ἀνεμύνηντο τῷ πάλαι.—Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. VII. 65.

there is a sober earnestness of belief, which breaks out in such passages as that about the Divine life, a belief in the existence of truth somewhere, and in the all-importance of the search for it, which we feel to be due above all other men to Socrates. The very form of this inquiry, as consisting in self-questioning, which we associate with Socrates, is adverted to more than once (*οὐ δυσκολεύοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅτι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες—βασανίζομεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς.*) The conception of a definition at once simple and exhaustive as the end to be attained by every inquiry, also belongs to him. Cf. *Ar. Met. M.* 1079 a. *δύο γὰρ ἔστιν ἃ τις ἂν ἀποδοίη Σωκράτει δικαίως, τοὺς τ' ἐπακτικούς λόγους καὶ τὸ ὀρίεσθαι καθόλου. ταῦτα γὰρ ἔστιν ἄμφω περὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης.* °

It deserves to be noticed here that critics have found in the picture of the dwarfed, shrewd, practical spirit, an allusion to Lycon, or to some other of the enemies of Socrates, as they have seen in the contrasted image of the philosophic life, partly a praise of Socrates, partly a trace of Plato's residence at Megara.

The person of Theætetus is also an important element. *Theætetus.* Whether or not, as seems probable, the dialogue contains a tribute of affection to a friend and pupil who was no more, the reader is certainly intended to dwell with admiring interest upon his character. His dangerous state is the subject of the most anxious solicitude to the persons who meet us on the threshold: they say of him that he has fulfilled the promise of Socrates, who augured most nobly of his future; and presently we are invited to view his portrait as a youth by the hand of his own master Theodorus, who ascribes to him the very combination of qualities described by Plato in his Republic as the ideal of the philosophic nature. We find Socrates in love with his mind at first sight, and still more delighted with him as the argument proceeds.—Theætetus is described by later writers as a great mathematician, who taught at Heraclea, after the times of the Peloponnesian war, and as the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids; and is said to have heard Socrates and to have been the companion of Plato. The latter fact may possibly have been derived from this dialogue, but it is at least natural to identify the persons, especially from the aptness for mathematics shown by the youth at the opening of



the inquiry. If we are right in doing so, a passage in the Republic (p. 528.) acquires a fresh interest from the fact mentioned above, that Theætetus wrote the first treatise on the regular solids. When Plato says that the geometry of solids is yet in its infancy, but that he does not despair of its being discovered, we are tempted to suspect an allusion to the labours of his friend<sup>u</sup>.

What have we then in Theætetus? A youth, whom, as the Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist afterwards remarks, no corruption of sophistry could long withhold from the belief in true ideas and the endeavour to grasp them, but full of perplexity and wonder (a proof of this very impulse) at the conflict between common sense, sceptical difficulties, and speculative enquiry, which he heard waged around him, and which found an echo within his mind. Yet until encouraged and helped by Socrates, he is unable to state his opinion on an abstract question, except in a subject which he has systematically studied, viz. geometry, in which he and his fellow-pupil have lately with some labour arrived at a generalised expression. But in this and in the other special studies which he has pursued, his master Theodorus has found in him qualities which are rarely combined, acuteness and gravity, gentleness and courage, a mind unruffled, rapid and unerringly successful in its application to learning and inquiry; and a spirit of generosity unaffected by reverses of fortune.

Theætetus, though a mere boy, is the most desirable of pupils for Philosophy, both as possessing all the requirements of the philosophic nature, and because without being yet irrevocably devoted to any special pursuit, he amply fulfils the condition, *μὴδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος ἐστίτω*. (See Rep. B. vii.)

Theodorus. The choice of Theodorus as an interlocutor (not to dwell upon the tradition that Plato had studied under him) connects itself with the same belief in the importance of geometry as an introduction to dialectic, though in Theodorus it had not led to this result. Theodorus is also (as already noticed) of Cyrene, the town of Aristippus, and professes himself a friend of Protagoras.

### § 5.

Such appear to be the external elements of the Theætetus;

<sup>u</sup> Although there may be also an allusion to the Conic Sections, which were discovered in Athens about this time.

possessing also a more general interest because they supply us with indications of the influences which had surrounded Plato himself, the phases of thought by which his mind had been attracted or repelled, and with some of which it had been perhaps almost identified; but to each of which he could now assign its due place and value in the progress of the mind towards true ideas, or, to use his own image, in its conversion out of the dark cave and prison of sense to mount upwards towards the world of Being.

It is not enough to have taken a work like this to pieces. That is only a step towards viewing it as a whole.

1. After a preface in which the Megarian tendency of the dialogue is indicated, a youth of philosophic genius is brought into contact with the prophet of Greek thought. The mind of the youth is not "a sheet of blank paper," for besides the ordinary *λογιστική* and *γυμναστική*, he has been instructed by Theodorus in geometry and other sciences, and has been stimulated to inquiry by hearing the report of questions raised by Socrates, while he is dizzy with wonder at the contradictions in common language and ideas pointed out by other teachers (compare the state of Glaucon in the Republic). But though anxious he is wholly unable to give a simple and comprehensive (i. e. abstract and general) definition of knowledge.

Socrates, therefore, approaches him in his character of man-midwife, professing no wisdom of his own, but only the power of bringing to the birth the minds of young men labouring with new thoughts, and of determining afterwards whether the birth be real or imaginary. Under this curious symbol there is expressed not only Plato's theory of education, which recurs in the figure of the cave and elsewhere, but also the consciousness of that which distinguishes this dialogue, and in a less degree other parts of Plato. Although it would be too much to say that he possessed the idea of the History of Philosophy in the modern sense, he approaches more nearly to it than any ancient writer except Aristotle. No one but Plato could have conceived and executed the design of showing the relation of different theories to each other, and the order of their succession, by representing them as gradually developed in an individual mind. Each theory, though negatived, is not annihilated, it has a real importance assigned to it as a stage in the

progress of the human intellect. This power of tracing the evolution of thought Plato preserved from Socrates, while he retained the negative elenchus in common with Euclides. The union of both is expressed in the above metaphor, and characterises all that follows.

2. Theætetus' first real answer, "Knowledge is Sensation," though spontaneous at the moment, is the expression of a current theory, (that of the men called here "disciples of Protagoras," probably including Aristippus.)

Socrates finds in it the doctrine of Protagoras, "A man the measure of what is," which comes to this, Appearing is reality: for what appears to me, is to me.

But this is shown to have been only the popular side of a deeper doctrine, which is appealed to by the current theory, viz. that nothing exists, but all things are ever passing into their opposites, or in other words, Motion is the world. This is supported by all but universal consent, and by the testimony of Nature, (according to Heraclitean interpretation.)

The union of these two principles enables us to conceive of Sensation as a relative process. Each sensation or perception arises relatively both to the individual and to other sensations or perceptions.

Unless we admit that 'more' and 'less,' 'greater' and 'smaller,' are wholly relative, and are therefore subject to continual change, we shall contradict the self-evident axiom, that nothing can become more while it is equal to itself.

Theætetus' curiosity is now fully awakened, and he is prepared to receive a more complete statement of the doctrine, care being first taken not to let any of those 'profane' ones hear who believe only in things bodily, and not in the invisible process.

The motion which is the world is active and passive, and both kinds are infinite. From the perpetual conjunction of these there arise perpetually sensations and sensible things. The active and passive elements are slower, the twin births are swifter, for they flit to and fro between them. Not that the active and passive elements are anything, except as producing that which thus arises from them; nay, active may become passive, and *vice versa*. Being therefore disappears, and all things become, and perish, and change. This applies to sorts

as well as to individual things. "Borne by the gale" of the argument, we even merge the Good and Noble in the universal flux.

Theætetus, however, does not rebel, and some further difficulties, occasioned by the phenomena of dreams, disease and madness, are triumphantly solved. Every such illusion is real to the subject of it at the moment. This appears most evidently in the case of the sick man's palate. At the same time the theory of a process between subject and object is more distinctly worked out. And the birth of Theætetus' first-born is pronounced complete.

3. To the surprise of Theodorus, Socrates now begins to criticise it.

The saying of Protagoras levels all distinctions as to wisdom, and makes argument absurd.

Theodorus is in vain challenged to reply to this, and Theætetus confesses himself staggered.

But Socrates again changes sides, and finds fault with the objection, as begging the question and daring to appeal to common sense.

The theory is, therefore, again examined in the form, Sensation is Knowledge.

After touching on the difficulty of sounds and characters heard and seen but not understood, Socrates dwells on the case of an object of sight remembered but not seen.

(As Theodorus still hangs back, Socrates acts the part of assailant and respondent in one.)

The advocate of sense is driven to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing. He might be reduced many times even to worse extremities (and that on the ground he has himself chosen) by a merciless Eristic adversary.

Still a defence of Protagoras is possible. He is not bound to commit himself to the answers of Theætetus. Memory, he might say, is far inferior in vividness to the present impression. And it is by no means certain that he would have been afraid to admit that the same man may know and be ignorant of the same thing. Or rather he would deny that an individual viewed in different relations, or under different conditions, is the same man. But he would challenge us to prove directly either that sensation is not relative to the individual, or that, if it is relative to him, it does not follow that the object of it is real to him and to him only.

Differences of wisdom there assuredly are both in individuals and states, and in plants also, but they are differences not in the reality, but in the excellence of impressions, customs, or conditions. To alter these from worse to better is the work of the wise teacher or statesman or husbandman. In conclusion Protagoras would demand fair treatment, as the contrary leads only to the hatred of inquiry.

4. That his demand may be complied with, Theodorus is at length 'compelled' to engage, and Protagoras' own words are selected for criticism, no advantage being taken even of the admission, that there are degrees of wisdom, which was made in his name.

'What seems to each is true for him.' It seems to all men that some think truly and some falsely. This was the drift of our appeal to common sense. It follows that whether Protagoras is right or wrong, some think truly and some falsely.

Further, if Protagoras' saying is true for him, it is false for all men besides. But he confirms their judgment who say that he himself thinks falsely and they truly. His saying then is true for nobody.

5. The weight of his authority still makes us pause. But one thing is clear, that the strength of the theory we are considering lies in the region of sense, and, as regards the state, in the sphere of law and custom;—if it gives way at any point, it is in the decision of such questions as, What is wholesome? What is expedient? A partial Protagoreanism, relinquishing the latter ground, but still maintaining the former, seems to have been held by some.

— The magnitude of the question that is thus stirred up reminds us of the blessedness of the life which has leisure for such inquiries. The digression which follows at once affords a rest, and by the elevation of its tone prepares the mind for the higher thoughts which are in reserve. It is of itself a sufficient answer to those who restrict the idea of Truth to particular impressions,—pointing upwards to the pattern in the Heavens and onwards to the life beyond the grave.—We proceed to apply the test indicated above. Even those who assert that what is Lawful is purely conventional dare not seriously assert this of what is Good.

To put the same admission more generally. In every judg-



ment which, like the calculation of expediency, regards the Future, there is the possibility of error. Even if we make the impression of the moment the test of what is true, that impression, when the moment comes, proves one man to have been right in his anticipation and another wrong. This is practically admitted by Protagoras himself, whenever he gives advice to a young speaker.

6. An inroad is thus made into the enemy's territory, but his last stronghold is not yet taken. We have found something independent of sensation, but the "truth" of sensation itself is not yet overthrown. The Heraclitean principle of motion is therefore grappled with. For its Ephesian supporters give us no hold. Theodorus describes the wavering mysticism of these modern Heracliteans, "no friends of his." And Socrates resumes what was said at first of the antiquity of the doctrine, adding that there have been a few who, like Parmenides, have stood out against it, and that our present position is the dangerous middle-ground between two armies. Before closing with the slippery "movement party" we arm ourselves by distinguishing two kinds of motion: locomotion and change. They must admit that all things move in both these ways, or else there would be a way in which they stood still. In the former statement of the theory, sensation and quality were described as flitting between object and subject. But now at the same time that they flit, they must also change. Therefore in the very moment when we are naming them they have become different. Every name is therefore false as well as true: e. g. When I say sensation is Knowledge, it is equally true to say Not-sensation, i. e. according to the theory, Not-Knowledge. Thus the boasted Infinity of Motion becomes the indeterminateness, i. e. the nothingness of Sense. Every thing is nothing in particular.

7. We are now wholly free from Protagoras and from the doctrine of motion. But instead of advancing at once to examine Parmenides, Socrates proceeds with the main argument, and Theodorus is accordingly released. The truth is, there is still some intermediate ground to travel. We have risen above sensation, but the problems connected with Opinion as such (*δόξα*, as independent of *αἰσθησις*) remain to be solved.

Thetetus must first be made conscious of the existence of pure acts of thought. To this consciousness he rises easily,

when, reverting to sensation for a moment, Socrates proves to him that the eye and ear are only the instruments of the mind. There are some ideas common to the objects of different senses, which are perceived concerning them without any such instrument. These the mind itself, reviewing the impressions of sense, immediately contemplates. 'Being' is the most general of them, and is found in company with all the rest. They include also that perception of what is good, to which reference has been already made.

The enthusiasm with which this acknowledgment is welcomed marks it as the highest point actually gained in the dialogue. It is with this that the more advanced teaching of the Sophists immediately connects itself.

The contrast between the contemplation of these ideas by the mind, and the particular impressions of the senses, throws the latter still further into the shade, and we no longer cast our glances backwards, but advance eagerly as into a new-found world.

We examine opinion, not now as it is bound up with sense, but as the pure act of the mind.

8. But all our efforts to grasp the idea of knowledge here only tend to show that Opinion like sensation is indeterminate.

Protagoras said that all men think rightly. This we interpreted to mean that sense is knowledge, and disposed of it rather summarily by a 'reductio ad absurdum.' But the same difficulty now returns upon us in a more abstract form. How is false opinion possible? Considered quite in the abstract, it seems impossible. For whenever we think, our thought is known to us, and real. Or, if thinking be a silent proposition, it seems impossible that we should join two ideas wrongly when both are clearly present to the mind.

We must descend again from this region of pure thought, and have recourse to the conception of degrees of knowledge and of a process between the mind and sensible things. (For otherwise (as Aristotle says) Thought is like a straight line passing over things, not like a curve embracing them.) False opinion will thus be the failure of the mind in bringing together the impressions of sensation and memory. But it is shown by an example that it is possible to mistake between two things, both of which are laid up in the mind. Therefore we must conceive of a more subtle process between the mind and its own ideas, which it may possess without actually grasping them at any

particular time. But when we look steadily at the image we have called up we find that the same difficulty returns. The mind is ignorant of that which is present to it. For, if I have grasped the wrong idea, how do I not know it for what it is? or if an unreal one, how, when I have grasped it, do I not know it to be unreal? The succession of such images must be continued to infinity.

The lesson drawn from this is, that we cannot define false opinion until we have defined knowledge. I. e. Opinion in its own nature is wholly Indeterminate. This is evident at once, if we examine true opinion. An opinion without any real grounds may yet happen to be true.

9. This leads the way to the last unsuccessful effort to define knowledge from the subjective side. Something more than true opinion is required to constitute knowledge. What is that 'something more?' The answer is ready. Knowledge is true opinion with an account of its object (*μετὰ λόγῳ*). The mind surveying its impressions (see above) cannot give an account of the individual objects of sense; it can only name them; but the complex ideas of the various relations of these are expressed in propositions. These therefore alone are the objects of knowledge. Or, more physically, the elements of all things cannot be known, but the combination of these in Nature is the object of Knowledge.

This theory is first tested in the case of letters and syllables, from which it seems to have been derived. The elementary sounds certainly cannot be analysed, but are they therefore unknown? If separately unknown how are they known together? Is the complex independent of its elements? Can a whole be thus conceived of without its parts? If, as appears probable, the expressions, for instance, 'all the six,' 'all of the six,' and 'the whole of the six,' (*τὰ πάντα, τὸ πᾶν, τὸ ὅλον*;) are synonymous, and the whole cannot be considered as separable from its parts, then, if the syllable is known, so are its constituent sounds. The simple is equally known with the complex. But if the whole differs from the all, and is separable from its parts, then it is one and uncompounded, that is, a new element. The complex is equally unknown with the simple. Experience points to the former alternative. In learning grammar or music, we did not know the combinations until after we had learned the letters or notes.

[In this conclusion a kind of reality seems to be again awarded to the objects of sense, not as they give rise to ever varying impressions, but as they are perceived by the mind, which imparts to each of them its own stamp of unity. At the same time ideas of relation are shown to have as much and as little reality as simple ideas, and in the *μία ἰδέα ἀμέριστος* a glimpse is afforded of the transcendent ideal world. If we compare the *Sophist*, *Philebus* and *Republic*, Plato's doctrine appears here in a rudimentary form. He wavers between abstract and concrete, the one and the many. The necessity is not yet felt of finding an expression for the relation between the ideal and actual.]

10. But, though this theory is rejected, the above definition of knowledge may still be true. What is the 'account' (*λόγος*) required in it? It cannot be the mere reflexion of thought in language. For this power is possessed by all men. Nor is it the analysis of the complex by the enumeration of its elements. For this may be done rightly in one case and wrongly in another where the elements are the same. But knowledge is infallible. Nor, lastly, is it, what seems plausible at first sight, the comprehension of the distinctive difference. For this is essential to right opinion. And if it is meant that we must have knowledge, and not opinion merely, of the distinctive difference, the term knowledge still remains to be defined.

What then is the result of the inquiry? The answer is simply that given by Socrates, The mind of Theætetus is prepared for better things. Difficulties have been undoubtedly raised, such as Plato really felt, and which were silenced rather than solved by the contemplation of the Idea of Good; (e. g. the difficulty about false opinion.) Hypotheses have been advanced which he knew to be really valuable, and the equivalents of which have frequently satisfied the human mind, (e. g. the hypothesis expressed in the figure of the waxen block.) But Plato does not rest in these uncertainties, and is by no means satisfied. Nor is it by any means his intention to point out the hopelessness of the attempt to define Knowledge. What he does point out is the impossibility of conceiving Knowledge apart from its object. The perception of the existence of Ideas of Being and Goodness, of sameness and difference, likeness and unlikeness, and of number, which is just touched upon, is the first step towards the construction of that transcendental

world, the contemplation of which, in the light of the Idea of Good, is Knowledge according to Plato's highest conception of it (*ἐν τῇ γνωστῇ τελευτάῃ ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα*). Whether or not he had attained to this when the *Theætetus* was written, (he had probably advanced some way towards it), the fact is certain that he was not satisfied with any lower or less triumphant view. The meaning and the merits of that final theory do not fall under discussion here.

## § 6.

The genuineness of the *Theætetus* has never been seriously questioned. To put its authenticity in the strongest possible light, it stands or falls with the *Republic*. No difficulty that may arise in assigning to it its chronological position, or in reconciling special points of teaching or method, can countervail the inward harmony, the manifold coincidences of thought and style, the incommunicable grace and beauty, the intensity of inquiry relieved with ever present humour, which bind this and the other greater dialogues to the greatest, making them one living individual whole.

## § 7.

The comparative study of Plato's dialogues is of importance not so much as leading to a chronological arrangement, towards which little progress has been made, but rather as throwing light upon his manner of dealing with a subject and his mode of composition generally. There are fallacies incidental to the study of one dialogue, which the comparison of others will remove: extreme views are thus corrected, assertions modified, the unevenness of the whole surface becomes more evident, as well as the inherent unity, and we become more cautious in speaking of 'Plato's view' of this or that point; and also in taking literally his development of the tenets of this or that school. It becomes apparent too, on a wider survey, that more varieties of thought existed around Plato than we have names for, or than can be easily summed up in one or two formulæ. And at every step we become more convinced that no limit can be assigned to his fertility either of imagination or thought. Such a comparison is the natural and necessary test of every hypothesis regarding any single dialogue.

Schleiermacher linked the *Theætetus* and *Gorgias* as com-



panion treatises: but when read without the bias of his peculiar scheme, they do not present features of very close relationship. The interest of the *Gorgias* is less philosophical and more dramatic, approaching even to comedy. In the *Theætetus* we breathe the serene atmosphere of friendship and peace; in the *Gorgias*, Socrates is engaged in his ironical warfare. The *Gorgias* annihilates rhetoric and the vulgar belief in success which was its food; the *Theætetus* is a criticism of scientific theories, preparing the way for serious philosophical inquiry. The *Gorgias* is written in the strain of the *Euthydemus*, *Protagoras* and *Meno*, and of the first and second books of the *Republic*; the tone of the *Theætetus* is nearer to that of the *Philebus* and *Sophista*, and of the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*. The points of coincidence, and there are several, between the two dialogues, have as much of contrast as of resemblance. The vulgar notion of the philosopher, which in the *Theætetus* is treated with lofty scorn, in the *Gorgias* is represented with humorous zest. The same may be said of the weakness of rhetoric in philosophy; and the common incentives to action, which in the *Theætetus* are contemptuously dismissed, in the *Gorgias* are stated at length with ironical gravity. Much nearer points of comparison may be found in the *Philebus*, *Cratylus*, and *Meno*.

The *Philebus* presents the other aspect of the controversy between *Euclides* and *Aristippus*, the opposition namely between pleasure and wisdom taking the place of that between sensation and knowledge. But the combatants are viewed from an independent height, and the instruments by which decision is made and the question solved, are neither *Cyrenaic* nor *Megarian*, but chiefly *Platonic*, and partly *Pythagorean*. A detailed parallel and contrast would extend this essay to undue length, but would be useful in illustrating the difference between *Plato's* earlier and later method, and the growth of his psychology. Some light is also thrown by the *Philebus* on the manner in which *Plato* treats contemporaries as witnesses to a truth, for which he has himself found a fuller expression.

In the *Cratylus* *Socrates* is seen moderating between the modern *Heraclitean* and the *Sophistical* or conventional view of language: thus a point of opposition is found between the doctrines which are blended in the *Theætetus*.

The Heraclitean or 'natural' theory is ironically set forth at great length; and etymology is tortured so as to bear witness to the flux of all things. The account given in the *Cratylus* of the earlier and later Heraclitean dogmas has been already quoted. The *Cratylus*, after acknowledging that there is a conventional element in language, and that it may possibly have no better foundation than the theory of a flux, ends, like the *Theætetus*, with a sort of 'dream' of the Ideas.

The *Meno* opens with the difficulty which haunts us in the *Theætetus*, How can one inquire about what he does not know? It is there solved by the half-mythical hypothesis of Recollection, to which the slave is made to bear unconscious testimony. This seems to throw some light upon the words of the *Theætetus* (which appear to be partly set aside as the dialogue proceeds), "I leave out of sight the intermediate processes of learning and forgetting, as beside our present purpose." (p. 188.) The image of the waxen block, which seems to take up what is thus reserved, makes it appear doubtful whether these words are meant to hint at any further theory. But a Megarian philosopher would probably know how to distinguish between *μαθάνειν* and *μαθεῖν*, *ἐπιμαθάνεσθαι* and *ἐπιλελῆσθαι*. (p. 191.)

It is of more importance, however, to examine the nature of the connexion hinted by Plato himself between the *Theætetus*, *Sophista* and *Politicus*. There is much substantial correspondence between the *Theætetus* and *Sophista*, which may be regarded as complementary to each other. In the *Theætetus* Knowledge is reduced to its elements; the aim of the *Sophista* is to point out the inadequacy of analysis as a method of Knowledge, and to harmonize opposite ideas, Being and Not-Being, Rest and Motion. The one dialogue is the basis of Plato's subjective, the other of his objective teaching. Heraclitus and Protagoras are examined in the one, Parmenides is brought to the test in the other. The *Theætetus* dwells chiefly on mental processes, the *Sophista* chiefly on ideas. The one is concerned with Knowledge, the other with Being. The possibility of false opinion is the cardinal difficulty of the one: the existence of the non-existent is the corresponding source of perplexity in the other. The highest point touched in the former dialogue is that there are ideas which the mind

itself contemplates unaided by sense, and which, it is hinted afterwards, have each of them an indivisible unity. These ideas or nobler elements are the foundation of the chief speculations in the latter. And the Megarian method of criticism which reigns almost unquestioned in the *Theætetus*, in the *Sophista* becomes criticised in its turn.

There is also an obvious bond of connexion between the *Sophista* and *Politicus*. The one is to the intellectual what the other is to the social and moral world. As the *Sophist* is to the *Philosopher*, so is the earthly *Statesman* to the true *King*.

But is there a common link, by which the three dialogues are bound in one? There is: and it is one which, though subtle, was probably regarded by Plato as of great importance. This is the gradual development in them of a dialectical method. Indeed, in the *Politicus* this is expressly spoken of as the chief thing, p. 286: *οὐν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις ἕνεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέβληται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικωτέρους γίνεσθαι*; A similar reason is given for the earnestness with which minute distinctions are pursued in the *Sophist*, p. 227: *ἀλλὰ γὰρ τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποιίας οὐδὲν ἦπτον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλου, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρά, τὸ δὲ μέγала ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαίρων. τοῦ κτήσασθαι γὰρ ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πειρωμένη τιμῇ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοιότερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τι τὰν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ πολὺ χαννότερον*. The same spirit of ironical disregard of the subject-matter in comparison of the method appears in the *Theætetus*, p. 174 (mingled with a deeper irony), where it is said that the philosopher regards a king as a species of herdsman. In the *Theætetus* also the Socratic element of this method is described under the image of *ματευτική*.

It is easier to perceive the existence of such a dialectical growth in the three dialogues than to trace the exact steps by which it is developed.

The mere outline of it is perhaps the following. First, the consciousness arises that the aim of all inquiry is to find a simple and comprehensive conception of the thing in question, (*ἐν, ἀπλοῦν—ἐν εἶδει περιλαβεῖν—ἐν λόγῳ προσειπεῖν*.) As a

means to this the Socratic questioning is set forth as the art of 'delivering' the mind. Then after the analysis of sensation, the mind is seen reviewing its sensations so as to arrive at general notions concerning them (*ἀναλογίζεσθαι—συλλογισμός.*) Further on, thought is described as a sort of question and answer within the mind (mental dialectic).

Again, the object of Knowledge appears first as a combination of unknown elements, then as a simple unity, then as a combination of which the elements are known, and lastly as a whole parted off from others by a distinguishing mark. With this conception of *λόγος* the *Theætetus* ends. With the same assumption that Definition implies Division, the *Sophista* opens. But presently it appears that these unities which are the objects of Knowledge (elementary ideas) are not fully known, until not only the differences but also the relations between them are perceived. I do not know This, until I acknowledge the existence of all that is Not-this. The existence even of that which is not must be acknowledged, as the condition of all existence. But in the *Politicus* it appears that this is not enough, but that the Other things from which the object of inquiry is distinguished, must not only be acknowledged as 'something different,' but must each be known in themselves, p. 281 : *πότερον οὖν ἡμῖν ὁ περὶ τῆς ὕφαντικῆς λόγος—ικανῶς ἔσται διωρισμένος, ἔαν ἄρ' αὐτὴν τῶν ἐπιμελειῶν, ὅπως περὶ τὴν ἐρεῶν ἐσθῆτα εἰσὶ, τὴν καλλίστην καὶ μεγίστην πασῶν τιθώμεν;* (cf. *Theæt.* 208 : *ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανῶς οἶμαι σοὶ εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.*) *ἢ λέγοιμεν μὲν ἂν τι ἀληθές, οὐ μὴν σαφές γε οὐδὲ τέλειον, πρὶν ἂν καὶ ταύτας αὐτῆς πάσας περιέλωμεν;* This seems to be in advance of the method of dichotomy, and may be described as a sort of return to the concrete. Compare *Phileb.* 16 : *μέχρι περ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἀπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴη τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα.*

And while fulness of conception as well as logical exactness is thus shown to be essential to Knowledge, Plato also points out the usefulness of the argument from analogy in proceeding from the more known to the less known, and from the lower to the higher, p. 277 : *Χαλεπὸν ὦ δαμόνιε, μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείκνυσθαι τι τῶν μειζόνων. κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον δύναρ εἰδῶς ἅπαντα πάντ' αὐτὰ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὑπαρ*

*διμοῖς*. The method of comparison, which was rejected as insufficient in the simpler and lower sphere, is embraced as the means of entrance to the higher: and it is shewn to be the part of inquiry not only to separate between things near together, but also to detect resemblances in what is remote. A more minute investigation of the connexion thus briefly sketched would probably repay the student. A slightly different aspect of it has been seized by Professor Thomson. *Camb. Phil. Tr.* vol. X. pt. 1.

It remains under the present head to consider the relation of the *Theætetus* to the account of knowledge which Plato gives in the *Republic*.

It has been common to speak of the Ideas of Plato as if they were the beginning and end of his philosophy; not only its consummation, but its foundation. But to see them as they were presented to him, we must learn to place ourselves behind them, and to regard them as a goal aimed at, but hardly reached. In the *Theætetus* he traces some of the steps by which he had arrived so far. He leads us upwards from the dark valley of sense, into which however some light from the upper region is allowed to penetrate, and makes us feel the difficulty of the ascent. We are not lifted at once to an ideal height, from which we can look down upon the world (*Sophist*, p. 216, *καθαρῶντες ἐψόθεν τὸν τῶν κάτω βίον*): every inch of advance is disputed, and we have the firm ground of experience beneath our feet.

Once, indeed, in the conversation with Theodorus, we are permitted to breathe the more serene air of the higher life, and mention is made of a Divine Pattern of goodness, to which the wise and righteous man becomes conformed. Compare *Rep.* B. IX. ad fin. 'Ἄλλ', ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἰσως παραδείγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν καροικίζειν. The passage in which this occurs, in which mention is also made of the region of pure souls, is such as vividly to recall the *Phædo*.

But in the argumentative part, we are led by slow and painful steps out of the limitations of sense, and to the last no attempt is made to extricate us from its conditions.

At first we are only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other: though binding them together in



bundles for the convenience of naming them. Presently perception and memory are shewn to be separable from sensation, but they are still occasioned by it. The "bonds" are further loosened by the observation that in judging of what is expedient for the future, the present impression of sense is worthless in comparison with reflection: but still the future is relative to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom is the impression of the moment when it arrives. Theætetus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some things, without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the objects of sense. Further inquiry is made into this process of the mind itself. It can think truly and also falsely. What difference is implied in this? An attempt is made to conceive this by reasoning from an abstract alternative (knowledge or ignorance, being or not being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the conception of a process between sensation and the recollection of former sensations, or between different abstractions of the world of sense laid up in the memory.

Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination of the indefinite elements of sensible things, then as an indivisible elementary unit arising out of them. But we are reminded that if the combination is known, then its elements must be known also. Yet the power of analysis is an inadequate test of knowledge. It is further requisite that the complete whole, which is the object of thought, be distinguished, by its characteristic difference, from every other.

The nearest approach that is made, in this gradual progress, to the doctrine of Ideas, consists in the acknowledgment that the mind in contemplating Being and Goodness is its own instrument, and in the conception raised for a moment and then relinquished, of the abstract whole ( $\mu\eta$  τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐκείναι ἐν τῇ γέγονε εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχου). These form the double summit of this ascent, 'rugged and steep,' through experience and reflection towards the ideal world, and upon these the ethereal structure of Plato's transcendental philosophy reposes. In this dialogue the subjective height alone is fully reached. Being and Goodness are still seen as relative, and the mists of doubt soon close over the momentary glimpse of the purely abstract whole as the object of knowledge.

Yet the consciousness, clearly brought to light, of the indeterminateness, the changes and contradictions of sense and opinion (see Rep. pp. 476, 479, 524), the endeavour to find a resting-place from the merely relative view by the Socratic method of definition, the reflection upon different processes of geometry and arithmetic, the Megarian notion suggested by Zeno and Socrates of Being as the Good, the conception of a pure act of the mind, and the questions raised about the elements, are so many distinct movements in the direction of the Ideas.

The approach is only a partial one, however. Socrates, in the *Theætetus*, speaks of Being as the universal attribute, and of goodness and beauty as perceptible by the comparison of the present with the past and future. In the *Republic*, Being is invested with a sort of Divinity, and the Form of Goodness is seen like the Sun in Heaven, giving light and colour and shape and nutriment to the supra-sensual world. The Ideas are no longer seen from beneath, but have lifted us into their own atmosphere. And yet they clothe themselves in imagery derived from the exploded doctrine of sensation. The sun was the favourite symbol of those who made motion their first principle: it is still used in a figure to typify that which is above motion. As the one principle was imagined to be the cause both of perception and life, so the other is conceived of as the Author both of Knowledge and Being. The Heraclitean element appears once again as the fire by whose glimmering light the shadows of borrowed forms are cast upon the wall of the cave or dungeon in which men lie bound. The combination of agent and patient in sensation, according to the earlier theory, resulted in the twin birth, ever recurring, of sensation and sensible thing. The consummation of the Soul's desires in the Ideal World is the Eternal Union of Mind and Being, the twin immortal offspring of which are Reason and Truth.

In the *Republic*, knowledge is shown to be inseparable from the reality of its object. And there are two conditions of this reality. The object of true Knowledge is, (1) above sense, (2) conformable to the Idea of Good. Knowledge is also divided into Absolute (or Transcendental) and Scientific<sup>k</sup>.

<sup>k</sup> Two slight discrepancies between the *Theætetus* and the *Republic* deserve to be noticed. (1.) In the *Theætetus* the word *ἰδέα* is applied to

It is unnecessary in this brief sketch to carry our thoughts onward to the latest and most complicated stage of Plato's philosophy. But we may allude in taking leave of this subject to the wide interval which separates the vague and simple notion of the diurnal revolution of the sun and of the sky, from the elaborate astronomy of the *Timæus*, and on the other hand to the close parallel which subsists between the doctrine of sense which is here rejected as a theory of knowledge, and the final theory of sensation as such, in which Pythagorean and other elements are blended with the Heraclitean. (*Tim.* 43. sqq.)

## §. 7.

It is manifest that the dialogue in its present form cannot have existed earlier than the date of the battle in which *Themistetus* is said to have been wounded; and the preface, at least, must probably have been written a few years later than this.

The destruction of the Spartan *Mora* by *Iphicrates* and his *peltasts*, an event which *Mr. Grote*, apparently with good reason, has placed as late as 390 B.C., seems on the whole to be most probably the occasion meant. As the *Corinthian* war continued three years after this, it is possible that some engagement may have taken place as late as the year 387. But if we are driven to suppose a still later date for the scene with which the *Themistetus* opens, the earliest assignable year is 369 B.C., when the combined forces of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians and their allies tried to dispute the passage of the *Isthmus* with *Epaminondas*.

So far as any arguments can be raised from the dialogue taken by itself, the hypothesis that it was written a few years later than 390 B.C. is quite satisfactory. It allows sufficient time for *Plato's* residence at *Megara* to have become the subject of reflection with him, and for his mind to have advanced considerably towards its final conceptions. If he was 30 at the death of *Socrates*, he would now be a little over 40. The bitterness caused by that event would not yet be mellowed

mental operations not immediately connected with sensation. In the *Republic* τὸ αἰσθητικὸν and τὸ νοητικὸν are identified. (2.) ὁρθὴ δόξα, which in the *Republic* is applied only

to practical notions, is used in the *Themistetus* indifferently of the juror's verdict and of the conclusions of the arithmetician.

down, or 'rubbed off by travel;' and the unwillingness to descend 'into the cave,' would naturally still give some harshness to the contrast between philosophy and Athenian life.

And even should it be necessary to place the Sophista and Politicus much later, the conception of a trilogy or tetralogy, though most important (in this case where it is suggested by Plato himself) as indicating connexion of thought, does not necessitate continuity of composition. No one supposes that the *Oedipus Tyrannus* of Sophocles immediately preceded the *Coloneus* in point of date. (εἰδὲ θεοῦς ὁρῶν τοιαύτης, ἐπιμύθεον καὶ ἄρᾶν ἐπιστάει παρ' ἑμῖν.)

On the other hand, even the year 369 B.C. (though some time must surely be allowed for the composition of the dialogue, and we read of no *battle* till the year 368 B.C.) would seem from internal evidence considerably too late. Plato would then be upwards of 60 years old. He is said to have died in 347 B.C. at the age of 81 or 82. It seems hardly probable that at a time when he must have been putting his thoughts into their most perfect shape in the Republic, he should make an elaborate return to the 'elements' of a rejected philosophy, or that the perplexities he had encountered in his sojourn with the Megarian philosophers should 'trouble' him as they once had done, or present themselves to him with the same vividness and reality. The slight way in which the two theories 'that wisdom is the good,' and 'that pleasure is the good,' are touched upon in Rep. p. 505, 509, contrasts forcibly with the earnestness with which in the *Theætetus* the Cyrenaic theory of knowledge is treated as an open question, and the strong Megarian influence which is throughout perceptible. And while it is most probable that the *Theætetus* is written from a point of view more advanced than any which is allowed to appear in the dialogue itself, it is very difficult to conceive that (e. g.) the passage in which the existence and goodness, sameness and difference of things, are shown to be immediately perceived by the mind, was written nearly at the same period with the account of the Idea of Good in the Republic. (See the beginning of B. VII. where the sameness and difference (e. g.) of the fingers is spoken of as one of the first perceptions of the awakening intellect.) The freshness and individuality of the person of Socrates, and the close identification of the

method with his teaching are also features which consist better with the earlier date.

The chief difficulty in the way of the above hypothesis is connected with the person of Theætetus; who in the conversation with Socrates is represented as a boy of about 16 (*μειράκιον*) while Euclides and Terpsion speak of him in the preface in terms which imply that he was already a distinguished and valued citizen and had justified the prophetic words of Socrates. (*Ολος ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν αὐτόνῳ εἶναι—τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι—ἀληθῆ εἶπεν.*) If the date of the battle in question were earlier than 390 B. C. Theætetus could hardly have had time to fulfil the prophecy of Socrates even in the eyes of his personal friends. But an interval of 9 years does seem sufficient for this. The youth of 16 would have become a man of 25, and might well have earned distinction in light-armed combat, and in other ways. Some touches in the conversation would then acquire additional point. Terpsion has no doubt of the prowess of his friend, yet Euclides mentions with some pride that men had praised him for his conduct in the battle. This praise is also the more natural, if the kind of fighting was one comparatively untried, and the occasion one in which the national honour of Athens and Sparta was nearly concerned. The words, too, *εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι*, have a more touching significance, if they apply to one who seems likely to be cut off in his prime.

The difficulty is greater, however, when the notices of later writers are taken into account. If Theætetus is supposed to recover from his illness and his wounds, the dialogue seems to be robbed of a great ornament. And yet Theætetus (the same Theætetus who had heard Socrates and followed Plato) is spoken of by Suidas as a distinguished mathematician who taught at Heraclea and was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. That he should be a distinguished mathematician before 25, and even a discoverer in geometry, is not impossible (for, as Aristotle says, *μαθητικὸς μὲν παῖς γένοισ' ἔν*) but that he should have become a teacher of it in a foreign city is less probable, even if he is supposed to live to the age of 28. And the complaint of Plato in the Republic, that the science of solid geometry was in its infancy, would seem hardly



justifiable, if the treatise on the regular solids had been in existence so long.

But (1.) it is not *impossible* that Theætetus may have so far recovered of his wounds as to be able to be a teacher of mathematics. (2.) The point of the difficulty lies in a late testimony, a cross-examination of which, if it were possible, might place the facts in a different light.

Still it becomes worth while to examine the hypothesis of a later date (368 B. C.), the reasons against which have been already mentioned. It may be said in favour of it; (1.) that it allows ample time for all Theætetus' distinctions; (2.) that a disciple of Plato would fight more willingly with the Lacedæmonians on his side; (3.) that Megara was at this time in alliance with Athens, and hence it would be natural to expect him to put up there. (On the former occasion, however, she seems to have been neutral.)

The preface may be of this date, and yet the chief part of the dialogue may be earlier. It may have been sketched during Plato's residence at Megara (*ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότε εὐθὺς—ὑπομνήματα*) and filled up and retouched at intervals (*ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμνησκόμενος ἔγραφον*); and long afterwards the preface may have been added to indicate the Megarian character of the dialogue.

Some such conjecture (which in any case is not improbable) would seem to be the natural resort, if it became necessary to suppose the preface written after 368 B. C.

§ 9.

The Theætetus and Aristotle.

One chief source of difficulty in the Theætetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the conception of the Proposition<sup>1</sup>. In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phenomena, bound up with the ever-varying impressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, How is false opinion possible, there appears indeed a

<sup>1</sup> Συλλογισμὸς in the Theæt. (p. 186) is nearly equivalent to "abstraction and generalization."

sort of consciousness that every act of thought implies a subject (p. 188. *οὐτε περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων οὐτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*), and that to think is to say to oneself, "This is that;"—which first shows itself in the example, "I think Theætetus is Socrates," and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that thought is the mind's silent discourse.<sup>m</sup> But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to prædicate in any proposition. Thus it is assumed that when one prædicate is substituted for another, (as when, in the propositions, "Yonder man is Socrates," or Thersites was handsome," the terms "Socrates" and "handsome" have been substituted by mistake for "Theætetus" and "ugly;") this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were predicated of each other: (thus, "Theætetus is Socrates," "What is ugly is handsome.")

The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block, but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, "the sum of 7 and 5 is 11," and saying "11 is 12."

Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination.

This confusion between subject and prædicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of *δύναμις* with *ἐνέργεια*. The subject is all its prædicates *δυνάμει*, and is that which, together with the opposite quality, becomes *τόδε τι*. Thus *Καλλίας ἄμουσος* becomes *μουσικός*: hence Callias is in one sense the material part.

It may be said therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or

<sup>m</sup> A close study of this passage (pp. 189, 190) will afford convincing proof of the indeterminate state of the science of logic at this time, and the

necessity of getting behind Aristotle (if the expression may be permitted) in order to understand Plato.

subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms.

1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the *Theætetus* which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two very similar passages of the *Metaphysics* (Γ. 1005 b.—1012 b., K. 1061 b.—1063 b.), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction.

The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, "Every thing at once is and is not." This is at first put forward with the qualification, "Some (i. e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this:" but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, "adopted by many physical philosophers." The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man's impression is true, then contradictories are true (and not true) together.

Aristotle does not profess to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (οἱ μὲν γὰρ πείθους δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίας<sup>n</sup>). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue. (1.) "We will not say that the act of predication must either *be* or *not be* something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question; but we will say, that every predicate *means* something, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to predicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, man and not man cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject."

(2.) "The difference between the same man's impressions

<sup>n</sup> Cf. Hom. II. B. II. 188, 198. Ὅντινα μὲν βασιλεῖα καὶ ἔρχον ἄνδρα κίχλην, τὸν δ' ἄγαν οἷς ἐπέσσειν ἱερῆν.

σασκε παραστάς.—Ὅν δ' αὖ δῆμον τ' ἄνδρα ἰδοὶ βοῶντα τ' ἱερῆναι, τὸν σελήντριν ἐλάσσονεν, ὁμοκλήσασκε τε μύθη.

at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the past, present, and future."

There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e. g. "nearer and farther from the truth," necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue, and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it, is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning:

(1.) It is assumed as part of the theory, that everything is thus and not-thus (*οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως*). But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the *Theætetus* (p. 183). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite; and this in two ways: first, as "not-this" means "everything but this," it follows that everything must be everything else<sup>o</sup>; and, secondly, (with Plato *Theæt. loc. cit.*) if *οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως* is true, then its contradictory (*οὐδ' οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως*) must also be true; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (*τὸ μὴ δὲ λέγει*).

(2.) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown, that in making all impressions true, he makes them also false, and his own theory amongst the rest.

(3.) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknowledges the distinction between good and bad. Every thing then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, "as Plato puts it," with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome, than a chance person.

<sup>o</sup> καὶ γίνεσθαι: δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Aristotle thinks that if this argument had been put to

Heraclitus himself, he would have been compelled to acknowledge its force.

Aristotle further points out the absolute relativity of the doctrine. They cannot say, "What appears, is," but "What appears to me, is to me."

The following scattered touches may be quoted without comment.

"The theory of Protagoras is called *ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα διόφρασις*."

"My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing."

"The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real."

"Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute."

"When a thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then, (i. e. the healthy one) and not the other, is to be held the measure of things."

"Language is made impossible."

"The man thinks thus and not thus : i. e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks. He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable."

Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down any thing to start with, and allow it to remain firm. Other points of comparison will be mentioned in the notes. In brief, Aristotle meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity of form.

2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place between them, and there is a world in which growth and decay, generation and corruption, are ever going on, viz. the world of sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the relations expressed in mathematics.

This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle's theory of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the indeterminateness of matter (Phys. Ausc. I.) and points out that therefore it can only be the object of knowledge, "by analogy," with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation as a realization of mental life, is very



similar to that expressed in the *Theætetus*. The *ἐνέργεια αίσθησεως*, which is inseparable from the *ἐνέργεια αίσθητοῦ*, is the meeting point of active and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a process between object and subject.) But the *φαντασία* or mental image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in thought, in the *Theætetus* is merged in sensation, although the term is simply the noun of *φαίνεισθαι* (*φαντασία δὲ καὶ αἰσθησις ταῦτόν*), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle. The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the possibility of error<sup>2</sup>.

3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or many, e. g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole: much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of receiving a certain form.

At this point Plato (in the *Theætetus*) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the *end* (*τὸ οὐ τέλος*) is bound up with that of the form.

As the tendency in the *Theætetus* is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element: (i. e. logically.) (*Met. Δ. 1014 b.*)

4. Among the germs which the *Theætetus* (like most of

<sup>2</sup> (*Met. I. 1010 b*: *Ὅτι δ' αἰσθησις* where the *φαντασία* is false the *ἔκτα* *φαιδὴς τοῦ ἴδιου ἑαυτοῦ ἀλλ' ἡ φαντασία* may be true. *De Somn.* 3. Cf. *de An.* *οὐ ταῦτόν τῃ αἰσθησει.*) Again, even *III. 3.*

The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue) on this point of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view:

Aristotle thus traces the gradual ascent of the human mind from sense to knowledge:	Plato distinguishes	
7. σοφία.	<i>ἐπιστήμη</i>	
6. ἐπιστήμη.	from	
5. τέχνη.		
4. ἐμπειρία.		
3. μῆμη.		
2. φαντασία.		
1. αἰσθησις.		

These two are in some cases inseparable. { *μῆμη* } each of which is accompanied by { *ἔκτα* } *φαντασία*.  
{ *αἰσθησις*. }

Plato's dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formulæ, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle's distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (*ἐπιστάσθαι, θεωρεῖν*),—his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a potential and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the *Theætetus* only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary symbol. But the distinction latent in the image between the potential and the actual, is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable completeness.

While Aristotle, in adding the corner stone to the fabric of Greek philosophy, could not but draw largely from Plato, either immediately or through the discussions of his followers, yet the presence in him must be admitted of a wholly distinct element, which gives a different value to his speculations, even when in substance they coincide. This may be briefly described as the determination to be at once logical and matter of fact, the conviction that philosophy must be consistent on the one hand with itself, and on the other with experience. This return to common sense, so valuable in restoring the balance of philosophy, and this subordination of all things to logic, may be viewed partly as the natural advance or recoil from the dialectic of Plato, but they are partly the culmination of a separate tendency of the Greek mind.

## § 10.

Modern  
aspects.

It has been already noticed, that the completeness with which the doctrine of sense is developed in the *Theætetus*, probably influenced the expression of cognate ideas in the later period of Ancient Philosophy. Passing with this slight remark from the Ancient world, we proceed finally to notice in a few words the bearing of the *Theætetus* upon modern metaphysical inquiry.

And first it is right to observe the importance of the transition. The comparison of Ancient and Modern Philosophy is very different from the study of the relations between two schools or two periods in either. The links by which they are

historically connected are comparatively slender: the external similarity, though sometimes obvious, is generally superficial: but there is also a deeper analogy, like what may be observed between separate kingdoms of nature.

Modern Philosophy starts from a more inward experience of the mind, from a wider and more varied observation of the external world, than was possible in the days of Thales or even of Parmenides. Ancient Philosophy had contributed to this, but indirectly. Descartes did not start from the Platonic Idea, but from the consciousness of his own highly-wrought mind. Bacon rebelled against the authority of Aristotle, and sought for natural and not logical 'forms' in the Interpretation of Nature. And yet it is not merely fanciful to see a kind of parallel between the resting-place from doubt, 'Cogito, ergo sum,' and the resting-place from what is particular and changeable—"The mind contemplating Being and Goodness is its own instrument:" or between Bacon's 'natural form' and the Platonic or Aristotelian *eides*. Indeed in the latter case, the mode of expression is adapted from the Greek Philosophy.

That which gives the Thesetetus a peculiarly modern interest is its comparatively subjective character. This is partly inherent in the nature of the question, but is also partly due to the human reference of Protagoras and the self-inquiry of Socrates. An approach only is made to the consideration of abstract Being; the mind is in vain endeavouring to find the determining law of truth within itself. Thus it fails at one time to find any firm standing-ground, at another to conceive the possibility of error. In like manner Descartes, starting from within, is obliged to postulate the existence of God, almost before he can establish his first principle, certainly before he can determine whether the waking or the sleeping life is real, and feels almost as keenly as a Greek Philosopher could have done, the difficulty of conceiving error as possible<sup>4</sup>.

Every metaphysical work, ancient or modern, is sure to

<sup>4</sup> E. g. Medit. III. p. 18: Jam quod ad ideas attinet, si solæ in se spectentur, nec ad aliud quid illas referam, falsæ proprie esse non possunt: nam sive capram sive chimæram imaginem, non minus verum est me unam imaginari quam alteram. Nulla etiam

in ipso voluntate vel affectibus falsitas est timenda, nam quamvis prava, quamvis etiam ea quæ nunquam sunt possum optare, non tamen ideo non verum est illa me optare, ac proinde sola superveniunt judicia in quibus mihi cavendum est ne fallar.

possesses some points of affinity and contrast to the *Theætetus*. All that will be attempted here is to indicate very briefly the points in the dialogue itself which seem capable of illustrating more recent phases of reflection. These are, (1) The analysis of sensation or perception. (2) The semi-physical theory of 'motion.' (3) The 'subjective' doctrine of Protagoras and the Cyrenaics. (4) The *Theætetus* as a psychology. (5) Logical difficulties.

1. The *Theætetus* contains a theory of sensation; or rather a doctrine of impressions of sense, in each of which there is shown to be an active and a passive—in modern language, an objective and a subjective—element. No attempt is made, however, at least in the earlier part of the dialogues, to distinguish the physical from the mental in the act of sense, the recipient from the active state of the Subject, sensation from perception. Warmth, whiteness, even comparative size and number, are viewed, so far as the Subject is concerned, (in common with pleasures, desires, hopes, fears,) simply as phenomena, experiences or impressions. And when presently it appears that there is something more in each of us than a bundle of diverse faculties of sense, and that the mind, which receives and judges all, is one; the distinction is drawn, not between the mind's sensation and perception, e. g. of a white object, but between its own perceptions and the impressions which it receives through the body: e. g. the eye informs me that this ball is white, that that ball is red; the mind, reviewing these sensations, perceives that each of them *is*, that it is *one*, that it is the same with itself, different from the other, that they are together two: also that the redness and the whiteness *are*, and that they are different, and that this difference *is* a real thing.

But towards the end of the dialogue, where it is said that the simplest elements, for instance, of speech and music, may be the objects of knowledge, this may be regarded as an admission that simultaneous with every impression of sense there is, or may be, a perception of the mind.

This reasoning is not without its bearing on modern theories of sensation and perception: (and it probably implies an observation of inward facts not less complete;) but it is not to be confounded with them.

It stands in a closer and more concrete relation to the mind's experience of itself; it is far simpler, and, though less distinct, is more luminous, expressing a fresh and vivid consciousness, and an intensity of inquiry, which has not yet assumed a set form, or attained to definite results, but is neither overclouded and paralysed by subjective uncertainty, nor lost in the abstractions of logic, nor perplexed by the distracting influences of physical science.

2. For although this theory of sensation is united with a doctrine of motion, and Plato's argument may thus seem to touch upon modern physiological inquiries, or even upon the theories of light and heat and sound, the sense in which the word *motion* is used is vague in the extreme. So far as it is used with a physical meaning, it is not distinguished from force, nor from matter, for this is left out of view. It is moreover the symbol of relation and change. And the term thus metaphorically used is not accurately defined, for while the object and subject are said to suffer change, sensations and qualities are said to be in locomotion (p. 156). It is not easy for us, with our more definite conceptions, to assign any very intelligible meaning to this. But it may be conceded that there is here an anticipation of the fact, that sensation is in every case occasioned by motion. A nearer approach to scientific truth may be found in the notion of the absolute relativity of phenomena. Studying the world of experiences from within the mind, 'ex analogia hominis,' Plato regards the objects of sensation as wholly indeterminate, and can find no true 'measure of things' but in the contemplation of abstract Ideas. I am conscious of my own sensation, but I cannot compare it with that of any other being, still less with any universal standard. Therefore I must not look for truth here, but in the world of Ideas. Modern Experimental Science is equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has found means of measuring the 'motions' by which they are caused, through the effect of the same motions upon other things besides our senses. 'When the same wind is blowing' (Theæt. p. 152) 'one of us feels it warm, another cold,'—but the mercury of the thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that



the sensation of heat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law.

3. The philosophy of Protagoras may be described in modern language as a rhetorical scepticism, that of the Cyrenaics as a sensational idealism.

An interesting parallel might be drawn (for instance) between Protagoras and Hume. But it must be kept in mind that scepticism is a relative term, and that while that of Protagoras was directed probably as much against astronomical and mathematical speculation, as against the Eleatic Absolute Being, that of Hume was aimed at the popular belief in supernatural causes, and those *a priori* notions or Innate ideas, which modern metaphysicians had in part elaborated and in part inherited from Greek philosophy. Both poured contempt upon the popular religion of their day; both pointed to the limited and relative nature of human knowledge; and both were content to rest within the clearly defined boundary of a 'certain uncertainty,' without even an aspiration after Absolute or Ideal Truth. Both (if Plato's representation in the *Protagoras* may be trusted) eminently possessed the faculty of lucid and persuasive exposition, which is sometimes found accompanying a kind of narrowness in speculation. But here the resemblance probably ends. Protagoras may however with justice be regarded as the type of a class,—the utilitarian or common sense sceptics,—of which Hume is in modern times perhaps the most brilliant example.

On the other hand the Cyrenaic dogma may be compared with the destructive or negative side of Berkeley. But their refined contempt for the materialists, who 'believe only in what they can clutch between their hands,' is of a different order from Berkeley's endeavour to resolve concrete existence into ideas of the mind. His denial of material substance as a metaphysical abstraction, was consistent on the one hand with the most searching physical inquiry, and on the other with his belief in the reality of universals, as thoughts of the Eternal mind. But the Cyrenaic could not be said to analyse phenomena: he merely dwelt upon the consciousness of the instant, and limited his view to that. True, he sought a ground of objective reality in a movement from without, corresponding to the impression

within, and embraced both, the active and the passive movement, in the formula of universal change, but universal change is at each instant a mere negation. Hence, to dwell in thought for a moment on this theory was to reduce it to nothingness. And, to speak more generally, modern controversies about the 'reality of the external world' would have little meaning for any of the Ancient Philosophers, who knew so little of the laws of the material universe, although the *spirit* (for instance) of Parmenides and of Democritus may be viewed as typical of all subsequent ideal and material theories.

4. As an inquiry into the nature of Knowledge and Opinion, and the boundary which divides them, the *Theætetus* may be compared with Locke's *Essay on the Human Understanding*. Such a comparison would be interesting for many reasons. Besides the sort of kindred which often exists between minds of genuine originality even in distant ages, there is in some respects a similarity of position. Both inquiries commence from within, in both Knowledge is reduced to its elements (simple ideas of sensation), both occupy the middle ground between Material and Ideal systems, both rest upon experience, both rise by gradual steps from sense to reason; in both reflection and imagination are engaged in bodying forth the mind's modes of thinking, (with perfect originality in both, yet with the most curious coincidences in the kind of images employed: compare Locke's sandstone and marble impressions, and his dark room or cabinet, with Plato's waxen block and aviary;) in both the office of the Reason is represented to be the combination (or comparison) of the impressions of sense. Both in short present us with a psychology, clear and simple, based upon experience, and in a certain way complete.

But, not to mention the difference of style, the comparative absence in Locke of the poetical element, and the influence which Natural Philosophy exercised upon his method, there is this radical distinction between the attitude of Plato in the *Theætetus*, and that of the English philosopher, that while Plato's chief endeavour is to rise from the elements of sense to higher things, the first effort of Locke is to recal the human mind from a spurious Platonism to its experience of itself; and while the highest point reached in the *Theætetus* (that the mind reviewing its impressions and determining of their Being,

Unity, or Beauty, is its own instrument) is but the 'topmost round' of 'young ambition's ladder,' Locke rests contentedly within the subjective limits which he believed to be imposed by Providence on the human mind.

5. Lastly, the modified Eleaticism of Euclides, whom Socrates once described as 'capable of arguing with Sophists but not with men,' is not without its counterpart in modern philosophy. It may be described in modern language as the tendency to extreme logical analysis: to rest, that is, in the abstractions of logic, refusing to appreciate the subtlety of Nature and the complexity of the world, and to endeavour to conceive of things as they really are.

(a.) Euclides does not stand alone in his method of following a theory to its logical conclusions, instead of inquiring into the reasonableness of the grounds on which it is based.

(b.) Nor is the 'victim of a mercenary logic,' *ἐν φρέσιν συνεχόμενος* (caught in a pit-fall), who is compelled to admit that he sees and does not see, in a much worse plight than the student who finds himself bound hand and foot, by victorious subjective analysis, within the limits of his own organism.

(c.) The paradoxical difficulty, 'Is it possible to know and not to know?'—'How can you inquire about that which you do not know,'—has a still nearer resemblance to metaphysical paradoxes among ourselves: e. g. How is it possible that Knowledge (or Inquiry) should transcend the limits of experience! In both cases the idea of a tentative and partial Knowledge, of a sort of faith of the Intellect, is left out of view, and the result of both is equally fatal to the spirit of inquiry.

(d.) In the *Theætetus* the Megarian tendency to divide every thing from every thing (*τὸ πᾶν ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποχωρῆσαι*) is met by the conception of the blending of diverse elements in a higher unity. This thought is further developed in the *Sophista*, and, as we have seen, is taken up by Aristotle. Though expressed by the Greek philosophers in a dialectical form, this assertion of the presence of a higher unity in every complex whole,—of the inadequacy of analysis as a method of knowledge,—is of permanent value. For it is directed against a confusion to which many others are parallel. Such, for instance, in modern times would be the confusion between facts or phenomena, and their principles or laws, or between

organism and life, or between experience and reason, or between the forms of language or imagination, and the creative mind. We may doubt, with Plato in the *Theætetus*, whether the higher can even be known apart from the lower, but this difficulty ought not to lead to their identification in thought.

(c.) The barren sophistry into which the method degenerated in the hands of the followers of Euclides affords a useful warning to 'intellectualism' in every time.

The mind of Plato in the *Theætetus* is keenly alive to the presence of logical difficulties, but is neither irritated nor deterred by them. He unravels them with the utmost patience, but at the same time treats them with a kind of compassionate irony, as if he refused to be bound within the framework of contemporary thought.

In an age when so much yearns for reconciliation, when, *Conclusion.* for instance, the paths of natural and mental science, after swerving far asunder, promise to converge again, when the abstractions of the intellect begin to stand in a new relation to the forms of the imagination, from which they had seemed to be finally severed, it is an interesting and suggestive labour, to turn again the earlier pages of the book of human Inquiry: to find there 'anticipations of Nature' indissolubly woven together with the reflections of the mind upon itself: to see a fast-ripening philosophy labouring with an imperfect logic; and language, and poetical imagination, with mixed modes of sense, casting their many-coloured veil over the irregularities of mental growth, and giving form and life and substance to dialectical and speculative thought. This Attic prime of intellectual manhood is beautiful to contemplate, even if philosophy may not hope from such fountains to renew her youth.





# ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

T. I.  
ed. Steph.  
p. 142.

ΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΥ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ  
ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ,  
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ.

ἌΡΤΙ, ὦ Τερψίων, ἡ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ;

ΤΕΡ. Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐξήτουν κατ' ἀγορὰν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον, ὅτι οὐχ οἷός τ' ἡ εὐρεῖν.

ΕΥ. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ κατὰ πόλιν.

ΤΕΡ. Ποῦ μὴν;

ΕΥ. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέτυχον 10 φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου Ἀθή-  
ναζε.

ΤΕΡ. Ζῶντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι;

ΕΥ. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις· χαλεπῶς μὲν γὰρ

The  
Preface.  
Terpsion and Eucli-  
des meet  
before  
Euclides' house in  
Megara.  
They con-  
verse about  
the danger-  
ous state of  
Theætetus,  
of whom  
Socrates  
had truly  
prophesied

3. ΕΥΚΛΕΙΔΗΣ, ΤΕΡΨΙΩΝ]  
Euclides and Terpsion appear  
also in the Phædo as the Mega-  
rians who were present at the  
death of Socrates, p. 59: Καὶ Με-  
γαροῖν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.  
Compare with the preservation  
of this dialogue by Euclides,  
and the introduction of Theo-  
dorus of Cyrene, the preserva-  
tion of the Pythagorean dia-  
logue by Phædo, and the intro-  
duction in it of Simmias and  
Cebes (Φιλολόφῳ συγγεγονότες).

6. καὶ σέ γε] With some em-  
phasis. I have been looking  
for you.

7. καὶ ἐθαύμαζον] It is per-  
haps intimated that Euclides,  
like his master Socrates, was to

be found daily in the market-  
place.

9. μὴν expresses surprise.

11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρα-  
τοπέδου] For the expression  
compare Charm. p. 25: Ἐκ  
Ποιυδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου.  
The date is either earlier than  
B. C. 387, or later than B. C.  
369. Either supposition pre-  
sents some difficulty. See In-  
troduction.

13. Ζῶντι ἡ τετελευτηκότι]  
Spoken not, as Stallbaum says,  
in jest, but in serious alarm,  
occasioned by the word φερο-  
μένῳ.

14. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις]  
'Indeed, hardly alive.' 'Only  
just alive.'

great things. Euclides has preserved the conversation, which Socrates a little before his death held with Theætetus when a boy.

ἔχει καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμάτων τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν αὐτὸν p.142.  
αἰρεῖ τὸ γεγονὸς νόσημα ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι.

ΤΕΡ. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία;

ΕΥ. Ναί.

5 ΤΕΡ. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι.

ΕΥ. Καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὃ Τερψίων, ἐπεὶ τοι  
καὶ νῦν ἤκουόν τινων μάλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων αὐτὸν περὶ  
τὴν μάχην.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γ' ἄσπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμα-  
10 στότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ  
Μεγαροῖ κατέλυν;

ΕΥ. Ἐπείγετο οἴκαδε· ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ' ἐδεόμην καὶ  
συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἤθελε. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας  
αὐτόν, ἀπὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σω-  
15 κράτους, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε δὴ εἶπε καὶ περὶ τού-  
του. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν  
αὐτῷ μειρακίῃ ὄντι, καὶ συγγενόμενός τε καὶ δια-  
λεχθεὶς πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καὶ μοι  
ἐλθόντι Ἀθήναζε τοὺς τε λόγους οὓς διελέχθη αὐτῷ  
20 διηγήσατο, καὶ μάλα ἀξίους ἀκοῆς, εἶπέ τε ὅτι πᾶσα δ  
ἀνάγκη εἴη τοῦτον ἐλλόγιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς  
ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι.

2. αἰρεῖ] 'affects him.' Compare Soph. Ant. 606: Τὰν οὖθ' ὕπνος αἰρεῖ ποθ' ὁ παντογῆρας.

5. Οἶον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι] 'What a noble life is then in peril!' 'What a loss such a man would be!' It is natural to conclude from this that Theætetus must have been already distinguished; although, perhaps, not in war.

10. αὐτοῦ Μεγαροῖ] 'Why did he not stop where he was, and

come and put up at Megara!'

14. ἀπὼν πάλιν] 'as I returned.'

16. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives a slight uncertainty to the expression. It here qualifies rather the mark of time δ. π. τ. θ. than the infinitive ἐντυχεῖν. So below, p. 144, δοκεῖσι belongs more in sense to διεισφάμενος than to λίπον. 'I think it was a little while before his death that he met with him.'

p.142. ΤΕΡ. Καὶ ἀληθῇ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι;

ΕΥ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ οὐτως γε ἀπὸ στόματος ἄλλ' ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότε εὐθὺς οἴκαδ' ἐλθὼν ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμνησκόμενος ἔγραψον, καὶ ὁσάκις Ἀθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπανηρότων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμνημήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην ὥστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὁ λόγος γέγραπται.

b ΤΕΡ. Ἀληθῇ ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μὲν 10 τοὶ αἰεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδείξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο.

1. Καὶ ἀληθῇ γε—εἶπε] In the editions before Heindorf these words were given to ΕΥ. But in the Bodleian MS. (in which the initials of the interlocutors are generally omitted) a small capital T has been inserted over καί. [Bekk. — : καὶ Δ. vulgo enim : ἀνὰρ.]

3. οὐκ οὐτως—γε] Not, at least, in the way you seem to expect. οὐτως] as we are, on the spot. Comp. the use of νῦν οὕτως.

4. ἐγραψάμην—ἔγραψον] I wrote for my own use—I went on writing.

5. ὑπομνήματα] 'notes.' See Phædr. 275, where letters are called ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον.

7. ὃ μὴ ἐμνημήμην] = εἴ τι μὴ ἐμνημήμην. μὴ gives indefiniteness to δ. Is it possible that we have here an indication of the mode in which the dialogue was really composed?

10. Ἀληθῇ ἤκουσα] The clauses are parallel and not consequent, hence the δούδετον.

καὶ μάλιστα, κ. τ. λ.] 'And, now I think of it, I have always meant to ask you to shew it me, but have let opportunities

slip till now.' That which is really most emphatic is expressed by the participle. It has been objected to this rendering, (a) that δεῦρο is not used as an adverb of time except with μέχρις or διέ, (β) that διατριβεῖν, meaning 'to delay,' could not have been used here without an adverb of place. But, (a) such transference of adverbs from place to time is not unusual, and it occurs in the case of δεῦρο in Plat. Tim. 21 : 'Ἦν ἤδη ἡ πόλις ἔκραζε μὲν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἐργασμάτων οὐ διήρασκε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. In the present passage, the deviation from common use is softened by the neighbourhood of αἰ. Comp. Æsch. Eum. 596 : Καὶ δεῦρό γ' αἰεὶ τὴν εὐχὴν οὐ μύθομαι. Such a refinement upon a common phrase is in the manner of Plato. And (β) there is no reason why διατριβεῖν should not be used here absolutely, with a touch of blame in it, as meaning not simply 'to delay,' but 'to waste time.' See Rep. 472 : Ἀίγα, καὶ μὴ διάτριβε. Aristoph. Equ. 515 : Θεοῖ

ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; πάντως ἔγωγε p.1  
καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὥς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἦκων.

ΕΥ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Ἑρινού Θεαί-  
τητον προὔπεμψα, ὥστε οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπανοίμην.  
s ἀλλ' ἴωμεν, καὶ ἡμῖν ἅμα ἀναπανομένοις ὁ παῖς ἀνα-  
γνώσεται.

ΤΕΡ. Ὁρθῶς λέγεις.

ΕΥ. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Τερψίων, τουτί· ἐγρα-  
ψάμην δὲ δὴ οὕτωςι τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη  
10 διηγούμενον ὡς διηγείτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη  
διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ  
τῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν c  
πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγῆσεις περὶ αὐ-  
τοῦ τε, ὅποτε λέγοι ὁ Σωκράτης οἷον Κάγῳ ἔφην ἡ

γὰρ ἀπὸ οὐκ ἔπ' ἀποίας τοῦτο πε-  
ποιθὸς διατρέβω, where it is  
used with a participle as here.  
Thuc. VI. 42, 43, 47.

1. πάντως ἔγωγε] This asyn-  
deton is very frequent. Infr.  
162: Πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μὲν  
ἑμμελῶς σοὶ ἐφαίντο ὑπακούειν.  
Polit. 269: Πάντως οὐ πολλὰ ἐκ-  
φεύγεις παιδιὰς ἔτη.

2. καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι]  
'Besides, as I have walked in  
from the country, I should any  
how be glad of the rest.'

3. Ἑρινού] A spot on the Ce-  
phissus, close to Eleusis, where  
it was fabled that Pluto had de-  
scended with Proserpine. Paus.  
I. 92. There were other places  
of the name.

5. ὁ παῖς] Euclides' servant.

9. οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον  
κ.τ.λ.] These words are parallel  
to οὕτωςι τὸν λόγον, depending  
on ἐγραψάμην. Compare Apol.  
19: Ταῦτα—ἰωρᾶτε—Σωκράτη  
—περιφερόμενον.

11. τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ]  
Theodorus the mathematician  
of Cyrene, with whom, accord-  
ing to a tradition, Plato once  
studied. Two points in him  
are of importance as regards  
this dialogue: he is a geome-  
trician, and stands thus on the  
threshold of philosophy; and  
he is of Cyrene, the city of  
Aristippus, with whom he is  
also connected as being one of  
the friends of Protagoras. See  
infr. 164: Οἱ ἐπίτροποι τοῖς Προ-  
ταγόρας κατέλιπον—Ἰν Θεόδωρος  
εἶς ἔδει.

12. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, κ.τ.λ.]  
Imitated by Cicero, de Amic.  
c. 1: Quasi enim ipsos induxi  
loquentes, ne inquam et inquit  
saepius interponerentur.

13. αἱ μεταξὺ] The bits of  
narration in the interstices of  
the dialogue.

περὶ αὐτοῦ τε] This is the  
reading of the Bodleian MS.  
If it is adopted, περὶ αὐτοῦ de-

3. Καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, ὅτι Συνέφη ἢ Οὐχ ὠμολόγει, τούτων ἕνεκα ὡς αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΤΕΡ. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἀπο τρόπου, ὦ Εὐκλείδη.

ΕΥ. Ἀλλά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, ὦ

The  
Dialogue.  
Socrates,  
meeting

pende immediately on *δηγήσεις*, and *ὥστε λέγει* is *exegetical*.

1. *ἡ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου*] sc. λέγει. *ἡ* κ. τ. λ. referring to *ὥστε λέγει* is introduced instead of the regular *καὶ* κ. τ. λ. answering to *περὶ αὐτοῦ* *sc.* The interruptions both concerning Socrates himself, when he told me, (e. g.) 'said I,' or 'I replied;' or again, when he told of the respondent, that 'he assented,' or 'he did not agree.'

4. *οὐδέν γε ἀπο τρόπου*] Comp. Rep. 470: *Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἀπο τρόπου λέγεις*—*Ὅρα δὲ καὶ τόδε εἰ πρὸς τρόπον λέγω.* See also Shakespeare's Julius Caesar (Act. II. sc. 3.): 'Why bird and beast from (i. e. contrary to) quality and kind.' (*ἀπο* is the Bodleian reading.) It is not necessary to suppose any allusion to the form of the Megarian dialogue, but it adds point to this expression if we suppose that it was cast in this dramatic mould. There is then a touch of nature in the approbation of Terpsion. This is at any rate better, if a reason must be found for everything, than to suppose with Schleiermacher, that Plato is acknowledging an error in his own earlier style. But perhaps it is enough to say that the form is adopted for the sake of clearness, which was of

great importance in this and the two following dialogues. And it is equally natural that Euclides should omit *Κἀγὼ ἔφη*, &c. in a written report, and that *viva voce* reporters in other dialogues should insert them. In this Preface we have been introduced to Theætetus as a distinguished citizen. In what follows we are to see the promise of his youth. We are told of Theætetus by later writers (besides the fact that he heard Socrates and followed Plato) that he taught mathematics at Heracleia, and that he was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solida. The interval which this seems to require between the trial of Socrates and the death of Theætetus (to which it is difficult not to suppose an allusion here) increases the uncertainty of the date. See Introduction.

6. *Εἰ μὲν*—] 'If my heart were in Cyrene.' There is an imperfect sequence of clauses, arising out of the interposition of the clause *ἦρτον γὰρ—ἐπαινεῖς*, the last words of which form a transition to the main thought, to which Socrates gradually returns. The opening is characteristic of Socrates. He starts from an analogous instance, in which the person addressed is interested.



Theodorus in an Athenian palaestra, asks what youth of promise he has met with, not in Cyrene, but in Athens.

Theodorus speaks warmly in praise of Theaetetus, who, though not beautiful, is at once bold and gentle and

Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκεῖ ἂν σε καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν ἠρώτων, <sup>P.</sup>  
εἴ τινας αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλο-  
σοφίαν εἰσὶ τῶν νέων ἐπιμέλειαν ποιούμενοι· νῦν δέ  
—ἦπτον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τοὺςδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον  
ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέ-  
σθαι ἐπιεικέις· ταῦτα δὴ αὐτός τε σκοπῶ καθ' ὅσον  
δύναμαι, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ οἷς ἂν ὀρῶ τοὺς  
νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγγίγνισθαι. σοὶ δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι  
πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως· ἄξιός γάρ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ  
10 γεωμετρίας ἔνεκα. εἰ δὲ οὖν τι ἐνέτυχες ἄξιον λόγου,  
ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοὶ τε εἰπεῖν καὶ

1. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἂν—περὶ ἐκείνων ἂν] 'Εκείνων is masc. 'Ἀηρώτων, the reading of several MSS., is inappropriate here, and is perhaps due to the parallel passage of the Charmides, p. 153: Αἰδοῦ ἐγὼ αὐτοὺς ἀηρώτων τὰ τῆδε, περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχει τὰ νῦν, περὶ τε τῶν νέων εἴ τινας ἐν αὐτοῖς διαφέρουσιν ἢ σοφίᾳ ἢ ἀδολοῖ ἢ ἀμφοτέρους ἐγγεγραμμένους εἶναι. The only difficulty of the reading ἂν ἠρώτων is the repetition of ἂν after the pronoun. It may be accounted for by the emphasis which the antithesis gives to τὰ ἐκεῖ and ἐκείνων, and also to ἐκείνων being an afterthought: cf. Rep. 526: Οὐκ ἂν ῥηθῆναι οὐτε πολλὰ ἂν εὖροις. In both cases we may avoid the reduplication of ἂν, which would be difficult to explain, by supposing a repetition of the verb understood.

2. ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν] 'or other liberal pursuit.' Comp. Tim. 88: Μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχράμεται.

5. τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων] ἡμῖν is

not emphatic. The emphasis is anticipated in τοὺςδε.

5. ἡμῖν τῶν νέων—(7.) 1. ἡμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν] Comp. Thuc. I. 6: Οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαίμωνων γενέσθαι ἐπιεικέις] 'to make a good figure.' 'Επιεικέις in Plato seems frequently to mean simply 'excellent' (*laudabilis*, Ast. Lex.) cf. Legg. 957: "Ἔστ' ἐν πόλει οὐκ ἀσχημονα ἐπιεικῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγα νομοθετήματα. Symp. 210: "Ὅστι καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικέις ἦν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐὰν σμαρδὸν ἀνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ. Rep. 398: "Ἀχρηστοὶ γὰρ καὶ γυναικῶν ἂν δέῃ ἐπιεικέις εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν. (Cf. 387: Γυναῖκι δὲ ἀποδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταῦται σπουδαίαις.)

9. ἄξιός γάρ] The adjective receives greater emphasis by the omission of the substantive verb. Comp. Soph. Œd. Col. 758: Τῆρδε τὴν πόλιν φθάς εἰπὼν, ἐπαφία γάρ. Also Rep. 500: Περὶ τούτου ἔτοιμοι (sc. ἐσμέν) τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι.

10. εἰ] interrogative; 'whether.' Cf. infra p. 207.

- p.143. σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνν ἄξιον, οἷον ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν μει-  
ρακίῳ ἐντετύχηκα. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην  
ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ  
εἶναι· νῦν δέ, καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθου, οὐκ ἔστι καλός,  
προσέοικε δὲ σοὶ τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν  
ὀμμάτων· ἦπτον δὲ ἡ σὺ ταυτ' ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὲ λέγω.
- p.144. εὐ γὰρ ἴσθι ὅτι ὦν δὴ πῶποτε ἐνέτυχον, καὶ πάνν

intelligent,  
a rare com-  
bination !  
Like a  
stream of  
oil, flowing  
smoothly  
and swiftly  
without a  
murmur.

3. μὴ καὶ τῷ δόξω] The ex-  
pression is softened by the im-  
personal τῷ. 'Lest it might  
be thought'—'Lest I should  
give the impression.' This in-  
direct reference to persons is  
more common in Plato than  
appears at first sight. Cf. (in  
this dialogue) p.175: "Ὅταν δὲ γέ-  
νῃς—δικασθῇ ἄνω, νῆξ. τὸν δικαστὴν  
ἐκείνον. Phaed. 63: 'Ἄλλ' ὁ Κέρβης  
λόγους τινὰ ἀπερνεῖ, κ. εἰ μόνος.

4. μοι ἄχθου] καὶ introduces  
what is suddenly interposed.  
Comp. Gorg. 486: Καίτοι, ὦ  
φίλε Σώκρατες—καὶ μοι μηδὲν  
ἄχθεσθης· εἰνοῖς γὰρ ἱρῷ τῇ σῇ  
—οὐχ αἰσχρὸν δοκεῖ σοι, κ. τ. λ.  
The outline of the sentence is  
εἰ μὲν ἦν—, ἐφοβούμην ἄν—· νῦν  
δὲ—ὅσα ἴσθι—· ἀδεῶς δὲ λέγω.  
Δὴ has something of an illative  
force. Cf. Euthyphr. 11: καὶ  
εἰ μὲν—σκέμματος.

5. τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ  
ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων] This passage  
and the speech of Alcibiades  
in the Symposium (p. 215: "Ὅτι  
μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὁμοῖος εἰ τούτοις (τοῖς  
Σειληνοῖς—καὶ τῷ Μαρσίῳ) οὐδ'  
αὐτὸς δὴ πού ἀμφισβητήσεις.) are  
the chief allusions to Socrates'  
personal appearance in Plato.  
See below, p. 209: Τὸν σιμὸν  
τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλμον. Comp. Xen.  
Symp. V. 5, where Critobulus,  
who has been boasting of beauty,  
is challenged to compete with  
Socrates. Socrates first shews

that each thing is beautiful in  
relation to its use, and then  
asks: 'Ὀφθαλμῶν τίνος ἔνεκα δεό-  
μαθα; Διῆλον ἔφη θεῖ τοῦ ὁρᾶν.  
Οὕτω μὲν τοῖσιν ἦθη οἱ ἐμοὶ ὀφθαλ-  
μοὶ καλλίωνες ἂν τῶν σῶν εἴησαν.  
Πῶς δὲ; "Ὅτι οἱ μὲν σοὶ τὸ κατ'  
εὐθὺ μόνον ὁρᾶσιν, οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ καὶ  
τὸ ἐπὶ πλάγιον διὰ τὸ ἐπιπολεῖν  
εἶναι. Λέγεις σὺ ἔφη κατεῖναι  
εὐσφθαλμέτατον εἶναι τῶν ζῶων.  
Πάντως δῆπου, ἔφη· ἐπεὶ καὶ πρὸς  
λογίῳ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἄριστα πε-  
φυκότες ἔχει. Ἐλέν, ἔφη· τῶν δὲ  
βρωτῶν ποτέρᾳ καλλίων, ἢ σῇ ἢ ἡ  
ἐμῇ; Ἐγὼ μὲν, ἔφη, οἶμαι τὴν  
ἐμὴν, εἰπὴρ γὰρ τοῦ ὑσφραίνεσθαι  
ἐνκεν ἐποίησαν ἡμῖν ῥῆμας οἱ θεοί.  
Οἱ μὲν γὰρ σοὶ μυκτῆρες εἰς γῆν  
ὁρᾶσιν· οἱ δὲ ἐμοὶ ἀνωπύττανται,  
ὥστε τὰς πάντοθεν ὁσμὰς προσδέ-  
χεσθαι. Τὸ δὲ σιμὸν τῇς ῥῆμας πῶς  
τοῦ ὁρθοῦ καλλίων; "Ὅτι, ἔφη, οὐκ  
ἀντιφράττει, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ἐφ' τὰς  
ἄψεις ὁρᾶν ἂν βούλωνται. ἢ δὲ  
ἡγήλῃ βίῃ ὥστερ' ἐπηρεάζουσα δια-  
ττείχῃ τὰ ὅμματα. Τοῦ γὰρ μὴ  
στόματος, ἔφη ὁ Κριτόβουλος, ἡφί-  
εμαι. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ ἀποδάσκειν ἔνεκα  
πεποιήται, πολὺ ἂν σὺ μείζον ἢ ἐγὼ  
ἀποδάσκας. Διὰ δὲ τὸ παχὺ ἔχειν  
τὰ χεῖλη οὐκ οἶσι καὶ μαλακώτερον  
ἔχειν τὸ φίλημα; Ἐοικα, ἔφη, κατὰ  
τὸν σὸν λόγον, καὶ δυναι αἰσχρὸν τὸ  
στόμα ἔχειν. Ἐκείνο δὲ οὐδὲν τεκ-  
μήριον λογίζω, ὥς ἐγὼ σοὺ καλλίων  
εἶμι, θεῖ καὶ Ναῖδες θεαὶ οὐσας τοὺς  
Σειληνοὺς ἐμοὶ ὁμοσιώτερον τικτου-  
σιν ἢ σοὶ;

πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα, οὐδένα πω ἡσθόμην οὕτω p. 144.  
θαυμαστῶς εὐ πεφυκότα. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὴ ὄντα, ὡς  
ἄλλω χαλεπὸν, πρᾶον αὖ εἶναι διαφερόντως, καὶ ἐπὶ  
τούτοις ἀνδρείον παρ' ὄντιν οὖν, ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν  
εὐθόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένους· ἀλλ' οἱ τε

2. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὴ ὄντα—γιγνο-  
μένοι] The anacoluthon adds  
to the expression of surprise.  
Comp. Protag. 317: Τὸ οὖν δι-  
δράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀποθῆναι,  
ἀλλὰ καταφασὶ εἶναι, πολλὰ μωρία  
καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Parm.  
128: Τὸ οὖν—οὕτως ἐκείνου  
λέγειν ὅστις μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν  
εἰρημίζει δοκῶν σχεδὸν τι λέ-  
γοντας ταῦτα, ἐπὶ τῇ φησὶ τοῦ  
ἄλλου φαίνεται ἑμὲν τὸ εἰρημίζει  
εἰρησθαι.

ἢ εὐμαθὴ χαλεπὸν] The simple  
and obvious meaning of these  
words, 'as it were hard for an-  
other to be,' i. e. 'in a degree  
hardly to be equalled,' has been  
rejected by critics because it  
was thought that χαλεπὸν could  
not be applied to qualities that  
are not acquired. But the  
word is not tied down to this  
preciseness of meaning. It has  
passed out of it even in Homer.  
Od. XI. 156: Χαλεπὸν δὲ τότε  
ζωῖσιν ὁρᾶσθαι. So elsewhere  
in Plato it is used where hu-  
man agency is not in question  
to signify 'next to impossible.'  
See Rep. 502: Χαλεπὸν γενέσθαι,  
ὅς μιν αὖ ἀδύνατό γε—viz. that  
philosophers should be kings,  
one of the conditions of which  
is the existence of this very  
combination of qualities. What  
Plato would think of this re-  
finement may be inferred from  
his caricature of it in the Pro-  
tagoras, p. 344: Σὺ δὲ φής, ὅ  
Πάντα, χαλεπὸν ἰσθλὸν ἔμμεναι  
τὸ δὲ—ἀδύνατον. The rendering

which it has been proposed  
to substitute—'so as to be  
ill-tempered with another,' or  
(with ἄλλω) 'so as in another  
case to be ill-tempered'—is  
objectionable, (α) as awkward  
in itself, (β) as breaking har-  
mony (ἢ εὐμαθὴ χαλεπὸν, δια-  
φερόντως, παρ' ὄντιν οὖν), (γ) as  
anticipating what is afterwards  
stated as a fresh thought (αἴ τι  
ἄξις, κ. τ. λ.)

5. γενέσθαι (τοιοῦτόν τινα) 'I  
should not have thought there  
could have been an instance of  
this combination, nor do I find  
it usual.'

γιγνομένοι] sc. τοιοῦτους. Cf.  
Rep. 492: Ὅστις γὰρ γίγνεται ὅστις  
γίγνεται οὐτ' οὖν μὴ γίγνεται ἄλλοις  
ἕξος, κ. τ. λ.

ὅστις ὁρᾷ γιγνομένους, κ. τ. λ.]  
The thought is exactly paral-  
leled in the Republic, where  
the same combination of qual-  
ities is described as essential  
to the philosophic nature, and  
its rarity is dwelt upon in al-  
most the same words. Rep.  
503: Εὐμαθὴς καὶ μαθήματος καὶ  
ἀγχίνου καὶ ἄξις οἷός ἐστι οὐκ ἐπί-  
λυσον ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ πρᾶν καὶ  
καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷας  
κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βασιλεί-  
ας ἰδέσθαι ζῆν, ἀλλ' οἱ τοιοῦτοι  
οὐκ ἐξύτητος φέρονται ὅσην ἂν τί-  
χουσι, καὶ τὸ βίβανον ἔπαν αὐτῶν  
ἐξοίχεται. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.  
Οὐαὖν τὰ βίβανον αὖ ταῦτα ἡβὴ καὶ  
οὐκ ἐμμετάβολα, οἷς τις μᾶλλον ὡς  
πιστοῖς χρῆσασθαι, καὶ ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ  
πρὸς τοὺς φέβους δυσπρόσιτα ὄντα,

p. 144. ὁξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὥς τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς δέξυρροποι εἰσι, καὶ ἄττον-  
 b τες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερμάτιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανι-  
 κώτεροι ἢ ἀνδριώτεροι φύονται, οἳ τε αὖ ἐμβριθέστε-  
 ροι νοθροὶ πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις καὶ λή-  
 θης γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταιστώως καὶ  
 ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τε καὶ ζητήσεις  
 μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ρεῦμα ἀψοφητὴ  
 ρέοντος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικούτον ὄντα οὕτω  
 ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι.

10

ΣΩ. Εὖ ἀγγέλλεις. τίος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολι-  
 τῶν;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὐ.  
 ο ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὁ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.

Theaetetus  
 (son of Eu-  
 phronius of

πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὐ ποιεῖ ταῦτον,  
 δυσκινητὴς ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθὴς, καὶ  
 ἵπνον τε καὶ χύσμη ἐμπίπλονται,  
 ὅταν τι διῇ τοιούτων διαπονῶν; So  
 the difficulty of combining  
 bravery with gentleness is dwelt  
 upon, *ib.* 375, 6. See also *Polit.*  
*p.* 309, 310. The essentials of  
 the philosophic nature enume-  
 rated in the 6th Book of the  
 Republic are, love of truth,  
 quickness in learning, good  
 memory, liberality, justice and  
 gentleness, temperance, cou-  
 rage. Theaetetus is the em-  
 bodiment of this nature.

1. δέξεις] This seems the ge-  
 neric word for quickness of  
 intellect. *Rep.* I. c.: Εὐμαθεῖς  
 καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ ὁξεῖς.  
 2. πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς δέξυρροποι]  
 'Impetuous.' 'Of a quick tem-  
 per.'

3. λήθης γέμοντες] *Rep.* 486:  
 Εἰ μὴθιν ἂν μάθοι σόξιν δύνατο,  
 λήθης ἂν πλείως, ἂρ' ἂν οἷός τ' εἴη  
 ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι.

7. ἀνυσίμως] 'Successfully'—  
 'Making rapid progress.'

9. ὥστε θαυμάσαι] *Soph. El.*  
 394: Καλὸς γὰρ οἷός τις βίος,  
 ὥστε θαυμάσαι. *Aristoph. Plut.*  
 810: Τὰ σκενῆρια πλήρη 'στίν,  
 ὥστε θαυμάσαι. By a refine-  
 ment of language, the particu-  
 lar cause of wonder is here  
 expressed and made to depend  
 on θαυμάσαι.

13. Ἀκήκοα μὲν τοῦνομα, μνημο-  
 νεύω δὲ οὐ] Theodorus takes the  
 interest of a teacher in the  
 youth himself: Socrates that  
 of a fellow-citizen in his father.

14. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι—ἀλλὰ σό-  
 κει] This double ἀλλὰ is fre-  
 quent in Plato. *Comp. Soph.*  
*Phil.* 520: Ἀλλ' αἰσχρομύνητος σοῦ  
 γ' ἔμ' ἐνδείστερον ἔξιπ' φανῆναι  
 πρὸς τὸ καίριον ποιεῖν· ἀλλ' εἰ δο-  
 κεῖ, πλείωμεν. The second ἀλλὰ  
 puts definitely forward the pro-  
 position for which the first ἀλλὰ  
 has cleared the way.

Sunium)  
now enters  
the gym-  
nasium  
between  
two com-  
panions.  
Theodorus  
adds that,  
though im-  
poverished,  
he is most  
liberal. He  
is made to  
sit by So-  
crates.  
They con-  
verse.

ἄρτι γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ἡλείφοντο ἑταῖροί τέ τινες p. 144.  
οὔτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτός, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψά-  
μενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις αὐτόν.

ΣΩ. Γιγνώσκω· ὁ τοῦ Σουνιεύς Εὐφρονίου ἐστί,  
καὶ πάνυ γε, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς οἷον καὶ σὺ τοῦτον διη-  
γεῖ, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μάλα  
πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ' ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μεираκίου.

ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό γε ὄνομα· τὴν δ  
μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέ-  
ναι· ἀλλ' ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθε-  
ριότητα θαυμαστός, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. καὶ μοι κέλευε  
αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίξασθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σω-  
κράτη.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἵνα καγὼ ἐμavτὸν  
ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖόν τι ἔχω τὸ πρόσωπον. φησὶ γὰρ  
Θεόδωρος ἔχειν με σοὶ ὅμοιον. ἀτὰρ εἰ νῦν ἐχόντων

'If Theo-  
dorus were  
a draughts-  
man, he  
would be  
an author-  
ity on the  
subject of

1. ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ] The  
scene then is a gymnasium,  
perhaps the Lyceum. Compare  
Euthyphr. 2 : Σὺ τὰς ἐν Λυκείῳ  
καταλιπὼν διατριβάς ἐνθάδε νῦν  
διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασιλείως  
στοάν; taken in connection with  
Theæt. below, p. 210 : Νῦν—  
ἀπαντητίον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασιλείως  
στοάν. Theodorus had seen the  
young men in the portico as he  
entered. The word δρόμος seems  
to have been applied to several  
parts of the gymnasium. Eu-  
thyd. 273 : Ἐν τῷ καταστήγῳ δρό-  
μῳ. (See the whole passage.)  
Aristias ap. Polluc. IX. 43 : Ἦν  
μοι παλαιότερα καὶ δρόμος ἐυστάς  
πέλας.

ἑταῖροί τέ τινες] Evidently two  
from the words δ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ.  
One, Νίος Σωκράτης, is named in  
this dialogue, and is an interlo-

cutor in the Politicus. The other  
remains mute. Such κῶφα πρὸς-  
ωπα occur in many dialogues ;  
e. g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc.,  
in the Republic. The scene  
is natural and not merely dra-  
matic. In Plato's "School of  
Athena" there are spectators  
as well as actors.

5. καὶ πάνυ] καὶ is intensive.

6. καὶ μέντοι] 'And, now I  
think of it.'

10. ἐλευθεριότητα] Rep. 485, 6 :  
καὶ μὴν πον καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν,  
ὅταν κρῖναι μίλλης ψυχὴν φιλό-  
σοφόν τε καὶ μὴ. Τὸ ποῖον; Μὴ σε  
λάβη μετέχουσα ἀλευθερίας.

12. τὸν ἄνδρα] not μεираκίου.  
'He must be a noble fellow.'

16. καγὼ] καὶ is to be taken  
closely with ἵνα. Cf. Soph. An-  
tig. 280 : Παῦσας, πρὶν ὀργῆς καμῖ  
μυστῶσαι λέγων.



p. 144. ἐκατέρου λύραν ἔφη αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον εὐθὺς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπισκεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ὦν λέγει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπισκεψάμεθ' ἂν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὐρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ' ἂν, 5  
ἄμουσον δέ, ἡπιστοῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῇ.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δέ γ' οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν  
p. 145. προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὦν λέγει  
ἢ οὐ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ζῳγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δὴ πού, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς τε καὶ  
μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματος τι ὁμοίους  
φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ ψέγων, οὐ πάνυ αὐτῷ 20  
ἄξιον τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως οὐ.

b ΣΩ. Τί δ', εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς

2. εἰ μουσικὸς ὦν λέγει] The man then is not the measure of the likeness of musical sounds! Yet afterwards Theætetus is wholly unconscious of contradicting this his first admission.

4. Ἐπισκεψάμεθ' ἂν] Cf. Crit. p. 47: Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτον πότερον παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐπαῖνος καὶ ψόγος καὶ δόξα τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνου δεινίου, δεῖ ἂν τυγχάνη ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρέβης ὦν;

13. Οὐχ, ὅσον γέ με εἰδέναι] Bekker has received γ' ἐμὲ from a

few MSS., the greatest number (including the Bodl.) reading γέ με. ἐμὲ seems more pointed, 'not that I know of,' but με is possibly right. Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 1264: Οὐκ ὅσον γέ μ' εἰδέναι.

14. Ἄρ' οὐδὲ γεωμετρικὸς;] 'Nor a geometrician, eh?' There is an archness in the expression, making doubtful what is a matter of notoriety.

16. Ἡ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς] 'I wonder if he is also an astronomer.'

23. εἰ ποτέρου] 'The mind of

our personal appearance. As he is a cultivated man, we must respect his judgment of our mental endowments.

10

15

ἀρετὴν τε καὶ σοφίαν; ἂρ' οὐκ ἄξιον τῷ μὲν ἀκού- p. 145.  
σαντι προθυμῆσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα,  
τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἐαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

Therefore, Thonstetus, you must be catechised by me, for he has praised you to me very highly.

5 ΣΩ. Ὥρα τοῖνυν, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπιδεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι· ὥς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεόδωρος πολλοὺς δὴ πρὸς με ἐπαινέσας ξένους τε καὶ ἀστούς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνεσεν ὥς σὲ νῦν δῆ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλ' ὅρα μὴ  
10 παίζων ἔλεγεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου· ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὁμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέγειν τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ἀναγκασθῇ μαρτυρεῖν πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκῆψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν ἔμμενε τῇ  
15 ὁμολογίᾳ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

one of us.' The indefinite πρότερος occurs several times in Plato.—E.g. Soph. 252: 'Ἐστὶ πρότερον αὐτῶν, οὐσίας μὴ προσκαινούντων; Though not common in other writers, it is precisely analogous to the indefinite use of τις, που, ποθεν, etc.

9. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι] 'That is good!'—'I am glad to hear it.' Or perhaps more hypothetically, 'It is well, if it is so.' Compare Menex. 249: Χάριν ἔχω τῷ εἰπόντι. I. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. ἀλλ' ὅπως μου μὴ κατερείς. Polit. 277: Κινδυνεύει τελείως ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχουσ. 2. Καλῶς ἂν, ὦ Σ., ἡμῖν ἔχοι. δεῖ δὲ μὴ σοὶ μόνον ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καμολ—ξυνοκεῖν.

11. μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὁμολ.] 'Do not shrink from what you have agreed to.' Comp. Hom. II. XIII. 225: Ὅβρι τις δαμψεῖται ἀνδύ-

εται πολέμον κακοῦ. Xen. Symp. V. 5, where Critobulus says, when his challenge is taken, οὐκ ἀναδύομαι. Euthyd. 302: Οὐκ ἴσθι γὰρ μοι ἀνάνυσσις.

14. ἐπισκῆψει] The verb ἐπισκῆπτει, to accuse of murder or false witness (φόνου, ψευδομαρτυριῶν) is more commonly found in the middle voice, because the accuser in such cases is generally an interested party. But comp. Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 142: 'Ἡ(ε) τῆς πόλεως οὐδὲ ψευδομαρτυριῶν θέμις ἐστὶν ἐπισκῆψαι; and for the passive, Legg. 937: 'Ἐὰν ἐπισκῆψῃ τὰ ψευδῆ μαρτυρήσῃ. Soph. Ant. 1313: 'Ὅς αἰτίαν γε τῶνδε κακίων ἔχων πρὸς τῇ θανούσῃ τῇσ' ἐπισκῆπτου μέρω. The ellipse of ψευδομαρτυριῶν is easily borne with μαρτυρεῖν preceding.

p. 145. ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι· *μανθάνεις* που παρὰ Θεοδώρου γεωμετρίας ἅττα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

d ΣΩ. Καὶ τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν τε καὶ ἁρμονίας καὶ λογισμούς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαι γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρὰ γε τούτου καὶ παρ' ἄλλων, οὓς ἂν οἶωμαι τι τούτων ἐπαίεω. ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἔχω περὶ αὐτὰ μετρίως, σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ, ὃ μετὰ σοῦ τε καὶ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. καὶ μοι 10 λέγε· ἂρ' οὐ τὸ μανθάνειν ἐστὶ τὸ σοφώτερον γίγνεσθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Σοφία δέ γ' οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοί.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

e ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὲ μὴ διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

1. *μανθάνεις*] There is a stress upon the word.

4. *τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν*] 'Astronomy, and what relates to it.'

6. *Προθυμοῦμαι γε δῆ*] 'I certainly do my endeavour.' He is more modest about these higher subjects.

7. *παρὰ γε τούτου*] *γε* (the MS. reading) may be defended: 'from such a master,' referring to *προθυμοῦμαι*: although *τε*, which is supported by the version of Ficinus, reads more harmoniously; and the change is slight. The Zurich editors,

in their last edition, omit the particle.

8. *ἀλλ' ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα—σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ*] Comp. Rep. 367: *Καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, αἰὲ μὲν δὴ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ τε Γλαύκωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀδριάντου ἠγάμην, ἅπαρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνν γε ἦσθην.*

18. *ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί*] For the indefinite plural comp. Gorg. 457: *Οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται—διαρισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους—οὕτω διαλίσσθαι τὰς συνουσίας.* Cf. Xen. Mem. IV. 6, 7: *Ὅ ἀρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος ταῦτα καὶ σοφός ἐστιν.*

You learn from Theodorus several things. To learn is to become wiser. To be wise is to know.

15

12

What,  
then, is  
know-  
ledge?

ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' οὖν ἀρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ σοφία;

p. 145.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' αὐτὸ τοῖνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορώ καὶ οὐ δύ-  
ναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμη ὃ τί ποτε  
τυγχάνει ὄν. ἀρ' οὖν δὴ ἔχομεν λέγειν αὐτό; τί π. 146.  
φατέ; τίς ἂν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἴποι; ὃ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν,  
καὶ ὅς ἂν αἰεὶ ἀμαρτάνῃ, καθεδεῖται, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ  
παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος. ὅς δ' ἂν περιγένηται  
ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει ὃ τι ἂν  
A pause. 10 βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Τί σιγᾶτε; οὐ τί που, ὦ  
Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, προθυ-  
μούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλέγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε  
καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίνεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Ἦκιστα μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν b  
15 εἴη ἀγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεираκίων τι κέλευέ σοι ἀπο-  
κρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης δια-  
λέκτου, καὶ οὐδ' αὖ συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω· τοῖσδε

4. λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς] 'To grasp thoroughly.' To get a clear conception of.

λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ' ἐμαυτῷ] Phileb. 50: λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφείναι με, κ.τ.λ.

6. ὃ δὲ ἀμαρτῶν] 'but he who makes a blunder, or whoever is in error from time to time.'

7. καθεδεῖται—ὄνος] Schol. Τῶν οὖν παιζόντων ταῦτα τοὺς μὲν παύσαντας βασιλεῖς ἐκάλουν, καὶ ὃ τι ἂν προσετίθοντο τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπὲρ-  
κειναι, τοὺς δὲ ἡττημένους ὄνους. Comp. Hor. Ep. I. i. 59: At pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiant, si recte facies.

13. προσηγόρους] The active and passive meanings are combined. 'Mutually conversible.' Compare Republic 546: Πάντα προσήγορα καὶ βήτῃ πρὸς ἀλλήλα

ἀνέφηναν. There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical meaning here: 'to make you friends, and bring you into relations with one another.' 'To create a little friendly intercourse.' Compare Rep. 534: 'Ἀλλήλους ἔστωις ὥσπερ γραμμάς,' and the phrases Σύμφωνοι καὶ πο-  
τάγορα,—"Ὅμοιοι καὶ ποτάγορα," in later Pythagorean writings.

15. τῶν μεираκίων τι] Steph. conj. τὰ, but cf. Euthyd. 277: Γινώσκεις βαπτίζόμενον τὸ μεираκίον, βουλεύμενος ἀναπαύσαι αὐτό. And see below, p. 169: Τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἐστί.

16. διάλεκτον] 'conversation,' with a tinge, perhaps, of the more technical meaning. Compare Rep. 454: "Ἐρῶ, σὺ δια-  
λέκῃ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

p. 146. δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο καὶ πολὺ πλείον ἐπιδιδόειν· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ἡ νεότης εἰς πᾶν ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει. ἀλλ', ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ' ἐρώτα.

ΣΩ. Ἀκούεις δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, ὅτι ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε σὺ ἐβελήσεις, οὔτε θέμις περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ ἐπιτάττοντι νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ' εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἶπέ· τί σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς κελεύετε. πάντως γάρ, ἂν τι καὶ ἀμάρτω, ἐπανορθώσετε.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἂν πέρ γε οἰοί τε ὦμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἂν τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἅς νῦν δὴ δὲ διήλθες, καὶ αὐτὴ σκυτοτομική τε καὶ αἱ τῶν ἄλλων δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαι τε καὶ ἐκάστη τούτων, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἐν αἴτηθεις πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀνθ' ἀπλοῦ.

Theætetus is at length encouraged to attempt an answer. 'Geometry and the like, shoemaking and other useful arts, all and each of these is knowledge.'

But these are many and various; knowledge

2. ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει] Rep. 536: Σώκρατες γὰρ οὐ πιστόν, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατός μαθήσκειν, ἀλλ' ἦττον ἢ τρέχειν, οἷον δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνου.

3. μὴ ἀφίεσο τ. Θ. ἀλλ' ἐρώτα] Compare Lach. 186: Μὴ ἀφίεσθαί σε ἐμοῦ δικαιέμετο, ἀλλ' ἐρωτήσω. Rep. 449.

5. οὔτε θέμις—νεώτερον ἀπειθεῖν] Instead of making ἀπιστεῖν depend on θέμις, a new clause is introduced expressing the particular points in this disobedience which make it unlawful. The like change occurs often in Plato, and is part of the fulness of his style. See above, p. 145: Ὅστε θανύμεσαι, κ.τ.λ. and note.

10. πάντως γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] Theætetus is not yet alive to the difficulty of the subject.

17. ἐπιστήμη] Not 'a science,' but 'science.' Theætetus does not make the distinction. The sentence is, however, humoured by the introduction of the singular ἐκάστη.

18. Γενναίως γε] Referring to εὖ καὶ γενναίως above.

19. ποικίλα] Either 'a rich variety of things,' or 'many complex notions for one simple one.' The analysis of terms which follows points rather to the latter meaning; but the former is more natural, and is supported by comparing Phile-



ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; p.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω.  
ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φράξεις ἢ ἐπιστήμην  
ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τί δ', ὅταν τεκτονικήν; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπι-  
στήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν ἐργασίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὐ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη,  
10 τοῦτο ὀρίζεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δ' ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν,  
τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅπως τινές. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμη-

bus, p. 12 (at the opening of the dialogue): τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὅς ἐστι ποικίλον. — ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀκούειν μὴ οὕτως ἀπλῶς ἐν τι, μορφῆς δὲ δῆπον παντοίας εἰληφὲ καὶ τινα τρόπον ὁμοίας ἀλλήλων. The two objections (πολλὰ, ποικίλα) are discussed in the reverse order. See below: Τίνων — ὅπως, Πρώτον γὰρ — Ἐπειτά γὰρ σου, κ.τ.λ.

1. Πῶς τί] What (τί), and with what meaning (πῶς). Compare Soph. 262: Πῶς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες; ὅπερ ψήθην, κ.τ.λ.

2. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν] sc. λέγω, 'perhaps I am talking nonsense.'

ὁ μέντοι οἶμαι] sc. λέγειν.  
3. σκυτικήν] This is said to have differed from σκυτοτόμῃ (above); and the change of word is an instance of Plato's love of variety. Perhaps the one was a generic, the other a specific term. At least they do not exclude each other in Plato. See Rep. 374: Ἡ οὖν σκυτικὴ δὲ μάλλον κηρῆσθαι ἢ πο-

λεμικῆς; Οὐδαμῶς. Ἄλλ' ἄρα τὸν σκυτοτόμον, κ.τ.λ. — Ib. 601: Ποιήσει δὲ γὰρ σκυτοτόμος καὶ χαλκεύς; — οὐδ' ὁ ποιήσας ὃ τε χαλκεύς καὶ ὁ σκυτεύς;

ὅταν — φράξεις] You express by the term 'shoe-making.'

12. Τὸ δ' ἐπ.] 'What I went on to ask you.' v. supr. μὴ ἀφίεσο κ.τ.λ.

13. τίνων ἢ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅπως τινές] The first answer of Meno to the question, 'What is virtue?' is exactly analogous to this of Theætetus about knowledge. Instead of attempting to generalize, he enumerates the several kinds of virtue. Men. 71: Ἄνδρες ἀρετὴν — γυναικεὶ ἀρετὴν — παιδὸς ἀρετή, κ.τ.λ. Socrates replies (Men. 72): Πολλῇ γὰρ τιμὴ εὐτυχίᾳ δοικα κερῆσθαι, ὃ Μένων, εἰ μίαν (ἡτῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός τε ἀνέμνηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων, κ.τ.λ.). The whole passage should be compared with this. See also Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates finds a similar difficulty in lead-

p. 146. σαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἡρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστή-  
μην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὁρθῶς.

p. 147. ΣΩ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων  
τι καὶ προχείρων ἔροιτο, οἷον περὶ πηλοῦ, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐ-  
στίν, εἰ ἀποκρινάμεθα αὐτῷ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν χυτρίων  
καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἵπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλι-  
βουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἴμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν γέ που οἰόμενοι συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς  
ἡμετέρας ἀποκρίσεως τὸν ἐρωτῶντα, ὅταν εἴπωμεν  
πηλός, εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων  
ὠντωνωνοῦν, δημιουργῶν. ἢ οἶε, τίς τι συνιήσιν τινας  
ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστίν;

ing the respondent to the con-  
ception of a general notion,—  
and Soph. 340, where Thespe-  
tus is again entrapped into a  
similar mistake in defining the  
word ἔβαλον.

1. ἐπιστήμην αὐτὸ] Rep. 472 :  
Ἐξιστοῦμεν αὐτὸ τι δικαιοσύνην οἷον  
ἐστι.

4. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς—εἰ ἀποκρινά-  
μεθα] For the double εἰ comp.  
Rep. 331 : Εἴ τις λάβει παρὰ φί-  
λου ἀδελφῆς σφραγισμένους ἔπλα, εἰ  
μακρὸς ἀπαιτοῖ, κ.τ.λ.

τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ προχείρων]  
Some trivial and obvious matter.

7. ἱπνοπλαθῶν] For this, the  
reading of all the MSS., κοροπλα-  
θῶν has been substituted in the  
margin of some MSS., for the  
sake of the uniformity which  
Plato avoided. See below, note  
on κοροπλαθῶν, l. 12.

10. οἰόμενοι συνιέναι] Comp.  
Rep. 505 : Εἰ δοκίμασθαι γε οἱ  
οἶκ' ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν  
ὡς οἰδοίμεν· φράσσιν γὰρ αὐτὸ φασιν

εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὡς αὐὸ συνιέντων ἡμῶν  
δ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ  
φθόγγεται δογμα. Soph. 344 :  
Τί ποτε βούλεισθαι σημαίνειν ὅπταν  
ὡς φθόγγεσθαι. We find ourselves  
involved in a further stage of  
the same absurdity at the end  
of the dialogue, p. 310 : Καὶ παν-  
τάσας γε εἴηθαι, ζητούντων ἡμῶν  
ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὁρθήν εἶναι  
μὲν ἐπιστήμης εἶτε διαφορότητος  
εἶτε ὁμοιότητος.

12. εἴτε ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσ-  
θέντες] It is in Plato's manner  
to surprise us with a fresh ex-  
ample at each step of the argu-  
ment, instead of dwelling upon  
one already adduced. Rep.  
333 : Ὡς περὶ ὁ κυβαριστοῦς, κ.τ.λ.  
—Prot. 312 : Ὡς περὶ ὁ κυβари-  
στής, κ.τ.λ.—and in this dialo-  
gue, p. 161 : Βασιλεὺς γυρίων.—  
169 : Ἐδὲ δι' αὐτῶν, κ.τ.λ.—  
178 : Οὐχ ἡ τοῦ κυβαριστοῦ.—  
190 : Ὑγαινοῦντα ἢ μαινοῦντα.

13. ἢ οἶε, τίς τι] οἶε is pa-  
renthetical, and therefore does

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

p. 1

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνήσιν ὁ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Σκυτικήν ἄρα οὐ συνήσιν ὅς ἂν ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοῇ, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Γελοία ἄρα ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέντι ἐπιστήμῃ τί ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. οὐ τῶς γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἀποκρίνεται, οὐ τοῦτ' ἐρωτηθεῖς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γέ πού ἐξόν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἶον καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσῃ φαῦλόν πού καὶ ἀπλοῦν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῇ φυραθεῖσα πηλὸς ἂν εἴη, τὸ δ' ὅτου ἐᾷν χαίρειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν γε οὕτω φαίνε-

Theætetus  
prociinet

not affect the position of the enclitic. For the sense, comp. Men. 80: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον (ἡγήσεις, ὁ 2., τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ αἰσθε τὸ παρόντα ὁ τι ἴσται.

12. Ἐπειτά γέ πού] This ought strictly to refer to the illustration: which however is brought up again immediately. But we had reverted to the main subject meantime.

13. περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν] Ar. Met. 3. 1007 a: Ἀδύνατον ἀπειρά γ' ὅσα τὰ συμβεβηκότα διελθῖν ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθῖν ἢ μηθεῖν.

14. ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσῃ] For the form of reference with ἐν, cf. Thucyd. I, 9: Ἐν τοῦ σκῆπτρου τῇ παραδόσει. Philib. 33: Ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων. The frequency of this idiom perhaps

assists the genitive πηλοῦ, which is descriptive rather than objective. 'In the question of the clay.'

15. πηλὸς ἂν εἴη] Either, 'earth, if moistened, will be (ἂν εἴη) mud,' or 'moistened earth would seem to be (ἂν εἴη) the definition of mud.' The latter is probably right.

17. νῦν γ' οὕτω] 'Now as you put it.' So far Theætetus has appeared wholly unfamiliar with the conception of a universal notion. But Socrates' illustration reminds him of the comprehensive simplicity of geometrical expressions. And thus he finds a clue in what he knows to the new labyrinth of inquiry into which Socrates invites him. Mathematical ideas,

47. ται· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύεις ἐρωτᾶν οἷον καὶ αὐτοῖς ἡμῖν  
 ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγόμενοις, ἐμοί τε καὶ τῷ σῷ  
 δ ὁμονύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὄδε 5

that the  
 answer re-  
 quired is  
 analogous  
 to a geo-  
 metrical  
 expression;  
 i. e. simple  
 and com-  
 prehensive.

being the first pure abstractions which the mind arrives at, are peculiarly fitted to guide it to the contemplation of abstractions generally. So at least thought Plato, Rep. VII. 522-531. We find here the same difficulty which meets us often in Plato. We have to think of that as in process of elaboration, which is already familiar to ourselves. See Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. p. 197: "A number of Plato's dialogues are intended merely to produce the consciousness of a general notion, which we possess without the trouble of acquiring it. Hence his discursiveness has often the effect of tediousness to us."

In reading what follows, it must be borne in mind that, by the ancients, arithmetic was studied through geometry. If a number was regarded as simple, it was a line. If as composite, it was a rectangular figure. To multiply was to construct a rectangle, to divide was to find one of its sides. Traces of this still remain in such terms as square, cube, common measure, but the method itself is obsolete. Hence it requires an effort to conceive of the square root, not as that which multiplied into itself produces a given number, but as the side of a square, which either is the number, or is equal to the rectangle which is the number. The use of the Arabic

notation and of algebra has greatly assisted in expressing and conceiving the properties of numbers without reference to form.

5. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι κ. τ. λ.]

See Eucl. B. X. Def. 3-11:

Εὐθείαι δυνάμει σύμμετροί εἰσιν, ὅταν τὰ ἐπ' αὐτῶν τετράγωνα τῷ αὐτῷ χωρὶς μετρήται. Ἀσύμμετροι δέ, ὅταν τοῖς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τετραγώνοις μηδὲν ἐνδέχεται χωρίον κοινὸν μέτρον γενέσθαι. Ταύτων ὑποκειμένων δείκνυται ὅτι τῇ προτεθείσῃ εὐθείᾳ ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθείαι πλήθει ἀπειροὶ ἀσύμμετροι αἱ μὲν μήκει μόνον, αἱ δὲ καὶ δυνάμει, (γ. λ. σύμμετροι καὶ ἀσύμμετροι, αἱ μὲν μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον.) Καλείσθω οὖν ἡ μὲν προτεθείσα εὐθεῖα ῥητή. Καὶ αἱ ταύτῃ σύμμετροι, εἴτε μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, εἴτε δυνάμει μόνον, ῥηταί. Αἱ δὲ ταύτῃ ἀσύμμετροι, ἀλογοὶ καλεῖσθωσαν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς προτεθείσης εὐθείας τετράγωνα, ῥητά. Καὶ τὰ ταύτῃ σύμμετρα, ῥητά. Τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ ἀσύμμετρα, ἀλογοὶ καλεῖσθω. Καὶ αἱ δυνάμενοι αὐτά, ἀλογοί· αἱ μὲν τετράγωνα εἴη, αἰνται αἱ πλεοναί, αἱ δὲ ἑτέρα τινα εἰδήγραμμα, αἱ ἴσα αὐτοῖς τετράγωνα ἀναγράφονται. B. VII. 17, 19. Τετράγωνος ἀριθμὸς ἐστὶν ὁ ἰσάκας ἴσος, ἢ ὁ ἐπὶ δυὸ ἴσων ἀριθμῶν περιχώματος. Ὅταν δὲ δυὸ ἀριθμοὶ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ποιῶσι τινα, ὁ γινόμενος ἐπίτεδος καλεῖται· πλεοναὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί.

5. δυνάμει] 'Roots,' i. e. here, 'square roots,' although cube

He relates  
the disco-  
very of  
the inte-  
gral and  
potential  
root.

ἔγραφε, τῆς τε τρέποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος, ἀπο-  
φαίνων ὅτι μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω  
κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην προαιρούμενος μέχρι τῆς ἑκτακαί-  
δεκάποδος· ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο· ἡμῖν οὖν εἰς-  
ἤλθε τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνά-  
μεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν, ὅτε  
πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν τὰς δυνάμεις.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ εὐρετέ τι τοιοῦτον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ.

10 ΣΩ. Λέγε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. τὸν  
μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκις γίνεσθαι τῷ τετραγώνῳ  
τὸ σχῆμα ἀπαικίσαντες τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσάπλευρον  
προσείπομεν.

quantity is afterwards spoken of. Δύναμις is an abbreviated expression for ἡ δυναμὶς εὐθεία. Ἐο ἡ τρίπους (δύναμις) ἐκείνη ἡ δυνάμις τρίπους, i. e. (a foot being the unit)  $\sqrt{3}$ . Cf. Polit. 266: Διήμερος ἡ δυνάμις δίπους. Similar abbreviations occur below in the terms μήκος and δύναμις. Cf. Eucl. X. Prop. 21: Τὸ ἐπὶ ῥητῶν δυνάμις μέγεθος συμμέτρον εὐθεῖαν περιεχόμενον ὁρθογώνιον διὰ γὰρ ἔστι. καὶ ἡ δυναμὶς αὐτὸ διὰ γὰρ ἔστι. Καλεῖσθαι δὲ μέγεθος. Ibid. infr. Def.: Ἐκ δύο ὁνομάτων πρῶτη, δευτέρα, &c. ἀνομαζὴ πρῶτη, δευτέρα &c.

2. μήκει] In linear measurement. They are δυνάμις σύμμετροι, i. e. their squares are commensurable, viz. by the unit.

3. κατὰ μίαν ἐκάστην] Why did he not begin with  $\sqrt{2}$ ? Was it because the δίπους δύναμις is less than the unit, viz. 1 ft.? The ending with ἐκτακαίδεκάποδος is a mere accident, as shown by

the words, καὶ δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέ-  
σχετο.

6. ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἓν, &c.] ἓν is not the antecedent to &c.; the construction is, πρὸς τὸ σημαίνεσθαι, as if it were εἰρήνῃ, &c., κ.τ.λ. 'By generalizing, to find an expression that should embrace them all.' Cf. Soph. Philoct. 341: Τοιγαροῦν τὸ σὺν φρέσιν αἰθεὶς παλιν μοι πρῶγ', &c. σ' ἐνέβρισμα. Charm. 166: Ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἔλας ἐρευνῶν, &c. διαφέρει πᾶσιν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

11. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα] Comp. Phaed. 104: Ἡ τρεὶς καὶ ἡ πεντὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ὅσας. Soph. 238: Ἀριθμὸν δὲ τὸν ξύμμετρον.

12. δυνάμενος] Used here in its ordinary sense, without any reference to δυνάμις above.

ἴσον ἰσάκις γίνεσθαι] i. e. to be made as a square number, which, as Euclid says, is ὁ ἰσάκις ἴσος, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ δύο ἴσων ἀριθμῶν περιεχόμενος. 'To arise by the



p. 147. ΣΩ. Καὶ εὖ γε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοῦνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, ὦν καὶ τὰ  
p. 148. τρία καὶ τὰ πέντε καὶ πᾶς ὃς ἀδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκεις  
γενέσθαι, ἀλλ' ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκεις ἢ ἐλάττων  
πλεονάκεις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων αἰὲν πλευρὰ  
αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμήκει αὐτὸ σχήματι ἀπεικά-  
σαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα. ἀλλὰ τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον καὶ  
ἐπέπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μήκος ὠρισάμεθα, <sup>10</sup>  
ᾧσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ

multiplication of equal num-  
bers.

7. προμήκη—ἑτερομήκη] These  
terms were distinguished by  
the later Pythagoreans. Nico-  
machus says that ἑτερομήκη  
ἀριθμὸς has one factor greater  
than the other by 1, προμήκη  
by more than 1.

10. τετραγωνίζουσι] Form as  
their squares.

11. ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη] sc.  
τετραγωνίζουσι. See Eucl. II. 14.

ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ συμμέτρουι  
ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις δὲ δύνα-  
ται] Translate either, 'not com-  
mensurable with the former in  
linear measurement, but in the  
surfaces (composite numbers,  
see Deff.) of which they are the  
roots,' or 'not commensurable  
with them in linear measure-  
ment, while they are mutually  
commensurable in the surfaces  
of which they are severally  
roots.' I a. the lines which  
are (or stand for) the irra-  
tional roots are not commen-  
surable with the integral roots  
or with unity (τῇ ποδιᾷ),  
but their squares, being inte-  
gers, have a common measure

of unity. They are commen-  
surable not in themselves, but  
in their squares, that is, they  
are potentially commensurable  
(δυνάμει μόνον σύμμετροι). For  
the constr. δὲ δύναται, comp.  
αὶ δυνάμει αὐτὰ in the Deff.  
above ; also, Eucl. X. 22 : 'Ἡ  
δυναμὴ ἐστὶν. It remains doubt-  
ful whether the one set of roots  
(δυνάμεις) or both are the no-  
minative to δύναται, and con-  
sequently, whether τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις  
refers only to oblong number,  
or to both oblong and square  
number. The former alternative  
may be adopted as the simpler ;  
although the latter would be  
the more accurate expression.  
Instead of enumerating all the  
irrational roots, which seemed  
infinite, they conceived the idea  
of finding an expression which  
should embrace them all. They  
first went for assistance from  
arithmetic to the less ab-  
stract forms of geometry (Ar.  
Met. I. 2 : αὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων  
ἀριθμῶν τῶν τε προσθίσαντες  
λεγομένων, ὅλον ἀριθμητικὴν γεωμε-  
τρίας). Here they at once found  
a generalization. All numbers

ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ' ἐπιπέδοις ἂ δύνανται· καὶ <sup>p. 148.</sup><sub>b</sub>  
περὶ τὰ στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστα γ' ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες· ὥστε μοι  
δοκεῖ ὁ Θεόδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίαις  
5 ἔσσεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὃ γε ἐρωτᾷς περὶ  
ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυνάμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὥσπερ  
περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως· καίτοι σύ γέ μοι  
δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν· ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται  
10 ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος.

ΣΩ. Τί δαί; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ c

which can be produced by equal integers they called square numbers. The rest, formed of unequal factors, they called oblong. The roots of the former can be measured by unity, the roots of the latter cannot, though the numbers themselves can. Hence a general distinction, and

a simple nomenclature. The roots of square numbers they called μήκη, i. e. μήκει σύμμετροι, commensurable in whole numbers, the roots of oblong numbers, δυνάμεις, i. e. δυνάμει μέσων σύμμετροις. And similarly, in regard to solid quantity, i. e. the cube roots of numbers.

In other words,  $\sqrt{16} = 4$  or  $16 = \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 4 \\ \hline \end{array}$ ;

and  $4 = \frac{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4}{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4} =$  the line forming one of its sides.

On the other hand

$\sqrt{12} = 3 \cdot 464$  or  $12 = 3 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 4 \\ \hline \end{array}$  and  $3 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 4 \\ \hline \end{array} = 3 \begin{array}{|c|} \hline 3.464 \\ \hline \end{array}$ ;

and  $3 \cdot 464 = \frac{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4}{1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4}$ , which is not commensurable with the side of the former square, although its square is commensurable, because it can be measured by unity. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term, and distinguishing the thing from

that with which they had confused it. So a real advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distinguished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself.

4. οὐκ ἔνοχ. τ. ψ. [τεισθαι] 'Will not be found guilty of perjury.' See above, οὐδὲς ἐπισκήψας, and note. The article refers to what has been already mentioned.

1. οὕτω δρομικῶ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἴτα δια-  
θέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἡττόν τι  
ἂν οἶε ἀληθῆ τόνδ' ἐπαινέσαι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ<sup>5</sup>  
ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἶε εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντη  
ἄκρων ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Νὴ τὸν Δί' ἔγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκρο-  
τάτων.

ΣΩ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σωτῶ καὶ τι οἶον Θεό-<sup>10</sup>  
δωρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν τε  
ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε  
τυγχάνει ὄν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμίας μὲν ἔνεκεν, ὧ Σώκρατες, φα-  
νεῖται.

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ· καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω· πειρῶ<sup>15</sup>  
μυμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἀπόκρισιν, ὥσπερ

But he  
fears that  
the ques-  
tion about  
knowledge  
is not so  
easy.

He an-  
swers that  
he has  
tried inef-  
fectually  
before; but  
is still  
anxious.

1. δρομικῶ] Running a course.  
Comp. Prot. 335: νῦν δ' ἐστὶν  
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου κρίσωναι τῷ  
ἡμεραίῳ δρομῷ ἀκμάζοντι ἔπεισθαι,  
ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῇ ἢ τῶν ἡμερο-  
δρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἔπεισθαι.  
Where Socrates speaks of him-  
self as past the δρόμου ἀκμῇ,  
(Rep. 460.) which Theætetus  
here has not reached.

5. ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ] See above,  
σμικρόν τί τι ὁποῶ.

6. τῶν πάντη ἀκρων] The Bodl.  
MS. has ἀκριβῶν, with an accent  
over the ᾱ, and a dot over each  
of the letters ε, β. ἀκρων is re-  
quired by the words which  
follow. Cf. Lach. 193: Τῶν  
πάντων καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεί σὺ  
ἀνδρίαν εἶναι; Εὐ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι  
τῶν καλλίστων. The mistake

perhaps originated in not per-  
ceiving that ἀκρων is masc.  
"Knowledge is no trifling mat-  
ter to find out, but it belongs  
to men every way complete;"  
i. e. not, like the runner, in one  
way only.

8. τῶν ἀκροτάτων] The superla-  
tive might seem unnecessary;  
but cf. Legg. 906: Τῶν παντά-  
νασσιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτούν.

12. ἐπιστήμη is governed par-  
tly by πέρι, but chiefly by λόγον.

14. προθυμ — ἔνεκεν — φαν.]  
Comp. Phædr. 272: Πειρῶ λέ-  
γειν—Ἐνεκα μὲν—πειρας ἔχομι' ἄν.  
Polit. 304: Πείρας μὲν τοίνυν  
ἔνεκα.

16. καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω]  
Comp. Gorg. 455: Αὐτὸς γὰρ κα-  
λῶς ὑφηγήσω.

'This is a sign, dear lad, that there is something in you, and that you ought to be made to feel the power of my art. You have heard that I am a strange fellow, but you were not aware that I practised my mother's trade. Consider the midwives; they have once had children, but are now past the age. They have thus experience

ταύτας πολλὰς οὕσας ἐνὶ εἶδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ p. 148.  
τὰς πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὐτ' αὐτὸς δύναμαι πείσαι ἑμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς τι λέγω, οὐτ' ἄλλου ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει· οὐ μὲν δὴ αὖ οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν.

ΣΩ. Ὡδίνεις γάρ, ὦ φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ  
κενὸς ἀλλ' ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες· ὁ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω.

ΣΩ. Εἴτα, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγὼ p. 149.  
εἰμι υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαι-  
ναρέτης;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα καί, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας;

1. ἐνὶ εἶδει περιέλαβες—ἐνὶ λόγῳ προσειπεῖν] To classify and to name (as above, συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἐν—ὅτε προσαγορεύομεν) are considered as different aspects of the same thing.

8. μέλειν] The reading is doubtful. μέλειν has on the whole the best authority; but the reading of the Scholiast, εἰρήν, which is found on the margin of several MSS., supposing it to have been originally a gloss, agrees better with μέλλειν, though it might have been suggested by either. There is an idea of uneasiness in μέλειν which suits well with the context. On the other hand, οὐδ' ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν (sc.

ἱκανῶς τι λέγω) is a thoroughly Greek expression. For μέλειν used personally, comp. Aesch. Ag. 370: Θεοὶς βροτῶν ἀφεισῆσθαι μέλειν. Soph. Electr. 342: Κεῖνον λαβίσθαι τῆς δι' ἐκτοῦς μέλειν (where it may be impersonal, as perhaps here). Eur. H. F. 772: Θεοὶ θεοὶ τῶν ἀδίκων μέλουσι.

9. ὠδίνεις γάρ] Rep. 490: Καὶ οὕτω λήγει ὠδίνος, πρὶν δ' εἶ.

14. μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς] 'Truly noble and valiant,' or 'commanding,' 'of no common or feeble mould.'

γενναίας] 'Of the right sort.' βλοσυρᾶς, 'burly.' Comp. Rep. 535: Γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυροὺς τὰ ἄβη.

p. 149. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εὖ ἴσθ' ὅτι· μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπης  
πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους· λέληθα γάρ, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην  
ἔχων τὴν τέχνην· οἱ δέ, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν  
οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἴπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἷτιον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὥς  
ἔχει, καὶ ῥᾶον μαθήσει ὁ βούλομαι. οἶσθα γάρ που  
ὥς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἐστὶ αὐτῇ κυῖσκομένη τε καὶ τίκτουσα  
ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἄλλ' αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τίκτειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν Ἄρτε-  
μιν, ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχεία ἐίληχε. στερίφαι-  
c μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη  
φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὣν ἂν ἡ ἀπειρος  
ταῖς δὲ δι' ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν  
αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα.

5. ἀτοπώτατος κ.τ.λ.] 'That I  
am the strangest of mortals,  
and bring men to their wit's  
end.' ἀτοπώτατος is the very  
word to express Socrates' idea  
of himself,—αὐτόν τε καὶ τοὺς λό-  
γους. Symp. 215 : Οὐ γὰρ τι ῥά-  
διον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὧδ' ἔχοντι εὐ-  
πύρως καὶ ἐφέητε καταρβήσασαι.

ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς  
ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν] Comp. Men.  
79, 80 : Ἦκουον μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ πρὶν  
συγγενίσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο  
ἢ αὐτὸς τε ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους  
ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν.—καὶ δοκεῖς μοι  
πατελῶς, εἰ δέ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοι-  
ότατος εἶναι τὸ τε εἶδος καὶ τὰλλα  
ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νόρῃ τῇ θαλασ-  
σίᾳ. This whole passage is at

least as much in favour of the  
MS. reading ἀτοπώτατος, as of  
Stallbaum's conjecture, ἀτοπέ-  
τατος, which was suggested by  
the former part of it.

15. Αἰτίαν] An adj. agreeing  
as predicate with Ἄρτεμιν. 'Ar-  
temis is responsible for this.'

16. Ἀλοχος] Used etymologi-  
cally, as if from ἀ priv., and λί-  
χος or λοχεύω.

17. Ἄρα] According to this  
tale.

ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀσθ.] 'It  
is not in human nature to  
become skilful where it is not  
experienced.'

19. ἀτόκοις] Bodl. p.m. ἀτόποις.  
τιμῶσα τὴν αὐτῆς ὁμοιότητα] 'In

of child-  
birth, and  
are also  
such as the  
virgin  
Goddess  
prefers.  
They per-  
ceive the  
state of  
those they  
meet with.  
They can  
arouse or  
allay the  
travail of a  
patient :  
and cause  
abortion  
when they  
think it  
meet. They  
are also  
naturally  
the best  
match-  
makers.  
They are  
slow, in-  
deed, to  
acknow-  
ledge the  
pride they  
take in  
this,  
though  
they bring  
20 people to-  
gether law-



ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός.

P.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε εἰκός τε καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς  
κυνούσας καὶ μὴ γιγνώσκεισθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιῶν  
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί γε αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια  
καὶ ἐπάδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν τε τὰς ὠδῖνας καὶ  
μαλθακοτέρας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν τε δ  
δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν κέον ὃν δόξη ἀμβλί-  
10 σκειν, ἀμβλίσκουσιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἐτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ᾗσθησαι, ὅτι καὶ  
προμνήστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ὥς πάσσοφοι οὔσαι  
περὶ τοῦ γινῶναι ποίαν χρὴ ποίῃ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ὥς  
15 ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴσθ' ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μείζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ  
ἐπὶ τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννόει γάρ' τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης ο  
οἷι τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ ξυγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ  
20 γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὐτὸ γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γῆν ποῖον  
φυτόν τε καὶ σπέρμα καταβλητέον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς.

honour of their resemblance  
to herself, τιμῶσα, 'prizing.' Cf.  
Symp. 208: Τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀποβλά-  
στημα φύσει πᾶν τιμᾷ.

6. φαρμάκια] The Diminutive  
is noticeable. 'Gentle reme-  
dies.'

8. τίκτειν τε δὴ] Sc. ποιεῖν.

9. κέον το] Sc. τὸ βρόφος, Said  
here of the embryo, 'At an early  
stage,' i. e. before it is dangerous  
to do so. Cf. Hipp. de Morb.  
Mul. § 3, 97: Ἦν μηνιαῖον φθίρη  
τὸ παιδίον, where the same thing

is spoken of. For the ellipse,  
which is a little difficult, v. infr.  
p. 161. τὸ γε σὺν, sc. κῆμα. Δύ-  
νανται is lost sight of as the sen-  
tence proceeds. Such a transi-  
tion to the indicative mood is  
not unfrequent. Cf. Rep. 465:  
Γέρα δέχονται, ζῶντες τε, καὶ τελευ-  
τήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίως μετέχουσιν.

14. ποίαν χρὴ] 'What woman  
should be married to what man,  
to produce the noblest off-  
spring.'

p. 149. ΣΩ. Εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, ὃ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἶε τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ ξυγκομιδῆς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὐν εἰκός γε.

p. 150. ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἥ δὴ προαγωγεία ὄνομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ἅτε σεμναὶ οὔσαι αἱ μαῖαι, φοβούμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν διὰ ταύτην ἐμπέσωσιν. ἐπεὶ ταῖς γε ὄντως μαῖαις μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν τοῖνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. οὐ γὰρ πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν ἐνίοτε μὲν εἰδωλα τίττειν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀληθινά, τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ῥάδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. εἰ γὰρ προσῆν, μέγιστόν τε καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον ἦν ἂν ταῖς μαῖαις τὸ κρίναι τὸ ἀληθές τε καὶ μὴ. ἥ οὐκ οἶε ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ γε.

ΣΩ. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαειύσεως τα μὲν

My art is  
greater still

1. τοῦ τοιούτου] Sc. τοῦ ποιῶν σπέρμα καταβλητόν. There is MS. authority for τοῦτον, but τοῦ τοιούτου is more natural in the connexion. It avoids tautology ; and besides the processes are analogous, rather than similar.

4. ἀδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον] 'unlawful and skill-less : ' contrary to morality and nature.

6. ἅτε σεμναὶ οὔσαι αἱ μαῖαι] Socrates himself however is not so particular. Xen. Symp. III. 10 : Σὺ δὲ δῆ, ἔφη ὁ Καλλίας, εἴ τι μέγα φρονεῖς, ὃ Σώκρατες ; καὶ δε μάλ᾽ ἀσπεύεις ἀσπείσας τὸ πρόσθεον, Ἐπὶ μαστροποιῇ, εἶπεν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡγίλασαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, Ὑμεῖς μὲν γελᾶτε, ἔφη ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδ' ὅτι καὶ πάνν ἂν πολλὰ χρήματα λαμ-

βάνοιμι, εἰ βουλοίμην χρῆσθαι τῇ τέχνῃ.

11. ἔλαττον δέ] There is a slight irregularity in the antithesis, occasioned by the stress on τοσοῦτον. The balance of clauses is, however, completed with τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ κ. τ. λ.

18. Τῇ δέ γ' ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαειύσεως] For the well-known metaphor, which is nowhere else so completely elaborated, compare Symp. p. 206, sqq. (where Diotima proceeds to explain the mystical expression τόκος ἐν καλῷ) κοῦσι γάρ, ἔφη, ὃ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, καὶ ἐπειδὴν ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ γίνονται, τίττειν ἐπιθυμῶν ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. τίττειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχροῦ σὲ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ.

than theirs, for it is exercised upon the minds of men, and I can also discern the false birth

ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ τε ἄνδρα p. 150. ἄλλὰ μὴ γυναικας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἄλλὰ μὴ τὰ σώματα. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ τέχνῃ, βασιανίζειν δυνατόν εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἰδωλον καὶ ο

ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θέον τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θητῇ ἐντὶ τῇ ζώῃ ἀνάτατον ὅτι, ἡ κηρὶς καὶ ἡ γέννησις. — δὲν δὲ τῷ κοῦντὶ τε καὶ ἕδῃ σπαργῶντι πολλή ἡ ποιήσεις γίγνεται περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὥδους ἀπολύειν τὸν ἔχοντα. ib. 209. τοῦτων αὐ ὅταν τις ἐκ νύου ἐγερῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν θέως ἄν, κ. τ. λ. to the end of the speech. Repub. p. 490 : Οὐκ ἀμβλύνοντο οὐδ' ἀπολήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ δ' ἔστιν ἐκαστοῦ τῆς φύσεως ἀφασθαι ἡ προσήκει ψυχῇ ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοῦτου προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ ἢ πλησιέστερας καὶ μάλιστα τῇ ὅτι ὅτι, γενήσας οὖν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γοῇ τε καὶ ἀληθῶς (ῥῆ καὶ τρέφοιο καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὥδους, πρὶν δ' οὐ. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see Phædr. 276, 278 : Παλὸν δ', οἶμαι, καλλίον σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχνῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσήκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ στείρῃ μετ' ἐπιστήμης λόγους, οἱ αὐτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοί, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀκαρποὶ ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες σπέρμα — δὲν δὲ τοὺς τοιοῦτους λόγους αὐτοῦ λέγεσθαι ὡς νύεις γηρύνει εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν αὐτῷ, ἂν εὐρεθείς ἐντὶ, ἔπειτα εἴ τινα τοῦτου ἔκγονοι τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἄμα ἐν ἄλλαισι ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκίψουσιν. For the theory of teaching and learning thus illustrated see Rep. 518 : Δεῖ δὲ, εἰπον, ἡμῶς τοῦνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ' ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν, οὐχ ὡς τινα ἑταγγελλό-

μετοὶ φασιν εἶναι τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δὲ πον οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφίσι ἐντιβίνας, ὡς τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιβίνας, κ. τ. λ. Where it occurs under a different metaphor, that of the cave.

It is always difficult to separate the Platonic from the real Socrates. In the present passage they are indissolubly blended. That men thought Socrates the strangest being, and that he brought them to their wit's end, is matter of fact. The quaint humour, perhaps even the name 'Son of a Midwife,' is Socrates' own. But it is impossible to determine how far the theory based upon his practice, that to teach is not to put something into the mind but to evolve something out of it, or to turn the mind from darkness to light, was consciously held by Socrates himself, and how far it is Plato's theory of the method Socrates pursued. It receives its full development in the VIIth book of the Republic.

3. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ] 'But as its greatest triumph my art comprises this.' δὲ answers to μὲν above, the former δὲ being parenthetical.

5. δυνατόν] Sc. τὸν ἔχοντα αἰτήν. [ἔδωλον] Comp. Rep. 520. (From whence Bacon probably took his *Idola*.) Soph. 240, 264, 266.

p. 150. ψεύδους ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμόν τε καὶ ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅπερ ταῖς μαίαις· ἄγονός εἰμι σοφίας, καὶ ὅπερ ἤδη πολλοὶ μοι ὠνειδίσαν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἐρωτῶ, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, 8 ἀληθὲς ὠνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἰτιῶν τούτου τόδε· μαιεύεσθαι με ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πάνυ τις σοφός, οὐδὲ τί μοι δέσστιν εὖρημα τοιοῦτο γεγονός, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἐκγονον· οἱ δ' ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνόμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται 10 ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊούσης τῆς ξυνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρέικη, θανμαστον ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργές ὅτι παρ' ἐμοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ παρ' αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ 15

from the true. I am childless of discoveries, by the will of the Deity, whom I serve in this. But those we take in hand, however stupid at first, make wondrous progress and do great things. If they leave me too soon, their minds miscarry: unless they return to me, when,

1. ἀποτίκτει] 'Is delivered of.'

2. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε] 'For I have the same previous condition which the midwives have, in being barren of wisdom.'

7. ὁ θεός] Who presides over my art as Artemis does over that of the midwives. This must not be identified with τὸ δαιμόνιον, though they are probably connected (see below, and cf. Apol. 40: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον), but belongs rather to the belief expressed in Apol. 21, 23, where he speaks of his cross-questioning as a Divine service, because occasioned by the oracle at Delphi; and Phædr. 85: Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγούμαι ἀμύδιλος εἶναι τῶν κικνῶν καὶ λαρὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, viz. of Apollo the god of the true μουσική (Phædr. 61: Ὡς φιλοσοφίας οὐσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς): but here, as in one or two places of the Apology, the feeling is generalized.

8. τις] Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.

οὐδέ τί μοι] 'Nor have I had such a prize of my invention born to me, the offspring of my own mind.' Perhaps there is a slight play upon the word εὖρημα. Compare Soph. Œd. Tyr. 1107: Εἰς ὁ Βακχίος θεὸς εὖρημα δέξασ' ἐκ τοῦ Νυμφᾶν Ἐλικωνιδᾶν, αἷς πλείστα συμπαλεῖ; but the primary meaning is 'invention,' cf. Phædr. 278: Υἱὲς γησίων — ταυτοῦ, ἐὰν εὖρεθῃς ἐνῇ, and εὐρόντες below.

9. ἔστιν—γεγονός] This differs from γίγνεται as ἔχω with aor. or perf. partic. differs from the perf. act.

13. ἐπιδιδόντες] Sc. φαίνονται.

14. καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ἐστὶ] 'And that manifestly.' τοῦτο sc. ποιούσιν. viz. ἐπιδιδάσκουσιν.

ἐναργὲς ἐστὶ] A strengthened form of δῆλον ἐστὶ. 'As clear as day.' Plato frequently thus extends an idiom.

if I am permitted to receive them, they again improve.

καλὰ εὐρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιείας p. 150. ὁ θεὸς τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὥδε δὲ δῆλον· πολλοὶ ᾗδ' οὗτοῦτο ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἣ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες, ἀπῆλθον πρωϊότερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τὰ τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, ψευδῇ καὶ εἰδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ ἀληθοῦς, τελευτώντες δ' αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις  
10 ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἰς γέγονεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ p. 151.

Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί. οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν ἔλθωσιν δεόμενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἑᾶ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπι-

4. ἡ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ] 'They left me, whether it was that they despised me, or were themselves won over by some one else.' The minuteness of the antithesis need not throw suspicion on the reading. πεισθέντες, 'attracted,' 'captivated.' v. Thucyd. VI. 54. (One MS. however has αὐτοὶ ἡ ὑπ'.)

6. ἐξήμβλωσαν] Cf. Aristoph. Nub. 137. φροντίδ' ἐξήμβλωκας ἐξευρημένην.

διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν] Symp. I. c.: Τίττιν δ' ἐν μὲν αἰσχυρῇ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῇ καλῇ.

10. Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου] We read of the introduction of this youth to Socrates in the Laches, p. 179: Λυσίμ. Ἡμῖν εἰσιν νικίαι αἰνοί. οἳ μὲν τοῦδε—ἐμὸς δὲ σὺ δὲ παππῶν δὲ καὶ οἷτος ὄνομα ἔχει τοῦμοῦ πατρός. Ἀριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. Lysimachus and Melesias are consulting Nicias and Laches, in the presence of Socrates, about their sons, Aristides and Thucydides.

12. θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες] 'Show-

ing extraordinary solicitude.' 'Going on their knees to me.' Cf. Apol. 35: 'Ἐώρακέ τινας—θαυμάσια ἔργαζομένους, ὥς δεινὸν τι εὐομένους πείσασθαι εἰ ἀποθαινοῦνται.

13. τὸ—δαιμόνιον] Here, as always, not commanding, but forbidding; and, as generally, neuter and impersonal. This is not the place to discuss the subject. It suits well with the intensely self-reflective nature of Socrates (lost sometimes for whole days in thought) that he should pause suddenly on the eve of doing something, without being able (at the time) to explain to himself and others the motives of reason or feeling which checked him.

14. αὐτοὶ] v. I. οἷτοι. αὐτοὶ has the best authority, and is perhaps also preferable as the more difficult reading. It is certainly admissible. 'In some cases I am permitted to do so, and the men themselves improve.' Not unfrequently the



p. 151. διδῶσι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ συγγιγνόμενοι καὶ  
 τοῦτο ταῦτὸν ταῖς τικτούσαις· ὠδίνουσι γὰρ καὶ ἀπο-  
 ρίας ἐμπίπλυνται νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον  
 ἢ ἐκέῃναι. ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀπο-  
 β παύειν ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. 5  
 ἐνίοτε δέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οἱ ἄν μοι μὴ δόξωσί πως ἐγ-  
 κύμονες εἶναι, γνούς ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, πάννυ  
 εὐμένως προμνῶμαι, καὶ ξὺν θεῷ εἰπεῖν, πάννυ ἱκανῶς  
 τοπάζω οἷς ἂν συγγενόμενοι ὄναιτο. ὧν πολλοὺς μὲν  
 δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε 10  
 καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδράσι. Ταῦτα δὴ σοι, ὦ ἄριστε,  
 ἔνεκα τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς  
 οἷε, ὠδίνειν τι κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρὸς  
 ο με ὡς πρὸς μαίας υἱὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἂ ἂν  
 ἐρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷός τ' εἴ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. 15  
 καὶ εἰ ἄρα σκοπούμενός τι ὧν ἂν λέγῃς, ἡγήσωμαι  
 εἰδῶλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἴτα ὑπεξαίρωμαι καὶ ἀπο-  
 βάλλω, μὴ ἀργίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτόκοι περὶ τὰ  
 παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρὸς με οὕτω  
 διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνουν ἔτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπει- 20  
 δάν τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἶονται

My pa-  
 tients also  
 are in tra-  
 vail, and  
 my art can  
 rouse or  
 allay this  
 pain. And  
 if some  
 come to me  
 whom I  
 perceive  
 not to  
 need my  
 skill, I give  
 them away  
 to Prodi-  
 cus or to  
 some other;  
 and in this  
 department  
 too I sel-  
 dom fail.  
 Take cou-  
 rage then,  
 and be not  
 angry if I  
 put aside  
 your first-  
 born as not  
 worth rear-  
 ing. I am  
 guided  
 in this also  
 by the  
 Deity, who  
 desires  
 your good.

more subtle and minute anti-thesis is preferred to the broader and more obvious one. Thus often the reader is puzzled for a moment by finding a negative reply where he expected an affirmative, or vice versa: that which is negated or affirmed being contained not in the whole of the previous sentence, but in the last word of it. But it must be admitted that the argument is more perfect with οἷοι.

6. πω:] Qualifying μὴ δόξωσι. 'Whom, somehow, I perceive not' etc.

10. ἐξέδωκα] For the word,

cf. Soph. 242: ἀνὸ δὲ ἑτεροεἰπῶν (τὰ ὄντα), ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν, συννοεῖ(σι) τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι. For the thing, see Lach. 200: Νικ. τὸν Νικήρατον τοῦτον ἤδιστα ἐπιτρίποιμι, εἰ ἰθὺλοι οἷός τ'· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἐκαστοὶ συνίστησιν.

12. ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἷε:] Cf. supr. p. 148: 'Ἄλλ' εἰ ἰσθι—πίπονθα λέγω.

13. προσφέρου] Charm. 165: Σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρει πρὸς με.

17. ὑπεξαίρωμαι] Bekk. corr. The MSS. have ὑπεξαίρωμαι. See below, ἀφαιρῶμαι.

ἀποβάλλω] Bodl. ὑποβάλλω.

εὐνοία τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες τοῦ εἰδέναί ὅτι οὐδεὶς p. 151.  
 ... θεὸς δύνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' ἐγὼ δυσνοία τοιοῦτον δ  
 οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλὰ μοι ψεῦδός τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀλη-  
 θεὸς ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,  
 3 ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν·  
 ὡς ὃ οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ, μηδέποτε' εἴπῃς. εἰ γὰρ θεὸς  
 ἐβέλη καὶ ἀνδρίξῃ, οἷός τ' ἔσται.

Theætetus  
 now ven-  
 tures to  
 answer,  
 I. Know-  
 ledge is  
 sensation.  
 1. 'Why,  
 Protagoras  
 meant this

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω  
 παρακελευομένου αἰσχροὺν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυ-  
 10 μείσθαι ὃ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστά-  
 5 μένος τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὥς γε  
 νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἰ-  
 σθησις.

(21.) τὴν λήρην] Some 'barren stuff'

οἶοντα] Plutarch in quoting this passage reads οἶονταί με.

1. οὐδεὶς θεός] 'And therefore not the presiding genius of my Art.'

8. σοῦ γε] I. a. 'You, whom I respect so highly.'

9. μὴ οἶ] See Appendix B.

12. ἐπιστήμη — αἰσθησις] The term αἰσθησις is more simple and more extensive than any one by which it could be rendered in English. See below, 156: Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθησις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὁράματα, ὅφρα τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὁσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναὶ γε δὴ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι κ.τ.λ. Perhaps 'to see and feel is to know,' is the nearest equivalent to what Theætetus means. But 'feeling' has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word 'Sinn' presents a nearer parallel.

Before reflection begins, our individual impressions are those

of which we are most conscious and most certain. And subjective certainty is the primitive meaning of τὸ ἐπίστασθαι. Hence αἰσθησις seems at first sight identical with ἐπιστήμη. Vid. Phæd. 83: 'Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ὅμα τε ἡσθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπὶ τῷ καὶ ἡγίεσθαι, περὶ δ' ἐν μέλλουσιν τοῦτο πάσῃς, τοῦτο ἐναργίστατόν τε καὶ ἀληθίστατον, οὐχ ὅπως ἐν. Aristotle Metaph. III. 1009 b: 'Ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐπίστασις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν.—ὅπως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἰσθησιν, ταύτην δ' εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναι φασιν. The saying of Theætetus is shown to be the meeting point of two lines of speculation; the one of which may be termed in modern language, subjective, the other objective: the one regarding all knowledge as relative and apparent to man: the other regarding things without reference to man as in a state of transience or

p. 151. ΣΩ. Εὖ γε καὶ γενναῖος, ὦ παῖ· χρηὶ γὰρ οὕτως ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῇ σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαῖον τυγχάνει ὄν. αἰσθησις, φῆς, ἐπιστήμη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

when he said, 'The man the measure of what is.' i. e. What appears to me, is real to me.

ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρη-  
p. 152. κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἶρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ γάρ που πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γάρ που;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί· ἀνθρώπος δὲ σύ τε καὶ γώ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως.

relation; thus sense cannot be knowledge, unless knowledge is relative, and being is change. This leads to an analysis of Sensation. We are made aware of its real nature, and so taught to distinguish Knowledge from it. See Aristot. de An. III. 3: Δοκί δὲ τὸ ποῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὅσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαι τι εἶναι· ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τοῖτοις ἡ ψυχὴ κρίνει τι καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων καὶ οἷ γε ἀρχαῖος τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταῦτα εἶναι φασιν, ὅσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἶρηκε, Πρὸς παρὲν γὰρ μήτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποις, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις—'Ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἄλλοια παρίσταται. Τὸ δ' αἰεὶ βούλεται τοῖτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, Τοῖσι γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐπ' ἡμᾶς ἄγῃσι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε.

i. e. collective human nature; nor yet exactly 'Each man.' As we have seen, p. 147, Thetetus is little conscious of the universal. Hence ἀνθρώπος signifies to him not humanity, nor yet the individual, as opposed to it, but this or that man, 'any man you choose.' And whether or not it was so intended by Protagoras, it certainly appears to have been so understood by his 'disciples,' who are here referred to.

6. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι.] 'Well, after all, I should not wonder if'—

13. ὡς οἷα μὲν, κ. τ. λ.] Cf. Cratyl. 385, 6: 'Ὅσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἀνθρώπου, ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνοιτο τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ὄντι ἐμοί, οἷα δ' ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ' αὖ σοί.

9. ἀνθρώπου.] Not 'Man,'

e. g. When it is asked, Is the wind cold? Protagoras would say it is cold to him who feels cold. Appearance in this case is sensation. The wind is to me as I sensibly perceive it. i. e. Sensation discovers that which is.

ΣΩ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν· ἐπα-  
κολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ. ἄρ' οὐκ ἐνίοτε πνέοντος  
ἀνέμου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν ῥιγοῖ, ὁ δ' οὐ; καὶ ὁ  
μὲν ἡρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν τότε αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα  
ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν; ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ  
Πρωταγόρᾳ ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ δὲ  
μὴ οὐ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἐκατέρῳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι γάρ.

15 ΣΩ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἰσθησις ταυτὸν ἐν τε

1. μέντοι] 'Well, at all events.'  
εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ λ.]  
Phædr. 260: Οὐκ ἀπόβλητον ἔποι  
εἶναι δεῖ—δ' ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ  
σκοπεῖν μὴ τι λέγωσι. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ  
νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφελόν.

6. ἐφ' ἑαυτό] The accusative  
may be defended from Thucyd.  
I. 141: Τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος  
σπευδῇ. IV. 28: Τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς  
εἶναι. The prep. is used in a  
slightly pregnant sense,=ἑρμω-  
τοῦμαι, 'As far as to itself, and  
no further.' v. infr. p. 160:  
Οὐδέ—ἐκείνο—ἑαυτῷ τοιαῦτον γε-  
νήσεται. (Perhaps the accus. is  
also partly due to the action  
of φήσομεν, or to the idea of  
motion in πνεῦμα.) For the use  
of the reflexive pronoun cf.  
Rep. 419: Καὶ ταῦτα δι' ἑαυτούς.  
Compare with this passage  
Locke Hum. Underst. II. 8.  
§ 21: "The same water may  
produce the sensation of cold  
in the one hand and heat in  
the other."

13. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάν-  
εσθαί ἐστιν] 'When you say  
"appears," it is that he has a  
sensation.' The example is kept  
in view throughout. There is  
MS. authority for αἰσθάνεται.  
(Cf. inf. 164: Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾷ  
οὐκ ἐπίσταται λέγει, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ  
ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται.) But the change  
of subject makes αἰσθάνεσθαί  
preferable. Cf. inf. 187. Τί οὖν  
δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδωκε ἔνομα, κ. τ. λ.  
Αἰσθάνεσθαί ἔγωγε. Crat. 411:  
Τὸ γὰρ γιγᾶσι γεγενῆσθαι λέγει.  
And the repetition of the ter-  
mination is a more probable  
corruption than the recurrence  
of σθ in the same word. Φαί-  
νεσθαι appears as a correction  
for φαίνεται in two MSS.

15. φαντασία ἄρα] i. e. 'In  
regard to heat and cold and  
the like your theory and that  
of Protagoras agree.' Φαντασία  
occurs here simply as the noun  
of φαίνεσθαι,='appearing,' rather  
than 'appearance,' and must be

2. θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἐκάστω καὶ κινδυνεύει εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀψευδές, ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ Πρωταγόρας, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγεν;

This theory of Knowledge, then, depends upon a theory of Being, which Protagoras reserved for his disci-

10

kept clear from the notion of faculty, and the associations due to Aristotle, (see de An. III. 3, where he defines it, *κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθησεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειας γενομένης*.) Appearance (or relative being) becomes a middle term between sensation and being, so that all is merged in sensation. Thus, while the answer of Theætetus is shown to coincide with the saying of Protagoras, the reader is gently led to acquiesce in their common point of view.

1. ἐν τε θερμοῖς] Cf. infr. p. 205: "Ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἴστω. They are instances of Plato's tentative method.

οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται] See αἰνά, which however is purposely omitted; viz., τὰ θερμά, κ.τ.λ. Or, while τὰ θερμά, κ.τ.λ. are subj. of κινδ. οἷα may be cogn. acc. "For they would seem to be to each according to his sensation." As we dwell upon the above example in support of the identification of appearance and sense, *ὅτι τῷ μὲν ὁρῶντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὖ*, (where, however, *ἐστὶ* was carefully excluded,) we are led insensibly to substitute "relative being" for appearance, by a

play of words, which may be preserved in English, "What appears to me, is to me." And from relative being (*ἰσθάνεσθαι*) we argue at once to 'being' (*αἰσθησις ἀρα τοῦ ὄντος*). For a similar recapitulation, in which the argument is really carried a step further, (with γάρ) cf. p. 191: *Ὅθεν γὰρ ταύτη οὕτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὕσα δόξα*.

4. Αἰσθησις ἀρα] Sensation then is of being, and, as being knowledge, (in accordance with your theory,) is infallible. Compare with *ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὔσα*, infr. p. 160: *Κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν*.

7. Ἄρ' οὖν—] If sensation is of being, then being is not being but change.

9. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the *real truth*, not in his book which is so entitled, but privately to his disciples. Cf. *Crat.* 413: *Ἐγὼ δέ, & Ἐρμούγετος, εἴτε λιπαρὴς ἢ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπίπτουσι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις*. (He had just given a derivation of the word *διαπιστήσις*, which he thus ironically attributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doctrine.) By a similar irony, he



ples, to whom he told the real truth 'in a mystery.'

3. If sensation is knowledge, being is change. Things are not, but become. Heraclitus, Empedocles, Homer, Epicurus, all agree in this.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις;

p. 152.

ΣΩ. Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον· ὥς ἄρα<sup>d</sup>

ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ οὐδὲν ἐστίν, οὐδ' ἂν τι προσ-  
εῖποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ' ὅποιονοῦν τι, ἀλλ', ἐὰν ὡς μέγα  
προσαγορεύης, καὶ σμικρὸν φανέται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρὺ,  
κούφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος ἐνὸς  
μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὅποιονοῦν· ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς τε καὶ  
κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα,  
ἃ δὴ φάμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύοντες· ἐστὶ  
10 μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ' οὐδέν, αἰεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περὶ  
τούτου πάντες ἐξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμ-

says here that the 'friends of Protagoras' have learnt their doctrine from their master 'in a mystery.' Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates proceeds to develop, was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the interpretations of his followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, 'disciples of Protagoras,' has been discussed in the introduction.

(9.) τὴν ἀλήθειαν] There is probably a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards.

2. καὶ μάλ' οὐ φαῦλον λόγον] 'I will tell you, and it is indeed a high argument.' He had spoken of a λόγος οὐ φαῦλος above.

3. οὐδ' ἂν τι προσείποις] 'Nor can you call any thing rightly by any name.' Whoever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which He-

raclitus was the most prominent exponent.

8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and decay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic influence. His Muse is called in the Sophist χαλαρυτέρα, because his friendship and strife do not possess the world together, but alternately.

11. συμμέρισθαι] MS. authority preponderates (numerically) in favour of συμμέρισθαι, which, however, gives no meaning. Stallbaum fails to defend it, by quoting Χαθί τε καὶ οὐ Πόδαργε &c. &c.; because we can hardly argue from Homer's use of the dual to Plato's, and because philosophers do not run in couples. Stobæus, who quotes this passage, has συμμέρισται. In the Bodleian MS. there is an erasure to the left of the omicron, which seems originally to have been α. An accent on the penultimate has also been

p. 152. φερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἑμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας· κωμωδίας μὲν, Ἐπίχαρμος, τραγωδίας δέ, Ὅμηρος, εἰπὼν

Ὠκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, 5

πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα ροῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

p. 153. ΣΩ. Τίς οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρὸς γε τοσοῦτον στρατόπεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητήσας 10 μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι;

erased. Thus *συμφερέσθων* is supported by the Bodleian p. m., besides three other MSS. 'Let it be assumed (since we cannot ask them) that the philosophers of all ages speak with one voice concerning this.' For the imperative, cf. *Soph.* 244: *Τόδε τοῖσιν ἀποκρινίσθωσαν*. Possibly the word *συμφ.* retains here something of its literal meaning, 'are gathered together,' 'move all one way.' The boldness of the language, especially the word *στρατόπεδον*, is in favour of this.

3. *Ἐπίχαρμος*] *Epicharmus* ed. *Krüsemann* fr. 95: *Συμπρίθη, καὶ διεπρίθη, καὶ ἀπῆνθεν ἔθεν ἦνθε πάλιν γὰρ μὲν εἰς γῆν, πνεῦμα δ' ἔνω*. *Ib.* fr. 90: *Φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἄσκολι πεφνησμένοι*. The passage quoted by *Diog. Laert.* III. 10. (who says that Plato borrowed from *Epicharmus*) though interesting, if authentic, is too long for quotation here. (*V. Mullah. Fragment. Phil. Gr. Epicharmus*. vv. 177—194.) *Epicharmus* (circ. 490 B.C.) is called a *Pythagorean*. One or two of his γῶμαι remind us of *Heraclitus*.

3. *τραγωδίας δέ, Ὅμηρος*] Where the form is in question, *ἔπη* are distinguished from *τραγωδία*: as in *Rep.* 394. Where this is not the case, they are combined as *tragedy*, this being another name for *σπουδαία μυμητική*: e. g. *Rep.* 605: *Ἀκροάμενοι Ὁμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν*.

4. *εἰπὼν*] γὰρ add. C. H. et re B. (*Bekk.*) *Flor.* a. b. c. (*Stallb.*) So in the similar passage, p. 175. (*Διγγιών τε κ. τ. λ.*) γὰρ is added in one MS. (*Ven. Z.*) The *Zurich* editors give *εἰ* *εἰπὼν*, without MS. authority. But the reading in the text is possibly right. See *Appendix A*.

5. *Ὡς. θ. γ. κ. μ. T.*] II. ξ, 201, 302.

11. *μὴ καταγ.*] A few MSS. have *μὴ οὐ*, which has been adopted by most editors. See *Appendix B*. Compare with the whole passage, *Cratyl.* 401, 402, where, after proposing first *Ἑστία* (fire) and then *ὥσια* (successive motion), as derivations for *οὐσία*, *Socrates* says: *Ὡ γὰρ, ἐκινῆσθαι τι σῆματος σοφίας. Ποῖον δὲ τοῦτο; Γελῶν μὲν πάνυ εἰσείν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα ἔχειν. Τίνα ταύτην;*

Motion is the principle of growth, rest of decay. Fire, the presiding element, is

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

p

ΣΩ. Οὐ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε τῷ λόγῳ σημεία ἱκανά, ὅτι τὸ μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ τὸ γίγνεσθαι κίνησις παρέχει, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ἡσυχία· τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τᾶλλα

τῶν Ἡρακλείτου μοι δοκῶ καθαρῶς παλαιὰ ἄλλα σοφὰ λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἔλεγεν. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις; λέγει πρὸς Ἡρακλείτου ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ βροχὴ ἐπεισάφῃ τὰ ὕδατα λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίητε κ. τ. λ. Two Orphic lines are quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod: 'Ἀεσώτες πρῶτοι καλλιπρόος ἦρε γάμοιο, ὅτε βακασιγνήτην ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄππινεν. S. adds, ταῦτ' οὐκ σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοισι συμφωνοῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει. The last words are a good commentary on ἐμφερέςθω.

The theory of knowledge, 'All impressions are true,' is shown to require the theory of being, 'All things come and go.' And thus of the Protagorean and Heraclitean traditions there is woven a doctrine of sense, similar to that which was held by the Cyrenaics and perhaps others at this time. As a doctrine of sense it is received, as a doctrine of knowledge and being it is negated. And yet some such relative view will return upon us after every effort to bind things in an abstract unity. Compare the way in which δόξα is treated in the Republic, p. 429: Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μὲν τι ἵσται, ὃ οὐκ εἰσχροὺς φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δεικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίμων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον; κ. τ. λ. τί δέ; τὰ

πολλὰ διπλάσια ἤττον τι ἡμίσητα ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Οὐδέν. Καὶ μεγάλᾳ δὴ καὶ σμικρᾷ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρὶά μὴ τι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν φήσωνται ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τᾶναντία;

2. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε] Cf. Thuc. I. 2: Καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οἷα ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι, διὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αἰετήσῃται' ἐκ γὰρ κ. τ. λ.

3. δοκῶν] The expression is a little harsh; and Badham proposes to read δοιοῦν. But cf. 152: Ἄ δὴ φάμεν εἶναι. 154: Καὶ ὃ δὴ ἴσαστον εἶναι φάμεν χρῶμα. Cf. also p. 176: Διωσότητές τε δοκῶσαι. 'Being so called.'

5. πῦρ, ὃ δὴ τᾶλλα γενεῇ] Which is assumed to produce all other things. The symbol of fire as the primal element, is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See Cratyl. l. c. (401.) ib. 413. (speaking of the Heracliteans): Ὁ μὲν γὰρ τίς φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διακρίναι καὶ κἄντα ἐπιτροπύειν τὰ ὄντα. Ἐπειδὴν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὸ ἐσμεναι ὡς καλὸν τι ἀκηκόεις, καταγελᾷ μου οἷτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἷμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀεθρόποις, ἔπειδ' ὁ ἥλιος δύη. Λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὃ τι αὐτὸ εἰκόνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί· τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥάδιον ἵσται εἶδέναι. ὃ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὃ δὲ τοῦτον μὲν πάντων καταγελᾷ φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει Ἀναγάρρας, τοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο κ. τ. λ.

p. 153. γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπύει, αὐτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ τρίψεως· †τούτω δὲ κινήσεις.† ἡ οὐχ αὐται γενέσεις πυρός ;

generated by friction, that is, by motion.

Β ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐται μὲν οὖν.

Living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν τό γε τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν εἰς τούτων φύεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; ἡ τῶν σωμάτων ἕξις οὐχ ὑπὸ ἡσυχίας μὲν καὶ ἀργίας διόλλυται, ὑπὸ γυμνασίων δὲ καὶ κινήσεων ἐπὶ πολὺ σώζεται ;

Exercise is essential to the preservation and improvement of body and mind.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως

Thus the mythology of the doctrine was rationalized by its adherents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from the most sensuous symbolism (ἥλιος, χρυσὴ σφαῖρα) to the most abstract principle (τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν, p. 156), and its most remote application. See also the famous saying of Heraclitus : (fr. 27. Mullach.) Ἐόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάρταν, οὔτε θεῶν τις οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἦν τε αἶψα καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰῶνος ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ σβεννύμενον μέτρα. But the symbol fire was by no means confined to Heraclitus, (—the Atomists, Pythagoreans, etc.) Cf. Rep. B. VI., where the sun appears as the chief of the sensible world, and the symbol of the idea of good.

10. ἐπὶ πολὺ] 'To a great extent ;' or 'for a long time.' So the Bodleian MS. The others vary between ἐπὶ ἐπὶ πολὺ, and ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, from which ἐπὶ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ has been conjectured.

12. Ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις] 'Ἐξις in Plato, like φαεινότης, is less technical than in Aristotle. It is simply the noun of ἔχειν, and wavers between the active and neuter meanings of the word. The body is said ἔχειν πᾶς, the mind is rather said ἔχειν τὰ μαθήματα ; hence ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἕξις, the condition of the body ; but ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, the having in the mind. Cf. Rep. 591 : 'Ἡ ψυχὴ τιμωτέρως ἔχει λαμβάνει σωφροσύνην καὶ δικαιοσύνην μετὰ φρονήσεως καὶ σωφροσύνης. Δρ. Met. Δ. 1022, 6 : 'Ἐξις δὲ λέγεται ὅσα μὲν τρόπον οὖν ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ ἔχοντος καὶ ἔχοντος—ἄλλου δὲ τρόπον διάθεσις, κ. τ. λ.

2. τοῦτω δὲ κινήσει] The Bodl. marg. (rather indistinctly) with several MSS. has τοῦτω δὲ κίνησις, which is perhaps right. τοῦτω will then refer to τριψέως. It seems unnecessary to assert that φορὰ is κίνησις. The ω of τοῦτω in the Bodleian MS. is partially erased. But the note Διαικῶν in the margin is in the ancient hand.

For a similar transition from one sense of a word to another, cf. p. 158 : τὰ αἰὶ δεκόντα τῇ δοκούντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ.

'But with regard to the having the mind, is it not through learning and practice, which are motions, that it gains and pre-

μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινήσεων ὄντων, κτᾶται τε μαθήματα π.  
καὶ σώζεται καὶ γίγνεται βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ' ἡσυχίας,  
ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει  
ᾧ τε ἂν μάθῃ ἐπιλανθάνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

Motion,  
then, is  
good, and  
rest is evil.

ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν ἄρα ἀγαθόν, κήσεις, κατὰ τε ψυχὴν  
καὶ κατὰ σῶμα, τὸ δὲ τούναντίον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι οὖν σοι λέγω ἡγεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας

serves what it learns, (or gains what it learns and is preserved,) and becomes better? The sentence proceeds as if ψυχὴ were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cf. Rep. 532: 'Ἡ δὲ γε, ἣν δ' ἔγω, λύσει τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν κ. τ. λ., where there is a similar 'nominativus pendens.'

1. κινήσεων ὄντων] Cf. Prot. 329: διὲς ὅτος τῆς ἀρετῆς μέρος ἴστω δ' ἐρωτῆς. Ὅντων is neuter; 'things which are of the nature of motion,' like τοῦτο δὲ κίσεις above.

2. σώζεται] 'Retains' (middle), or 'is preserved' (passive). Ἔξεις, as above interpreted, the preceding κτᾶται τε—καί, and ἐπιλανθάνεται in the corresponding clause, are in favour of the former: for which cf. p. 163: Ἐτι ἔχοντα μνήμην τούτου καὶ σώζομενον. Rep. 455: Μηδ' ἀτρεθε σώζοιτο. But when it is rendered as passive, there is a more natural progress in the thought, 'gets knowledge, is preserved, improves,' while ἐπιλανθάνεται may be as justly opposed to improvement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines above and below: cf. Symp. 208: Μελετῇ—σώζει τὴν ἐπιστήμην. See the whole passage. In the

indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not unconscious, ambiguity?

6. τὸ μὲν ἄρα] 'The one, then, viz. motion, is good.'

There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato's usual explicitness without κίσεις; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cf. Rep. 434: Ἐνδὲ μλλον ἄρα—ἡ—δύναμις; inf. p. 156: Τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις.

9. Ἐτι οὖν σοι λέγω—ἔτι] 'Must I go on to mention still weather and calms, and the like, showing how quietness in every case corrupts and destroys, while its opposite preserves: and for my crowning instance, pressing it into the service, shall I insist upon it that by his golden chain Homer means the sun?' For the meaning here given to προσβιβάζων, 'making it yield to my theory,' cf. Phædr. 229: Αἷς εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσβιβᾷ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον.—'If one is to force each of them (the mythes) to harmonize with probability.' Cratyl. 427: Καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβιβάζειν—δ νομοθέτης, viz. 'the sound of words to square with the sense.' Mythology, poetry, nature, body, mind, the elements, had already been 'pressed



13. καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύουσι, τὰ δ' ἕτερα σώζει; καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν

Water and air are preserved by motion. The argu-

into the service.' But this final instance requires still greater force. The position of the accusative τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν is possibly due to the attraction of the active προσβιβάζων, and the previous acc. τ. κολοφῶνα. For the transitive clause with ἀναγκάζω. cf. Symp. 202 : Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαι, δὲ μὴ καλὸν ἴσθιν, αἰσχροὺς εἶναι. PARM. 133 : Ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. Rep. 611 : Ὅτι—ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ καὶ δ' ἀρτε λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσιαν ἔν (where, however, the word has a different meaning). The construction is assisted by λόγῳ in what precedes. τὸν κολοφῶνα (to which ἐπὶ τούτοις closely adheres) is accusative in apposition to τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν ὡς κ. τ. λ. Schol. : εἰ ποτε ἴσται αἱ ψῆφοι ἰγίνεσθαι, οἱ Κολοφῶναι περιττὴν ἐτίθεντο τὴν νεώσαν Σμυρναίους γὰρ εὐθόνας εἶχον συνοίσεις, ὑπὲρ ἑν καὶ τήνδε τὴν ψῆφον ἐτίθεντο.

Three alternatives to the above rendering may be proposed :

(a.) ἀναγκάζω may be used absolutely, and προσβιβάζων may be the governing word.

'Shall I clinch my argument, making this to yield to my theory as its crowning instance, how that, &c. ?'

The obscurity of this construction would be a little softened by the position of τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν.

(b.) ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων might mean, 'convince you, bringing you to terms,' i. e. forcing your assent. In this case *σε* must be repeated from *σεα*. (This is

somewhat remote.) Ὡς κ. τ. λ. depends on ἀναγκάζω, πρὸς τὸ σημαίνεσθαι, as a sort of cognate accusative, (for it contains the final argument, and not the thing convincingly proved,) and τὸν κολοφῶνα is accusative in apposition to all that follows. Both τὸν κολοφῶνα and ὡς κ. τ. λ. are softened by the influence of λόγῳ, for which ἀναγκάζω is substituted.

Or (c.), This construction might be a little modified by taking ἀναγκάζω absolutely. 'Shall I clinch or complete my argument, forcing your assent ?' But the two latter interpretations are perhaps a little violent.

1. αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι] There is a slight redundancy of expression in order to bring the instance in question under the general theory.

3. τὴν χρ. σειρὰν] II. VIII. 18, sqq. At this point Socrates has entered fully into the Heraclitean vein ; as when he says of himself in the Cratylus, 407 :

Ὅφρα ἴδωαι εἶναι Εὐθύφρωνος ἵπποι, or in the Phædrus, 238 : Οὐκ ἐνὶ πόρρῳ διθυράμβων φθίγγομαι. This is the crowning argument, because it adduces the capital fact of nature witnessed to by the oldest and gravest authority (στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον). The lines chiefly adverted to are 23—26 : Ἄλλ' ὅτε δὴ κεν ἐγὼ πρῶφρων ἐβόλομαι ἐρύσσαι, αὐτῇ κεν γαῖῃ ἐρύσαιμ' αὐτῇ τε θαλάσῃ σειρὴν μὲν κεν ἔπειτα περὶ ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο δῃσαίμην, τὰ δέ κ' αὖτε μετ' ὅρα πάντα γίνεσθαι. Cf. Heracl. fr. 36 : (Mullach) Εἰ μὴ ἤλιος ἦν,

ment is clinched with Homer's golden chain. If the revolution of

ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει, καὶ δηλοῖ ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος, δ πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις· εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ' ἂν

εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν. Fr. 34 : ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερβήσεται μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρίοντες μὲν Δίῃσι ἐπικούρου ἰζηύρσουσι. As fire was the symbol of motion, so the sun was the still more concrete symbol of fire. See Rep. p. 508, where the sun is allowed to be paramount in the region of sense; being essential to vision and to life. For the way in which the authority of Homer and the poets is used, ironically by Plato, but seriously by those whom he imitates, cf. Cratyl. 391, where an argument is based upon the line ἐν Ζῶντι καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σάμανδρον, and infr. p. 194 : Ὅταν τοῖνυν λάσιν του τὸ κέαρ ᾗ, δ δὲ ἐπὶνισεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής. See also Xen. Symp. III. 6. (Antisth. loq.) : Οἷσθ' αὖτις οὖν ἴδντες, ἔφη, ἡλιθιώτερον βαψφάδην ; Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δι', ἔφη ὁ Νικίρατος, οὐκ οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Δῆλον γάρ, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπιστάνται.

3. ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κιν.—καὶ ὁ ἥλιος] The motion of the whole universe, and the perpetual interchange of the different elements, was symbolized in the Heraclitean theory by the revolution of the sun, who not only rose and descended, traversing the sky, but was also quenched and rekindled daily, Νέος ἐφ' ἡμέρῃ. See Lassalle II. 119. sqq., who compares Aristot. Meteor. I. 9 : Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὥς κινούσα καὶ κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν· ἐν ᾧ φανερώς ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου φορὰ διακρίνεται καὶ συγκρίνεται τῇ γήγινεσθαι

πλησίον ἢ πορρότερον, αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστίν.—Ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὕδατος ἀναθυμίασις, ἀτμίς· ἡ δ' ἐξ αἰέρος εἰς ὕδωρ, νέφος.—Γίνεται δὲ κύκλος οὗτος μινόμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον, ἅμα γὰρ ἐκείνος εἰς τὰ πλάγια μεταβάλλει, καὶ οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Δεῖ δὲ νοῆσαι τοῦτον ὥσπερ ποταμὸν ῥέοντα κύκλῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κινῶν αἶρος καὶ ὕδατος.—Ὅστ' εἴπειρ ἤνι-τοστο τὸν Ὀκεανὸν οἱ πρότερον, τάχ' ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν λέγοιεν τὸν κύκλῳ ῥέοντα περὶ τὴν γῆν. Cf. infr. p. 181. τὴν δὲ περιφορὰν.

4. εἰ δὲ σταίη] Cf. Phaedr. 245. (where the point of view is nearer Plato's own.) Τὸ αἰετη-τον ἀθάνατον, τὸ δ' ἄλλο κινῶν καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλου κινούμενον, παύλων ἔχει κινήσεως, παύλων ἔχει (ῥῆς) —οὕτω δὲ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ κινῶν. τοῦτο δ' οὐτ' ἀπο-λυσθαι οὐτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεωσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στήναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅταν κινήβητα γενέσθαι. In the text all is made to depend on change; in the above passage all change depends on that which is self-moving, but in both, motion is essential to being. See Ar. Met. a. 994 A : Τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰέρος κιν-θῆναι, τοῦτον δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ἐπὶ τοῦ πύκτου, καὶ τοῦτον μηδὲν εἶναι πέρας. Cf. Simpl. in Aristot. Cat. p. 1056. Bas. (quoted by Lassalle) Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἰσχυρίων ἐπιδείκνται, ὀ-χιστο αὖ πάντα ἀφανισθῆναι· διὸ καὶ μέμφεται Ὅμηρος Ἡράκλειτος εἰπόντι, Ὅς ἐρις κ.τ.λ. Οἰχῆσθαι,

3· διαφθαρείη καὶ γένοιτ' ἂν τὸ λεγόμενον ἄνω κάτω πάντα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ' ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ὑπόλαβε τοῖνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὕτωςί. κατὰ τὰ 5 ὁμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ ἑτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὁμμάτων μῆδ' ἐν τοῖς ὁμμασι· μῆδέ τιν' αὐτῷ χῶραν ἀποτάξῃς· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν εἴη τε [ὄν] που ἐν τάξει καὶ μένοι καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐν γενέσει γίγνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλὰ πῶς ;

ΣΩ. Ἐπόμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μῆδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἐν ὃν τιθέντες· καὶ ἡμῖν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκόν καὶ ὀτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς τῶν ὁμμάτων πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται 15

the sun and of the heaven were stopped, the order of the universe would be overthrown.

3. The theory is now applied.

(1) Color is not something without

10 nor in the eye, it arises between, when the eye encounters a particular motion. Hence it is different to

γάρ, φησι, πάντα. Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. XVIII. 107 : ('Ὡς ἔρως ἐκ τοῦ θεῶν ἐκ τ' ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο) 'Ἡράκλειτος τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν κατ' ἔρως συνιστάται νομίζων μέμφεται Ὀμήρῳ, σύγχυσιν κόσμου δοκῶν αὐτὸν εἶχισθαι. In the words ἄνω κάτω there is perhaps an allusion to Heraclitus' ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία.

Some of the latest guesses at truth have sometimes had a real or fanciful resemblance to the earlier ones. See Comte in Miss Martineau's abridgment, Vol. I. p. 439. 'Amidst the confusion and obscurity which exist on this subject, I think we may conclude that no organism, even the simplest, could live in a state of complete immobility. The double movement of the earth, and especially its rotation, may probably be as necessary to the development of life as to

the periodical distribution of heat and light.'

5. Ὑπόλαβε] If being then is motion, how are we to conceive of knowledge, i. e. of sensible perception? This is now evolved, a fresh appeal to experience being made at every step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence they are, 1. relative to the individual (ἐκαστῷ ἴδιον γεγονόσι); 2. relative to each other. 1. is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, &c. : 2. of the perceptions of size and number.

κατὰ τὰ ὁμματα] 'In the sphere of vision.'

9. εἶ] MSS. δν.

15. πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φορὰν] The theory does not consider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in

man and other animals, to different men, and to the same man in different states.

γεγεννημένον, καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμεν χρῶμα, οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ρ. ἀλλὰ μεταξύ τι ἐκάστω ἴδιον γεγονός· ἡ σὺ διῷσχυρί-  
σαιο ἂν ὡς οἶον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρῶμα, τοιοῦτον  
8 καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὀτρυνῶν ζῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἄλλω ἀνθρώπῳ ἂρ' ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ὅτι οὖν; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἡ πολὺ μᾶλλον, ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταῦτόν δια τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως  
10 αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκείνω.

(2) Warmth in like

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὐ ἔφα-

the reality of external things is already dissolved.

1. ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναι φαμεν] Cf. p. 152: ὃ δὴ φόμεν εἶναι. τὸ προσβάλλον, sc. ἡ φορὰ. τὸ προσβαλλόμενον, sc. τὰ ὅματα. Cf. inf. ἄλλῃ τῇ προσπεισόν—ἄλλον προσελθόντος.

2. οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον] Neither that which gives, nor that which receives, the impulse.

12. ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα] Cornar. (followed by most editors), read δ. \*Ficin. Id, quod mensuramus. Their difficulty was created by not observing that there is a tacit reference to the example adduced below—ἡ ὅταν φόμεν ἐμὲ τηλικούτε δοτα κ. τ. λ. If this is borne in mind, the text of the MSS. reads smoothly enough, the middle voice is accounted for, and παρα retains its full meaning. 'If that, with which we compare ourselves in size, were large,' &c., (ἡ is emphatic.) We are introduced to a new class of objects, and advance a step in the argument at the same time. All that I

see, hear, feel, &c., is seen, heard, felt, &c. by me alone, and arises solely in relation to me. Again I view the size of other bodies in relation to my own, or I compare different quantities. I cannot think of any magnitude or number as great or small, except in relation to some other magnitude or number. For the use of παραμ. cf. Lucian. I. 198: Οὐτῶ γὰρ ἂν τὸ μέγα δειχθεῖν ἂν μέγα εἰ τῷ μικρῷ παραμετροῖτο. For a similar anticipation of an illustration, see Rep. 495: Ὡς περ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημῶν εἰς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀποδιδράσκουσιν—Νεωστὶ μὲν ἐκ δεσμών λελυμένον, where Plato seems to have the allegory of the cave in his mind. Cf. also Thucyd. I. 7: Αἱ δὲ παλαιαὶ—ἐκὸς θαλάσσης μᾶλλον φεισθήσαν, αἱ τε ἐν ταῖς νήσοις καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡπείροις (ἐφερον γὰρ ἀλλήλους τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσοι δοτεὶ οὐ θαλάσσιοι κἀντα φέουσι), where the fact that the islanders were the chief pirates, which is mentioned in the next chapter, is assumed.

p. 154.  
b πτόμεθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἄλλῃ προσπεσὼν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν μεταβάλλον· εἰ δὲ αὐτὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον ἕκαστον ἦν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸ ἄλλου προσελθόντος ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὼν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φιλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα λέγειν, ὥς φαίῃ ἂν Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ πᾶς ὁ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις;

ο ΣΩ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσει ἂ βούλομαι. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς προσενέγκῃς, πλείους φαμέν εἶναι τῶν τεττάρων καὶ ἡμιολίους, εἰ δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις· καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἢ τις ἄλλος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἴθ' ὅπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν; τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μὲν, ὦ Σώκратες, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν 20  
d νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν· εἰ δὲ πρὸς τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν.

3. τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτόμενον] I. e. 'I, the subject'. Cf. p. 182, τὸ πάσχω. Ar. Eth. N. X. 4: Αὐτὴν δὲ (τὴν αἴσθησιν) λέγειν ἐνεργῆς ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἔστι μηδὲν διαφερέτω.

7. εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα] 'We allow ourselves to be driven to use strange and contradictory expressions.' Protagoras would not find fault with us for calling the six dice more than the four, but for using the verb εἶναι to express the relation.

12. ἀστραγάλους γάρ που ἔξ] The

difficulty has been stated with regard to size, it is now illustrated with regard to number.

20. τὸ δοκοῦν] Cf. p. 157: Δοκοῦντά σοι.

22. φυλάττων] Not exactly 'avoiding' (φυλαττέμενος), but 'being careful': keeping watch on one point only. Cf. Gorg. 461: Ἐάν μοι ἐν μόνον φυλάττης. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις; Τὴν μακρολογίαν — ἢ καθιέρῃς. Infr. p. 180: Εἰ πάντες φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βίβασαι ἔγωγε εἶμι. So too, p. 169. πάντες τήρει τὸ ταῦτά, μὴ κ. τ. λ.

manner is relative to the touch, and size and number are wholly relative.

For want of observing this, we allow ourselves to fall into contradictions.

e. g. We say that

10 six dice are more and fewer; more than four, fewer than twelve.

Can anything become more 15 unless increased?



ΣΩ. Εὐ γε νῆ τὴν Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θεῖος. ἀτάρ, ῥ  
ὡς εἰκεν, εἰς ἀποκρίνη ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειόν τι ξυμ-  
βήσεται· ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἔσται,  
ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

Let us con-  
sider this,  
not in the  
spirit of con-  
tro-  
versy, but  
of calm  
inquiry.]

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ  
ἡμεν, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ᾗδη ἂν τὸ  
λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀσπειρώμενοι, ξυνελ-  
θόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς  
10 λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν· νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται  
πρῶτον βουλευσόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, τί  
ποτ' ἔστιν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις  
ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ' ὅπως τιούνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ' ἂν βουλοίμην.

What are  
these ap-  
partitions

15 ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ' οὕτως ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ  
ἡρέμα, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανα-

1. Εὐ γε—καὶ θεῖος] Themistetus' answer showed great dialectical aptitude. He perceives the contradiction, and yet will not answer παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν.

3. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα] 'Our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.' Eur. Hipp. 612: 'Ἡ γλῶσσο' δμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνέλεγκτος.

7. πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν] Having ransacked every mental problem.

8. ἐκ περιουσίας] 'Out of our superfluity,' 'for mere pastime.' Dem. de Cor. 226: Οἷός ἐστιν ἐκ περιουσίας ἱμοῦ κατηγορεῖ.

9. εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην] Sc. σοφιστικὴν. Cf. Symp. 210: 'Ὅστι καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὲς ᾖ τὴν ψυχὴν τίς καὶ συμπερὶν ἀνδρὸς ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῇ καὶ ἱρᾶν καὶ ἐπιδεσθαι καὶ νίκην λόγους τοιούτους, viz. ἐπιεικεῖς.

τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρού-

ομεν] Ar. Nub. 321: Καὶ γνομήν γνῶμην νύξας, ἐτέρω λόγῳ ἀντιλογήσω.

10. ἐκρούομεν] 'Would have knocked our arguments together,' like swords in a sham fight; 'would have bandied arguments.'

11. αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά] Compared with one another. The reading of the old edd., αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτὰ, might be defended; but αὐτὰ is the Bodleian reading.

15. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε] The abruptness of ἐγὼ without γε might be defended from Rep. 500: Καὶ ἐγὼ, ἀμύλει, ἔφη, συνοίωμαι. Eur. Med. 1375: Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ σὲν. Alcest. 369: Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ σοὶ πείθεο—συνοίωμαι. But the correction of the Bodleian MS. is in the ancient hand. In either case καὶ belongs to the proposition.

p. 155. σκεψόμεθα, οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἅττα ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα ἐν ἡμῖν ; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες φήσομεν, ὥς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μείζον μηδὲ ἑλαττον γενέσθαι μήτε ὄγκῳ μήτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. οὐχ οὕτως ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ᾧ μήτε προστίθεται μήτε ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαι ποτε μήτε φθίνειν, αἰεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

b ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ τρίτον, ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γίνεσθαι ἀδύνατον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δῆ, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται

that have been raised within us ! One voice says, Nothing can become more or fewer, greater or less, while it is equal to itself. Another : That to which nothing is added, and from which nothing is taken, remains equal to itself. A third : Nothing can be, what it was not, without becoming.

1. οὐ δυσκολαίνοντες] 'With no feeling of irritation.' Cf. Men. 75 : Εἰ μὲν γε τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἱριστικῶν ὁ ἰρόμενος, εἴποιμ' ἂν αὐτῷ, ὅτι Ἐμοὶ μὲν εἴρηται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁρθῶς λέγω, σὺν ἔργῳ λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν· εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλουτο ἀλλήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πρῶτόν τινος καὶ διαλεκτικέτερος ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

2. φάσματα] These mental phenomena (that have started up before us). Cf. Polit. 268 : Τὸ περὶ τὴν Ἀτρίως τε καὶ Θεόστου λεχθεῖσαν ἵδρι φάσμα. Cf. Meno 85 : Ὅσπερ ἔσται ἀρετὴ ἀνακτεῖνται αἱ δόξαι αὐταὶ κ.τ.λ. For the thought, comp. p. 203 : Βασανίζομεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαβόντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. Prot. 331 : Οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἀλλ' ἐμὶ τε καὶ σέ.

5. ὄγκῳ] Cf. Phaed. 102. 'Similes is at once taller and shorter, taller than Socrates, shorter than Phaedo.' Where the difficulty is met in a different spirit.

12. ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. 1. What existed not before, but afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming. 2. What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production, &c.

The latter is the more subtle, but is probably right. Schol. : Ὁ Πρόκλος τὸ ἀλλὰ παρὰ λέγει. Prorsusque ita Latine dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse. Heind. 'Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards.' Cf. Soph. 265 : Ἢ τις ἂν αἰτία γίγηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον ὅσων ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι.

These seem to jar, when we say that the dice which were fewer are now more without being increased: or that I, that was taller than you, am now shorter, without becoming so. Thematetus is full of

αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ, ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν p. 155-  
 ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε  
 ὄντα, μήτε αὐξηθέντα μήτε τούναντίον παθόντα, ἐν  
 ἐνιαυτῷ σου τοῦ νέου νῦν μὲν μείζω εἶναι, ὕστερον δὲ  
 5 ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ  
 σου αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ πρότερον οὐκ  
 ἦ, οὐ γενόμενος· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι  
 ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλύς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἂν ποτε  
 ἐγιγνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα δὴ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις  
 10 οὕτως ἔχει, εἶπερ καὶ ταῦτα παραδεξόμεθα. [ἔπει] γάρ

1. τηλικόνδε] Of the height you see me.

5. μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρέθεις] 'My size having been stripped of nothing,' i.e. 'Without anything being taken from my height.' Badham conjectures μηδὲν ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος. But this is unnecessary.

7. ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is supplementary to the 3 former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενέσθαι), the present in the second (αἰξάνεσθαι, φθίνειν). Both (γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι) are accordingly combined in the third, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such refinements are difficult, because unnecessary. The subtlety is carried still further in the Parmenides, until it is reduced to the formula, 'That which is, is.' Parm. 156: 'Ἐστὸς τε πρότερον ὕστερον αὐτίσθαι καὶ πρότερον καυόμενον ὕστερον ἐστάναι, ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ μεταβάλλειν οὐχ οἷόν τι ἵσταται ταῦτα πύσχειν'—'Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ μὴ μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ μεταβάλλειν.'

9. καὶ, which implies a subtle connexion between τοῦτε and

ἄλλα μυρία, can only be expressed in English by the emphasis on 'these.' Cf. Soph. Œd. Col. 276: ἄσπερ με κάνοιστήσας, ἴδε σάζειν.

10. παραδεξόμεθα] Sc. παρὰ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου. 'If we are to take this at his hands;' i.e. not only accept, but adopt this as our own difficulty. Cf. Charm. 162: Εἰ οὖν εὐχχωρεῖς τοῦτ' εἶναι σωφρ. ἅπερ εἰπὸς λίγαι, καὶ παραδέχει τὸν λόγον, ἔργου πολὺ ἂν ἦδον μετὰ σοῦ σκοπούμεν.—'Ἀλλὰ πᾶν εὐχχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι.'

[ἔπει] γάρ πον] 'I assume this (δῆ), for I suppose I take you with me.' Cf. Euthyph. 12: Ἐπεὶ γάρ πον εἰς γε; Euth. πόν γε. The MSS. have εἰσί, but there can be little doubt about the emendation. The six dice are more when compared with four. They were fewer when compared with twelve. They cannot be more without having become more, and they cannot have become more without increase. Protagoras would say; It is true the same thing cannot be more without addition, but the dice in the two cases are not the same thing, for they are in

55. που, ὦ Θεαίτητε· δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἄπειρος τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερφύως ὡς θαυμάζω τί ποτ' ἐστὶ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐνίστε ὡς ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινίῳ.

ΣΩ. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακῶς τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἴριν Θαύμαντος ἐκγονοὺς φήσας οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον μαυθάνεις ἤδη δι' ὅ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φημὲν λέγειν, ἢ αὖπω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕπω μοι δοκῶ.

ΣΩ. Χάριν οὖν μοι εἴσει, εἰάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον

wonder a  
bewilderment at  
this: a sign  
of his philosophic  
nature.

a different relation. The distinction between relative and absolute quantity is so familiar to us, that this is apt to appear a mere verbal quibble. But the solution of such difficulties was one of the steps by which the Greeks arrived at that distinction.

6. οὐ κακῶς τοπάζει] 'Theodorus is evidently right in his conception of you. For this Wonder is a true symptom of the philosophic nature.'

8. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη] Arist. Metaph. I. 2: Διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ εἰς καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, κ. τ. λ.

9. τὴν Ἴριν Θαύμαντος ἐκγονοὺς] Hes. Theog. 265. Θαύμας δ' Ἀκαιοῦ βαθυρρεῖται θυγῆτρα ἡγάγην Ἑλέκτρην· ἢ δ' ἑκαίην τέκεν Ἴρις, cf. v. 780.

10. πότερον μαυθάνεις ἤδη] 'Do you begin to perceive what is

the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras?'

Aristotle, Met. E. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativity of quantity. Θαύνομαι γὰρ οὐχ ἥμισυ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταύτου κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ πᾶν ὑπεληφέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶναι τετράπληχον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὅλα εἶναι. ἢ δ' οὐσία κατὰ τὸ ποῖον, ταῦτα δὲ τῆς ὁρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ πᾶν τῆς ἀορίστου.

14. Χάριν, κ. τ. λ.] 'Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help you to elicit the truth of their meaning from its hidingplace in their minds?'

μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν] viz. Heraclitus, Homer, and the rest mentioned above, p. 152.

4. To meet these and other difficulties the "Protagorean" doctrine is further developed. It must be hidden, though, from the uninitiate, those "impenetrable" men, who believe in no unseen operations, but only in what they can clutch with their hands.

δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομασθῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπο-  
κεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ γε πολλήν ;

ΣΩ. Ἄθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μὴ τις τῶν ἀμνητῶν  
ἐπακούῃ. εἰσὶ δὲ οἱ τοῖοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο οἰόμενοι εἶναι ἢ  
οὐδ' ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρίξ τοῖν χερσὶν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις  
δὲ καὶ γενέσεις καὶ πᾶν τὸ ἀόρατον οὐκ ἀποδεχόμενοι  
ὡς ἐν οὐσίας μέρει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Σώκратες, σκληροὺς γε  
λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους.

ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ γάρ, ὦ παῖ, μάλ' εὖ ἄμουντοι. ἄλλοι δὲ

1. ἀνδρῶν—αὐτῶν] The two genitives are not precisely in the same construction : ἀνδρῶν is governed by διανοίας, αὐτῶν by ἐξ in συνεξερευνήσωμαι. The pronoun αὐτός, however, is frequently used to recall a noun, which, for the sake of emphasis, has been placed in the forefront of the sentence, e.g. Rep. 477: Ἐπιστήμων πρότερον δόξαμιν τινα φῆς εἶναι αὐτόν, κ.τ.λ.

ἀποκεκρυμμένη] Is to be taken closely with συνεξερευνήσωμαι, as the order shows.

6. ἀπρίξ τοῖν χερσὶν λαβέσθαι] What may be 'grasped thus.' The extreme materialists are here discarded, in the Sophist they are made better for the argument's sake, that we may be able to discourse with them. The description there is very similar. Soph. 246: Οἱ μὲν εἰς γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀστέρεος πάντα βλάπτει, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀνιχνεύει σίγῃ καὶ ὀρεῖ περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἀφαστόμητοι πάντων διασχιζέμεναι τοῦτο εἶναι μέν πον δ' ἀπρίχτι προσβέβηκε καὶ ἴτα φῆναι τινα, τοῦτον σῆμα καὶ οὐσίαν ἀνιχνεύοντι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἰ τις φῆσι μὴ σῆμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφροσύνην

τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο δοῦναι. 247: τοῦτω οὐδ' ἂν ἐν ἐπισχευομένῳ εἴ γε αὐτῶν σπαράται τε καὶ εὐτόχθοντες, ἀλλὰ διατίθονται ἂν πᾶν δ' μὴ διανοεῖται ταῖς χερσὶν ἐμπιπύειν εἶναι, ἐπεὶ ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν.

πράξεις] e.g. δικαία καὶ ἀδικοὶ πράξεις. v. Soph. 247.

7. γενέσεις] e.g. αἰθέρις, αἰήσεις, ἥδοναί.

8. σκληροὺς—καὶ ἀντιτύπους] 'Hard and repellent,' i.e. stubborn and impenetrable.' For the verbal climax, cf. Tim. 62: Σκληρὸν δέ, βίοντες ἂν ἡμῶν ἢ σαρξ ὕψιστος—τὸ δὲ ἐκ τετραγώνων ἐν βέβαιον—ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδες. There is perhaps a humorous intention in the application of these material epithets to the men in question, similar to the play of words by which the Heracliteans are called βίοντες, inf. p. 181. For the inquiry, who are referred to, see Introduction. Cf. Soph. 246: Ἡ δεινὸς εἰρηκεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἤδη γὰρ καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτων συχτοῖς προσέτιχον.

11. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομφύστεροι] In comparison with these advocates of gross bodily "matter,"



p. 156. πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, ἥδε αὐτῶν, ὡς τὸ πᾶν κίνησις ἦν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πᾶ-  
 b σχειν. ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως πρὸς ἄλληλα γίνεταί ἕκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δέ, τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησις, αἰὲ συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡμῶν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὅφεις  
 10 τε καὶ ἄκοαί καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λύπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι

The men whose mysteries we teach, are more refined. Their first principle, upon which the whole depends, is that All is motion. Motion is active and passive, and each kind is infinite. These meet and produce in-

Protagoras is almost an idealist. His disciples believe not indeed in a world of *νοητὰ εἶδη*, but in a hidden process underlying appearances, cf. Rep. 477: *δυνάμεις γὰρ ἐν ὅτι τὰ ἐκ χρόαν ὁρᾷ ὅτι σχῆμα*, κ. τ. λ.

(11.) Ἄλλοι δὲ] viz. the μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου, to whom he communicated his doctrine *ἐν ἀπορήσει*, p. 152. Schleiermacher conjectured ἄλλ' οἶδε; but they would then be liable to be confused with the *ἄνδρες ὀνομαστοὶ* above. The 'disciples of Protagoras' are evidently contemporaries of Plato. Aristippus is probably included. (Κομψότες and *συρφετέρες* are opposed, Hippias Maj. 288: *Οὐ κομψότες ἀλλὰ συρφετέρες*.) The word *κομψός* is used similarly of certain nameless philosophers (who are clearly the Pythagoreans) Polit. 285 *Πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν ὅτι ἀρα μαθητικὴ περὶ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ γενόμενα*. Cf. Phil. 53: *κομψοὶ γὰρ δὴ εἶναι αὐτοῖτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μὴνύειν ἡμῶν ὅτι δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν*. (Megarians!)

3. ἦ] 'really is,' according

to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Aristotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a general statement. Soph. Œd. Col. 117: *Τίς ἄρ' ἦ*; The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed.

8. *συνεκπίπτουσα*] 'Tumbling forth to light at the same moment.' Compare the lively expression in Rep. 432, when justice is discovered, *πάλα δ' ἡμετέραι φαίνονται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κληνδεύσθαι*. For the insertion of *καὶ γεννωμένη*, cf. Soph. Ant. 533: *Καὶ ξυμμετρίῳ καὶ φέρῳ τῆς αἰτίας*. Aesch. Prom. 339. *Πάντων μετασχὼν καὶ τεταλμμένος ἐμὸι*.

10. τὰ τοιαῦτα—*ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὅφεις—πεκλημέναι*] The slight redundancy helps to connect the sentence.

12. ἡδοναί γε δὴ] The particles mark the transition to a class of things less familiarly known by the name *αἰσθησις*.

numerable  
twin births:  
sensation  
and sen-  
sible thing  
coming  
forth toge-  
ther.  
Sensations  
include  
pleasures,  
pains, de-  
sires and  
fears, and  
there are  
many with-  
out a name.  
Sensible  
things are  
colours, and  
the like.  
All the  
things now  
spoken of

κεκλημένα καὶ ἄλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνόνομοι, p. 156.  
παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὀνομασμένοι· τὸ δ' αὖ αἰσθητὸν  
γένος τούτων ἐκάσταις ὁμόγονον, ὅψεσι μὲν χρώματα  
παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναί,  
καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῇ  
γιγνόμενα. Τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος,  
ὃ Θεαίτιτε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα; ἄρα ἐννοεῖς;  
ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄθρ' εἰάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται  
γὰρ δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα πάντα μὲν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν,  
κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτῆς ἐνὶ τῇ κινήσει αὐτῶν.  
ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ πλησιάζοντα  
τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ δ

1. αἱ ἀνόνομοι] See Locke, Hum. Und. B. II. c. 3. I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense, nor indeed is it possible if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for.

3. The Bodleian with nine other MSS. has ἐκδόστης.

6. οὗτος ὁ μῦθος] Cf. Soph. 242: Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγέσθαι πᾶσιν ὡς ὅσιν ἡμῖν κ.τ.λ. For the spirit with which all this is done, compare Rep. p. 545: Φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογουμένας λέγαν;

7. πρὸς τὰ πρότερα] 'In reference to what preceded,' viz. from p. 153. Ὑπόλαβε — to p. 155, παραβεβήμεθα.

9. Ἄλλ' ἄθρ' εἰάν] 'Well, look attentively, perhaps we shall be able to finish it.' Cf. infr. p.

192: Ἴδὲ δὲ, εἰάν τι μᾶλλον εἴναι ἐπισημῇ εἰάν = in the hope that.

10. ταῦτα] ποιούτα, πάσχοντα, αἰσθητὰ, αἰσθήσεις.

πάντα — κινεῖται] Comp. Locke. 'The next thing to be considered is, how bodies produce ideas in us, and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.'

12. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ] 'The slower have their motion in one spot, and in relation to what is in contact with them, and are thus the producing elements; but those which are thus produced are swifter; for they are carried along, and their motion is from place to place.'

13. τὰ — γινόμενα οὕτω δὴ] Schol. Εἰς τὸ δὲ ὑποστικτικόν. The (probably conjectural) interpolation of Cornarius after οὕτω δὴ [βραδυτέρᾳ ἴστω] δεῶν διὰ τοῦτο, πρὸς τὰ πάροικον τὴν κίνησιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα οὕτω δὴ] is quite un-

p. 156. γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ θάπτω ἐστί· φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν  
φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις πέφυκεν. ἐπειδὴν οὖν ὅμμα  
καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεν-  
νήσῃ τὴν λευκότητά τε καὶ αἰσθήσιν αὐτῇ ξύμφυτον,  
ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο ἐκατέρου ἐκείνων πρὸς ἄλλο  
ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὀψεως  
πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν. τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ  
συναποστίκτοντος τὸ χρῶμα, ὃ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἄρα  
ὀψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο

are in mo-  
tion. But  
the motion  
of some is  
swift and  
of others  
slow. Those  
which pro-  
duce are  
slow, and  
they move  
only when  
in contact.  
The things  
produced  
are swifter,

necessary, and confuses the real sense. The slower motions are the ποιῶντα and πάσχοντα, which, when in contact, produce (without changing place) the αἰσθητά and αἰσθήσεις (i. e. qualities and sensations) which are the 'quicker motions,' and pass to and fro between the ποιῶν and πάσχον. Cf. inf. p. 159: 'Ἐγίνησι γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε ποιῶν καὶ τό πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἰσθησι, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφοτέρω. It is not quite clear what is intended by the qualities and sensations being in locomotion. Perhaps nothing more is distinctly meant than that they flow from subject to object, and from object to subject. But when it is said that they are the swifter motions, the idea is vaguely connected with the Heraclitean doctrine. Sensations and qualities are drops in the ever-flowing river of succession. The man or the tree is like the dull weed that clogs it, itself to be carried down in time. Subject and object are more of the nature of Earth, sensation and quality are sparks of the everliving Fire. This is not, however, brought out consciously here. It is shown afterwards, p. 182, that while sensation and qua-

lity are flowing between subject and object, they have also changed. The above interpretation was first suggested by Voegelinus, quoted by the Zurich editors in the preface to their last edition. He seems however, by a curious error, to make γεννῶν and γεννώμενον equivalent to ποιῶν and πάσχον. That the ποιῶν and πάσχον are both γεννώντα, appears from p. 159: 'Ἐγίνησι γὰρ δὴ — τό τε ποιῶν καὶ τό πάσχον, quoted above.

3. τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων] Men. 76: 'Ἐστὶ γὰρ χρῶς ἀπορρίψη στήματος θψει σύμμετρος καὶ αἰσθητός. This definition is said to be "κατὰ Γοργίου." In Tim. 67 colour is called, φλόγα τῶν σωμάτων ἐκείνων ἀπορρίπουσαν, θψει ξύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἰσθησι. Cf. ib. 45, 6.

6. τότε δὴ, κ. τ. λ.] Then it is that while these are issuing in the midst, sight from the eyes, whiteness from that which helps to create the colour, the eye is filled with seeing, and sees now, and becomes not sight indeed, but a seeing eye, and that which helps to give the colour birth is covered with whiteness, and it too becomes not whiteness but white, whether stick or stone, or whatever it is that

for their motion is from place to place. e. g. The eye and its appropriate active motion come in contact. Then sight begins to flit from the eye and

οὐ τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὄρων, τὸ δὲ ξυγγενήσαν p. 156.  
τὸ χρώμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ  
λευκότης ἀδ' ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε  
ὄτουον ξυνέβη † χρώμα † χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ  
χρώματι. καὶ τὰλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν  
καὶ πάντα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν  
καθ' αὐτὸ μηδὲν εἶναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ p. 157.  
τῇ πρὸς ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα

happens to have been coloured with this hue.

(6.) μεταξὺ φερομένων] It is doubtful whether this means "whilst they are moving," or "as they are moving in the midst." The former is excellent Greek, but the latter seems preferable if we turn to p. 154 : Μεταξὺ τι ἐκείνων ἰδὼν γηγόνες, and infr. p. 182 : Φέρεσθαι ἴκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντος τε καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος.

3. εἴτε ὄτουον, κ. τ. λ.] Heind. who receives ὄτουον—χρῆμα, (Cornarius' emendation,) adds, "ne ipso quidem χρῆμα opus fuerit, h. l." It has not been sufficiently remarked that ὄτουον has scarcely more authority than χρῆμα. This is sacrificing too much for a weak reading. One MS. (Par. H.) has σῶμα on the margin, but ὄτουον—σῶμα, though it has thus some slight authority, would introduce a distinction between organic and inorganic matter scarcely known to Plato, and at all events too novel to be so slightly hinted at. The real text is perhaps restored by dropping χρώμα, and reading ὄτουον, (ὄτουον Par. F.) λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὄτουον συνέβη χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. 'White, whe-

ther stick or stone, or whatever happens to be coloured with that colour.' The repetition of similar consonants is a frequent form of corruption, cf. esp. p. 158 : ὄψις χρῆ, κ. τ. λ. : where three MSS. (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.) read ὄψις χρώψις χρῆ, κ. τ. λ. (Χρόνου, χρόνον, χρόνον, χρόνου, occurring within the next few lines.) Also, p. 149, ἀτόποις for ἀτόκοις Vat. pr. Bodl. pr. Ven. Π. with ἀτοπώτατος a few lines above.

(Yet the reading ὄτουον—χρώμα, in which most MSS. agree, may possibly be right. For our theory has reduced us to narrow limits in the use of language. We have already been within a very little of saying 'motions move.' Cf. also, Rep. 601 : τὸς ποιητικὸν φήσομεν χρώματ' ἅπτα—ἐπιχρωματίζεω.) For εἴτε ξύλος εἴτε λίθος, cf. infr. ἀνθρώπων τε καὶ λίθων καὶ ἴκαστον ζῷον τε καὶ εἶδος. Hipp. Maj. 292 : Καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ, κ. τ. λ. The sentence is turned like Phædr. 237 : Εἴτε δὲ φῶς εἶδος λεγέται, εἴτε διὰ γίνετο μουσικὸν τὸ λεγόμενον ταύτην δεσχετο τῆς ἐκωνυμίας. Rep. 612 : Εἴτε πολυνεὺς εἴτε μονοεὺς εἴτε δευτεὺς καὶ ὅτιες. The aorists give a sort of picturesqueness to the expression, referring, as in the Homeric similes, to an imaginary case.

p. 157. ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως· ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως· οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιῶντι τὸ τέ τι ξυνελθὼν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλω αὐτῷ προσπεσόν 3 πάσχον ἀνεφάνῃ. ὥστε ἐξ ἀπάντων τούτων, ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ  
b τινι αἰεὶ γίγνεσθαι, τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συντηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. τὸ δ' οὐ 10 δεῖ, ὥς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος, οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε του οὐτ' ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὐτ' ἐκείνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὃ τι ἂν ἰσθῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι

colour from the object of sight; the eye becomes a seeing eye, and the object becomes coloured. Neither seeing eye nor coloured object can be thought of as existing independently of this mutual process. We must not speak of anything as existing,

1. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν] 'For it is impossible to have a firm notion (they say) even of the active and passive elements as existing separately in the case of any single thing.' αὐτῶν sc. τῶν κινουμένων, 'To distinguish amongst them the active or passive element as existing in any single case.' Or ἐπὶ ἐνὸς may be taken differently: 'To conceive steadily of agent and patient, as each existing separately in one;' i. e. 'as a single thing.' Cf. Soph. 259: 'Ἐν ἐνὶ ξυμμήνῃ, and the common expression ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ. But the former rendering is more probable. Cf. Arist. Met. V. 20: Μηδὲν ἀξίων λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οικείῳ λόγῳ ἐν ἐφ' ἑνός. For αὐτῶν Cornarius suggested αὐτῶν. If a change were necessary, αὐτῶν would seem more probable. τῶν ἐπὶ ἐνός, 'of things taken singly,' might then be compared with τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ, Phil. 16.

2. νοῆσαι—παγίως] Rep. 479:

Καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐκαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὐτ' εἶναι, οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δύνατον παγίως νοῆσαι, οὐτ' ἀμφοτέρω οὔτε οὐδέτερον. The word is used by Aristotle.

9. οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς] The irony of this appears very clearly, if we compare p. 197: Εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀνταγωνιστὴς κ.τ.λ.

10. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ] This may be regarded as a sentence of which τὸ is the subject, and all that follows the predicate. The idiom occurs frequently in Plato, Apol. 23. Rep. 340. De Legg. 803. Soph. 244. Its growth may be traced in the following passages, Rep. 357: Τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἦν ἀρα, ὥς δοκεῖ, προσίμῳ. 443: Τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἦν ἀρα κ.τ.λ. Τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ., 489. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν κ.τ.λ. See also Thuc. II. 44: Τὸ δ' εὐτυχὲς κ.τ.λ.

11. οὐτε του] The genitive is a point of transition to ἡμοῖ.

13. φθέγγεσθαι—] 'To use the expressions.'



but only as becoming this or that, arising, perishing, or changing. This applies not only to single things, but to those bundles of things, which men call sorts.

γινόμενα καὶ ποιούμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἄλλοι- p. 157.

ούμενα ὡς ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῇ λόγῳ, εὐλέγκτος ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι ἄνθρω-  
8 πόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ ο  
εἶδος. Ταῦτα δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀρ' ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι, καὶ γενοιο ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς ἀρεσκόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά  
10 σοι λέγεις αὐτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀσπείρω.

ΣΩ. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' οἶδα οὔτε ποιῶμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμόν, ἀλλ' εἰμὶ αὐτῶν ἄγονος, σὲ δὲ μαιεύομαι καὶ τούτου ἔνεκα ἐπάδω τε καὶ παρατίθημι ἐκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο-  
11 γένεσθαι, ἕως ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυνεξαγάγῃς δ  
ἐξαχθέντος δέ, τότε ἤδη σκέφομαι εἴτ' ἀνεμαῖον εἴτε γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν εὖ καὶ ἀνδρείως ἀποκρίνου ἃ ἂν φαίνηται σοι περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν ἐρωτῶ.

Theaetetus is invited to acknowledge the theory so far devel-

2. ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν] For the redundancy, cf. Rep. 506: Δί- κεια καὶ καλὰ ἀγνούμενα ὅση ποτὶ ἀγαθὰ ἴσταν, οὐ πολλὰ τινος ἄξιον φύλακι ἐπιγέσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνο- οῦντα.

4. ᾧ δὴ ἀθροίσματι—τίθενται] Sc. ἔνομα. The subject of τί- θενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to a common name is not ἐν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, nor ἐν πλεονεξία πολλῶν, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phenomena. Cf. Parm. 165, where the word ὅλον answers to ἀθροίσμα here, but implies something even more vague and formless.

12. ποιῶμαι] 'Tanquam pro-

prium mihi vindico,' velut dici- tur ποιείσθαι τινος νόον. Heind. Is it not rather, 'give birth to?' Cf. Rep. 372: Ποιούμενοι τοὺς παῖδας. Crit. 45: Ἦ γὰρ οὐ χρὴ ποιείσθαι παῖδας.

14. παρατίθημι] P. 149: Διδοῦ- σαι γὰρ αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκας καὶ ἐφέ- δουσαι. See the description of the education of a Greek youth in the Protagoras, 325: Παρα- τυθίσαι αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βιβρῶν ἀπογεγνῶσθαι ποσῶν ἀγαθῶν ποι- ἡματα. The genitive is perhaps partitive, but more probably governed by ἀπογεγνῶσθαι.

17. καὶ καρτερῶν] 'And with perseverance.' Boldness was all he required at first. p. 148. Θάρρει. 151 ἴδω—ἀνδρίῳ.

p. 157. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρώτα δὴ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε τοῖνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μὴ τι εἶναι ἀλλὰ γίνεσθαι αἰεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα ἄ ἄρτι δεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἔμοιγε, ἐπεὶδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω δι-  
εξιόντος, θαυμασιῶς φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑπο-  
ληπτίον ἥπερ διελέλυθας.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοῖνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὅσον ἐλλείπον αὐτοῦ.  
λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε πέρι καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων  
καὶ μανίας ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ τι ἄλλο  
παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα γάρ που ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι  
τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ὃν ἄρτι δι-  
μεν λόγον, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον ἡμῶν ψευδεῖς αἰσθήσεις

oped. So-  
crates dis-  
claims  
having  
any share  
in it, ex-  
cept that  
he has  
helped to  
bring it  
to the  
birth. The  
Good and  
Noble  
must be  
thought of  
with other  
things, as  
not exist-  
ing, but  
arising con-  
tinually.  
3. A for-  
midable

2. εἰ σοι ἀρίσκει] 'Whether you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.'

3. ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν] As, above, εἰσθήσεις is made to include desire, fear, &c., so by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its farthest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Protagoras is made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as individuals. It is a good example of the irony of dialectic.

8. Μὴ τοῖνυν] The doctrine is now so far developed, that we have only to notice an objection, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stumbling-block afterwards, so now false impressions have to be

accounted for. The solution is a simple one—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is knowledge, was at first made equivalent to its having a real object (p. 153). But are dreams real? Are the illusions of madness true? Is that really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, it must be so. (In fact, such impressions are not contrary to sense, but to reason.)

9. καὶ νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ] And disease, especially madness and its delusions. *μανία* is the subject of λέγεται, and ὅσα is cogn. accus. Cf. Soph. Trach. 406, *λείσσω μέτρα*. alib.

ὅσα—τί ἄλλο] The double cognate accusative is noticeable. 'The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression.'

class of objections is now disposed of. It is commonly said that in dreams and madness nothing of what appears is real. Protagoras says, All that appears to me is real to me. What account does he then give of these phenomena?

ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένας, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινόμενα πρὸς ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τίς δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην τιθεμένῳ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστω ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ φαίνεται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅκνῳ εἰπεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἔχω τί λέγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι αὐτό. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβητῆσαι ὡς οἱ μαινόμενοι ἢ οἱ ὀνειρώττοντες οὐ ψευδῆ βδοξάζουσιν, ὅταν οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι, οἱ δὲ πτηνοὶ τε, καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανοῶνται.

There is a doubt which is often felt about them: e. g. when it is asked, Can we prove that we are not dreaming now?

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς περὶ αὐτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοῦ ὄναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὁ πολλὰκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων τί ἂν τις ἔχοι τεκμήριον ἀποδείξαι, εἴ τις ἔροιτο νῦν οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώττομεν, ἢ ἐγγρηγόραμεν τε καὶ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα.

1. πολλοῦ δεῖ] These words are adverbial.

2. ἀλλὰ πᾶν τούναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι] E. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight: Σημεῖον δ' ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὰ μὴ ταῦτα πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζώουσιν, ἀλλ' ὃ ἡμῖν γλυκὺ, τοῦτ' ἄλλοις πικρὸν καὶ ἑτέροις ὀξύ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀσμύ, τοῖς δὲ στρυφνόν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δι' ὡσαύτως.

12. οἱ μὲν — αὐτῶν] I. e. the madmen.

13. πτηνοὶ τε] Sc. οἴωνται εἶναι.

18. Ὁ πολλὰκις] δ is not exactly governed by ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, but it is cognate accusative in apposition with the whole sentence that follows. 'What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, &c.' Cf. p. 165: 'Ἀλλοχῶν δὲ πελταστῶν ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγῳ ἐρόμενος κ. τ. λ. Rep. 443: Τὸ ἐνύπνιον, δ' ἐφαιμὲν ὑποπτεύσαι, κ. τ. λ.

Arist. Met. Γ, 6, 1011 A: Τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ὁμοιά ἐστι τῷ ἀπορεῖν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγγρηγόραμεν.

p. 158. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε ὅτῃ χρη-  
 ἐπιδείξαι τεκμηρίῳ. πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα  
 τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ. ἃ τε γὰρ νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα,  
 οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέ-  
 γεσθαι· καὶ ὅταν δὴ ὄναρ ὀνειράτα δοκῶμεν διηγέ-  
 σθαι,—ἄσπονος ἡ ὁμοιότης τούτων ἐκείνοις.

ΣΩ. Ὅρας οὖν ὅτι τό γε ἀμφισβητῆσαι οὐ χαλε-  
 πόν, ὅτε καὶ πότερόν ἐστιν ὕπαρ ἢ ὄναρ ἀμφισβητεῖ-  
 ναι, καὶ δὴ ἴσον ὄντος τοῦ χρόνου ὃν καθεύδομεν ὡς  
 ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ 10  
 τὰ αἰεὶ παρόντα δόγματα παντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθῆ,  
 ὥστε ἴσον μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμέν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ  
 ἐκείνα, καὶ ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διῶσχυρίζομεθα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάσας μὲν οὖν.

1. ἄπορόν γε ὅτῃ χρη- ἐπιδείξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin.): Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu'il leur plaira, je ne crois pas qu'ils puissent donner aucune raison, qu'il soit suffisante pour ôter cette doute, s'ils ne présupposent l'existence de Dieu. Descartes however would not say ὁμοίως ἐφ' ἑκατέροις διῶσχυρίζομεθα. As early as the age of Homer, attention had been attracted by the phenomena of dreams. II. XXII. 199: 'Ὡς δ' ἐν ὀνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεῖγ' ὅσα δέκεται. (Bodl. ὅτῃ χρόνῳ χρη-)

2. πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ] 'For everything corresponds in each exactly, as if one was the counterpart of the other.'

4. ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ] This is the reading of the best MSS., though ἐν νύκτι is supported by the greater number. But the article with ἐν νύκτι is out of place, and

the indefinite τῷ is not used adjectively.

5. καὶ ὅταν δὴ] 'And when in a dream we do seem to be telling thoughts which are dreams,—it is strange, the resemblance of this state to that.'

ὀνειράτα—διηγίσθαι] Not 'to tell dreams,' but 'to give utterance to thoughts which are only dreams.' Cf. supr. πάντα δ' διανοοῦμεθα ὀνειρότροπον. Ὀνειράτα is a sort of cognate accusative, or rather, is in apposition to the suppressed object of διηγίσθαι. ὄναρ is adverbial to δοκῶσι. (Meno 85:

ὥσπερ, ὄναρ ὅρι ἀνακεῖνται αἱ δόξαι αἰναι.) Τούτων refers to the waking, ἐκείνους to the sleeping state, like ἰσθῆδε, ἐκεῖ of the visible and invisible world. There is probably a slight break in the sentence before ἄσπονος, κ.τ.λ. The collocation ὄναρ ὀνειράτα is like κακοὶ κακοῖς p. 177, and adds intensity to the expression.

Dreams have as much reality to the dreaming mind, as daylight impressions have to the waking mind. And half our life is spent in dreaming.

The im-  
 pressions

of madness, too, though more short-lived, are real at the time to him who experiences them. In both cases it is impossible to demonstrate which is the real world.

Our theory resolves this doubt as follows :

That which is different has a different power, Whether this be

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς p. 158.

λόγος, πλὴν τοῦ χρόνου, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἴσος ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι τὸ  
5 ἀληθὲς ὀρισθήσεται ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῖον μὲντ' ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι,  
ὅποια τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μοι δοκῶ.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν οἱ τὰ αἰεὶ δοκοῦντα ὀριζόμενοι τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. λέγουσι δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, ὦ Θεαί-  
τητε, ὁ ἂν ἕτερον ἢ παντάπασι, μὴ πῇ τινα δύναμιν  
τὴν αὐτὴν ἔξει τῷ ἐτέρῳ ; καὶ μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ  
15 μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι ὁ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, ἀλλ' ὅλως  
ἕτερον.

p. 159.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον τοίνυν ταῦτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυνάμει ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὁτφοῦν, ὅταν ἢ κομιδῇ ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ ἀνόμοιον ἀναγκαῖον τὸ τοιοῦ-  
20 του ὁμολογεῖν ;

4. πλῆθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. Γ. 5. 1009 B : Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλῆθει κρίνεσθαι οἰοῦνται προσήκειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι.

7. τι ἄλλο—σαφές] 'Any other certain test.'

11. ἀριζόμενοι] 'Who determine.' Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of the word to them.

14. μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν] Megarian subtilty is here ironically brought to the help of Protagoras. The language of

logic is applied to the sensible world : the language of ideas to things that admit of degrees. And throughout, the idea dwelt upon is that of difference. The language is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be, διὰ ἕτερον, wholly different, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, διὰ τοῦτο διὰ ἐκείνῳ. For the application of this logic in the mouth of a Sophist see Euthyd. 283. 'Kleinias is not wise. You wish him to be made what he is not : i.e. no longer to be what he is. You wish him to be annihilated.' Cf.



p. 159. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμογε δοκεῖ.

active or  
passive.

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὁμοίων τῶ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταῦτον φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

5

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὥς πολλὰ μὲν εἶη τὰ ποιούντα καὶ ἄπειρα, ὡσαύτως δὲ γε τὰ πᾶσχοντα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμεγνύμενον 10 καὶ ἄλλῳ οὐ ταῦτ' ἄλλ' ἕτερα γεννήσει ;

And the  
same thing  
in combi-  
nation with  
different  
things has  
different  
products.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ καὶ τὰλλ' ἥδη κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον· Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σωκράτη αὐ ἀσθενούντα· πότερον ὁμοιον τοῦτ' ἐκείνῳ ἢ 15 ἀνόμοιον φήσομεν ;

Socrates  
ill, is a dif-  
ferent man  
from So-  
crates well :

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα τὸν ἀσθενούντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει ;

Democritus ap. Ar. de Gen. et Corr. I. 2 : Καὶ ὅπως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνὸς μετακινήντος· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίγνεται γραμμάτων.

2. Εἰ ἄρα] 'What is the same is like, therefore what is like is the same.' This is one of many examples of the imperfect state of logic, which puts Socrates' respondent at his mercy. He does not always escape unchecked, however, see Prot. 350: Ἐγὼγε ἐρωτῶντις ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰ οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρραλίοι εἰσίν, ἀμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλίοι ἀνδρείοι, οὐκ ἠρωτῆθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἤκου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες.

6. πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν] Soph. 259 : Ὁ καὶ πρόσθεν εἰρήται.

10. Ἄλλο ἄλλῳ—καὶ ἄλλῳ] Cf. Rep. p. 369 : Παραλαμβάνειν ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεῖα. The combination of one element with this and another with that, and again with another different from all. Compare with what follows, Ar. Met. E. 2. 1026 B : Εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὥς εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον ἕτερον ἢ ταῦτόν—μονσιώδε Κορίσκει καὶ Κορίσκει, κ. τ. λ.

13. Λέγωμεν δὴ] Phaed. 100 : Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. Σωκράτης is governed partly by λέγωμεν, partly by φήσομεν.

15] i. e. Having laid down these premises.

ΣΩ. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες· αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω. p. 159.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνόμοιον δὴ πού.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

Socrates  
sleeping  
from So-  
crates wak-  
ing, and so  
on.

5 ΣΩ. Καὶ καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλ-  
θομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

Therefore  
in combi-  
nation with  
the same  
active mo-  
tion they  
will pro-  
duce dif-  
ferent re-  
sults.

ΣΩ. Ἐκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο  
τι, ὅταν μὲν λάβῃ ὑγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἐτέρῳ μοι  
10 χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ὡς ἐτέρῳ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει ;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ' ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ  
τε ὁ πάσχων καὶ ἐκεῖνο τὸ ποιοῦν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν ;

15 ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαί-  
νεται καὶ γλυκὺς ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

According-  
ly, wine  
both seems  
and really  
is pleasant  
to me when  
well.

ΣΩ. Ἐγέννησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προσωμολογημένων  
τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθη-  
20 σιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφοτέρα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις  
πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὔσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσ-  
σαν ἀπειργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἶνου περὶ  
αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαίνουσῃ  
γλῶττι ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι.

25 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῶν οὕτως  
ὠμολόγητο.

5. καθεύδοντα] Par. F. marg.  
add. καὶ ἐγρηγοῦντα. Bodl.  
καθεύδοντι. Is it possible that  
καθεύδοντα δὴ ἐγρηγορεῖ may be  
the true reading ?

6. ὡσαύτως φήσεις] Sc. ἀπό-  
μοιον καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐγρηγορό-  
τος, κ. τ. λ.

8. τι ποιεῖν] To act upon some-  
thing ; to be agenta. So τὸ

ποιοῦν ἐμέ, below. Soph. 247 :  
Ἐπεὶ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ἐμοῖον.

12. ἐφ' ἑκατέρου] In either  
case. Cf. Parm. 130 : Ἀέγοντος  
δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους — ἐφ' ἐκαστου  
ἀχθεσθαι τὸν τε Παρμενίδην καὶ τὸν  
Ζήνωνα.

22. ἀπειργάσατο] 'The sensation  
arising on the side of the subject  
renders the tongue percipient.'

p. 159. ΣΩ. Ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν; ἀνομοίῳ γὰρ δὴ προσήλθεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

5 ΣΩ. Ἔτερα δὴ αὐ ἐγεννησάτην ὃ τε τοιοῦτος Σω- But the  
κράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν same wine  
αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην both seems  
καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα and really  
ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ' αἰσθανόμενον; is distaste-  
For I am then a dif-  
ferent man.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐγὼ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι I should  
οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος· τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, never re-  
ceive the  
same im-  
pression  
from any-  
thing else.  
And it  
would  
never pro-  
duce the  
same im-  
pression  
upon an-  
other per-  
son. Nor  
could

p. 160. καὶ ἀλλοῖον καὶ ἄλλον ποιῇ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον· οὐτ' ἐκεῖνυ τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ' ἄλλῃ συνελθὼν ταῦτόν γενηῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται· ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο 15 γενηῆσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ μὴν ἔγωγε ἐμαντῶ τοιοῦτος, ἐκεῖνό τε ἐαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται.

1. δοθινοῖντα] The const. is resumed from *εἶναι*—*λάβη* above.

5. *ἐγεννησάτην*] The use of the 3<sup>d</sup> pers. helps to support the notion of 'Socrates being a different man.' Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine is spoken of as the 'active motion.' The dual is expressive. 'They produce when paired.'

11. *οὐδὲν ἄλλο—γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος*] 'There is nothing else from which I can receive the same sensation.' That *ἄλλο* is the object of *αἰσθανόμενος* seems required by what follows. For the accusative, see p. 185: 'Ἀ δὲ ἐν ἑτέρας δυνάμει αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταύτ' αἰσθίσθαι, and elsewhere. There is a stress

on *οὕτως*. For *γενήσομαι—αἰσθανόμενος*, see a few lines below, *εἶναι αἰσθανόμενος γίγνωμαι*. The words *γίγνεσθαι*, *αἰσθανόμενος*, have become in a manner technical; cf. p. 182. *γεν. αἰσθ.* answers to *ἐγεννησάτην—αἰσθανόμενος* above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For 'ἄλλον ποιῇ, (the Bodleian reading) cf. *supr. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλ.* (*γενήσομαι* Bodl. Vat. A.) 'For a different object implies a different sensation, and makes him who perceives it a different man,' i. e. I and my sensation become different, with every change in the object of sense.

either subject or object become separately what they become together.

I become percipient of something. It becomes sweet or bitter or the like to some person.

Subject and object are thus mutually dependent and inseparable.

That which sensibly affects me is to me alone and I alone perceive it. My sensation therefore is true, for it is inseparable from my present being: and I am the judge, as Protagoras says, of what is and is not to me.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἀνάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν p. 160.  
αἰσθανόμενος γίνωμαι· αἰσθανόμενον γάρ, μηδενὸς δὲ  
αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι· ἐκεῖνός τε τινὶ γί- b  
γνεσθαι, ὅταν γλυκὺ ἢ πικρὸν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον γένηται·  
γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκὺ, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Λείπεται δὴ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ' ἐσμέν,  
εἶναί, εἴτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ περ ἡμῶν ἡ  
ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μὲν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν  
ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται  
συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι  
ἢ τινὸς ἢ πρὸς τι ρητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίγνεσθαι· αὐτὸ  
δὲ ἐφ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὅν ἢ γιγνόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον c  
οὐτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, ὥς ὁ λόγος ὃν διελη-  
λύθαμεν σημαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμέ ποιοῦν ἐμοί ἐστι καὶ  
οὐκ ἄλλω, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ' οὐ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ;

ΣΩ. Ἀληθὲς ἄρα ἐμοί ἢ ἐμῇ αἰσθησιν· τῆς γὰρ  
ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰεὶ ἐστι. καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρω-  
ταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοί, ὥς ἐστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ  
ὄντων, ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν.

2. τινὸς] The genitive is caused by αἰσθανόμενος, but cf. Rep. 438 : Τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναι τον. Cf. also ib. 478 : δοξάζειν μιν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν.

6. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι] It is impossible a thing should ever be, &c. This is a general statement, the aor. is therefore right. Above, in the words αἰσθανόμενον—γίγνεσθαι, the particular case was not lost sight of.

12. εἶναι τι ὀνομάζει] Uses the

term Being in reference to any thing. Inf. p. 201 : Οὐτως καὶ ὀνομάζων. Parm. 133 : Ὃν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες, εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπὶ ὀνομαζόμεθα. Cf. Phæd. 92 : Ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα ἐπικουρίαν τοῦ ὄντος.

15. ἀποδεκτέον] ἀπολεκτέον Bodd. 21. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας αἰεὶ ἐστι] Seeing it is inseparable from my being at the particular time. Vid. supr. : Ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τῆς οὐσίας συνδεῖ μιν, συνδεῖ δὲ ἐσθλὴν τὴν ἄλλαν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

p. 160. ΣΩ. Πῶς ἂν οὐκ ἀψευδὲς ὦν καὶ μὴ πταίων τῇ  
d διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν  
εἶην ὡνπερ αἰσθητής ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως οὐ.

ΣΩ. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ  
ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταῦτ' οὐκ συμ-  
πτῶκε, κατὰ μὲν Ὅμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν  
τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον οἷον ῥεύματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα,  
κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρη-  
μάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον  
e τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων αἰσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι.  
ἢ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε ; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον  
νεογενὲς παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα ; ἢ πῶς λέγεις ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, μόλις ποτὲ ἐγεννήσα-

Sorely  
what I thus  
perceive I  
may be  
said to  
know.

5 Thaletas  
then was  
right. Sen-  
sation is  
knowledge.  
And in  
this prin-  
ciple the  
doctrines  
of Heracli-  
tus and  
Protagoras  
meet.

15 I. a. First  
criticism

3. ἡ] 'Or rather.' Cf. Arist.  
Eth. N. III. 1, § 3 : δὲ πρῶτον ἢ  
δὲ πάσχειν.

10. Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον]  
Prot. 309 : Σοφωτάτη μὲν οὖν δὴ-  
που τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώ-  
τατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. Perhaps  
Plato is ironically preparing the  
way for what follows, p. 161, 2.

12. αἰσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι]  
The doctrine 'Sense is know-  
ledge,' is the meeting point of  
the two theories 'Man is the  
measure,' and 'All is motion.'  
The several topics are recapitu-  
lated in the reverse order. So Ar.  
Eth. N. I. 2 : Περὶ μὲν ἀποστοῦ καὶ  
πῶς ἀποδεκτικόν καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα.

16. Τοῦτο μὲν μόλις ποτὲ ἐγενή-  
σαμεν] Our theory is now com-  
plete. (1) First the hypothesis  
was ventured, Sensation is know-  
ledge. (2) This was at once  
identified with the axiom of  
Protagoras. The man the mea-

sure of what is : and their com-  
mon meaning was brought home  
to us by the analysis of a familiar  
example. (3) The mystery was  
revealed which lay beneath this  
saying, which had been reserved  
for certain 'disciples of Prota-  
goras,' the Heraclitean theory  
of the universe that 'All is mo-  
tion ;' in which all philosophers  
save Parmenides concur : which  
is witnessed to by poetry ; and  
confirmed by the observation of  
nature. (4) This theory of being  
was then applied to the pheno-  
mena of sense ; by which means  
the contradictions of common  
language were removed ; and  
(5) in meeting the formidable  
objection drawn from what are  
commonly called false impres-  
sions, the doctrine was still fur-  
ther developed, and shown to  
be universally applicable.

At each step it has grown in



the doctrine  
of sense.

μεν, ὅ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ τυγχάνει ὄν. μετὰ δὲ τὸν τόκον p. 160.  
τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρε-  
κτέον τῷ λόγῳ, σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ  
ἄξιον ὄν τροφῆς τὸ γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ ἀνεμαϊῶν τε p. 161.  
καὶ ψεῦδος. ἡ σὺ οἶε πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν  
καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι; ἡ καὶ ἀνέξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὄρων,  
καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, εἴαν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτό-  
κου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνέξεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος· οὐδαμῶς  
10 γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἡ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως  
ἔχει;

ΣΩ. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὡ

distinctness, and boldness, and  
apparent certainty. At first  
only warmth, colour, and the  
like were spoken of; gradually  
our eyes were opened to the  
relativeness of size and number.  
By and by it was assumed that  
the term αἰσθήσις includes plea-  
sure, pain, hope, fear, &c. Then  
we are quietly asked to concede  
that things good and beautiful  
have only a relative existence.  
And, being now fairly at the  
mercy of the argument, we can-  
not resist the admission that the  
illusions of dreams and madness  
are as real as our waking and  
sane impressions. They are  
real to us at the time when we  
experience them; which is all  
the reality any thing is per-  
mitted to claim.

3. τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ] Cogn.  
acc. in somewhat vague connec-  
tion with what follows: like τὸν  
κολοφῶνα, sup. p. 153. Schol.:  
'Ἡμῖνα πέμπτῃ τοῖς βρίψουσιν ἐκ  
γενέσεως οὕτω κληθεῖσα παρ' ὅσων  
ἐν ταύτῃ καθαίρουσι τὰς χεῖρας αἱ  
συνεσφάμμενοι τῆς μαϊώσεως, καὶ  
τὸ βρίψος περὶ τὴν ἰστίαν φέρουσι  
εὐρίχουσαι κύκλῳ, καὶ ταῦτομα τί-

θενται τούτῳ, διότι τε πέμπουσι τῇ  
παθείᾳ, ὡς ἐπὶ πλείστον πολίποδας  
καὶ σπηκίας, οἳ τε φίλοι καὶ οἰκτιροί  
καὶ ἀπλῶς οἱ προσήκοντες.

ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτίον] 'All  
round;' i. e. leaving out no  
point of view. There is an  
allusion to the etymology of  
ἀμφιδρ., as the words ὡς ἀληθῶς  
indicate.

3. τῷ λόγῳ] In our argument.

4. τὸ γινόμενον] In this and  
in some other cases where the  
reading has been questioned,  
the present or imperfect tense  
really gives additional videness.  
'That which is now born  
to us.'

7. τις σοῦ] Bodl. p. m. τίστων;

10. γὰρ δύσκολος] P. 145: Με-  
τὰ πόσῃ προάτητος. p. 155: Οὐ  
δυσκολαίνοντες κ.τ.λ.

12. Φιλολόγος γ' εἰ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ  
χρηστός, & Θ.] Phædr. 235: Φι-  
λότερος εἰ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυσοῦς, &  
Φαῖδρ. Ib. 264. χρηστός ἐλθεῖ κ.τ.λ.  
Φιλολόγος] 'You are truly  
a patient inquirer and an in-  
genuous person, Theodorus, if  
you take me for a sack full of  
different theories; and expect  
me without any difficulty to

p. 161. Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἶει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ῥαδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὐ ἔχει οὕτω ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ γινόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐξέρχεται παρ' ἐμοῦ ἀλλ' αἰεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγόμενου, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, ὅσον λόγον παρ' ἐτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειράσομαι, οὗ τι αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Σὺ κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκратες, λέγεις· καὶ ποιεῖ οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οἶσθ' οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἐταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου;

c ΘΕΟ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἶρηκεν, ὡς τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ ἔστι· τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου τεθαύμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος τῆς ἀληθείας ὅτι πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὅς ἡ κυνο-

1. Why did not Protagoras say that a pig or a tadpole was the mea-

pull out the refutation of what has been now stated. But you do not perceive what is really taking place.'

5. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν] 'But I have no advantage in wisdom beyond this simple skill, to receive a theory from some wise person, and admit it on fair conditions.'

7. μετρίως] In a spirit of fairness. P. 179: Μετρίως ἄρα πρὸς τὸν διδ. εἰρήσεται.

παρὰ τοῖς] Viz. Theætetus. Or is Protagoras meant?

11. ὃ θαυμάζω] A courteous way of expressing strong dissent. Prot. 329: Εἴπερ ὁλοφύειν ἀνθρώπων πευδομένην ἐν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι· ὃ δ' εἰδέναι σοὺ λέγοντες—. Gorg. 458: Ἄκουε δὲ, ὦ Γοργία, ὃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ. No fault is found with

the arguments of Protagoras, only if we follow his doctrine to its results, all creatures that have sense must be equally infallible. Hence there can be no teaching and no discussion.

14. Τὰ — ἄλλα — εἶρηκεν, ὡς] Cf. supr. p. 153: "Ἐτι οὖν σοὶ λόγος — γαλήνης, — ὅτι α. τ. λ.

16. τῆς ἀληθείας] The title of Protagoras' work. It is often covertly alluded to in this and other dialogues. The most pointed instance is in Cratyl. 391: Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπήνῃ ὥς του ἀξία.

17. ἐς] The type of stupidity. Lach. 196: Κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ ἐς γνώσῃ.

αὐτοκέφαλος] Something more remote even than the Μυσῶν

sure of things! His principle clearly includes all creatures that have sense: and destroys his own pretension to superior wisdom. Not to say that it cuts at the root of dialectic and of all discussion.

κέφαλος ἢ τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἰσθη- p. 161.  
 σιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς  
 ἤρξατο ἡμῖν λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν  
 ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὃ δ' ἄρα ἐτύγ-  
 5 χανεν ὧν εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρί- d  
 νου, μὴ ὅτι ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν,  
 ὦ Θεόδωρε; εἰ γὰρ δὴ ἐκάστῳ ἀληθὲς ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι'  
 αἰσθήσεως δοξάζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος  
 βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μήτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται  
 10 ἐπισκέψασθαι ἕτερος τὴν ἐτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής, ἀλλ'  
 ὃ πολλάκις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος μόνος  
 δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε,  
 ὦ ἐταῖρε, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων  
 διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, •  
 15 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἦν παρ'  
 ἐκείνῳ, μέτρω ὄντι αὐτῷ ἐκάστῳ τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας;  
 ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν Πρωτα-  
 γόραν; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν τε καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς τέχνης τῆς  
 μαευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον γέλωτα ὀφλισκάνομεν· οἶμαι

τεχνητός, infr. p. 209. As we might say, Why not the African apes!

2. πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς] 'Showing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him.'

3. ἤρξατο] The use of the aor. ind. with ἵνα, ὥστε &c., as with εἰ, though not frequent, is well-known. Euthyd. 304: Καὶ μὴν, ἔφη, ἀξίον γ' ἦν ἀκοῦσαι. Τί δέ; ἦν δ' ἐγώ. ἵνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων, οἱ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἰσι. Æsch. Prom. 749: Ὅπως πῆδω σπῆψασι τῶν πάντων πάντων ἀπηλόγηται &c.

6. λέγωμεν] λέγωμεν, Bodl. Ven. II. λέγωμεν, Vat.

13. ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος] The negative form of the same

saying, viz., 'Οὐκ εἶμαι ἀντιλέγων,' is in like manner turned against itself, Euthyd. 287: Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοοῦμενοι, ἡμεῖς, δ' πρὸς Διός, εἰ ὅστις ἔχει, τίνας διδάσκαλοι ἔσμεν;

15. ἦν] Viz. In his life-time.

17. ταῦτα] So the Bodleian with the greater number of MSS. C. F. Hermann quotes its authority for καὶ ταῦτα, the reading formerly received; judging, probably, from the silence of Gaisford.

19. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ συμπαῖσαι] Locke, Hum. Und. 13, § 88: But if it should so happen that two thinking men have different ideas, I do not see how they

- δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεία. τὸ  
 2. γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν τὰς ἀλλήλων φαντασίας  
 τε καὶ δόξας, ὁρθὰς ἐκάστου οὐσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν καὶ  
 διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἡ ἀλήθεια Πρωταγόρου,  
 ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῆς βύβλου ἐφθέγ- 5  
 ξατο ;

could argue or discourse with  
 one another.

1. ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγμα-  
 τεία] Ar. Met. Γ, 4, 1006 : Τὸ γὰρ  
 μὴ ἐν τι σημαίνει οὐδὲν σημαίνει  
 ἐστίν, μὴ σημαίνοντων δὲ τῶν ὀνο-  
 μάτων ἀνήρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς  
 ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ  
 πρὸς αὐτόν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν  
 μὴ νοοῦντα ἐν. Euthyd. 286 : Τοῦ-  
 τόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλὰν δὴ καὶ  
 πολλὰς ἀσχετοῦς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω.  
 καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφό-  
 δρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἐτι πα-  
 λαῖότεροι· ἐμοὶ δὲ δεῖ θαυμαστός  
 τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοῖς τε ἄλλοις  
 ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτόν. οἶμαι  
 δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ  
 ἐδωκῆσθαι πείσεσθαι. Ἄλλο τι ἢ  
 ψευδὴ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι ; τοῦτο γὰρ  
 δύναται ὁ λόγος. Gorg. 481 : Εἰ  
 μὴ τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς  
 μὲν ἄλλοι τι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοι τι, τὸ  
 αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τίς ἡμῶν ἰδὼν τι ἔπα-  
 σκε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν  
 βρόδιον ἰνδείσασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ  
 αὐτοῦ πάθημα.

3. μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος]  
 'Great, nay enormous.' μὲν  
 points forwards to the alterna-  
 tive implied in ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα  
 κ. τ. λ. 'But then perhaps he  
 was in jest.' διωλύγιος, Sch. :  
 Μεγάλη, ἡ ἐπὶ πολὺ διήκουσα.  
 ἀπὸ τοῦ περιβόητος—σημαίνει δ'  
 ἔσθ' ὅτι καὶ τὸ σκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ  
 νουθετεῖν. The meaning, 'loud'  
 (if it really existed, but it is  
 perhaps due to a fanciful deri-  
 vation from ἀλλό(ω) must have

been derived from the meaning  
 'long.' Cf. Μακρὸν εὐτεῖν, φωνὴ  
 ὁρατομήτης. The idea of vast  
 size, or length, may again have  
 arisen from the idea of gloom.  
 If so, the word is possibly re-  
 lated to ἡλυγῆ, λυγῆ. Compare  
 ῥάξ, ῥάξ· πτήσσω πτώσσω, &c.  
 'Vast in extent,' is the only  
 meaning admissible here, and  
 in de Legg. 890 : Τί δ' οὐ  
 χαλεπὸν τε ἐστὶ ξυκαλουθεῖν  
 λόγους οὕτως εἰς πλήθιν λεγόμενα,  
 μήκη τε αὐτὴ κίετται διωλύγια.  
 This, too, is the meaning in  
 which it is used by the Neo-  
 platonists. For the climax,  
 compare p. 156 : Σκληροῦς τε—  
 καὶ ἀστενέστες. P. 174 : Σμικρὰ  
 καὶ οὐδέν. Rep. 449 : Μέγα καὶ  
 δλον.

5. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τῆς βύβλου]  
 'If the Truth of Protagoras is  
 sincere, and was not laughing  
 when she uttered this from be-  
 hind her impenetrable screen  
 of written words.' There is an  
 allusion to the etymology of  
 αὐτον. (βύβλου, Bodl. : κύβλου,  
 Vat. et pr. Ven. B.)

Cf. the celebrated passage in  
 the Phædrus, about written  
 teaching, without dialectic, 275 :  
 Διὸν γὰρ πονεῖ θεαῖδρι, τοῖτ'  
 ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ἐς ἀληθεῖς ἄνθρωπον  
 ζωγραφία· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἐκείνης ἔκ-  
 γωνα ἔσθηκε μὲν ἐς ζῶντα, ἐν δ'  
 ἀνέρη τι, σέμνως πάντων σιγῇ κ. τ. λ.  
 For the imagery which is here  
 resumed, see above, p. 152 : Τοῦ-

ΘΕΟ. Ὁ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἀνὴρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν p. 1  
 δὴ εἶπες. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δι' ἐμοῦ ὁμολογοῦντος  
 ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ' αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν  
 ἀντιτείνειν. τὸν οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ' πάντως  
 5 καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ' ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακοῦειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθὼν, ὃ Θεόδωρε,  
 πρὸς τὰς παλαιστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος b  
 γυμνοῦς, ἐνίους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνύναι τὸ  
 εἶδος παραποδνόμενος ;

10 ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι  
 ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι ; ὥσπερ νῦν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς

το ἡμῖν μὲν ᾔνίστοτο τῇ πολλῇ συρ-  
 φητῇ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορήτῃ  
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγε. P. 156 : Τὴν  
 ἀλήθειαν ἀποκεκρυμμένην.—μὴ τις  
 τῶν ἀμύητων ἱπακούῃ.—ὧν μέλλω  
 σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν.—οὗτος δ  
 μῦθος. At first Protagoras him-  
 self spoke in riddles—now his  
 'Truth' is personified, and speaks  
 obscurely from her hidden  
 shrine. Plato often thus follows  
 up a metaphor. Compare the  
 well-known image of the wave,  
 Rep. 441 : Ταῦτα μὲν μόλις δια-  
 νύκαμεν. 453 : Ἄν τί τις εἰς κο-  
 λυμβήθραν μακρὰν ἐμπίσῃ ἂν τε εἰς  
 μέγιστον πύλαγος μίσσον, ὅμως γε  
 νεῖ οὐδὲν ἦττον. 457 : Ἐν ὥσπερ  
 κύμα φῶμεν διαφύγειν ὥστε μὴ  
 κατακλυσθῆναι. 472 : Τὸ μέγιστον  
 τῆς τραχυμάς. 473 : Ὅσπερ κύμα  
 ἐπηλὼν κατακλύσειν.

1. Ὅσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες] P.

161 : Τοῦ ἑταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου.

3. παρὰ δόξαν] Rep. 346 : Καὶ  
 ὁ μακάριος, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνουν,  
 ὡς τι καὶ περαινόμεν.

4. πάντως καὶ] See above, p.  
 143. n.

5. ἐμμελῶς—ἱπακ.] Cf. Soph.  
 217 : Πάντες γὰρ ὑπακούουσά σοι

πράξεις. Rep. 474 : Glaucous says,  
 'Ἀλλὰ τοί σε οὐ προδώσω, ἀλλ'  
 ἀμυνῶ οἷς δύναμαι δύναμαι δι' εὐ-  
 νοίᾳ τε καὶ τῇ παρακλείεσθαι, καὶ  
 ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου τοῦ ἐμμελίστερόν σοι  
 ἀποκρινοίμην.

6. Ἄρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα] It  
 appears from this, and p. 169,  
 that the Lacedaemonians used to  
 compel bystanders to join in  
 their gymnastic exercises. ('Ἐλ-  
 κειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον.—ἐπύνασι ἢ  
 ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσιν.) This is  
 probably the point of the allu-  
 sion here. There is no reason  
 to suppose that the human form  
 was less visible in an Athenian  
 than in a Lacedaemonian palaestra.  
 The law of Solon observed  
 in severer times at Athens, which  
 forbade adults to enter a gym-  
 nasium where boys were exercis-  
 ing, perhaps throws some light  
 on this Spartan custom. (Each.  
 c. Tim. p. 38.)

8. ἐνίους φαύλους] Socrates  
 courteously implies his own in-  
 feriority.

9. παραποδνόμενος] 'Stripping  
 beside them,' i. e. to compare  
 with them.



p. 162. πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἂν θεᾶσθαι καὶ μὴ ἔλκειν πρὸς τὸ γυμνάσιον σκληρὸν ἤδη ὄντα, τῷ δὲ δὴ νεωτέρῳ τε καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ' ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίπητον ἰτέυν. Λέγε δὴ, ὦ Θεαίπητε, πρῶτον μὲν ἃ νῦν διήλθομεν, ἄρα οὐ συνθauμάξεις εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὕτως ἀναφανήσῃ μηδὲν χεῖρων εἰς σοφίαν ὁπουοῦν ἀνθρώπων ἢ καὶ θεῶν; ἢ ἡττόν τι οἶε τὸ Πρωταγόρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρώπους λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε. καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, πάνν θαυμάζω. ἡνίκα γὰρ διήμην ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνν δ' μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι· νῦν δὲ τούναντίον τάχα μεταπέπτωκεν.

ΣΩ. Νέος γὰρ εἰ, ὦ φίλε παῖ· τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. πρὸς γὰρ ταῦτα ἐρεῖ Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, Ὡ γενναῖοι

According to this theory, Theaetetus is as wise as any God. The confidence of the youth is shaken by these objections, but they are dismissed by Socrates, who points out that argument should be met with argument and not with ridicule.

2. σκληρόν] 'Stiff,' opposed to ὑγροτέρῳ, 'more supple.' Symp. 196: Ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος (ὁ ἔρως) οὗ γὰρ ἂν οἷός τ' ἦν πάντη περιπτύσσεισθαι — εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. Cf. Rep. 410, where σκλ. is metaphorically applied to character: Ἀγρότης τε καὶ σκληρότης καὶ αὐτὸ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότης. See too Hor. Od. IV. 1: Desine—flectere mollibus jam durum imperiis.

3. προσπαλαίει] Sc. σπ.

6. σφόν] Quia scientiam assequi esse ponendo repente sapiens evasit. Heind.

7. συνθauμα.] Cf. supr. ὁ θαυμάζω.

10. εἰς θεοὺς] Contrast with this de Legg. 716: 'Ὁ δὲ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἐστὶν εἷς μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ

πού τις ὥς φασιν ἀθεῖος.

15. τούναντίον] viz., οὐκ εὖ φαίνεται λέγεσθαι. This word is not the subject of μεταπέπτωκε, but in apposition with the subject, forming part of the predicate. Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Me non, p. 70 C. Ἐνθάδε δὲ—τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν. Heind.

τάχα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. Π.

17. Νέος γὰρ εἰ] Parm. 130: Νέος γὰρ εἰ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὁ Σόκρατες, καὶ οὐκ οὐκ σου ἀντιλήφεται.

τῆς—δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθεις] 'Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular arguments.'

παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι, π. θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, οὓς ἐγὼ ἕκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὥς εἰσὶν ἢ ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ἂν ἀποδέχοιντο ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦτα, ὥς δεινὸν εἰ μὴδὲν διοίσει εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκήματος ὅτου- οὖν ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν λέγετε,

1. δημηγορεῖτε] 'You talk clap-trap.'

2. ἄγοντες] Hipp. Maj. 298 : Μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον πα- ράγοντες. Phædr. 267 : Τὸν δ' —Εἴηεν εἰς μέσον οὐκ ἄγονεν.

The Bodl. MS. with its two followers, Vat. and Ven. Π., gives λέγοντες. But the tendency to the repetition of consonants, already noticed, weakens its testimony in this instance with λέγειν and λέγετε following. Compare, besides the instances adduced in the note on p. 156, p. 160 : Οὐτ' αὐτῷ λεκτίον, οὐτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεικνύω, Bodl. Vat. δυο- λεκτίον, p. 169. ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἔγω, Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἀντ. ἀλλὰ λέγω. As regards the sense there would be a slight awkwardness in the repetition of the same common word, which it is in Plato's manner to avoid, though, on the other hand, the expression ἕκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν, is made more pointed at first sight. But the general sense with δημηγορεῖτε is enough to occasion this, without the introduction of λέγοντες. And if we look closely at the expression εἰς τὸ μέσον λέγειν θεοῖς, it is hardly supported by comparing Herod. VI. 139 : Ἐρως εἶχον ἀμφὶ μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἐς τὸ μέσον ;

de Legg. 817 : (the poets are addressed) Μὴ δὴ δόξετε ἡμᾶς —ἐπιτρέψαι ἡμᾶς δημηγορεῖν— πρὶν κρίναι τὰς ἀρχὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πεποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἴτε μὴ. Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον is not equivalent to δημηγορεῖν, but means rather to 'recite in public.' Cf. ib. 664 : Εἰς τὸ μέσον φερόμενος. The passages already quoted show that ἄγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον, meaning 'to adduce in illustration or argument,' is quite Platonic. See also Phil. 57 : Οὐ δ' ἔτι καὶ ταῦτα προσηγορεύμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον. There is a slight expression of violence in θεοῖς— ἄγοντες which suits the context well. .

οὐκ ἔγω] Here, as p. 152, Protagoras' opinion is quoted in his own words. Diog. Laert. IX : Περὶ θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὐθ' ὥς εἰσὶν εἰθ' ὥς οὐκ εἰσὶν. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ καλῶντα εἰδέναι, ἢ τε ἀδηλόγη, καὶ βραχύς ἐν ἐ βίος ἐ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

4. ἐξαιρῶ] Rep. 492 : Θεῶν μύηται κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγον.

7. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην] In dealing with a metaphysical theory it is not enough to have shown its inconsistency with common sense. It must be met upon its own ground, and the truth which it contains, as well as the sources of falsehood,

- p. 162. ἀλλὰ τῷ εἰκότι χρῆσθε· ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετεῖν, ἄξιος οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου ἂν εἴη. σκοπεῖτε οὖν σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος εἰ ἀποδέξεσθε πιθανολογίας τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένους λόγους.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε σὺ οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαίμεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλη δὴ σκεπτέον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὡς ὁ τε σὺς καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλη.

ΣΩ. Τῇδε δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ αἴσθησις ταύτην ἢ ἕτερον. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν. οὐ γάρ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάσῃ μὲν οὖν.

b ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ὁμολογήσομεν, ἂ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανό-

clearly distinguished. This, and not merely, as the Scholiast says, that he may draw out Theætetus further, is Socrates' motive in relinquishing the ground he has just taken.

3. οὐδ' ἐνὸς μόνου] Sch. ἐκ τῆς τῶν κυβερνούντων συνηθείας ἔλαβε τὸ οὐδένος μόνου, ὅταν ἐκεῖ πύσις ἐν τῷ παίξειν ἐν τὸ ἐλάχιστον.

'Not worth an ace.' Or, if, as Stallbaum conjectures, the phrase originated in the line of Homer, *ἦ. VIII. 234*, Νῦν δ' οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἀξιοῖ εἶμην Ἐκτορος, 'No better than a single man,' where-as he is now *ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιος*. Cf. *Polit. 297*: Τὸν ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον ἱατρόν. See above, p. 144: 'Ἀξιος γὰρ — γεωμετρίας ἐνικα, and below, p. 167: 'Ὁ σοφιστής—ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθείσιν.

4. πιθανολογίας τε καὶ εἰκόσι]

The Bodleian reading in the ancient hand. Cf. *Ar. Eth. N. I. 2*: Παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικῷ τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχισθαι καὶ ῥητορικῷ ἀποδείξεισ ὅπαιτεν.

5. τούτων] Several MSS. have *τηλικούτων*.

8. ὁ τε σὺς καὶ] Theæt. has answered for both. See above, *σύ τε καὶ Θεοδ. !*

14. ἐκινήσαμεν] *Rep. 450*: 'Ὅσον λόγον πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ἀναίτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας !

16.] The argument is in brief the following: 'If sensation is knowledge, we can know and not know the same thing; since (1.) we have perfect sensible perception of things we do not know thoroughly; and (2.) we remember (i. e. know) things which we do not sensibly perceive.'

10

2. The doctrine is therefore examined in the shape in which it first appeared ; viz. *Seuso* is knowledge. If to see and hear is to know, when a person

15

hears a strange language, or sees characters which he has never learnt, does he know or not know what is said and written?

μεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, πάντα ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι; p. 163. οἶον τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν πότερον οὐ φήσομεν ἀκούειν, ὅταν φθέγγωνται, ἢ ἀκούειν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἃ λέγουσι; καὶ αὐτὰ γράμματα μὴ ἐπίσταμένοι βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ πότερον οὐχ ὁρᾶν, ἢ ἐπίστασθαι, εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν, διύσχυριούμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ὁρῶμεν τε καὶ ἀκούομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι· ἃ δὲ οἱ τε γραμματισταὶ περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ οἱ ἐρμηνεῖς διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι.

Allowing this to pass,

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμφισβητῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ' ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσίόν, καὶ σκόπει πῇ αὐτὸ διωσύμεθα.

15. ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ] 'That I may leave you room to grow,' 'That I may not be always stunting and stopping you.' *Lys.* 206: Οἱ καλοὶ, ἐπειδὴν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαυῇ καὶ σβῇ. *Phædr.* 246: Τοῖσι δὴ τρέφεται τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται μάστιγά γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα. *Rep.* p. 497: Ἐν γὰρ προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλλον αὐξήσεται. The expression in *Aristoph.* *Vesp.* 638, *Ἡξυμένειν ἀκούω*, though more humorous, also affords an illustration.

We may naturally ask what objection Socrates would have raised, had he not feared to check Theætetus' growing intelligence. This may perhaps be gathered from below, where he ventures to puzzle him a little further, p. 166: 'ἴσως δέ γ' ἂν θανάσιμι πλείω ἢ τοιαῦτ' ἔπα-

θεῖ α.τ.λ. Socrates might have asked, Does every one who sees the forms and colours, or who hears the sounds, possess the sciences of them (*ζωγραφικὴ, μουσικὴ*, p. 145)? Could he give an account e. g. of the *ὀξύτης* and *βαρύτης* of what he hears? Cf. *Rep.* 524: *Μέγα μὲν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἴσρα ἅλλ' οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι*. Not even the objects of sense are *known* by sense, but by a higher faculty.

16. τόδε ἄλλο προσίόν, α.τ.λ.] The implied metaphor is probably that of the wave. It is continued below, p. 161: *Λόγος δὲ ἡμῶν—ἐκ λόγου μίξις ἐξ ἐλάττωτος καταλαμβάνει*: and is slightly varied, p. 177: *Πλείω αἰεὶ ἐπιφύεσθαι καταχέουσι ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον*.

p. 163. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ ;

d ΣΩ. Τὸ τοιόνδε· εἴ τις ἔροιτα, ἄρα δυνατόν, οὗτος  
τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτό ποτε, εἴ ἔχοντα μνήμην αὐτοῦ  
τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε μέμνηται μὴ ἐπί-  
στασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται. μακρολογῶ δέ, ὥς εἰ  
ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρεῖσθαι, εἰ μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνη-  
μένος μὴ οἶδεν.

Can I be  
ignorant of  
what I re-  
member!

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες ; τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις. Surely not.

ΣΩ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ ; σκόπει δέ. ἄρα τὸ ὁρᾶν <sup>10</sup> And yet,  
οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἰσθῆσιν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὃ ἰδὼν τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν  
o ὃ εἶδε κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. <sup>15</sup>

ΣΩ. Τί δέ ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τινὸς δὴ που.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ᾗσθητο, τοιουτωνί <sup>20</sup>  
τινων ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν ;

ΣΩ. Ὃ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίστε ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνηται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ μύσας ; ἢ τοῦτο δράσας ἐπελάβετο ; <sup>25</sup>

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε φάναι.

when I  
shut my  
eyes and  
remember  
what I  
have seen,

p. 164. ΣΩ. Δεῖ γε μέντοι, εἰ σώσοιμεν τὸν πρόσθε λόγον·  
εἰ δὲ μή, οἴχεται.

8. Τέρας γὰρ ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις] That is a monstrous supposition. *Par.* 129: *Εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὰ τὰ δμοῖά τις ἐπίφαιεν ἀνόμοια γηγόνεα ἢ τὰ ἀνόμοια δμοια, τέρας*

*ἀν, οἶμαι, ἦν.* *Phæd.* 101. alib.

16. Τί δέ ;] So *Bodl.* p. m. *Vat.* Ven. II. It seems more appropriate in argument than *τί δαί*, the common reading.



ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἐγώ, νῆ τὸν Δία, ὑποπτεύω, οὐ μὴν p. 164.  
 ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ· ἀλλ' εἰπὲ πῇ.

ΣΩ. Τῆδε· ὁ μὲν ὁρῶν ἐπιστήμων, φαμέν, τούτου  
 γέγονεν οὐπὲρ ὁρῶν· ὅψις γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις καὶ ἐπι-  
 5 στήμη ταύτων ὁμολόγηται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

I remem-  
 ber it and  
 do not see  
 it.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ὁρῶν καὶ ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς οὐ  
 εἴωρα, εἰ μὴ μύσῃ, μέμνηται μὲν, οὐχ ὁρᾷ δὲ αὐτό· ἢ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

i. e., If to  
 see is to  
 know,

10 ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾷ οὐκ ἐπίσταται ἔστιν, εἴπερ ὁ  
 καὶ τὸ ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

I remem-  
 ber it and  
 do not  
 know it.

ΣΩ. Συμβαίνει ἄρα, οὐ τις ἐπιστήμων ἐγένετο, ἔτι  
 μεμνημένον αὐτὸν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι, ἐπειδὴ οὐχ ὁρᾷ· ὁ  
 15 τέρας ἔφαμεν ἂν εἶναι εἰ γίνοιτο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

But this  
 seemed to  
 us a mon-  
 strous sup-  
 position;  
 Therefore,  
 sense is  
 not know-  
 ledge.

ΣΩ. Τῶν ἀδυνάτων δὴ τι συμβαίνειν φαίνεται,  
 εἰ τις ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν ταύτων φῇ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

20 ΣΩ. Ἄλλο ἄρα ἐκότερον φατέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

—We are  
 in too great  
 a hurry.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δῆτ' ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη, πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς,  
 ὥς ἔοικε, λεκτέον. Καίτοι τί ποτε μέλλομεν, ὦ Θεαί-  
 25 τητε, δρᾶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνος πέρι;

ΣΩ. Φανόμεθά μοι ἀλεκτρυόνος ἀγεννοῦς δίκην,

1. οὐ μὴν ἱκανῶς γε συννοῶ] σθητής.  
 'But I do not quite compre-  
 hend why it is so.'

4. οὐπὲρ ὁρῶν] So Bodl. Vat.  
 Ven. Π. ὁρῶν sc. ἔστιν or γέγονεν.  
 Compare the technical use of  
 αἰσθανόμενος, noticed above, pp.  
 159, 160. Also p. 157: Ἐγένετο  
 οὐτι θψις ἀλλ' ὀφθαλμός ὁρῶν. See  
 also v. 160. ἐπιστήμων—ὡνπερ αἰ-

10. Τὸ δέ γε οὐχ ὁρᾷ] Soph. 264:  
 φαίνεται δ' ὁ λέγομεν.

23. πάλιν] μὴ πάλιν Bodl. Vat.  
 Ven. Π. The Bodleian margin  
 however says, ἐν ἐτέρῃ λείπει τὸ  
 μὴ. If μὴ were right, the sub-  
 junctive ᾗ would be required to  
 complete the sense.

p. 164. πρὶν νενικηκέναι, ἀποπηδήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἄδειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ ;

ΣΩ. Ἀντιλογικῶς εἰκάμεν πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ περιγενομένοι τοῦ λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες ἄγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταῦτα δ' ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποιοῦντες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μαθάνω ὅπως λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν ὃ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἡρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ τὸν ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα μεμνημένον, ὁρῶντα δὲ οὐ, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδὸτα ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀδύνατον. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὁ Πρωταγόρειος,

Perhaps the contradiction is only verbal.

1. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the theory of Protagoras, which we are trampling upon. v. infr. προπηλαξίζομεν.

3. Ἀντιλογικῶς εἰκάμεν] Rep. 453, 4: Ἡ γυναῖκα, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Γλαῦκος, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἀντιλογικῆς τέχνης. Τί δὴ; Ὅτι, εἰπον, δοκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἰεσθαι οὐκ εἰρῖζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἰδὴ διαροῦμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐνασπίσω, ἴραδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι.

πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολογίας] 'With a view to mere verbal consistency.' Lys. 216: Καὶ ἡμῖν οὐθὲν ἄσμενος ἐπισηρῆσεν οὗτοι οἱ πάνσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ οὐκ ἐναντιώσασιν ἔχθρῳ φίλῳ; The tendencies of Ἀντιλογική are, 1st, to argue from contradictions of language, leading in the last resort to scepticism. Phaed. 90: Καὶ μάλιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρί-

ψαπτες οἷσθ' ὅτι τελευτῶντες οἴονται σοφότεροι γεγονέναι τε καὶ κατανηκέναι ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ἰγνείει οὐδὲ βίβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων. 2nd, to confuse ideas or principles with facts or results. Ib. p. 101: Ἄμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενοι καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ἀρμημάτων, εἴπερ βούλοιο τι τῶν δεινῶν εὑρεῖν.

5. οὐ φάσκοντες] Viz. p. 154: Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ κ.τ.λ.

14. μῦθος ἀπώλετο] Schol.: Παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν διήγησιν μὴ ἐπὶ πύρας ἀγόντων. Hence probably the absence of the article. Cf. Rep. 621: Καὶ οὕτως, ὁ Γλαῦκος, μῦθος ἐσώθη καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο. See also Phil. 14: Ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ μῦθος, ἀπολόμενος αἰχίον.

μῦθος ὁ Πρωταγόρειος] P. 157: Οὕτως ὁ μῦθος. Soph. 242: Μῦθος τινα ἕκαστος φαίνεται μοι διηγέσθαι πασις ὡς οὖν ἡμῖν. Arist. Met. A 10. 993 A. (cf. Gorg. 485): Ψευδισμὸς γὰρ τοῦ κεν ἢ πρώτη φιλοσοφία.

καὶ ὁ σὸς ἅμα ὁ τῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ αἰσθήσεως, ὅτι p. 164.  
ταυτὸν ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

Protagoras  
would still  
have much  
to say.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τι ἂν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὁ πατήρ  
ε τοῦ ἐτέρου μύθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἤμυνε· νῦν δὲ  
ὄρφανὸν αὐτὸν ἡμεῖς προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ'  
οἱ ἐπίτροποι οὓς Πρωταγόρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέ-  
λουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος εἰς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυ-  
νεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἔνεκ' αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν.

10 ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον  
Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου τῶν ἐκείνου ἐπίτροπος· ἡμεῖς p. 165.  
δέ πως θάττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεω-  
μετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. χάριν γε μέντοι ἔξομεν, ἔαν  
αὐτῷ βοηθῆς.

4. εἴπερ ὁ πατήρ] See the passage of the Phaedrus already quoted, p. 275: Πλημμελοῦμενος δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λουδωρηθεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς δὲι δέῃται βοηθοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Soph. 241: Μὴ με οἷον πατραλοῖαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγνεσθαι τινα. Τί δὴ; Τὸν τοῦ πατρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνόμενοι ἵσται βασανίζειν.

8. κινδυνεύσομεν] Not, 'I will undertake the risk,' but = κινδυνεύω βοηθεῖν, 'It seems I shall have to take his part myself.' Cf. Cratyl. 399: Καὶ κινδυνεύσω ἔαν μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ὅτι τήμερον σοφώτερος τοῦ δίστοτος γινώσθαι. Symp. 174: Ἰσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὥς σὺ λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ' Ὅμηρον φαῦλος ἂν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἴναι τοῖν ἀληθεῖ.

11. Καλλίας ὁ Ἰππονίκου] With whom Protagoras stayed when he came to Athens. Apol. p. 20: Ἀνδρί, δε νετίλεκε χρήματα σοφιστοῖς πλείω ἢ ξυμπαιτες οἱ

ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου. Prot. 311, 315: Xen. Symp. I. 5.

12. ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων] 'From the mere abstractions of dialectic.' We are accustomed to speak of Geometry as a purely abstract science, but see Arist. Met. I. 2: Αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομέναι, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας. The expression ψιλῶς λόγους is used differently in Symp. 215: Ψιλῶς λόγους ἔστω δργάνων, but cf. Phaedr. 262: Νῦν γὰρ ψιλῶς πως λέγομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες λατὰ παραδείγματα. Aristhenes is said to have called the Ideas of Plato ψιλὰ ἴστωια. For λόγοι = διαλεκτικὴ, cf. Phaedr. 99: Ἐδοξε δὴ μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους καταφυγόντα ἐν δεινῶς σκοπεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. See also Arist. de An. I. 1, where a distinction is drawn between φιλόσοφος, μαθηματικός and φυσικός.

13. μέντοι] σοι is added in the MSS. except Bodl. Vat. Ven. II.

p. 165. ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. σκέψαι οὖν τὴν γ' ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι δεινότερα ἂν τις ὁμολογήσειε μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνέυσθαι. σοὶ λέγω ὅπη, ἢ Θεαιτήτῳ ;

The 'crucial' question is this,

ΘΕΟ. Εἰς τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὁ νεώτερος· σφαλεῖς γὰρ ἦττον ἀσχημονήσει.

ΣΩ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δὲ οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι· ἄρα οἶόν· τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι ;

Is it possible for the same person to know and not to know the same thing?

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, εἰ τὸ ὅρῳ γε ἐπίσταςθαι θήσεις. τί γὰρ χρήσει ἀφύκτῳ ἐρωτήματι, τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος, ὅταν ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος ἀνὴρ, καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἕτερον ὀφθαλμόν, εἰ ὁ ὅρῳ τὸ ἱμάτιον τῷ κατελιγμένῳ ;

You are bound to say it is, if aight be knowledge. Nay, you may be driven to it without

(13.) ἔξομεν] Theod. speaks on behalf of the ἐπίτροποι Πρωταγόρου.

3. μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] By freeing ourselves from the habitual oppositions of words, we are sometimes reconciled to what at first appears a pure contradiction. Spinoza (Cog. Met. I.) shows a still loftier indifference to common language : ' At vero si rem accuratius examinare vellemus, possemus forte ostendere Deum non nisi improprie unum et unicum vocari ; sed res non est tanti imò nullius momenti iis qui de rebus non verò de nominibus sunt solliciti.' Many of the difficulties in Greek philosophy arose, as Plato himself points out in the Sophist, from

the too great stress laid upon logical alternatives ; while the complexity and variety of things as they exist was lost sight of.

ἢ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] 'According to our common mode of affirming and denying : viz. with a view to words.

8. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα] Compare Rep. 473 : ' Ἐπ' αὐτὸ δὴ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἶμι δ' ἐγὼ μεγίστην προσεικάσομαι κίματα. Where Socrates assumes the same tragic tone as here.

14. ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος] 'Caught in a pit,' i. e. unable to stir hand or foot.

16. καταλαβὼν—τὸν—ὀφθαλμόν—εἰ ὅρῳ τὸ ἱμάτιον] Perhaps there is here a trace of the spirit which was afterwards de-

reference to memory, within the sphere of sense itself. A relentless adversary will pin you down, covering one eye with his mantle, to confess that you see and do not see, and therefore know and do not know. And thus you will be proved to know both vividly and dimly, near but not far off, softly and violently.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἶμαι, τούτῳ γε, τῷ μέντοι p. 165. ἐτέρῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἅμα ταῦτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γέ πως.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσῃ, τοῦτο οὔτε τάττω οὐτ' ἡρόμην, τὸ ὅπως, ἀλλ' εἰ, ὃ ἐπίστασαι, τοῦτο καὶ οὐκ ἐπίστασαι. νῦν δ' ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὁμολογηκὼς δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν τούτων λογίζου τί σοι  
10 συμβαίνει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ λογίζομαι ὅτι τὰναντία οἷς ὑπέ- d  
θέμην.

ΣΩ. Ἴσως δέ γ', ὃ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ' ἔπαθες, εἴ τις σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἔστι μὲν  
15 ὁξὺ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἥρεμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία, ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθο-

veloped in the sophisms of Eululides.

5. οὐδὲν—τούτε, κ. τ. λ.] Τάττω sc. ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cf. Rep. 473: Ἐξευρηκίαις ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γινώσκειν ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις (sc. ἐξευρίειν). For the sense cf. supr. p. 159: Μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταῦτόν εἶναι, κ. τ. λ. Cf. Euthyd. 295: Πότερον ἐπίστασαι τῷ ἃ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὐ; Ἐγὼγε, ἔφη, τῇ γε ψυχῇ. Οὗτοι αὖ, ἔφη, προσποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτομένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ἔγω, ἀλλ' εἰ ἐπίστασαι τῷ, κ. τ. λ. For the intentional abruptness of the expression, cf. Phil. 28: Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν. 'None of that! I never asked you for it'

τούτο—τὸ πως] This, viz. the manner.

13. ὃ θαυμάσιε] Such addresses interposed give a tone of increased earnestness to the con-

versation. See Appendix D.

15. ὁξὺ—ἀμβλύ] These terms are properly applicable to vision.

ἐγγύθεν μὲν—πόρρωθεν δὲ μή] This probably refers to the sense of smell, v. τὸ ἀσφραίνεισθαι below.

16. σφόδρα καὶ ἥρεμα τὸ αὐτό] To have an intense and slight knowledge of the same thing: e. g. τὸ ψυχρόν, p. 152, μέγας—εἰ μὲν ἥρεμα, εἰ δὲ σφόδρα; but the reference here is probably to sound, v. τὸ ἀκούειν below. (Cf. Phil. p. 14: Βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία.) Aristotle does not feel the difficulty. Met. Z. 1029 B: Τὰ δ' ἐκείναι γινώσκω καὶ πρῶτα πολλὰ καὶ ἥρεμα ἔστι γινώσκω. Plato would not allow that anything is known, except what, in Aristotle's language, are ἀπλῶς γινώσκω.

17. ἃ] An accusative depend-



p. 165. φόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἥνικ' ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἰσθησιν ταυτὸν ἔθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ ἀκούειν καὶ ὁσφραίνεισθαι καὶ τὰς τοιαύτας αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν ἂν ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείεις, πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν πολυάρατον σοφίαν ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενός τε<sup>5</sup> καὶ ξυνδῆσας ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτων ὧσων σοὶ τε κακείνω ἐδόκει. Τίν' οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, φαίης ἂν ὥσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοῖς αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ; ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτά τε δὴ πάντα ὅσα ἡμεῖς ἐπαμύνοντες αὐτῷ λέγομεν, καὶ ὁμοσε, οἶμαι, χωρήσεται, καταφρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὁ

How would Protagoras defend his own against the attacks of such a light-armed mercenary!

ing chiefly on ἐρόμενος, but vaguely also on all that follows.

1. μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις] A logical mercenary.

2. ἐμβαλὼν] 'Making his assault.'

3. ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ ἀνείεις] Rep.

411: ὅταν δ' ἐπέχων μὴ ἀνῆλθῃ ἀλλὰ κηλῇ. 'Keeping up the attack.'

4. πολυάρατον] Buttmann conjectures πολυεργον, 'cunning,' which occurs as a v. l. for πολύτροπον in the first line of the Odyssey. Heind. πολυήρατον, but adds, ne hoc quidem satisfacit. In Ven. Π. both δ's are erased. Πολυάρατος occurs twice in the Odyssey, VI. 280; XIX. 404: 'Ονομ' ὅτι κε θείης παυδὸς παυδὶ φίλῃ' πολυάρατος δέ τοι ἴσται. Protagoras seems to have affected certain rhetorical expressions, and perhaps may have used this word. See Phædr. 268: ὁρθόπειρα, &c. Stallbaum quotes Themist. Orat. XXII. p. 325. 19. ed. Dindorf.: Τὸν πολυάρατον πλεῖστον τί ἂν καὶ λέγομεν

ὁποῖον ἀγνωσίῃ τε πολέμῳ ἴσται.

For the sense cf. Euthyd. 272:

Τῆς σοφίας ἥς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἰριστικῆς. Ib. 273: εἰ δὲ οὖν

ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχετον, Πλεονεξίαν γὰρ ἔγωγε

σφῶ ὥσπερ θεῶ προσαγορεύω. Ib.

296: 'Ἀλλὰ βουληθείης, ἦν δ' ἐγώ,

ἡ πολυμήτης Εὐθύδημε. Ib. 301:

'Ἦδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδρῶν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μμεῖσθαι, ἀτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς.

6. χρημάτων ὧσων] Protag.

328: Καὶ τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως

τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πεποιήμας. ἐπει-

δὴν γὰρ τις παρ' ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, εἴαν μὲν

βούληται, ἀποδίδωκεν δ' ἐγὼ πρῶτον

τομαὶ ἀργύριον' εἴαν δὲ μή, ἄλθον

εἰς ἱερὰν, ὁμώσας, ὅσον ἂν φῇ ἀξία

εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσούτον κατέ-

σθαι.

12. καὶ ὁμοσε ο. χ.] 'He will

grapple with us.' There is a

change of construction similar

to that in p. 149: Καὶ τίς τε

δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ—ἀμβλί-

πενεσι.

3. He would say that he is not refuted, because not fairly represented by you. He would urge that memory is far less vivid than sensation. And, while not fearing to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, he would assert that the man knowing

χρηστός, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθὲν ἔδεισεν, εἰ p. 167.  
οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸ μεμνήσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, καὶ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ τὸν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀπέδειξε.  
5 τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥαθυμότατε Σώκρατες, τῇδ' ἔχει. ὅταν τι τῶν ἐμῶν δι' ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, εἰ μὲν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς οἰάπερ ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφάλληται, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἄλλοιᾳ αὐτὸς ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς. b  
αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινὰ σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην  
10 παρῆναι τῷ ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πάσχοντι; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ἡ αὖ ἀποκινήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν τ' εἶναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό; ἡ εἰάπερ τοῦτο δείσῃ, δώσειν ποτὲ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀνομοιοῦμενον τῷ πρὶν  
15 ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι; μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν εἶναι τινα, ἀλλ'

4. τὸν ἐμὲ] Cf. Soph. 239 : τὸν μὲν τοῖνυν ἐμὲ γε ἔτι τί τις ἀν λέγοι; Phædr. 258 : τὸν αὐτόν. Phil. 14 : τοὺς ἐμὲ (see below). Ib. 20 : τὸν ἐμὲ. Ib. 59 : τοὺς μὲν δὴ σὶ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Γοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον.

5. ὦ ῥαθυμότατε Σώκρατες] 'Slovenly Socrates!'

9. αὐτίκα] 'To begin with.' τινὰ σοι ξυγχ.] i. e. ἐμὲ. 'Do you think a man would admit?'

μνήμην] 'That the memory a man has of an impression when it is past, is anything like what he experienced at the time.'

10. τοιοῦτόν τι οὔσαν πάθος] Hume, Inquiry Conc. Human Understanding: 'Every one will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when

he afterwards recalls to his memory this sensation, or anticipates it by his imagination.'— 'We may observe a like distinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind.' — 'When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed.'

15. τὸν εἶναι τινα] τίνα is subj. τὸν pred. Cf. Phil. 14 : 'Ἀρ' οὐν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρωταρχὸν εἶνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐνατίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ σμικρόν τιθέμενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κούφον τὸν αὐτόν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία. Compare a strange fancy of Comte's: Catechisme Posit. p. 2 : 'For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneously from other men.'

p. 166. οὐχὶ τοὺς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους, εἴανπερ  
 c ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσῃ θη-  
 ρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων; ἀλλ', ὦ μακάριε,  
 φήσῃ, γενναιοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω, εἰ δύνα-  
 σαι, ἐξέλεγξον ὥς οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν 5  
 γίνονται, ἢ ὥς ἰδίων γιγνομένων οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον  
 τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, ἢ εἰ εἶναι δεῖ  
 ὀνομάζειν, εἴη, ᾧπερ φαίνεται. ὅς δὲ δὴ καὶ κυνοκε-  
 φάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς ὑπνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς  
 ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματά μου ἀνα- 10  
 d πείθεις, οὐ καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ γὰρ φημὶ μὲν τὴν  
 ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὥς γέγραφα· μέτρον γὰρ ἕκαστον  
 ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ μὴ· μυρίον μέντοι δια-  
 φέρειν ἕτερον ἐτέρου αὐτῷ τούτῳ, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἄλλα  
 ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν καὶ 15  
 σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ'  
 αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ λέγω σοφόν, ὅς ἂν τινα ἡμῶν ᾧ  
 φαίνεται καὶ ἔστι κακά, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ἀγαθὰ  
 φαίνεσθαι τε καὶ εἶναι. τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ρή-  
 e ματί μου δῶκε, ἀλλ' ὥδε ἔτι σαφέστερον μάθε τί 20  
 λέγω. οἷον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνή-  
 σθητι, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει,

is different from the man ignorant, and that every man becomes as many as the changes he undergoes. More seriously, he would challenge us to prove either that each man's sensations are not peculiar to him, or that it does not follow from this, that what appears to each man, is to him.

1. καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπείρους] 'Becoming multiplied to infinity, if only alteration take place.'

2. ἀνομοίως γίγν. the reading of Bodl. Vat. admits of a possible rendering, 'If only the man become in a different way:' i. e. when he is the subject of a different process. But the reading of the other MSS. is more probable.

ὀνομάτων—θηρεύσεις] 'Entanglements of words. The

genitive is not objective but descriptive. Cf. Euthyd. 295: Βουλόμενός με θηρεύσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας. 'If we must really be on our guard against being entangled by each other with words.'

20. μου] To be taken with λόγον.

22. φαίνεται—καὶ ἴστι—ἴστι καὶ φαίνεται] What is to the healthy man, also appears to him. Protagoras asserts that what appears to the sick man also is to him.

He would tell us that he is far from disparaging the wisdom of the wise: but he would define wisdom as the power of bringing men over, not from false ideas to true ones, but from a

καὶ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνουντι τὰναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται· p. 167.  
 σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι·  
 οὐδὲ γὰρ δυνατόν. οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμ-  
 νων ἀμαθής, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός,  
 ὅτι ἀλλοῖα μεταβλητέον δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα· ἀμείνων γὰρ  
 ἢ ἑτέρα ἔξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ ἀπὸ ἐτέρας  
 ἔξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἱατρὸς  
 φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ  
 οὐ τί γε ψευδῇ δοξάζοντά τις τινα ὑστερον ἀληθῆ  
 ἐποίησε δοξάζειν. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατόν  
 δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ' ἃ ἂν πάσχη· ταῦτα δὲ αἰ  
 ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ' οἶμαι, πονηρὰς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας b

12. πονηρὰς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζον-  
 τας συγγενῇ ἱαντῇ. Πονηρὰς is the  
 reading of all the MSS. δοξάζον-  
 τας of Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. ἱαντῇ is  
 found in all the MSS. but one.  
 (Flor. b. αὐτῆς). Πονηρὰς ψυχῆς  
 ἔξει, 'through having a bad or  
 vicious soul.' Ἐξεῖ, like φαντα-  
 σία, is not with Plato, as with Ari-  
 stotle, a term of art, it is simply  
 the noun of the verb ἔχειν, and  
 accordingly has two meanings,  
 'condition,' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν πως,  
 and 'having'; and, like πράξις, it  
 sometimes wavers between both.  
 For instances of the active sense,  
 cf. Rep. 433: 'Ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ  
 ἱαντοῦ ἔξις καὶ πράξις. Soph. 247:  
 Δικαιοσύνης ἔξις καὶ παρουσία, and  
 infr. p. 197: 'Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν  
 φασὶν εἶναι. Also Crat. 414. de  
 Legg. 625. Tim. 73, 74. 87.  
 For an instance where it seems  
 to waver, cf. Rep. 509: 'Ἐτι μει-  
 ζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔξιν.  
 Ib. 591: 'Ἡ ψυχὴ—τιμωτέραν  
 ἔξιν λαμβάνει, σωφροσύνην κτωμέ-  
 νη. Gorg. 524: 'Ἐχει τὴν ἔξιν  
 τὴν αὐτοῦ. And above, p. 153:  
 'Ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἔξις—ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ  
 ψυχῇ ἔξις, we seem to pass from  
 one meaning to the other within

a few lines, as here. Comp. also  
 Gorg. 523: Ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχον-  
 τες. Ἐαντῆς presents more diffi-  
 culty, but it may still be genuine.  
 The transition is easy and not  
 unfrequent from the person  
 thinking to the mind thinking.  
 Cf. Phædr. 82, where the change  
 from the masculine to the femi-  
 nine, i. e. from the persons to  
 the souls, occurs several times  
 together. Gorg. 526, τοιοῦτόν  
 τινα—ἐνίοτε δ' ἄλλην. inf. 173:  
 σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς.  
 τὴν γὰρ σῆξιν καὶ τὸ εὐθύ—ἡ ἐκ  
 νέμευ δουλείᾳ ἀφῆρηται—κυνδύονος  
 —ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλ-  
 λουσα, οὐκ οὐ δυνατόμενοι, κ. τ. λ.  
 Supr. 153: 'Ἡ δὲ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξις,  
 and note. See also, for an in-  
 stance of a like change of sub-  
 ject, Rep. 442: Μουσικῆς καὶ γυμ-  
 ναστικῆς κρᾶσις—προστήσεται.  
 (That such a change of subject  
 does occur here, is evident  
 from the nominative χρᾶστί.)  
 The reflexive pronoun is also  
 facilitated by συγγενῇ, being a  
 correlative word. Cf. Phædr. 84:  
 Εἰς τὸ ζυγχεῖς καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον  
 ἀφαικομένη. Phædr. 238: Τῶν ἐα-  
 τῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. Compare

1. συγγενῇ ἑαυτῆς χρηστῇ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ἃ δὴ τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἐτέρων, ἀληθεύστερα δὲ οὐδέν. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὧς φίλε Σώκρατες, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς. φημὶ

worse to a better state: and would urge that until this is disproved, Socrates must be content to be a "measure of things."

also for the use of the reflexive pronoun, where it cannot be strictly referred to the subject of the sentence, Rep. p. 419: 'Εάν τις σε φῇ μὴ πᾶν εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τοῖτους τοὺς ἀνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἑαυτοῖς. Supr. p. 152: πόττερον — ἐφ' ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν.

(12.) δοξάζοντας is preferable as the reading of the best MS., as the harder reading, and because the change to δοξάζοντα was so easy with the same word occurring a few lines above. For the change from the singular τινὸς, to the indefinite plural, cf. Rep. 344: 'Ἐπειδὴν δὲ τις αἰτοῦν—δουλεύσεται—ἀντὶ τοῦτων τῶν αἰσchrῶν ὀνομάτων—μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι δὲν εὐδύνονται αὐτὸν τὴν δὴν ἀδικίαν ἡδικηκότα: et passim.

'For it is not to be supposed that any one ever makes one, who thinks falsely, afterwards think truly. For it is impossible either to think what is not, or to think any thing beyond the present impression, which is always real. But, I suppose, whereas men, through having an inferior mind, entertain thoughts of a kindred nature; a good mind causes them to have good thoughts, those, namely, which the inexperienced call true.'

If any change of reading were

required, the most probable would be the transposition of συγγενῇ ἑαυτῆς and ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

1. χρηστῇ] Sc. ψυχῇ.

ἕτερα τοιαῦτα] Sc. χρηστὰ. 'Whereas inferior minds have opinions kindred to themselves, a superior mind creates in them opinions which resemble it.'

2. φαντάσματα] This word here contains no association of falsehood, seeing that φαῖναισθαι and εἶναι are identified; but neither does it imply truth.

4. ἀληθέστερα δ' οὐδέν] I. e. 'all are equally real.'

6. κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς] The theory is exposed by being gravely carried to the farthest point. Man is reduced to a level not only with brutes but with vegetables. Cf. Ar. Met. 1008 B: Εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ' ὁμοίως οἰεταί τε καὶ οὐκ αἰεταί, τί δὲ διαφερόντως ἔχει τῶν φυτῶν; This however is only remotely hinted at. At present we are to receive this as an additional proof of Protagoras' boldness. For a more serious use of the analogy between human nature and the vegetable world, see Rep. 492: Σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φύτου εἶτε ἄγγειων εἶτε τῶν ζώων κ.τ.λ. Heind. quotes Aristot. de Plant. I. 1, where after mentioning the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the question, 'Do plants feel?' he adds, Ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν μόνον αὐτὰ



γὰρ καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, p.  
 ὅταν τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεῖνὰς αἰσθήσεις o  
 τε καὶ ἀληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφούς τε καὶ  
 ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν  
 5 πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ οἶα γ' ἂν  
 ἐκάστη πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι  
 αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ· ἀλλ' ὁ σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν  
 ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἐκάστων χρηστὰ ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ  
 δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς  
 10 τοὺς παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν  
 σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευ- d  
 θεῖσι· καὶ οὕτω σοφώτεροί τέ εἰσιν ἕτεροι ἐτέρων καὶ  
 οὐδεὶς ψευδῇ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, εἴαν τε βούλῃ εἴαν τε μὴ,

διὰ τὴν σφοδρὰν τῆς θρηπτικῆς δυνάμειος ἀνάγκην ἔφησεν, ὃ ἐὰν συνσταίῃ, ἦδεσθαι ὅπως αὐτὰ καὶ λυπῖσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι τε σύμφωνον ἔσται. Cf. *Aesch. Eumen.* 911: ΑΘ. στήρην γὰρ, ἀνδρὲς φετυπομένοις δίκην, τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ' ἀπείσθηται γένος.

2. χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεῖνὰς αἰσθήσεις τε] 'Impart to them good and healthy sensations, and real ones too;' i. e. not only real (which they all are), but also good and healthy. The difference of idiom by which in Greek what is most emphatic is put first, though well-known, is often a source of difficulty. E. g. *Soph. (Ed. Col.* 308: 'ἀλλ' εὐτυχίῃ μοι τοῦ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει ἐμοί τε· τίς γὰρ ἐσθλὸς οὐχ αὐτῷ φίλος; 'May he come, a blessing to his own city, as well as to me. For who by kindness does not befriend himself?' where the second clause refers to τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει as the emphatic words.

Cf. *supr.* p. 150: Αὐτοῖς τε καὶ

τοῖς ἄλλοις ἰδοῦσαν ἀμαθίαν εἶναι.

Schleiermacher's conjecture, *ἀληθείας*, has been generally received, but *ἀληθείς* is very possibly right. For the difficult position of τε, comp. *Rep.* 466: Καὶ γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὐτῶν πόλεως ζῶντες τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίως μετέχουσιν. *Pb.* 472: Εἰκότως ἄρα δυνάμειν τε καὶ ἰδεοδόξῃ οὕτω παράδοξον λίγειν λόγον τε καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. The objection drawn from *supr.* 2 δὴ τινες—ἐπὶ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ καλεῶσιν, is cancelled by the preceding ταῦτα δὲ αἰεὶ ἀληθῆ. The state of plants has as much reality as that of the wise man: and the latter has no advantage in point of truth.

4. ταῖς πόλεσι] A further step is thus made in advance. Having already included the good and noble amongst the things of which each man is judge for himself, it is natural to apply the same theory to the state, and to law and justice.

p. 167. ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρον· σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τοῦτοις ὁ λόγος οὗτος· ὃ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἔχεις ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, εἰ δὲ δι' ἐρωτήσεων βούλει, δι' ἐρωτήσεων. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοῦτο φευκτέον ἀλλὰ πάντων μάλιστα διωκτέον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντι. ποίει 5  
• μέντοι οὕτως· μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν. καὶ γὰρ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ' ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅταν τις μὴ χωρὶς μὲν ὡς ἀγωνιζόμενος τὰς διατριβὰς ποιῆται, χωρὶς δὲ διαλεγό- 10  
μενος, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίξῃ τε καὶ σφάλῃ καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδάζῃ τε καὶ ἐπανορθοῖ τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον, ἐκείνα μόνα αὐτῷ ἐνδεικνύμενος τὰ σφάλματα, ἃ αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ καὶ

He would be willing to proceed by question and answer, only he would demand fair treatment. For Dialectic, if fairly used, leads to sincere inquiry: if controversially, to the hatred of inquiry.

p. 168. τῶν προτέρων συνουσιῶν παρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μὲν γὰρ 15  
οὕτω ποιῆς, ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιάσονται οἱ προσδιατρίβοντές σοι τῆς αὐτῶν ταραχῆς καὶ ἀπορίας, ἀλλ' οὐ σέ, καὶ σέ μὲν διώξονται καὶ φιλήσουσιν, αὐτοὺς δὲ μισήσουσι, καὶ φεύξονται ἀφ' ἑαυτῶν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἣν ἄλλοι γεγνημένοι ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῶν οἱ πρότερον ἦσαν· 20  
ἐὰν δὲ τάναντία τούτων δρᾷς ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, τάναν-

3. λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών κ. τ. λ.] Protagoras himself is represented as master of both styles (Prot. 329: 'Ἰσάνδῃ μὲν μακροῦν λόγους—εἰπεῖν—Ἰσάνδῃ δὲ καὶ ἐρωτήθεις ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ), and in the Phaedrus Socrates himself adopts both, of course to the implied disadvantage of the rhetorical, which is more openly ridiculed in the Gorgias. Cf. also Soph. 217: Πότερον εἰώθας μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξίνασθαι—ἢ δι' ἐρωτήσεων;

9. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν, ἐν λόγοις, sup. Probably this

passage contains a covert censure of the eristic method that pervades this dialogue. Cf. Rep. 487, where perhaps Socrates himself is gently criticized: Ἐγούνται—ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἐρώτημα συμμικρὸν παραγόμενοι.—ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι.

13. ἐκείνα—τὰ σφάλματα] Those slips and deflections which are due to himself and to the company he has previously kept. παρακρούειν is said to have been a wrestler's term.

He would invite us to examine the meaning of his own saying, and of the principle of motion, and thus to meet the doctrine of sense on its own ground, avoiding the captiousness of verbal criticism.

τία ξυμβήσεται σοι καὶ τοὺς ξυνόντας ἀντὶ φιλο-  
 σόφων μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα ἀποφανείς, ἐπει-  
 δὲν πρεσβύτεροι γένωνται. εἰς οὖν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, ὃ καὶ  
 πρότερον ἐρρήθη, οὐ δυσμενῶς οὐδὲ μαχητικῶς, ἀλλ'  
 ἵλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψῃ τί ποτε  
 λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαι τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα τό τε  
 δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι ἰδιώτῃ τε καὶ πόλει.  
 καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψῃ εἴτε ταῦτόν εἴτε καὶ ἄλλο  
 ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις, ἀλλ' οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἄρτι, ἐκ  
 10 συνηθείας ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνομάτων, ἀ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅπῃ  
 ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοιτες ἀπορίας ἀλλήλοις παντοδαπὰς  
 παρέχουσι. Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ ἐταίρῳ σου εἰς  
 βοήθειαν †προσηρξάμην† κατ' ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ  
 ἀπὸ σμικρῶν· εἰ δ' αὐτὸς ἔζη, μεγαλειότερον ἂν τοῖς  
 15 αὐτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν.

ΘΕΟ. Παίξεις, ὦ Σώκρατες· πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς  
 τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας.

2. μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα] Viz. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. i. e. μισολόγους γηγόντας. See the remarkable passage in the Phædo on this subject, p. 89, 90; where a parallel is drawn between the growth of misanthropy and scepticism.

3. ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρήθη] Viz. supr. 167: Γενναϊοτέρως ἐπ' αὐτὸ εἰδὼν δ' λέγω. The unusual form ἐρρήθη was perhaps adopted in imitation of Protagoras.

5. ἵλεω τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεῖς] Sc. σταντών. Cf. infr. 174: Αὐτὴν συγκαθεύω. 'Meeting us without reserve, in a candid and good-humoured spirit.'

10. ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν ἔλκοιτες] Soph. 259: Τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἔλεον. Phil. 57: Τοὺς δεινοὺς περὶ λόγων ὀλέην.

14. προσηρξάμην] Notwithstanding Buttman's ingenious defence of this word, Lexil. I. p. 103, it is difficult not to incline to the conjecture of Coraius, προσήρκεσα μὲν. Cf. Soph. Œd. Col. 72: 'Ὡς ἂν προσαρκεῖν σμικρὰ, κερδαίνῃ μέγα. See however p. 171: Ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες.

15. μεγαλειότερον] A rhetorical word, used probably in ironical imitation of Protagoras' style. See notes on πολυάρατον, ἐρρήθη, supr. Cf. Xen. Mem. III. 1: Οὕτω πῶς διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν ἱπ' Ἀρετῇ 'Ηρακλίου παιδευσιν, ἐκόσμησε μίνοι τὰς γνώμας ὅτι μεγαλειότεροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ εἶν.

17. πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας] 'Your defence of our friend has been most vigorous.'

p. 168. ΣΩ. Εὖ λέγεις, ὦ ἑταῖρε. καὶ μοι εἰπέ' ἐνενόησάς που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ Πρωταγόρου καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος δ ἡμῶν ὅτι πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιούμενοι τῷ τοῦ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζόμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαρι- εντισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων ε μέτρον, σπουδᾶσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὐτοῦ λόγον ;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ ;

ΘΕΟ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρᾳς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία ἰστίν ; εἰ οὖν πεισόμεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ 6 ἐρωτῶντάς τε καὶ ἀποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδᾶ-σαι αὐτοῦ περὶ τὸν λόγον, ἵνα μὴ τοι τοῦτό γ' ἔχῃ ἐγκαλεῖν, ὥς παίζοντες πρὸς μεϊράκια διεσκεψάμεθ' αὐ 15 τοῦτον τὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δ' ; οὐ πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους πῶγωνας ἐχόντων ἅμεινον ἂν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ διερευνωμένῳ ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι σοῦ γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἅμεινον. μὴ 20 οὖν οἶου ἐμὲ μὲν τῷ σῷ ἑταίρῳ τετελευτηκότι δεῖν p. 169. παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ' ἴθι, ὦ ἄριστε, ὀλίγον ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν, εἴτε ἄρα σὲ δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον

That Protagoras may be treated with due gravity, Theodorus is at last compelled to join in the discussion.

4. χαριστισμόν τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον] 'Abusing us for a certain quibbling vein, and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.'

15. αὐ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον] Coisl. p. m. Αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον. The Bodl. p. m. had αὐτοῦ τὸν τὸν λόγον. Cf. p. 167 : Τὸν δὲ λόγον αὐ μὴ τῷ

ῥήματί μου δίκαιε. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protagoras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them.

22. σὲ δὲ μηδενί] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative.

24. διαγραμμάτων—ἀστρονομίαν] Note the variety.

εἶναι, εἴτε πάντες ὁμοίως σοὶ ἱκανοὶ ἑαυτοῖς εἰς τε π  
 ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τᾶλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ περί αιτίαν ἔχεις  
 διαφέρειν.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον  
 5 μὴ διδόναι λόγον, ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων  
 σε ἐπιτρέψαι μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν  
 καθάπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν  
 Σκίρῳνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ b  
 ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δέ κατ' Ἀνταῖον  
 10 τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν· τὸν γὰρ προσ-  
 ελθόντα οὐκ ἀνίης πρὶν ἀναγκάσῃς ἀποδύσας ἐν τοῖς  
 λόγοις προσπαλαῖσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπεί-  
 κασας· ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων. μυριοί  
 15 γὰρ ἤδη μοι μοι Ἡρακλῆες τε καὶ Θησῆες ἐντυγχά-  
 νοντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν,  
 ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι· οὕτω τις ἔρως

2. αιτίαν ἔχεις] 'You are re-  
 puted.' Rep. 435: Οἱ δὲ καὶ  
 ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν (τοῦ θυ-  
 μοειδεῖς εἶναι).

8. τείνειν] Cf. Phaed. 65: Ἐγ-  
 γίς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνᾶναι. 'You  
 come nearer to the analogy of  
 Sciron.'

9. κατ' Ἀνταῖον] The allusion  
 to the Lacedæmonian custom  
 is repeated, but, as usual, with  
 fresh imagery, and additional  
 point. The Lacedæmonians tell  
 one to strip or go away. But  
 you, like Sciron, strip all you  
 meet with, and, like Antæus,  
 force them to wrestle with you.

10. τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν] 'To go about  
 your work.' Supr. 150: Ἐλατ-  
 τον δὲ τοῦ ἑμοῦ δράματος.

11. ἀποδύσας] 'Having stripped  
 him of every excuse.'

14. ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκεί-  
 νων]

'But I have more of the  
 athlete in me than they had.'

15. Ἡρακλῆες τε καὶ Θησῆες]  
 Schol. Οἱ Θρασύμαχοι, Καλλιμαεῖς,  
 Διωνυσόδωροι, Εὐθύδηροι καὶ οἱ  
 τοιοῦτοι. Winkelmänn (Fr. An-  
 tisthenis) suspects an allusion  
 to Antisthenes here. But the  
 Scholiast is probably nearer the  
 mark. See Introduction; and  
 cf. Euthyd. 297.

16. καρ. πρ. τ. λ.] 'Men of va-  
 lour in the art of controversy.'

μὲλ' εὖ ξυγκ.] 'Have bruised  
 me well.'

17. οὕτω τις ἔρως δευρὸς ἐνδε-  
 δυκε] Sc. me implied in ἐγὼ supr.  
 It is left doubtful whether οὕτω  
 is to be joined with δευρὸς or  
 ἐνδεδυκεν. 'So strong a passion  
 for this kind of exercise has  
 taken possession of me.'



69. δεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνασίας. μὴ οὖν  
 ° μὴδὲ σὺ φθονήσης προσανατριψάμενος σαυτὸν τε  
 ἅμα καὶ ἐμέ ὀνήσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἔτι ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ' ἄγε ὅπῃ ἐθέλεις·  
 πάντως τὴν περὶ ταῦτα εἰμαρμένην, ἣν ἂν σὺ ἐπικλώ-  
 σης, δεῖ ἀνατλήναι ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω  
 γε ὧν προτίθεται οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρασχέω ἐμαντόν  
 σοι.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. καί μοι πάνν  
 τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μὴ που παιδικόν τι λάθωμεν εἶδος  
 τῶν λόγων ποιούμενοι, καί τις πάλιν ἡμῶν αὐτὸ  
 ὀνειδίση.

d ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ' ὅσον ἂν δύ-  
 νωμαι.

ΣΩ. Τοῦδε τοίνυν πρῶτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβόμεθα  
 οὐπερ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὁρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὁρθῶς  
 ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι αὐτάρκη  
 ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὁ  
 Πρωταγόρας, περὶ τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χειρόνος δια-  
 φέρειν τινάς, οὓς δὴ καὶ εἶναι σοφούς. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

2. προσανατριψάμενος] 'Giving  
 me a grip,' 'trying one fall with  
 me.'

γ. ἐν προτίθεται] Viz. διαγραμ-  
 μάτων περί, *supr.*

11. τις] Somebody; i. e. Pro-  
 tagoras.

15. ἀντιλαβόμεθα] 'Let us at-  
 tack the question from the same  
 point as before.' Cf. Rep. 544 :  
 Πάλιν—ὡςπερ παλαιστῆς τὴν αὐ-  
 τὴν λαβὴν παρέχει.

18. καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν] The  
 sentence breaks and reverts to  
 the direct form. Cf. Rep. 489 :  
 ὅτε δὴ σὺ φῆς κ. τ. λ. λέγων ξυν-

εχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. In  
 conceding for Protagoras that  
 some men are wise, we went  
 beyond his own words. We  
 must try to prove it out of his  
 own mouth. He says, What  
 appears to each man, is to him.  
 Now it certainly appears to  
 every man that some are wiser  
 than himself, and some less  
 wise; that some think truly,  
 others falsely. Therefore, whe-  
 ther he be right or wrong, it is  
 the case that some think truly,  
 and some falsely.

I. B. Pro-  
tagoras'  
oon maxim  
is criti-  
cised.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν ὁμολόγει, ἀλλὰ p. 169.  
μὴ ἡμεῖς βοηθοῦντες ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐ-  
δὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαμβάνοντας βεβαιούσθαι· νῦν  
δὲ τάχ' ἂν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου  
ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως ἔχει σαφέστερον περὶ τού-  
του αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι· οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παρ-  
αλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως.

ΘΕΟ. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν δὲ ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου  
10 λόγου ὥς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. p. 170.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς ;

'What ap-  
pears to  
each man,  
is to him.'  
And does  
it not, then,  
appear to  
every man  
that some  
know more  
than he  
does and  
some less :  
so that in  
the great-  
est dan-  
gers, they  
look up to  
the wise  
man as to a  
God, sub-  
mitting to  
be taught  
and ruled  
by him !  
And they  
account  
wisdom to  
be true

ΣΩ. Οὐτωςί. Τὸ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί  
φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ ;

ΘΕΟ. Φησί γὰρ οὖν.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου,  
μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ  
φαιμέν οὐδένα ὄν τινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν  
ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ εἶν γε  
τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις  
20 ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν  
τοὺς ἐν ἐκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτήρας σφῶν προσδο-  
κῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῷ διαφέροντας ἢ τῷ εἰδέναι. καὶ  
πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα ζητούντων διδασκάλους  
τε καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν  
25 τε ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὐτῶν ἱκανῶν μὲν διδάσκειν,  
ἱκανῶν δὲ ἄρχειν εἶναι. καὶ ἐν τοιούτοις ἅπασι τί ἄλλο

5. καλλίονως ἔχει] 'It would  
seem the less exceptionable  
course.'

6. οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλέ-  
τε] It is of no small importance  
to the question at issue.

20. ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν] Cf.

Rep. 489 : Τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν,  
ἐάν τι πλοῦσιος ἐάν τι πένης κάμῃ,  
δυνακίους εἶναι ἐπὶ λατρῶν θύρας  
λέται, καὶ πάντα τὸν ἀρχεῖσθαι δεόμε-  
νον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἀρχεῖν δυναμίτου.

23. μεστά] [So Bodl. with Ven.  
πΠ. Par. F.

p. 170. φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν  
καὶ ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῇ διάνοιαν ἡ-  
γούνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῇ δόξαν;

ΘΕΟ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ;  
πότερον ἀληθῇ φῶμεν αἰεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ  
ποτέ μὲν ἀληθῇ, ποτέ δὲ ψευδῇ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ  
που ξυμβαίνει μὴ αἰεὶ ἀληθῇ ἀλλ' ἀμφοτέρα αὐτοὺς  
δοξάζειν. σκόπει γάρ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἄν τις τῶν  
ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὥς οὐδεὶς  
ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄλλ' ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἔκει οἷον  
d πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπων λέγων.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ πρὸς με ἀπο-  
φαίνῃ περὶ τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸν  
ἐκεῖνον λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις  
περὶ τῆς σῆς κρίσεως πότερον οὐκ ἔστι κριταῖς γενέ-  
σθαι, ἢ αἰεὶ σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῇ δοξάζειν; ἢ μυρίοι  
ἐκάστοτέ σοι μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ἡγούμενοι  
ψευδῇ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἶεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι  
e δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἳ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων  
πράγματα παρέχουσιν.

7. 3 π.] Bodl. Vat. pr. Ven. Π. τῷ Πρωταγόρῃ.

15. εἰς τοῦτο—ἀνάγκη—ἔκει] 'Is driven to this.'

25. Νὴ τὸν Δία, 3 Σώκ.] 'Yes, truly, Socrates, I have oppo-  
nents more than I can tell, as

Homer says, and they give me worlds of trouble.'

26. φησὶν Ὅμηρος] Od. Π. 121: τῷ οὖν δυσμενέει μάλα μυρίοι εἰσ' ἐπὶ οἴκῳ.

τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα] 'A world of annoyance,' lit.

thought;  
and folly to  
be false  
opinion.

It follows  
that, if all  
men think  
truly, some  
men think  
falsely.

As a mat-  
ter of fact  
men do  
become  
judges of  
each  
other's im-  
pressions.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; βούλει λέγωμεν ὡς σὺ τότε σαυτῷ p. 170.  
μὲν ἀληθῆ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῇ ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐοικεν ἓκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρα ; ἀρ' οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη, εἰ  
5 μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾤετο μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ  
πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην  
τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἔγραψεν ; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν p. 171.  
ᾤετο, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος μὴ συνοίεται, οἶσθ' ὅτι πρῶτον  
μὲν ὅσῳ πλείους οἷς μὴ δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ  
10 μᾶλλον οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ ἔστιν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ' ἐκάστην δόξαν  
ἔσται καὶ οὐκ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ' ἔχει κομψότατον ἐκεῖνος μὲν  
περὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ οἰήσεως τὴν τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων οἴη-  
15 σιν, ἣ ἐκείνων ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, ξυγχωρεῖ που  
ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὐτοῦ ἂν ψευδῇ ξυγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν b  
τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῇ  
20 εἶναι ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

For in-  
stance, they  
condemn  
Prota-  
goras.  
His opinion  
therefore  
may be  
true for  
him, but it  
is false for  
all men be-  
sides. Its  
truth is to  
its false-  
hood, as  
one man is  
to all man-  
kind. But  
further, in  
saying  
that they  
think truly,  
he confirms  
them in  
saying that  
he thinks  
falsely :  
and up-  
holds them  
in denying  
that they  
are wrong.  
Thus the

troubles, such as (i. e. the great-  
est that) can come from all  
men. Cf. *Æschin.* c. Timarch.  
9 : Τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον δέσσαντες πρὸς  
τὸν κῆρα αὐτὸν τὸν Πιττάδακον ἐμα-  
στίγουν τὰς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πληγὰς  
οὕτω πολλὸν χρόνον ὥστε κ.τ.λ. A  
somewhat similar use of ἀνθρώ-  
πων occurs in *Soph. Phil.* 305 :  
Πολλὰ γὰρ τάδε ἐν τῷ μακρῷ γέ-  
νοισ' ἂν ἀνθρώπων χρόνῳ. Also fr.  
CV. 110, 5 (Bekk.) : Ἐξ ἀνθρώ-  
πων τι πέπονθεν. 'Respondet  
vulgare illud nostratium, alle  
menschenmögliche.' Heind.

4. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρῃ ;] Sc.  
ἀνάγκη ἐστίν ;

5. μηδὲ—μηδὲ] 'If Protagoras  
himself also did not think so,  
nor yet the majority, as indeed  
they do not.'

8. συνοίεται] This is present,  
because it has been asserted  
just above.

13. Ἐπειτα—κομψότατον] 'Now  
follows the most exquisite touch  
of all.' Cf. *Rep.* 558 : Τί δέ ; ἡ  
κρατίης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ  
κομψή ; ἔχει ec. τὸ πρᾶγμα a. ὁ λό-  
γος.

p. 171. ΣΩ. Οἱ δέ γ' ἄλλοι οὐ ξυγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς ψεύ-  
δεσθαι;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γ' αὐτὸ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν  
δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραπεν.

ΘΕΟ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμέ-  
νων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμο-  
λογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τὰναντία λέγοντι ξυγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ  
αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς ξυγχω-  
ρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἀνθρωπον  
μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἐνὸς οὐδ' ἂν μὴ μάθῃ. οὐχ  
οὕτως;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴῃ ἡ Πρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής; οὐ τέ  
τινι ἄλλῳ οὐτ' αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἄγαν, ὦ Σώκратες, τὸν ἐταῖρόν μου κατα-  
θέομεν.

unanimity  
of dissent is  
not broken  
even by  
Protago-  
ras himself.

The saying  
of Protago-  
ras is true  
for nobody.

7. Ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄρα] 'So then, what we get from all is this.' Cf. Soph. 245: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους λέγοντας αὐτὸ θεοῖον, ὡς ἐκ πάντων εἰδῶμεν ὅτι τὸ δε τοῦ μὴ οὕτως οὐδὲν εἰσπορέτερον εἰπὲν δ τί ποτε ἴσται. Ar. Met. 988 A: Τοσοῦτόν γ' ἔχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, ὅτι, κ.τ.λ. The preposition is probably suggested by ἐξ αὐτῶν immediately preceding. 'On all hands, then, including Protagoras, it is disputed, or rather on his part it is admitted.'

9. ὅταν—ξυγχωρήσεται] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, and what follows, from μήτε onwards, depends immediately on ξυγχωρή-

σεται, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cf. Rep. p. 529: Οὐ δύναμαι ἄλλοι τοι νομίσαι ὅσω ποιῶν ψυχὴν βλάπτει μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο, δ' αὖ περὶ τὸ δε τε ἢ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, ἐάν τις αὐτῷ κεχρησῇ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῇ μαθεῖν, ὅτε μαθεῖν ποτὶ φημι αὐτόν, ὅτε αὖ ἀλλὰ κατὰ αὐτοῦ βλάπτει τὴν ψυχὴν, κλπ. ἐξ ὑπέρτας νύεν ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μαθήσῃ.

18. Ἄγαν] 'We are urging my friend too vehemently, 'running him very hard.' καταθέομεν] De Legg. 806:



Could he  
put his  
head above  
the ground,  
no doubt  
he might  
convince us  
of much  
folly. But  
we have  
done our  
best.  
No one will  
deny that  
one man is  
wiser, and  
another  
less wise,  
than his  
neighbour.  
It is clear,  
too, that

ΣΩ. Ἀλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν π  
τὸ ὀρθόν. εἰκὸς γε ἄρα ἐκείνον πρεσβύτερον οὔτα σο-  
φώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι· καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύνειε d  
μέχρι τοῦ αὐχένος, πολλὰ ἂν ἐμέ τε ἐλέγξας ληροῦντα,  
ὥς τὸ εἰκός, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο  
ἀποτρέχων. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν  
αὐτοῖς, ὅποιοί τινες ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα αἰεὶ ταῦτα  
λέγειν. καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν  
ἂν τοῦτό γε ὄντιν οὖν, τὸ εἶναι σοφώτερον ἑτερον ἐτέ-  
10 ρου, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον,

τί δράσμεν, ὁ Κλεινία; τὸν ξῖνον  
ἐάσομεν τὴν Σπάρτην ἡμῖν οὕτω κα-  
ταδραμῖν;

1. Ἀλλά—ἀδηλον] 'But it does  
not appear that we are out-  
running' what is right,' i. e.  
I do not see that we are trans-  
gressing any rule of truth or  
fairness. τὸ ὀρθόν means simply  
(as in Rep. 540: τὸ ὀρθόν περὶ  
πλείστον ποιησάμενοι) 'What is  
just and true.' There is no ne-  
cessity therefore for making πα-  
ραθεῖν (with the accus.) mean 'to  
swerve from.'

2. εἰκὸς γε ἄρα] Socrates ad-  
mits that there is some ground  
for Theodorus' remonstrance.  
'It is reasonable, I grant, to  
presume that as he is older so he  
is wiser than we are.' Ἄρα refers  
partly to what Theodorus has  
suggested, but chiefly gives em-  
phasis to ἐκείνον and the words  
that follow, and perhaps marks  
the illative connexion between  
them (πρεσβύτερον οὔτα, σοφώτε-  
ρον ἄρα εἶναι) 'Indeed, when we  
come to think of it, Protagoras,  
being older, must be wiser than  
we are.'

5. καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα] Sc. λη-  
ρόδη.

6. ἀλλ' ἡμῖν] Socrates returns  
to the charge with the second  
ἀλλά.

7. τὰ δοκοῦντα] P. 154: 'Ἐν  
μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν, κ.τ.λ. Men. 83:  
'Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. Σ. Καλῶς· τὸ  
γὰρ σοὶ δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀπαρῖνον.'

12. ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι]  
'Will by preference take its  
stand (or will take its stand  
most resolutely) in this posi-  
tion, which we sketched out for  
it in our defence of Protagoras.'  
Οὐ μάλιστα may be taken closely  
with ταύτῃ, 'Hereabouts, as near  
as we can guess.' Cf. Parm.  
130: εἴων ταύτῃ στή. 'The ar-  
gument' is more or less per-  
sonified, as so often in Plato,  
(cf. Rep. 484: διὰ μακροῦ τινος  
διεξιλλόμενος λόγον. Ib. 503: τοι-  
αῦτ' ἄντα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξ-  
ιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ  
λόγου.) and is the subject of εὐγ-  
χωρήσεται, ἐπιλήσεται, ὁμολογήσει,  
and τολμήσεται, in what follows.  
ἵστασθαι depends immediately  
on φῶμεν. May there also be  
a slight play upon the word?

p. 171. ἡ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρα, ὥς τὰ  
 ° μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἐκάστω, θερμά,  
 ξηρά, γλυκεία, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου· εἰ δέ  
 που ἐν τισι ξυγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου,  
 περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐβελῆσαι ἂν φάναι μὴ πᾶν  
 γύναιον καὶ παιδίον καὶ θηρίον δὲ ἰκανὸν εἶναι ἰᾶσθαι  
 αὐτὸ γιγνώσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινόν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ  
 ἄλλον ἄλλου διαφέρειν, εἴπερ που ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

p. 172. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰ- 10  
 σχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀδίκαια καὶ ὅσια καὶ μὴ, ὅλα ἂν  
 ἐκάστη πόλις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νόμιμα ἑαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ  
 εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ἐκάστη, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μὲν οὐδὲν  
 σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως  
 εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῷ ξυμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ ξυμφέροντα 15  
 τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ', εἴπερ που, αὐτὸ ὁμολογήσει ξυμβουλόν  
 τε ξυμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἐτέραν  
 ἐτέρας πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πᾶν τολμήσει  
 β φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις ξυμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὐτῇ,  
 παντὸς μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ ξυνοίσειν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ οὐ 20

the strength of the position lies in the region of sensible things, which we made the basis of our defence of Protagoras.

(Transition to the conception of the good.)

If the theory would concede any thing, it would be this, that all are not equally judges of what is wholesome: and in the case of states, that although

'This unstable theory will make a stand hereabouts if anywhere.'

See also Thuc. VI. 34: Πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αὐτὸ γινώμην ἴστανται.

1. ἡ ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες Πρωταγόρα] This 'new wave' of discussion rises upon the last, pp. 167, 168: Κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἱστροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς—ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστά ἀπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ δὲ γ' ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ὥς ἐν αὐτῇ νομίζῃ. The argument is beginning to relax a little under the influence of the ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν thrown carelessly in, p. 157.

6. καὶ θηρίον δέ] 'Nay, even

every inferior animal.'

10. Οὐκοῦν—περὶ πολιτικῶν] The distinction in the case of sensible things between the impressions of sense, and the knowledge of what is good, is evident enough. The analogous distinction in the case of things moral and social is less obvious. See, amongst other passages, Rep. 505: Τί δέ; τότε οὐ φανερόν, ὥς δίκαια μὲν, καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἴλουντο τὰ δοκοῦντα καὶ μὴ ὃ ὅμοις ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔτι ἀρκεί τὰ δοκοῦντα κτῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὅσα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἴδῃ πᾶς ἀτιμάζει ;

justice are matters of convention merely, yet in deciding what is expedient, mistake is possible both to individuals and states.

This is the attitude of some who have partially relinquished the Protagorean doctrine. They offer us a new and important handle for discussion.

λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δίκαιοις καὶ ἀδίκτοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνο- p. 172.  
σίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι ὥς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει  
αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν  
τοῦτο γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξη καὶ ὅσον ἂν  
δοκῇ χρόνον. καὶ ὅσοι γε δὴ μὴ παντάπασι τὸν Πρω-  
ταγόρου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὡδὲ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι.  
Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάτ-  
τονος, καταλαμβάνει.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν γε δῆ, ὦ δαι-  
μόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενόησα, ἀτὰρ καὶ νῦν, ὥς εἰκότως  
οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρόνον διατρίψαντες εἰς  
τὰ δικαστήρια ἰόντες γελοῖοι φαίνονται ῥήτορες.

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις ;

2. ἰθίλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes from what the 'argument' would naturally say, to what certain persons, who are presently defined, actually do say. For a somewhat similar transition to an indefinite plural, cf. Gorg. 457: Οἶμαι, ὦ Γοργία, καὶ σὶ ἐμπειροὶ εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθ' ἑωρακεῖν ἐν αἰταῖς τὸ τοῖόνδε, ὅτι οὐ βολίως δύναται περὶ ἐν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσῃ διαλέγεσθαι διορισμένον πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω διαλέεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας—καὶ ἐνταῖς γε τελευτῶντες (cf. καὶ ὅσοι γε in the present passage) &c. &c.

6. τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι] Cf. Men. p. 80: Ὅρῃς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατὰ γένος ;

Aristotle (Met. 1008 A), uses the expression, τοῖς τὸν Πρωταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. The digression which follows is not merely an ornament. As in the Sophists the philosopher and the sophist

are the counterpart of being and not-being respectively, so here the man of the world and the philosopher represent the contrast between the life of sense and the life of knowledge. There are similar digressions in the Phædrus and Protagoras.

9. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν] Compare the opening of the digression in the Phædrus, σχολὴ μὲν δὴ ὡς τοιαύτη—, and Cic. de Am. V: Et sumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi.

12. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] 'In scientific pursuits.' Supr. p. 144: Γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν. Tim. 88: Μουσικὴ καὶ πάσι φιλοσοφίᾳ. He takes common ground with Theodorus. Cf. infr. p. 173: Τά τε γὰρ ἀνέκρηθ' καὶ τὰ ἐπικτετα γωμετροῦσα, οὐρανῷ τε ὑπερ ἀστρανομία. Compare with the whole passage the opening words of the Apology.

2. ΣΩ. Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ ἐν δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὥς οἰκέται πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι.

ΘΕΟ. Πῇ δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ἡ τοῖς μὲν, τοῦτο ὃ σὺ εἶπες, αἰὲν πάρεστι σχολὴ καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῇ ποιῶνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ, εἰς αὐτοὺς ὃ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ καὶ

(Digression.)

Before entering upon this, however, we pause to reflect upon the happiness and freedom of the philosophic life, which has leisure to take up fresh topics or to lay them down at will.

Not so the

2. ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι] 'Who have been jostled about from their youth.' Compare Aristophanes' περίτρυμμα δικῶν. (Nub. 447): cf. Dem. de Cor. 269.

κυλινδούμενοι] The word expresses contempt. Cf. Rep. 479: Μεταξύ που κυλινδούμεται.

3. πρὸς ἐλευθέρους] Soph. 253 (referring to this): Ἡ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἰλάσμεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἐμπροσθέντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν (ῥητοῦντες τὸν σοφιστὴν πρότερον ἀναιρεμένοι τὸν φιλόσοφον; Rep. 499: Οὐδέ γὰρ αὐτὸν λόγον, ὃ μακάρις, καλὸν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἰσχυρῶς ἐπὶ γένεσιν, οἷον (ῥητοῦν μὲν τὸ ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ. 536: Οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλευθέρου χρηρῆ μαθάνειν—and the whole image of the cave with its captives and their liberation. See also Aristot. Met. I. 2: Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι οὐδὲ μίαν αὐτὸν (ῥητοῦν) χρῆσαν ἐν τῇ, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἀνθρώποις φέμεν ἐλευθέρους ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔσκε καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὅτι, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη μὴν ἐλευθέρῃ οὕτω τῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

8. τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου] 'We are for the third time beginning a fresh argument.' The first fresh λόγος was the criticism of Protagoras and his de-

fence; the second begins where Theodorus is induced to accept Socrates' challenge (see the words, p. 168, αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον); the third arises with the mention of the wholesome and expedient, and the partial supporters of Protagoras.

9. οὕτω καὶ οἱ] So. μεταλαμβάνουσι. This part of the sentence (from ὥσπερ—) is in apposition with what precedes. Cf. supr. 171: Τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωτ., and note; also Rep. 557: Κινδυνεύει ἢ ὃ ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτικῶν εἶναι: ὥσπερ ἡμῶν ποιητῶν πᾶσι δοκεῖ πεποιτημένον οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσι ἔστιν πεποιτημένη καλλίστη ἢ φαίνεται. Also ib. p. 532: Οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ὅταν πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ὁρμῇ, καὶ μὴ ἀποσπῇ πρὶν ἢ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσῃ λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τίλει, ὥσπερ ἐκίνοιο ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ.

10. καθάπερ ἡμᾶς] Such slight redundancies are natural in conversation.

ἀρέσκειν seems to govern the accusative with the meaning to satisfy. The whole sentence is in construction with Ἡ.

mind which is exercised in the courts of law. The one is the training of a freeman, the other of a slave—

διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχείων μέλει οὐδὲν λέγειν, ἂν μόνον p. 172.  
 τύχῳσι τοῦ ὄντος. οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχαλίᾳ τε αἰεὶ λέγουσι·  
 κατεπείγει γὰρ ὕδωρ ρέον, καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν  
 ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη  
 5 ἔχων ὁ ἀντίδικος ἐφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγι-  
 γνωσκομένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ρητέον (ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν  
 καλοῦσιν)· οἱ δὲ λόγοι αἰεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δε-  
 σπότην καθήμενον, ἐν χειρὶ τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ  
 ἄγωνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ' αἰεὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ·  
 10 πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος· ὥστ' ἐξ ἀπάν- p. 173.

1. διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχείων] See Polit. 286.

4. ἀνάγκη] Hesych.: 'ἀνάγκη' ἢ δικαστικὴ κλεψύδρα. Pollux VIII. 17: 'Ἐποὶ δ' οἴονται καὶ ἀνάγκην σκεῦος εἶναι δικαστικόν. The latter quotation expresses doubt. May not the notion mentioned by the grammarian have arisen from the present passage? The structure of the sentence (τε—καὶ) forbids our identifying ἀνάγκη here with the clepsydra, which has been already alluded to. It is rather 'the strong arm of the law,' which the adversary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the indictment. 'But the other sort are always pressed for time: for the ebbing water hurries on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to wield over him the resistless logic of coercion, holding a written outline of the points to which he must confine himself, which forms a running commentary to his oration.'

6. ἂν ἐκτὸς οὐ β.] ὑπογραφὴν retains its verbal force nearly

as if it were ὑπογεγραμμένα, but is not the antecedent to ἂν. See p. 147, note on ἐπε.

ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν] 'What they call their affidavits.' The affected unfamiliarity with legal terms is in good keeping. Compare Rep. 400: Καὶ, ὅτι ἐγγῆμαι, λαμβόν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τροχαίως ἀνέμας.

7. πρὸς δεσπότην] Not simply the δικαστής, but rather δῆμος or νόμος, which he represents. Compare the passages in the Republic in which δῆμος is spoken of as the master of the ship (488), as the great sophist (492), and as a mighty beast (493); and cf. Euthyphr. p. 2: 'Ἐρχεται κατηγορήσαν μου, ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. Also Herodotus VII. 104 (of the Spartans): 'Ἐπεισοὶ γὰρ σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλὰ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ἢ οἱ σοὶ σί. Pindar III. 38: Νόμος πάντων βασιλεὺς.

8. τινα δίκην] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. 'Some cause or other.' καὶ οἱ ἄγωνες] 'And the trial is never for an indifferent stake, but always immediately concerns the speaker.'

10. περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος] Π.



3. των τούτων ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς γίνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν δεσπότην λόγῳ τε παυεῦσαι καὶ ἔργῳ χαρίσασθαι, σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχὰς. τὴν γὰρ αὖξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἢ ἐκ νέων δουλείᾳ ἀφήρηται, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιά, μεγάλους κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἀπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλλουσα, οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδος τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγ-

Whose mind becomes inevitably dwarfed and crooked and servile.

XXII. 161 (of Achilles and Hector): 'Ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἡρήϊον, οὐδὲ βοεῖν ἀνύσθην, δ' τε ποσσὶν δέθλια γίγνεται ἀνδρῶν· ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς δίω· Ἑταροὶ ἱπποδάμοιο. In Herodotus the metaphor is already softened down, VII. 57: Περὶ ἰαντοῦ τρέχων (said of Xerxes). Aristoph. Vesp. 375: Ποίῃσω δακύν τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον δραμεῖν. The expression τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ, is suggested by τὴν ἄλλω. (τὴν ἄλλω Bodl. p.m.)

1. ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς] 'Keen and shrewd.'

3. τὴν γὰρ αὖξην—ἐλεύθερον] 'Of all mental growth, and all honest and liberal culture; 'of self-respect and the spirit of upright independence. Both meanings are expressed in the Greek.

7. οὓς οὐ δυνάμενοι] 'Not being able to undergo these consistently with righteousness and truth, they betake themselves immediately to falsehood, and to avenging themselves on one another by wrong, and so are repeatedly bent and stunted; whence they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness in their mind, but supposing themselves to have become capable and accomplished men.'

Cf. Rep. 519: 'Ἡ οὖτω ἐνενόη-  
κας τῶν λεγομένων ποιητῶν μὲν  
σαφῶς δέ, ὥς δριμύ μιν βλέπει τὸ  
ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξίως διορᾷ ταῦτα  
ἐφ' ἃ τέτραπται, ὥς οὐ φαῦλῳ  
ἔχον τὴν θῆψιν, καὶ ἐξ ἡττοκασιμῶ-  
νον ὑπηρετεῖν· ὅσοι δ' οὐκ ἐξέ-  
τερον βλέπῃ τοσούτῃ πλείω κακὰ  
ἐργαζόμενοι.—Τοῦτο μῖντοι ἦν δ'  
ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως εἰ ἐκ  
παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενοι περιεκόπη  
τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὥσπερ  
μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὲ ἰδαδαῖς τε καὶ  
τῶν τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνύσας  
προσφυνεῖς γιγνώμεναι, περὶ τὰ κἀτω  
στρίφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς θῆψιν.  
κ. τ. λ.

9. πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγελῶ-  
ται] 'Are continually thwarted  
and cramped in their  
growth.' Rep. 495: 'Ἀτελεῖς μὲν  
τὰς φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε  
καὶ βασανιστῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα  
λελύθησιν οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς  
εὐγενελασμένους τε καὶ ἀποστερημέ-  
νους διὰ τὰς βασανίας τυγχάνου-  
σι. 611: Τεθνάμειναι μῖντοι δια-  
κειμένους αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν θεί-  
λάττιον Γλαυκῶν δρώσας οἷα ἂν ἐπὶ  
ῥάβδῳ αὐτοῦ ἴδουσι τὴν ἀρχαίαν  
φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τέ τε παλαιᾶ τοῦ  
σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι,  
τὰ δὲ συνεστρίφθαι καὶ πᾶντος λε-  
λωθῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων.

κλῶνται, ὥσθ' ὑγιᾶς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς p. 173.  
 ἄνδρας ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοὶ τε καὶ σοφοὶ  
 γεγονότες, ὡς οἴονται. Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὦ  
 Θεόδωρε· τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει  
 5 διελθόντες ἢ ἑάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ-  
 μεθα, ἵνα μὴ καί, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ τῇ  
 ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα;

Turn we  
 now from  
 them; and  
 let us still  
 use our  
 liberty to  
 describe  
 the leaders  
 of our own  
 band.

ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες.  
 πᾶν γὰρ εὐ τοῦτο εἶρηκας, ὅτι οὐχ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἐν τῷ ο  
 10 τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρεταί, ἀλλ' οἱ λόγοι  
 οἱ ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν περι-  
 μένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ· οὔτε γὰρ δικα-  
 στής οὔτε θεατής, ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων τε καὶ  
 ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ' ἡμῖν.

They know  
 nothing of  
 politics and

15 ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ  
 τῶν κορυφαίων· τί γὰρ ἂν τις τοὺς γε φαύλως δια-

4. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ] Phædr. 247: φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω  
 θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται. Polit. 291:  
 'Ἡμφεγήσῃ κατεὶδὼν τὸν περὶ τὰ  
 τῶν πόλειων πράγματα χορόν. The  
 metaphor is continued in the  
 words οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύοντες,  
 — ὅστις θεατὴς ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς —  
 περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων—.

5. διελθόντες] The expression  
 is a little confused: for the  
 words πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ-  
 μεθα, as understood with διελ-  
 θόντες, are unemphatic, while in  
 the second part of the clause  
 they are emphatic. Probably but  
 for the attraction of the other  
 participle, διελθόντες would have  
 been διέλθωμεν. (Coisl. τρεπώμ.)  
 ἑάσαντες] Since here, as in  
 the Sophista, we have stumbled  
 prematurely on the philosophic  
 life.

6. τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μετ.] 'Our

freedom, which consists, as we  
 have said, in the power of  
 ranging from one topic to an-  
 other.' Cf. Tim. 26: καὶ τίς δὲ  
 ἔκρινται, μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τούτου με-  
 ταλάσσομεν; Polit. 257: διανα-  
 παύσομεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβόντες αὐ-  
 τοῦ τὸν συγγυμναστήν τάνδε Σω-  
 κράτη; — Καθότιον εἶπες, μετα-  
 λάμβαν.

11. οἱ ἡμέτεροι] οἱ is suspicius.  
 If genuine, it still belongs to  
 the predicate, — 'our servants,'  
 i.e. those which, as philosophers,  
 we have.

περιμένει] 'Waits our plea-  
 sure for its completion.'

13. ἐπιτιμήσων] 'Stands over  
 us to criticise and to compel.'

15. ὡς ἔοικεν] The sentence  
 continues as if λέγωμεν had been  
 λεκτέον.

16. τοὺς φαύλως διατρέχοντας ἐν  
 φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγῳ] ἐν φ. is empha-

3. τρέβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων  
 ὁ πρῶτον μὲν εἰς ἀγορὰν οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν ὁδόν, οὐδὲ ὅπου  
 δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἢ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο τῆς πό-  
 λεως συνέδριον· νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα  
 ἢ γεγραμμένα οὔτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. σπουδαί  
 δὲ ἐταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν  
 αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσιόταται  
 αὐτοῖς. εὐδὲ ἢ κακῶς τι γέγονεν ἐν πόλει, ἢ τί τω  
 κακόν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ

public life,  
 still less of  
 revels and  
 intrigues  
 for power.

The philo-  
 sopher's

tic, i. e. 'in such a pursuit.' For an account of these gentry, see Rep. 489—496., where they are called παμπόνηροι—ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημίων εἰς τὰ λερὰ ἀποδι-  
 δράσκοντες, κ. τ. λ.

1. Οὗτοι δέ που] Compare the less ironical description in the Republic 488: νόησον γὰρ τοιούτων γενόμενον, κ. τ. λ. The contradiction between philosophy and common life is here stated in its most paradoxical aspect. Nor do there appear any features of the transcendental philosopher. (V. infr. τῶν ὅσων ἐκαστος ὄλου.) We find a trace of him for the first time in the Sophist, as of the ideal king in the Politicus.

5. σπουδαί δέ, κ. τ. λ.] 'But the ambitious striving of political clubs for power, and public meetings and banquets and revellings with minstrelsy, are actions which do not occur to them even in dreams.'

For a similar 'nominativus pendens,' cf. Rep. 532: 'Ἡ δὲ γὰρ λύσις—ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν—ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. The irregularity is softened in the present instance by the fact that the earlier part of the sentence forms a sort of collective no-

minative to προσιόταται. With this list of 'worldly goods,' compare Rep. 491: πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθὰ, κάλλος καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχύς σῆματος καὶ θυγγί-  
 νια ἰβήρυμνη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τοῦτων οἰκεία.

6. ἐταιρειῶν] 'Clubs' or 'leagues.' See Rep. 365: ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ λαυθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἐταιρείας συνάφομεν.—Thucyd. VIII. 54: Καὶ ὁ μὲν Πείσανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτίγγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἀπάσας ἐπιθάν, κ. τ. λ.: and Arnold's note.

8. τι γέγονεν] So the Bodleian and several other MSS. But Clement in quoting the passage reads, τις with the majority of manuscripts. This, however, may easily have arisen out of what follows. Stallbaum says, 'Si quis alius, certe philosophus scit, quid recte, quid secus in republica fiat.' But if he is ignorant of what is passing, how can he judge of it? See above, νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα κ. τ. λ. The fate of Archimedes would be an illustration of what is meant. It is true that we cannot imagine Socrates to have been ignorant (e. g.) of the mutilation of the Hermæ.

ignorance of these things, and of his neighbour's pedigree, is not ironical but real. His body is at home in the city, but his mind is traversing the earth and heaven, compassing the whole of everything.

γυναικῶν, μάλλον αὐτὸν λέλθην ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης p. 173 λεγόμενοι χόες. καὶ ταῦτα πάντ' οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, οἶδεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κεῖται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ἡγήσασθαι σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ἀτιμάσασθαι πανταχῇ φέρεται κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τὰ τε γὰρ ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὑπὲρ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνώμενη τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου p. 174. οὐλοῦ, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὐτὴν συγκαθιῶσα.

1. οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες] Aristid. Or. III. T. 1. p. 30. ed. Dind. : τὸ λέγειν περὶ τούτων καὶ ἔγχεσθαι ὥστερ' ἂν εἰ τις ἐξαριθμῆσθαι βούλετο τοὺς χόας τῆς θαλάττης. (Stallb.)

3. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν] Cf. Ar. Eth. N. IV. 3, §§ 27, 28. (of the high-minded man) — πρὸς τὰ ἐντομα μὴ ἵνα — εἴρωσα πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς.

6. ἀτιμάσασθαι] Cf. Rep. 496 : ἢ ἐν σμικρῇ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φύῃ καὶ ἀτιμάσασθαι τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ· βραχὺ δὲ πού τι καὶ ὅτ' ἄλλοις τήχῃσι δικαίως ἀτιμάσων εἰφύεῖ ἐν' αὐτὴν ἂν ἔλθοι.

7. κατὰ Πίνδαρον] The fragment is thus quoted by Clem. Alex. Str. γ. 707 : πέντα κατὰ Πίνδαρον τὰς τε γὰς ὑπένερθεν οὐρανὸν τε ὑπὲρ ἀστρονομῶν, καὶ πᾶσαν πάντῃ φύσιν ἐρευνώμενος. (v. l. ἐρευνώμενος.) He seems to have had the poet's words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed πέντα into the more prosaic φέρων, (πέντα occurs as a marginal reading,) and to have introduced the words καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεωμετροῦσα, (perhaps also

ἀστρονομοῦσα,) in compliment to Theodorus, adding τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου κ. τ. λ. Plato almost always thus weaves quotation with his own language, and accommodates the poet's measures to the rhythm of prose; e. g. Rep. 365 : πότερον δίκαια τοῖς θεοῖς ἢ πολλοῖς ἀπείροις ἀναβάς καὶ ἑμμενὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβῶ; ib. 364 : τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρύτα θεοὶ προπάραιθεν ἴδμεν καὶ τινα ὁδὸν μακρὰν τε καὶ ἀνάστη. Protag. 340 : ὅταν δὲ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἀκρόν ἵκηται, ἠμῶν δ' ἡμεῖς πελῶν, χαλεπὴν περ εἴσω, ἐκτῆσθαι.

τὰ τε γὰς] Bodl. τῆς. Is it possible that Plato wrote τὰς τε, as in the quotation of Clement? This seems probable, when it is considered that τὰ ἐπίπεδα κ. τ. λ. is an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is somewhat abrupt; and also that the term γεωμετροῦσα is more naturally applicable to the surface of the Earth.

9. τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου ὁλοῦ] Ὅ γὰρ συνωστιστὲς διαλεπτοῦς, εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ. (Rep. 537.) See the humorous illustration of this in

p. 174. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Ὡς περ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομούντα, ὃ Θεό-  
 δωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, Θρᾷττά  
 τις ἐμμελῆς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαινὶς ἀποσκῶψαι λέ-  
 γεται, ὡς τὰ μὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ  
 δ' ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνει αὐτόν.  
 ταῦτόν δ' ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα ἐπὶ πάντας ὅσοι ἐν φιλο-  
 σοφίᾳ διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν  
 πλησίον καὶ ὁ γείτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὃ τι πράττει,  
 ἀλλ' ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο θέρμα·  
 τί δέ ποτ' ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ τί τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει  
 προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,  
 ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ' ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις  
 γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὐ ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγώ γε· καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Τοιγάμτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ

He is  
 laughed at  
 by ordinary  
 people, as  
 Thales was  
 by the  
 Thracian  
 maid-ser-  
 vant. For  
 knowing  
 nothing of  
 his neigh-  
 bour, while  
 he searches  
 into the  
 nature of  
 man, he  
 appears  
 helpless in  
 public and  
 private life,  
 having no  
 topics for  
 scandal,  
 and despai-  
 15 sing the  
 common  
 subjects of  
 praise and

the Republic, 474 : *ὅτι δὲ ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆραι αὐτόν, ἵνα ὁρθῶς λεγῆται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἱκεῖναι, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέρξαντα, κ. τ. λ.* And ib. 486 : *ἐκαστοῦ ἐκαστοῦ ἐμμελὲς ψυχῇ μιλύουσα τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντός διὰ ἐκαστοῦ ἐκαστοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπου. — ὃ οὐκ ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντός μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οὐδὲν τε οἷον τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπου βίον ; ὅλου, 'In its universal aspect.'*

(10.) *εἰς τῶν ἑγγύς* [Not lowering herself to contemplate any of the things surrounding her.]

Θρᾷττά τις] Θρᾷτταν a patria ancillam hanc dicit. ἐμμελῆς autem h. l. ad leporem et venustatem in jocando trahendam docuit Ruhnken. ad Longin. p. 261. Fabellam hinc forte

duxit Laërt. I. 34. (Heind.)

Do not the epithets rather refer to the slave's neatness in her own department? v. τῶς καὶ ὁρίως p. 175. 'A trim and dainty Thracian handmaid.'

7. ταῦτόν δ' ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα] 'The same piece of raillery does not fail to apply,'—'will serve.—' For the metaphorical use of ἀρκεῖν ἐπὶ, cf. Soph. Ant. 611 : τό τ' ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρείσει νόμος δε.

For the application of the σκῶμμα in the mouth of an enemy, see the speech of Calicles in the Gorgias, 484 sqq., which presents many points of similarity to the present passage.

11. τῇ τοιαύτῃ φ.] Sc. ἀνθρωπίνῃ.



boasting :  
thinking of  
a king  
merely as  
the shep-  
herd of a  
trouble-  
some flock,  
who for  
want of lei-  
sure must  
be a clown :  
looking  
upon broad  
acres as a  
narrow  
strip of  
earth : and  
on high pe-  
digree as  
but a single  
reach in an  
endless  
river.

τοιοῦτος ἐκάστω καὶ δημοσίῃ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, p.174.  
ὅταν ἐν δικαστηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι ἀναγκασθῇ περὶ ὅ  
τῶν παρὰ πόδας καὶ τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι,  
γέλωτα παρέχει οὐ μόνον Θράτταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ  
5 ἄλλω ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπί-  
πτων ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη δεινὴ, δόξαν  
ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ἔν τε γὰρ ταῖς λοιδορίαῖς  
ἴδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, αἳ οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν  
οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι· ἀπορῶν οὖν  
10 γελοῖος φαίνεται· ἔν τε τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ ταῖς τῶν δ  
ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι  
γελῶν ἐνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύ-  
ραννόν τε γὰρ ἡ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἓνα τῶν  
νομέων, οἷον συβάτην, ἡ ποιμένα, ἡ τινα βουκόλον

1. ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον] These words refer only to δημοσίῃ.

5. εἰς φρέατα] 'Into pitfalls and all manner of perplexity.' Supr. 165. τὸ λεγόμενον ἐν φρέατι συναχόμενος.

6. ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη] 'And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, and makes him seem no better than a fool.'

8. ἴδιον] 'He cannot use personality in invective.'

12. τύραννον—ἐγκωμιαζόμενον] Governed by ἀκούων, implied in ἀκούειν below.

13. ἓνα τῶν νομέων] Comp. the Politicus, p. 266, where this is regarded as the most universal conception of the kingly office. Regarding νομντική as a whole, the philosopher thinks of βοσι-  
λική only as a part of it. ὅτι τῇ ταῦδε μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὕτε σε-  
μνότερον μᾶλλον ἐμίλησεν ἢ μή, τῶν τε συμφορῶν οὐδὲν ἡμίκασι πρὸ τοῦ μέλλοντος, αἰεὶ δὲ καθ' αὐτὴν περαινέει τάληθιστα. Soph. 227.

τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποιίας οὐδὲν ἦν οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλου, εἰ τὸ μὴ σμικρὰ τὸ δὲ μέγα ἐφελκεῖ ἡμᾶς καθαίρων. τοῦ γὰρ κτήσασθαι ἵκεα καὶ πωλῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγχεῖν καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγχεῖν κατανοεῖν πει-  
ρωμένη τιμὴ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ δότερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγείται γελαι-  
ότερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δη-  
λοῦντα θρηνητικὴν οὐδὲν ἐννόμειν ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερον.—  
The latter passage has also a slight tinge of the irony of the text. The figure proba-  
bly originated in some saying of Socrates. Compare Xen. Mem. I. 2. § 32 : ὅτι θαυμαστὸν οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναι, εἰ τις γενομένης βλάβος ἀγέλης νομῆς καὶ τὰς βούς ἐλάττους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολογῶν κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι. Ib. § 38 : 'Ὁ δὲ Κρίτιος· Ἄλλὰ τῶνδ' ἐγὼ σε ἀπέχισθαι δέησαι, τῶν σκυτίων καὶ τῶν τετιόνων καὶ

- p. 174. ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα·  
 δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῶον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον  
 ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς· ἄγροικον  
 δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἦττον τῶν  
 • νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν 5  
 ὄρει τὸ τεῖχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία  
 πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος  
 θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν  
 εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη  
 ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἐπτά πάππους πλουσίους 10  
 ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρὸν  
 p. 175. ὁρώντων ἡγεῖται τὸν ἔπαινον, ὑπὸ ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ  
 δυναμένων εἰς τὸ πᾶν αἰεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογιζέσθαι  
 ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἐκάστῳ γεγό-  
 νασιν ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν αἷς πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ καὶ 15  
 βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολ-

τῶν χαλκίων.—Ναὶ μὰ Δῖ', ἔφη ὁ  
 Σαρμῆς, καὶ τῶν βοσκῶν γε· εἰ  
 δὲ μή, φυλάττου, ὅπως μὴ καὶ σὺ  
 ἰλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσῃ.

1. πολὺ βδάλλοντα] Lit., As  
 being rich in milk, i. e. sucking  
 out no small advantage. Com-  
 pare the speeches of Thrasyma-  
 chus in Rep. B. I.

2. ἐκείνων] masculine.

3. ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν]  
 'Only he thinks the creature  
 whom they tend, and out of  
 whom they squeeze their wealth,

to be of a less tractable and  
 more insidious nature.'

ἄγροικον δέ] 'rough and un-  
 civilized from stress of work'—

10. ὑμνούντων] 'And when  
 they cant of pedigree'—

11. παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ—ὁρών-  
 των] 'Betraying a dull and  
 contracted vision'—

14. ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων]  
 Compare the comic fragment  
 ascribed to Epicharmus or Me-  
 nander. (Krüsemann's Epichar-  
 mus, 119.)

Ἀπολεῖ με τὸ γένος· μὴ λίγ', εἰ φιλεῖς ἐμέ,  
 Μῆτερ, ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ τὸ γένος· εἰς δὲ τῇ φύσει  
 Ἀγαθὸν ὑπάρχει μηδὲν οἰκίου προσόν,  
 Ἐκείσιν καταφύγουσιν εἰς τὰ μύηματα,  
 Καὶ τὸ γένος, ἀρεθμούσιν τε τοὺς πάππους δοιοί.  
 Οὐδ' ὅνα δ' ἔχουσ' ἰδεῖν δὲ, οὐδ' εἰπεῖν, ὅτι  
 Οὐκ εἰσὶ πάπποι· πῶς γὰρ ἐγένοντ' ἂν ποτε; κ. τ. λ.

μυριάδες ἀναρίθμητοι] This ex-  
 pression recurs frequently in  
 later Greek authors.

16. βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες]  
 These words belong to all the  
 preceding nouns.

λάκεις μυρίοι γεγόνασιν ὀτφούν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ ρ.<sup>1</sup>  
 εἴκοσι καταλόγῳ προγόνων σεμνυνομένων καὶ ἀναφε-  
 ρόντων εἰς Ἡρακλέα τὸν Ἀμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ  
 καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἀπ' Ἀμφι-  
 5 τρύωνος εἰς τὸ ἄνω πεντεκαεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν, οἷα b  
 συνέβαιεν αὐτῷ τύχη, καὶ ὁ πεντηκοστὸς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ,  
 γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαι τε καὶ χαυνότηθα  
 ἀνοήτου ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις ὁ  
 τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, τὰ μὲν ὑπερ-  
 10 ηφάνως ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ δ' ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ  
 ἐν ἐκάστοις ἀπορῶν.

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες.

1. ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι] The order is ἐπὶ καταλόγῳ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι προγόνων.

2. ἀναφερόντων] Sc. τὰ γένος. The genitives depend upon σμικρολογίας, or rather, more vaguely, upon the sense of the words εἰς. a. κατ. γ. σμικρ., as δυναμένων upon γέλα below, —κατὰ in καταφαίνεται being probably used in its condemnatory sense.

3. ἄτοπα—τῆς σμικρολογίας] The genitive is not quite analogous to ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας, Ap. 41., which is rather quantitative: nor is it exactly equivalent to ἄτοπος ἡ σμικρολογία, (like ἄσημα—βοῆς, —φύτων δόλιον ἱστήρια, in Sophocles), though as in these last cases the adjective is isolated for the sake of emphasis, but the genitive has the additional meaning, 'in respect of,' as after interjections and epithets. Cf. Protagor. 317: πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Rep. 328. χαλεπὸν τοῦ βίου (for its way of

life!) Rep. 532: πάμπαν ἔργον λέγεις. τοῦ προσμίου, ἦν δ' ἐγώ; Phaed. 99: πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ βλάβη αὐτῷ τοῦ λόγου.

The whole sense lies somewhere between σεμνυνομένοι καὶ ἀναφέροντες—ἄτοποι φαίνονται τῆς σμικρ. and σεμνυνομένοι καὶ ἀναφέροντες—ἄτοπος φαίνεται ἡ σμικρολογία.

5. οἷα συνέβη.] The Bodl. reads οἷα συνέβαιεν αὐτῷ τύχῃ. Perhaps rightly. The meaning in both cases is the same. 'He was,—what Fortune made him.'

6. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] Sc. τοῦ πεντεκαεικοστοῦ. Compare Rep. 515, 6: Εἰ δ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐνταῦθεν ἔλκει τις αὐτὸν βίῃ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάτου, καὶ μὴ ἀνίη πρὶν ἐξελκύσει πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ ὀδυῖσθαι τε αὖ καὶ ἀγαπᾶσθαι ἐλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς αὖ ἔχοντα τὰ ἔμματα μετὰ ἑρῆς οὐδ' αὖτε δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν.

p. 175. ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὐτός, ὡ φίλε, ἐλκύσῃ ἄνω,  
 ο καὶ ἐβέλσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι ἐκ τοῦ τί ἐγὼ σέ  
 ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ  
 ἀδικίας, τί τε ἐκάτερον αὐτοῦ καὶ τί τῶν πάντων ἢ  
 ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον; ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων<sup>5</sup>  
 κεκτημένος τ' αὐτὸν πολὺ χρυσίον, βασιλείας περὶ καὶ  
 ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀβλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέ-  
 ψῃ, ποῖω τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου  
 φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῦ, τὸ δὲ ἀπο-  
 φυγεῖν,—περὶ τούτων ἀπάντων ὅταν αὐτὸν δέῃ λόγον<sup>10</sup>  
 δ διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνου τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμύν

But when  
 he takes  
 the other  
 up into his  
 own region,  
 from ques-  
 tions of pri-  
 vate wrong,  
 to inquire  
 what jus-  
 tice is, from  
 diatribes on  
 the theme  
 'Is a king  
 happy?' to  
 contem-  
 plate the  
 ideas of the  
 royal office  
 and of hu-  
 man happi-  
 ness,

1. τινα—τις] The indefinites  
 are used with an indirect refer-  
 ence to the philosopher and to  
 τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκείνου καὶ δριμύν καὶ  
 δικαιοσύνη below.

5. Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων] See  
 the passage of the Gorgias  
 (p. 471.), in which Polus con-  
 tends that Archelaus is happy.  
 (Diog. mentions a diatribe of  
 Antisthenes, called Ἀρχέλαος, ἢ  
 περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gorgias  
 was assailed.)

Buttmann thus defends εἰ,  
 which three MSS. omit :—  
 "Quamvis certum exploratum-  
 que haberent vulgares illi ora-  
 tores, regem propter divitias  
 suas unice beatum putandum  
 esse, tamen rem ita in encomiis  
 tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea  
 videri posset, multis eam exem-  
 plis argumentisque probarent.  
 Quidni igitur v. c. encomii  
 alicujus in Croesum argumen-  
 tum his verbis indicari potu-  
 erit; εἰ Κροῖστος εὐδαίμων;" It  
 may be questioned, however,  
 whether ἢ βασιλ. might not give  
 a better meaning.

In the words which fol-  
 low, τε seems to impede the

sense, and εἰ is superfluous. If  
 Plato is really quoting from a  
 rhetorician, this is possibly not  
 a fatal objection, though the  
 conjectures πάντων πολὺ, πάμπαν,  
 (Heusd. Hirschig. Badh.) would  
 seem probable. Possibly, how-  
 ever, the words βασιλεὺς—χρυσί-  
 ον are adapted from some  
 poet. (Cf. Theogn. εὐδαίμων  
 εἶναι, καὶ θεοῖς φίλος ἀθανάτοισι,  
 Κύρην, ἀρετῆς δ' ἄλλης οὐδὲ μᾶς  
 ἔραται.) In which case γὰρ πο-  
 λύχρυσον is perhaps the true  
 reading. For κεκτημένος in such  
 an adaptation, cf. (besides Pro-  
 tag. 340., quoted above), the  
 quotation of Tyrtaeus in the  
 Laws, p. 629: οὐτ' ἂν μνηστῆρ  
 οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τυτθίμην, οὐτ' εἰ  
 πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώπων εἴη, φησὶν,  
 οὐτ' εἰ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος.  
 εἰκὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα, κ. τ. λ.

There is a close parallel be-  
 tween the present passage and  
 page 174. τοιγάρτοι κ. τ. λ.

Cf. τί ἐγὼ σέ ἀδικῶ, with ἐν  
 δικαστηρίῳ—ἀσπασσθὲ λόγιον : ἢ  
 σὺ ἐμέ, with ἐν ταῖς λαοβοίαις : εἰ  
 (or ἢ) βασιλεὺς—with τὴν ῥάσαν  
 τε γάρ—

7. ἐπὶ σκέψῃ] MSS. ἐπισκεψ.

Then that dwarfed shrewd legal mind is puzzled in its turn, and becomes a laughing-stock not to the uneducated, but to the wise and free. The philosopher may be well con-

καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν. p. 175.  
 ἰλιγγιών τε ἀφ' ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων με-  
 τέωρος ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀπθείας, ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν  
 καὶ βαρβαρίζων, γέλωτα Θράτταις μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ'  
 5 ἄλλῃ ἀπαιδεύτῃ οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς δ'  
 ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν. Οὗτος  
 δὴ ἐκατέρου τρόπος, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν  
 ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένον, ὃν δὴ φιλόσο-  
 10 φον καλεῖς, ᾧ ἀνεμέσῃτον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ  
 εἶναι, ὅταν εἰς δουρικὰ ἐμπέσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον  
 στρωματόδεσμον μὴ ἐπισταμένον συσκευάσασθαι  
 μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδύναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους· ὁ δ' αὖ τὰ μὲν  
 τοιαῦτα πάντα δυναμένου τορῶς τε καὶ ὀξέως δια-  
 κονεῦν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια

2. ἰλιγγίων τε] 'He gives the philosopher his revenge; (for) dizzyed by the height where he finds himself hanging by a thread, and from which he looks downwards into space, (a strange experience to him), and being dismayed and lost, and broken in his utterance, he is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaids, nor by any other of the uneducated, for they do not perceive his plight; but by all whose nurture has been the reverse of servile.'

The sentence probably divides after ἀπθείας, and ἀδημονῶν τε—answers to ἰλιγγίων τε. (ἰλιγγίων τε, γὰρ add. Ven. x. This is quite unnecessary.)

9. ᾧ ἀνεμέσῃτον] 'Who may, without our surprise or censure, appear simple and a mere cipher, when some menial service is required of him, if he has no skill, for instance, in

tying up bed-clothes with the proper knot, nor in flavouring a sauce, or a fawning speech:—the other character is that of the man who is able to do all such service with smartness and dispatch, but has not the skill to throw his cloak over his right shoulder with a gentlemanly grace; no, nor to celebrate aright with the music of discourse, in his turn, that life which is lived in truth by the immortals and by heaven-favoured men.'

11. ἐπισταμένου] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἐπιστάμενος cett.

13. τορῶς] 'Smartly.' ἄτε δριμύτι δν.

14. ἀναβάλλεσθαι—ἐπιδέξια] Probably, 'to wear his garment over his right shoulder in a gentlemanly fashion.' Aristoph. Av. 1566: οὔτος, τί ἄρτι; ἐπ' ἀριστερῇ οὔτως ἀντίχει; οὐ μεταβαλεῖς βολιμένον ἔδ' ἐπὶ δεξιῇ; Cf. Hor.



6. ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ.

ΘΕΟ. Εἰ πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ' ἀνθρώπους εἴη.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε· ὑπεναντίον γάρ τι τῷ ἀγαθῷ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἀνάγκη· οὐτ' ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἰδρῦσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν

tautoseem  
unskilled in  
servile arts,  
in compari-  
son with  
those who  
are dumb  
in the high-  
est music of  
the soul.

Ep. I. § 96. si toga dissidet im-  
par, Ridea. Quid, mea cum pa-  
gnat sententia secum? A pos-  
sible rendering at first sight is,  
'to strike up the song in his  
turn.' Vid. οὐδέ γ' ἁρμονίαν λό-  
γων λαβόντα, and cf. Rep. 420:  
κατακλινάσθαι ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ πρὸς τὸ  
πῦρ διαπίνοντας. Symp. 177:  
εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἐρωτες ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ.  
But one person could hardly be  
said to sing ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ, and the  
antithesis requires the other  
rendering. The slave can tuck  
in bed-clothes, the freeman  
wears his garment with a  
grace. The slaves' contribution  
to the banquet is literally ἔψον  
ἡδύκα, figuratively *ὥπως λόγους*  
ἡδ. (Cf. Gorg. 465: τὴν ῥητο-  
ρικὴν—ἀπίστροφον ὀψοποιίας ἐν  
ψυχῇ ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι.) The  
'freeman's' is literally the lyre  
and song; in a higher sense,  
discourse of philosophy and  
virtue. This is his proper  
ἔρως. Cf. Symp. 177., where  
the minstrel is dismissed, and  
Eryximachus proposes that  
they should discourse of the  
praises of love. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι  
χρήναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν  
ἔπαινον Ἐρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ ὡς ἂν  
δίσσηται καλλιστον. v. Prot. 347.  
There is a further 'harmony'

between the discourse and life  
of the philosopher. Lach. 188:  
καὶ κομῆ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ  
τοιούτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλιστὴν  
ἡρμωσμένον οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς  
ἄρματα, ἀλλὰ τῇ ὅτι ζῆν ἡρμωσμέ-  
νος αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τὸν βίον ἐξυμῶναι  
τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ὅτεχώς  
θαυριστὶ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἱαστὶ, ὁλομαι δὲ  
οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστὶ, ἀλλ'  
ἥπερ μέση Ἑλληνικῇ ἴστω ἁρμονίᾳ.

There is an allusion to the  
well-known custom of taking  
the lyre in turn. *ὥπως λόγους*  
is perhaps rightly supposed by  
Ruhnck. ad Tim. p. 146. to be a  
poetical expression, quoted pro-  
bably from Euripides or Epi-  
charmus.

2. θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαι-  
μόνων βίον ἀληθῆ] There is a  
rhythmical cadence in the  
words, cf. Phædr. 261: Πάρτε  
δὴ, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά  
τε φαῖδρον πείθετε. Rep. 617:  
λαχίστως θυγατρὸς πόρης λαχι-  
στως λόγος κ. τ. λ. Symp. 197.  
the end of Agathon's speech.

7. ὑπεναντίον γάρ] Compare  
the saying of Heraclitus, παλιν-  
τονος ἁρμονία κόσμον ὅσπερ τόξον  
καὶ λύρας. The prep. conveys  
the idea of 'bearing up  
against.'

φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. p.176.  
διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκείσε φεύγειν ὅ τι  
τάχιστα. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν· b  
ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέ-

Men will  
not hear

1. τόνδε τὸν τόπον] viz. τὸν  
σωματοειδῆ τε καὶ ὁρατὸν τόπον.  
Rep. 532. The imagery of  
place in which Plato's philoso-  
phy is enfolded appears most  
prominently in the Phædo, the  
Phædrus, and Rep. B. VI. and  
VII.

The notion that evil must  
exist in everything but the  
Divine Nature reappears in a  
curious mythical form in the  
Politicus, p. 270. and is implied  
Tim. 87: τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχῇ (sc.  
νοήματα) διὰ σώματος ἔξω κ. τ. λ.  
Ib. 69: ξυγκερασμένοι εἴ αὐτὰ  
ἀσχαλῶσι τὸ θνητὸν γένος ξυτίθε-  
σαν. In the Phædo evil is al-  
most identified with the bodily  
principle. Our ignorance on  
the subject is, however, con-  
fessed in the Lysis, p. 220, 1:   
πότερον, ἢν δ' ἰγώ, ἴδω τὸ κακὸν  
ἀπὸ λητῆς, οὐδὲ πειρῇν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ  
διψῇν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιού-  
των;—ἢ γέλως τὸ ἐρώτημα, δ τί  
ποτ' ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται; τίς γὰρ  
οἶδεν;

3. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ]  
Phædr. 252, 3: ἰκνύσιντες δὲ  
παρ' ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκου τὴν τοῦ  
σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν, εὐποροῦσι  
διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἡσυχάζειν πρὸς  
τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι  
αὐτοῦ τῇ μύθῃ, ἐκθουσιῶντες, ἐξ  
ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ  
ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ' ὅσον δυνατόν  
θεοῦ ἀνθρώπων μετασχέιν.

Rep. 613: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὑπὸ γε  
θεῶν ποτὶ ἀμελείται, δεῖν ἂν προθυ-  
μίσθαι ἐθελῶ δικαίως γίγνεσθαι καὶ  
ἐπιτηδεύειν ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατόν

ἀνθρώπων ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. Ibid.  
500: Οὐδὲ γάρ που, ἂν ἡδύμαστε,  
σχολῇ τῇ γε ὥς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς  
ὅσοι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέ-  
πειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας καὶ  
μαχόμενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ  
θυμωρίας ἐμπίπασθαι, ἀλλ' εἰς  
τεταγμένα ἄντα καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα δεῖ  
ἔχοντα ὄντας καὶ θεωμένους ὅτ'  
ἀδικούντα ὅτ' ἀδικούμενα ὑπ' ἀλ-  
λήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ  
λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μμείσθαι τε  
καὶ δ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοιοῦσθαι.  
Phæd. 107: εἴν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνα-  
τος φαίνεται ὅσα, οὐδενί μιν εἴη  
αὐτῇ ἄλλῃ ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ  
σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὥς βελτίστην  
τε καὶ φρονιμωτέστην γενέσθαι.  
Tim. 90: τῇ δὲ περὶ φιλομάθειαν  
καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθείας φρονήσεις  
ἐσπουδακότε καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν  
αὐτοῦ γεγυμνασμένη φρονεῖν μὲν  
ἀθάνατα καὶ θεία, ἀνπερ ἀληθείας  
ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, καθ'  
ὅσον δ' αὐ μετασχέιν ἀνθρωπίνῃ  
φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, τοῦτον  
μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν—διὰ τὸ  
καταμαρτυρεῖν τὰς τοῦ παντός ἀρ-  
μονίας τε καὶ περιφορές, τῇ κατα-  
νοουμένη τὸ κατανοεῖν ἑξομοιωσας  
κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν.

4. ὁμοίωσις δὲ] 'And to be  
made like to Him is to become  
righteous and holy, not without  
wisdom.'

μετὰ φρονήσεως] Is virtue  
possible apart from know-  
ledge? This question is dis-  
cussed in the Protagoras and  
the Meno. The answer given  
is, that practically it would ap-  
pear so, but that virtue can be

p. 176. σθαι. ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ ἄριστε, οὐ πάνν ῥάδιον πείσαι ὥς  
 ἄρα οὐχ ὦν ἔνεκα οἱ πολλοὶ φασὶ δειν ποιητρίαν μὲν  
 φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν τὸ μὲν ἐπι-  
 τηδευτέον, τὸ δ' οὐ, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ ἵνα ἀγαθὸς  
 δοκῇ εἶναι. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν  
 ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν.  
 ε θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ' ὡς οἶόν τε δικαιο-  
 τatos, καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτῷ ὁμοιότερον οὐδὲν ἢ ὅς ἄν

this: for  
 there must  
 be some  
 evil to re-  
 sist the  
 good, and  
 this cannot  
 be in hea-  
 ven, but in  
 this lower  
 world. Our  
 wisdom  
 therefore is  
 to escape  
 heaven-

proved to be inseparable from knowledge. And in the Meno the paradox is solved by saying that practical virtue is a Divine gift, *θεία μοίρα προσγενομένη ἄνθρωπῳ*, but that if there should be a virtuous man who could teach virtue, he would be like Tiresias amongst the shades; *ἥσπερ παρὰ σκιάς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρῶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετὴν*. In the more dialectical dialogues one side of the contradiction disappears, and it is assumed that philosophy is essential to real virtue. Phaed. 69: *ὁ μακάρι Συμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὁρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλλαγὴ, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεισθαι*—*ἀλλ' ἢ ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόμισμα ὁρθόν, — φρονήσεις, — καὶ συλληβὴν ἀληθοῦς ἀρετῆς* *ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως, — χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλασσόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετῆς*, a. v. λ. In the Republic it is again acknowledged that it is possible to partake of virtue without philosophy, but in an imperfect way; e. g. in the case of the soul which laments its choice of another life. P. 619: *εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βεβιω-*

*κότα, ἴθιαι ἄνεν φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετεληφότες*. And the education of the *φύλακες* generally (not of the rulers) is independent of reason, though in harmony with it. Rep. 401, 2. (In the Philo- bus also the perfect life contains the knowledge of practical things. The philosopher must know his way home.) Thus the contradiction felt at first is reconciled by acknowledging the existence of different parts of our nature, which, though connected, and indispensable to each other's perfection, are not identical. There is a slight emphasis on *μετὰ φρονήσεως* in opposition to what follows.

4. *ἵνα—δοκῇ εἶναι—ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ (ἡμῶν ἀδικίας)* The whole of this passage is parallel to the speeches of Glaucon and Adimantus in the 2nd book of the Republic, and the same thought is differently worked out in the Gorgias.

5. *ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος* 'This is what men commonly repeat, an old wives' fable, it appears to me.' The meaning of *λεγόμενος* here (not = 'as the saying is') seems determined by *λέγωμεν* following.

wards, by becoming just and pure with wisdom, so becoming like to God.

This is a man's true 'cleverness' and proof of virtue. And the real penalty of vice is one which cannot be escaped by clever shifts. For to act wrongly is to be removed from the Divine pattern, and to be brought nearer to the likeness of the Evil.

ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὅ τι δικαιοτάτος. περὶ τούτου καὶ ἡ p.176.  
ὡς ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ οὐδενία τε καὶ ἀναν-  
δρία. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τούτου γνῶσις σοφία καὶ ἀρετὴ  
ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐναργής· αἱ  
5 ὁ ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφαίαι ἐν μὲν  
πολιτικαῖς θυναστείαῖς γιγνόμεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ  
τέχναις βάνανσοι. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέ-  
γοντι ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἄριστ' ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχω- d  
ρεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται γὰρ  
10 τῷ ὀνειδεῖ, καὶ οἶονται ἀκούειν ὅτι οὐ λῆροί εἰσι, γῆς  
ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ' ἄνδρες οἷους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς  
σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τάληθές, ὅτι τοσοῦτον  
μᾶλλον εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἶονται, ὅτι οὐχὶ οἶονται· ἀγνο-  
οῦσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα ἀγνοεῖν. οὐ  
15 γάρ ἐστιν ἦν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ θάνατοι, ὧν  
ἐνίστε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικρύντες, ἀλλὰ ἦν ἀδύνατον  
ἐκφυγεῖν.

ΘΕΟ. Τίνα δὴ λέγεις ;

ΣΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὧ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἐστῶτων,

1. περὶ τούτου] 'Moreover a man's real ability, or else his nothingness and want of manhood, is concerned with this.' The genitive is accounted for by the vagueness of the relation expressed. ἀνανδρία is suggested by ἀνδρός.

6. φορτικαί—βάνανσοι] 'vulgar'—'mechanical,' or 'mean.'

7. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι, κ. τ. λ.] This very favourite thought is developed in the Gorgias.

9. ὑπὸ πανουργίας] 'Not to admit that villainy constitutes him a clever man.'

10. οὐ λῆροι] 'that they are not mere absurdities, cumbering the ground:'—'not sole-

cisms,' as Carlyle might say.

γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη] ἐτάσσον ἄχθος ἀρούρη (Il. XVIII. 104., quoted Apol. p. 28.) Aristoph. Nub. 1203 : πρόσβατ' ἄλλως.—Milton, Areopag. : 'Many a man lives a burden to the Earth.'

λῆροι] Charm. 176. ἐμὶ μὲν λῆρον ἡγείσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὅτι οὐκ ἵσταται. Phæd. 72 : τελευταῖα πάντα λῆρον τὸν ἔνδον μὲν ἀποδοτεῖται καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἐν φαίνονται.

11. τοὺς σωθησομένους] Who deserve to live in it, i. e. for whose interest the laws are to be made. Cf. Soph. Ant. 189 : ἦδ' ἴστιν ἡ σάφεια.

19. παραδειγμάτων] Cf. Rep.

- p. 176. τοῦ μὲν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθείου ἀθλιω-  
τάτου, οὐχ ὁρῶντες ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητός  
τε καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοι-  
p. 177. ούμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι.  
οὐ δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ ὁμοι- 5  
οῦνται. ἐὰν δ' εἴπωμεν ὅτι, ἂν μὴ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τῆς  
δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκείνος μὲν ὁ  
τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος οὐ δέξεται, ἐνθάδὲ δὲ τὴν  
αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς αἰεὶ ἔξουσι, κακοὶ κα-  
κοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ 10  
πανοῦργοι ἀνοήτων τινῶν ἀκούσονται.

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

- b ΣΩ. Οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἐν μέντοι τι αὐτοῖς συμ-

The soul that does so will not be received at death into the region pure from evils.—They will laugh at this, and call us simplemen. But if they would consent to reason with us, they would ere long become confused and silent, and their fluent rhetoric would fade away, leav-

592 : 'ΑΛΛ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παραδείγμα ἀνάκειται τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ αὐτὸν κατοικεῖν.

1. τοῦ ἀθείου] 'From which the Divine has fled.'

6. τῆς δεινότητος] 'From this cleverness which is their boast.'

8. τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς] Viz. πλάσσει καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβου καὶ ἀγρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων. Phæd. 81.

καθαρός] Phæd. 83. ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν τῷ σώματι καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χεῖρην ἀναγκάζεται, οἶμαι, ὁμότροπος καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνισθαι καὶ οἷα μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκεσθαι ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλῆα ἐξίνα, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν ἐς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδούς συνουσίας.

Ibid. 69 : καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη κ. τ. λ. καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ καθαρὸς τις β. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελευτὰς—καταστήσαντες—

πάλαι αἰνίσσεται ὅτι δεῖ ἐν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλειτος εἰς Ἄιδου ἀφίκεται, ἐν βορβόρῳ κίεσται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεισμένος ἐκείνους ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰήσει.

τὴν αὐτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς] 'They will always retain their way of life like to themselves—evil as they are, associating with evil things.' κακοῖς is neut. Compare the well-known passage of the Phædo, p. 81. 'Ἀλλὰ διυλημμένη γε, οἶμαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματικοῦς κ. τ. λ. imitated by Milton, Comus, circ. v. 460 :

'The soul grows clotted by contagion,

Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose

The divine property of her first being.'

See especially the words κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητος τῆς μελήτης.

10. καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοί] i. e. their feeling of superiority will only be confirmed.

13. Οἶδά τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε] 'I am



ing them as  
helpless as  
a child.  
But we  
must re-  
turn, and  
take up the  
broken  
thread of  
discussion.

βέβηκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέη δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξα- p.177.  
σθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, καὶ ἐβελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς  
πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομῆναι καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν,  
τότε ἀτόπως, ὧ δαιμόνιε, τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν  
8 αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη  
πῶς ἀπομαραινεται, ὥστε παιδῶν μηδὲν δοκεῖν δια-  
φέρειν. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα  
τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν· εἰ δὲ μή, πλείω αἰὶ  
ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον· ἐπὶ c  
10 δὲ τὰ ἐμπροσθεν ἴωμεν, εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα, ὦ Σώκратες, οὐκ ἀη-  
δέστερα ἀκούειν· ῥῶ γὰρ τηλικῶδε ὄντι ἐπακολου-  
θεῖν· εἰ μέντοι δοκεῖ, πάλιν ἐπανίωμεν.

I. γ. Third  
criticism of  
the doctrine, 15  
What ap-  
pears to me,  
is to me.  
We found  
that even

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐνταῦθ' αὖτε ἡμεῖς τοῦ λόγου, ἐν ᾧ  
ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ  
τὸ αἰὶ δοκοῦν ἐκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο ᾧ δοκεῖ,  
ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διῶχρῖσθαι, καὶ οὐχ  
ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται d

quite aware of it, my friend!'  
i. e. 'I know the full extent of  
the ridicule that they will pour  
on us.' He refers to the em-  
phatic answer of Theodorus.

3. καὶ μὴ ἀνάνδρως φεύγειν]  
Cf. Rep. 518: οὐκ ἔν ἀνδρίστως  
γελῶ.

5. ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη πῶς ἀπο-  
μαραινεται] 'That brilliant rhe-  
toric of theirs fades utterly,  
leaving them to appear no bet-  
ter than children.'

6. παιδῶν μηδὲν δοκεῖν διαφέ-  
ρου] Crit. 49: ἐλάττωμεν ἡμᾶς αὐ-  
τοὺς παιδῶν οὐδὲν διαφέροντες.

8. πλείω αἰὶ ἐπιρρέοντα κατα-  
χώσει ἡμῶν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον]  
'They will bury us under the

discussion to be commenced  
afresh, i. e. the arrears of dis-  
cussion, which will gather  
against us with an ever-increas-  
ing stream.' He means, that if  
the main stream of the inquiry  
is dammed up any longer, it  
will come in upon us with  
overwhelming force. Cf. Rep.  
p. 450: ὅσον λόγον πάλιν ὥσπερ  
ἐξ ἀρχῆς κινήσει περὶ πολιτείας.  
Polit. p. 303: τοῦ τὸν ἐπιπλεον-  
μέτου λόγου κατ' ἀρχάς.

11. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Quam spino-  
siora ista. Cic. Tusc. I.

18. περὶ τὰ δίκαια ... περὶ τὰ  
γαθὰ] 'In regard to what is  
just—concerning what is good'

p. 177. πόλις δόξαντα αὐτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἔστι δίκαια τῇ θε-  
 μένῃ, ἕως περ ἂν κέηται· περὶ δὲ τάγαθου οὐδένα ἀν-  
 δρείον ἔθ' οὕτως εἶναι, ὥστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι ὅτι  
 καὶ ἂν ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις εἰαυτῇ θῆται, καὶ  
 ἔστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν  
 εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι· τοῦτο δὲ πον σκῶμ' ἂν εἴη  
 πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν. οὐχί;

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

- ο ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πράγμα  
 ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται.

those who  
 make jus-  
 tice con-  
 ventional,  
 hesitate to  
 apply their  
 principle to  
 what is be-  
 neficial and  
 good.

1. τῇ θεμένῃ] So Bodl. with  
 Vat. Ven. Π.

2. περὶ δὲ τάγαθου] Rep. 505:  
 δ δὴ δίκαιε μὲν ἅπανα ψυχὴ καὶ  
 τοῦτον ἵκεα πάντα πράττει, ἀπο-  
 μαυτισμένη τι εἶναι, ἀπορούσα δέ—  
 What is good cannot be appa-  
 rent merely. (Compare the say-  
 ing of Des Cartes and Spinoza:  
 The idea of God implies His  
 existence.) This was not, how-  
 ever, universally admitted. Ar.  
 Eth. N. I. 2: τοιαύτην δὲ τινα  
 πλάσιν ἔχει καὶ τάγαθά, κ. τ. λ.

τάγαθου—ὠφέλιμα] Rep. 457,  
 458: καλλίστα γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ λέ-  
 γεται καὶ λελίξεται ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέ-  
 λιμον καλὸν τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.  
 — γάμοις — ποιήσομεν ἱεροῦς εἰς  
 δύναμιν ὅτι μέγιστα· εἴτε δ' ἂν ἱεροὶ  
 οἱ ὠφελιμώτατοι.

We have not yet risen to the  
 conception of the ideal good  
 ἐπίκρυμα τῆς οὐσίας: good is still  
 a relative term, though know-  
 ledge begins to find a resting-  
 place there. In the concrete  
 the good and expedient are  
 identical. See Spinoza, Cog.  
 Met. I. c. 6. § 7. § 11. Res  
 sola considerata neque bona  
 dicitur, neque mala, sed tan-  
 tum respectu ad aliam, cui

conducit ad id quod amat ac-  
 quirendum, vel contra; ideoque  
 unaquæque res diverso respectu  
 eodemque tempore bona et mala  
 potest dici—Deus vero dicitur  
 summe bonus, quia omnibus  
 conducit, nempe uniuscujusque  
 esse quo nihil magis amabile,  
 suo concursu conservando. Ma-  
 lum autem absolutum nullum  
 datur, ut per se est manifes-  
 tum.

Porro uti bonum et malum  
 non dicitur nisi respective, sic  
 etiam perfectio, nisi quando  
 perfectionem sumimus pro ipsa  
 rei essentia, quo sensu antea  
 diximus, Deum infinitam per-  
 fectionem habere, hoc est infi-  
 nitam essentiam, seu infinitum  
 esse.

5. πλὴν εἴ τις—λέγομεν] Rep.  
 533: ἔστι δ', ὡς ἱμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ  
 ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οὐ τοσοῦ-  
 των πέρι σκέψις ὅσον ἡμῖν πρό-  
 κειται.

7. πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν] In respect  
 of that which we mean.

9. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα]  
 Let him not intend the name  
 but the thing which is contem-  
 plated under it. (γὰρ add. Bodl.  
 Vat. Ven. Π.) Dr. Badham con-

ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γάρ.

p. 177.

A state makes laws for the benefit of its members, but they are not always beneficial.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ, τούτου δὴ που στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, καθ' ὅσον οἶεταί τε καὶ δύναται, ὥς ὠφελιμωτάτους 5 εἰαυτῇ τίθεται. ἥ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθετεῖται;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

p. 178.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει αἰεὶ, ἥ πολλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνει ἐκάστη;

10 ΘΕΟ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν.

Or, to put it more generally, (for the laws regard the future benefit of the citizens,)

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοῖνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμολογήσειε ταῦτ' αὐτά, εἰ περὶ παντός τις τοῦ εἶδους ἐρωτῇ, ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸ ὠφελίμον τυγχάνει ὄν. ἔστι δέ 15 που καὶ περὶ τὸν μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομοθετώμεθα, ὥς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέμεθα εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτο δὲ [μέλλον] ὀρθῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πάνυ γε.

b

The man, you say, is the measure of all things white,

ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, οὕτως ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἥ 20 ἄλλον τινὰ τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὥς φατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα,

jectures τὸ πρ. δ ὀνομάζομεν θεωρεῖται. This does not appear necessary.

(9.) Μὴ λεγέτω τὸ δνομα] Ar. Met. I. 4. 1006. 6: τὸ δ' ἀπορούμενον οὐ τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἀνθρώπου τὸ δνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα.

1. Μὴ γάρ] These words were put into Socrates' mouth in the edd. before Heindorf. Cf. Soph. 255: Μὴ τοῖνυν λέγωμεν α. τ. λ. Theset. μὴ γάρ.

2. δ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ] 'Whatever name it gives to this.'

11. ἐνθένδε] From the following point of view.

13. ἐν ᾧ καὶ] For the method cf. Rep. 491: λαβοῦ τοῖνυν διου αὐτοῦ ὁρθῶς ——— πάντος περὶ σπέρματος ἢ φυτοῦ.

ἔστι δέ] Sc. τὸ ὠφελίμον. Whatever is expedient, is also referrible to future time.

16. τοῦτο δέ] Viz. τὸ ἐσόμενον εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον.

μέλλον] The MSS. vary between μάλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.) μέλλει μάλλον (Coisl.) and μέλλον μάλλον (cett.)

p. 178. λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοιούτων. ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τι οἶται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. οὐχ οὕτως ;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὦ  
 c Πρωταγόρα, ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ οἷα ἂν  
 οἰηθῇ ἔσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι ;  
 οἷον θερμά, ἂρ' ὅταν τις οἰηθῇ ιδιώτης αὐτὸν πυρετὸν  
 λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ 10  
 ἕτερος, ἱατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν  
 φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι, ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφο-  
 τέρων, καὶ τῷ μὲν ἱατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρετῶν  
 γενήσεται, ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα ;

heavy, and the like, for he has the standard of them in himself. Has he also the standard in himself of future things? If he thinks he is going to have a fever, and the physician tells him No, which opinion will prove true for him in the sequel?

1. λευκῶν βαρέων κούφων οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ] Cf. supr. 172 : τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἢ δοκεῖ ταύτη καὶ ἴστω ἑκάστῃ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκία, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου.

2. τὸ κριτήριον] The word is formed from κριτής, on the analogy of δικαστήριον. Cf. Legg. 767 : δύο δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἴστω κριτήρια. The present is probably one of the earliest instances of its use.

οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος] sc. αὐτά. Or rather the accusatives are cognate. Vid. supr. p. 152. Οἷα γὰρ αἰσθάνεται—.

4. ὄντα] There is a slight stress on the present tense in opposition to μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι.

6. Ἡ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι φήσομεν] As here knowledge seems to emerge with the mention of future time, so in the Protagoras, p. 357, virtue is shown to be knowledge, because it implies the power of comparing the future with the

present. (Cf. the line of Homer, οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἄμα πρόσω καὶ ὀπίσω.)

7. ἔχει τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ] 'The tribunal for deciding these things is within him.' 'The decision rests with him.'

9. οἷον θερμά] The word is placed absolutely. Heind. compares Crat. 393 : οἷον τὸ βῆτα ἄρῃς εἶναι τοῦ ἡ καὶ τοῦ εἰ καὶ τοῦ αἰ προστεθέντων οὐδὲν ἐλύπησεν κ.τ.λ.

ἀρα—κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν] 'Surely we must suppose (must we not?) that the result will be according to the opinion of one of them, or shall we say that it will be in accordance with both?' It is implied in what follows, which opinion is probably right.

14. ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα.—εἰ καὶ πνεῖα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρέβῃ δόξει εὐάριστον εἶναι—τὸ μέλλον—καὶ δόξαι καὶ ἴσασθαι] These words contain the point of the argument.

ἐαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφοτέρα] Vis. καὶ

ΘΕΟ. Γελοῖον μὲν τ' ἂν εἶη.

p. 178.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ', οἶμαι, περὶ οἶνου γλυκύτητος καὶ αὐστηρότητος μελλούσης ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, δ' ἄλλ' οὐχ ἢ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ, κυρία.

The musician is a better judge of future harmony than the gymnast, as the latter will himself confess when he hears the sounds.

5 ΘΕΟ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὸ περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ εὐαρμόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης ἂν βέλτιον δοξάσειε μουσικοῦ, ὃ καὶ ἔπειτα αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει εὐάρμοστον εἶναι.

10 ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐστιάσασθαι μὴ μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θαίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἢ κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος ἐκάστω ἡδέος ἢ γερονό- 15 τος μηδὲν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐκάστω καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ἄριστος κριτῆς, ἢ σὺ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἐκάστω ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ιδιωτῶν 20 ὅστισιν;

Surely Protagoras himself professed to be a better prophet than those he taught, of the probable effect of a rhetor-

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν αὐτός.

θερμὸς καὶ πυρέττων. The repetition of the word is curious.

Aristotle, Met. I. 5. 1010 b.: 'Ἐτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δέπου ὁμοίως κυρία ἢ τοῦ λατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἢ τοῦ ἀγνοούontos, ὅσον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ἡμῶν ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος.

15. μηδὲν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα] The certainty of present impressions is swept away together with the doctrine of motion, *infr.* p. 182. The rela-

tion of present to past impressions is further discussed under the guise of a new inquiry, pp. 191, sq. (See espec. the word *μημῖων*.)

17. τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανόν] A further home-thrust at Protagoras.

18. ἐκάστω ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς δικαστήριον] 'That which each of us will find persuasive to be spoken in court.'



ΣΩ. Νῆ Δία, ὦ μέλε· ἡ οὐδεὶς γ' ἂν αὐτῷ διε-  
 ). λέγετο διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἴ τι μὴ τὸν συνόντα  
 ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε  
 μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς  
 αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα.

2. εἰ τιμή] εἰ πῃ τοὺς συνόντας  
 —Profecto in futurarum quo-  
 que rerum cognitione omnibus  
 præcellere se Protagoras pro-  
 fitebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnam  
 doctrinæ mercedem solvisset, si  
 quo modo persuasisset disci-  
 pulis, etiam de futuris rebus  
 neque vatem neque alium  
 quemquam melius posse judi-  
 care, quam ipsum sibi unum-  
 quemque. V. ad Gorg. § 75,  
 p. 47. Platonis autem senten-  
 tiam restituiimus unius litterulæ  
 mutatione. Quippe vulgo scrip-  
 tum εἰ μὴ τοὺς συν., unde con-  
 trarius prorsus et absurdus sen-  
 sus efficitur. Quam scripturam  
 nequis tuendam arbitretur ver-  
 bo αὐτὸς ad Protagoram tra-  
 hendo et αὐτῷ mutando in αὐτῷ  
 (sc. τῷ συνόντι), manifesta h. l.  
 est superiorum verborum πρότε-  
 ρον αὐτὸς αὐτῷ δριστος κριτὴς re-  
 petitio, neque tum ferri posset  
 hoc αὐτῷ: adeo id moleste re-  
 dundaret. Idem vitium insedit  
 Philob. p. 34 c. ἵνα μὴ τὴν ψυ-  
 χῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος εἶναι μά-  
 λιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν.  
 CORR. ἵνα πῃ, et Protag. p. 33 i d.  
 Καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτιοῦν ἀμνηστὴ  
 προσέειπε. εὐ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέ-  
 λει ἔστιν ὃ μὴ (l. δη) προσέειπε  
 καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τῷ μαλακῷ. Heind.

This reasoning is probably  
 correct. But δῆ, which is the  
 received correction of Phil. l. c.  
 seems more forcible here than

πῃ, which has no particular  
 aptness in this passage. 'If he  
 had really persuaded them of  
 that which has been now sug-  
 gested.' Cf. p. 166. εἰ δὲ ὀνομάτων  
 γε—: alib. The corruption pro-  
 bably originated in the slightly  
 obscure reference of αὐτὸς αὐτῷ,  
 or perhaps simply from the  
 neighbourhood of μή. (i. e. Νή.)  
 Schleiermacher solved the  
 difficulty by omitting αὐτῷ, and  
 referring αὐτὸς to Protagoras.  
 But this destroys the force of  
 καὶ, and the question is not be-  
 tween one oracle and another,  
 but between the opinion of the  
 master and of the common in-  
 dividual. For αὐτῷ referring  
 to an indefinite subject, cf.  
 Apol. 39: οὐ γὰρ ἴσθ' αὐτὴ ἡ  
 ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνν δυνατὴ οὔτε  
 καλὴ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ  
 ῥᾶσθη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολουέιν·  
 ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως  
 ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. The change  
 from plural to singular has been  
 elsewhere illustrated.

The μάντις is introduced as  
 being ἐπιστήμων of the future  
 generally, just as the physician  
 is of future health or sickness,  
 the musician of future harmony,  
 &c. τις ἄλλος points distantly  
 at Protagoras himself, and his  
 position as the prophet of his  
 school is hinted at. Cf. supr.  
 162. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύβλου  
 ἐφθόγιστο.

And it is acknowledged that a state must often fail in its legislation, which regards the future. Therefore one man is wiser than another, and not every man, but the wise man, is the measure of things.

On this ground, then, the theory cannot stand. And there are other points where it is easily assailable. But it is more diffi-

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον p. 179. περὶ τὸ μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετομένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀνάγκην εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμοτάτου ἀποτυγχάνειν ;

5 ΘΕΟ. Μάλα γε.

ΣΩ. Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρήσεται, ὅτι ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ ὁμολογεῖν σοφώτερόν τε ἢ ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ τῷ ἀνεπιωτήμονι μηδὲ ὅπωςτιοῦν ἀνάγκην  
10 εἶναι μέτρον γίνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἡνάγκαζεν ὁ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου λόγος, εἴτ' ἐβουλόμην εἶτε μή, τοιοῦτον εἶναι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα ἀλίσκεσθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλίσκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ἥ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐταὶ δὲ ἐφάνησαν  
15 τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι.

ΣΩ. Πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε ο τοιοῦτον ἀλοΐη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι. περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίνονται, χαλεπώτερον  
20 ἐλεῖν ὥς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω· ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, εἰσὶ, καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς εἶναι καὶ ἐπιστήμας τάχα ἂν ὄντα λέγοιεν, καὶ

2. πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογῇ] Both from experience and from the analogies just adduced. We pass from the individual to the state, as in p. 172.

Arist. Met. E. 1063 a. τοῦτον δ' ὅντος τοιοῦτον, τοὺς ἐτίροντες μὲν ὑποληπτίον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ' ἐτίροντες οὐχ ὑποληπτίον.

16. Πολλαχῇ &c.] We revert from the general saying of Protagoras to the particular interpretation of it given above, viz. in its application to the doctrine of sense. This has not

been disproved by the above argument, as it has nothing to do with the future.

18. ἐξ &c.] 'The momentary effect produced on each man, from which arise the sensations, and the beliefs which are in accordance with them.' Vid. p. 156; and note the incipient distinction between αἰσθήσεις and δόξα.

22. &c.] Ast. conj. τὰ ὄντα, but see above, p. 178. ἀληθῆ τι αἰσταν αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα.

P. 179: Θεαίτητος ὁδε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἶρκεν αἰσθησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην ταῦτὸν θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, δὲ ὡς ὁ ὑπὲρ Πρωταγόρου λόγος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκεπτέον τὴν φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, εἴτε ὑγιὲς εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. μάχη δ' οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ φάυλη οὐδ' ὀλίγοις γέγονεν.

ΘΕΟ. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ φάυλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ. οἱ γὰρ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἐταῖροι χορηγοῦσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου μάλα ἐρρώμενως.

ΣΩ. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον<sup>10</sup> καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται.

cult to attack the main position, viz. that the present sensible impression is true. Perhaps this is impregnable, but let us approach, and try whether its foundation in the doctrine of motion is secure.

I. 8. Criticism of the

1. οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἶρκεν] Hom. *Odys.* A. 343: ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὲν ἔμμεν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οὐδ' ἀπὸ δόξης Μυθίται βασιλεία περίφρων. Xen. *Symp.* II. 11: καὶ οὗτος δὴ ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ σκοποῦ ἔδοξεν εἰρῆσθαι.

3. σκεπτέον—διακρούοντα] Soph. 246: Τοιγαροῦν εἰ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μᾶλα εὐλαβῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ὁράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ δόσματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθειᾶν οὐσίαν εἶναι: τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαδραίνοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γίνεσθαι αὐτ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινα προσκαγορεύουσιν. ἐν μίσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλητος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις ἔσται, δεῖ ἐνίστηναι. This combat is somewhat differently described in the present passage.

4. τὴν φερομένην—οὐσίαν] This is the ground on which the 'semi-Protagoreans' take their stand, the last stronghold of the doctrine, as it was the first point it occupied.

διακρούοντα] Schol.: ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν διακωνούντων τὰ κέραμα, εἰ ἀκείρα εἰσιν. Cf. Philob. p. 55: γυναικες δέ, εἴ πῃ σαθρὰν ἔχει, πᾶν περιμαρύνει. Compare the English expression, 'As sound as a bell.'

8. ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ] 'Makes rapid strides,' 'gains in importance,' 'is waged with increasing energy.'

9. χορηγοῦσι] Vid. Demetr. Byz. ap. Athen. p. 295. ed. Schw.: ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ χορηγούς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος Δημήτριος, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς μισθουμένους τοὺς χοροὺς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καθηγουμένους τοῦ χοροῦ, καθάπερ τοῖσι μαθηματικῇ.

τούτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγος is here almost equivalent to "school of thought." Cf. *supr.* τοὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ π. τ. λ. *infr.* τῶν ἐπισκευαζόντων λόγων.

11. Τῷ τοι] 'We are the more bound to consider the question, and that in the light of its first principle, even as they present it to us in the discussion.' Gorg.

principle,  
All is mo-  
tion.

Final re-  
jection of  
the doctrine  
of senec.

Great has  
been the  
conflict

ΘΕΟ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. καὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, p. 179.  
περὶ τούτων τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἡ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις<sup>e</sup>  
Ὀμηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιότερων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ  
τὴν Ἐφεσον, ὅσοι προσποιούνται ἔμπειροι [εἶναι,]  
οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρώσιν.  
ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ

448: ὥσπερ σοὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπε-  
τίνατο Χαιρέφῶν. (καὶ add. Bodl.)

(12.) ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτίθενται]  
Viz. in referring every thing to  
a first principle, whether of fire  
or motion.

2. τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων] Sc. δογμά-  
των. περὶ τούτων κ. τ. λ. depends  
verbally partly on διαλεχθῆναι,  
partly on ἔμπειροι, really upon  
the notion "there is no discus-  
sion possible." Cf. infr. ὅπερ  
ἡ ἀφῶν. If the genitives were  
masculine, and out of construc-  
tion, the use of ἔμπειροι without  
an object would be too abrupt.  
Compare, however, παρὰ μὲν τού-  
των, below.

ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις] p. 152. Cf.  
Cratyl. 439: φαίνονται γὰρ καὶ  
ἔμοιγε οὕτω διανοηθῆναι.

3. Ὀμηρείων] Cf. p. 152.  
ἔτι παλαιότερων] Orpheum  
intelligit: conf. Cratyl. § 41.  
(p. 402.) Heind.

4. εἶναι] Om. Bodl. with se-  
ven other MSS.

5. τοῖς οἰστρώσιν] 'with men  
in frenzy.'

6. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ] "For, in true  
accordance with their master's  
writings they are ever in mo-  
tion; but as for dwelling upon  
an argument or question, and  
quietly asking and answering  
in turn, they are absolutely  
without the power of doing so;  
or rather they possess in a sur-

passing degree the most perfect  
absence of all quietness, even in  
the minutest respect."

The weak point in this ren-  
dering of the last words is πρὸς  
τὸ μὴδὲ σμικρόν = 'in respect of  
what is less than little.' For  
πρὸς, compare Soph. p. 248:  
ὅταν τῷ παρῇ ἢ τῷ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν  
καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμις.  
And for μὴδὲ σμικρόν, cf. Phileb.  
p. 60 c. φρόνησιν — ἡδονῆς μὴδὲ  
τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσιν. But the  
article still presents some diffi-  
culty. We can only suppose  
that in the accumulation of ne-  
gatives μὴδὲ σμικρόν has taken  
the place of σμικρότατον.

Another possible rendering  
is: 'Or rather the utter nega-  
tion of it (τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν) sur-  
passes every thing, in regard to  
the absence of all quietness in  
the men.' But it is difficult to  
find a parallel for this use of τὸ  
οὐδ' οὐδὲν.

In either case ὑπερβάλλει is  
probably used absolutely, and  
not with reference to μὴδὲν.  
The point is, not that οὐδ' οὐδὲν  
is a stronger expression than  
μὴδὲν, (it should be compared  
with ἦτρον — ἢ τὸ μὴδὲν), but (1)  
the negation is put more  
strongly by being affirmed;  
(2) ὑπερβάλλει assists the climax,  
as being a stronger word than  
any in the former clause; and,

p. 180. μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἦτον αὐτοῖς ἐνὶ ἡ τὸ  
 μηδέν· μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ  
 μηδὲ σμικρὸν ἐνεῖναι τοῖς ἀνδράσι ἡσυχίας· ἀλλ' αὖ  
 τινὰ τι ἔρη, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγμα-  
 τῶδῃ ἀνασπῶντες ἀποτοξεύουσι, κἂν τούτου ζητῆς  
 λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἶρηκεν, ἐτέρῳ πεπλήξει καὶνῶς  
 μετωνομασμένῳ, περαινὲς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς  
 οὐδένα αὐτῶν· οὐδέ γε ἐκείνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους,  
 ἀλλ' εὖ πάνν φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδέν βέβαιον ἔμν εἶναι  
 ἢ μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι,  
 ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στάσιμον εἶναι· τούτῳ δὲ πάνν  
 πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκ-  
 βάλλουσιν.

ΣΩ. Ἰσως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοὺς ἀνδρας μαχομένους  
 ἐώρακας, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας. οὐ γάρ σοι  
 ἐταῖροί εἰσιν. ἀλλ', οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς  
 ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, οὗς αὖ βούλονται ὁμοίους αὐ-  
 τοῖς ποιῆσαι.

(3) if the former rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally. Cf. *infra*. μήτ' ἐν λόγῳ μήτ' ἐν ταῖς αὐτῶν ψυχαῖς. Compare with *ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ' οὐδὲν—ἐνεῖναι*, Arist. *Eth. N. IV. 1. § 39. ὑπερβολῇ τοῦ μηδενὶ ἀντιδιδόναι*.

5. ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας κ. τ. λ.] Cf. *Protag. 342. (of the Spartans) τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὐρήσει φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐκβαλεῖ ῥῆμα βραχὺ καὶ συνοστραμίνον, ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκουστικὸς*.

ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγμ.] 'Plucking up as from a quiver sayings brief and dark, they let them

fly at you.'

6. ἀνασπῶντες] Cf. *Soph. Aj. 302. λόγους ἀνίσπα*.

τούτου] Sc. τοῦ ῥηματισκίου.

7. τί εἶρηκε] Sc. τὸ ῥηματισκίον. καὶνῶς μετωνομασμένῳ] 'Of words new-fangled ill,' 'of terms strangely twisted to an unheard-of sense.'

10. βέβαιον—στάσιμον] 'Fixed or settled—stationary.' εἶναι] γινώσκειν is purposely avoided.

16. οὐ γάρ σοι ἐταῖροί εἰσιν] The dislike of a geometrician to the Heraclitean method is not unnatural.

17. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Sc. εἰρηκῆς β. τὰ βέβαια ἐν τοῖς λόγοις.

and many the combatants on either side. The friends of Heraclitus in Ionia defend the doctrine of motion with all their might. But we must take their theory into our own hands to test it. For the men are in a fur, and offer us no hold for argument.



ΘΕΟ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε; οὐδὲ γίγνεται p. 180.  
 τῶν τοιούτων ἕτερος ἐτέρου μαθητῆς, ἀλλ' αὐτόματοι  
 ἀναφύονται, ὅπόθεν ἂν τύχη ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθου-  
 σιάσας, καὶ τὸν ἕτερον ὁ ἕτερος οὐδὲν ἡγείται εἰδέναι.  
 5 παρὰ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ ἦα ἐράων, οὐκ ἂν ποτε  
 λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἐκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων· αὐτοὺς δὲ  
 δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι.

The pro-  
 blem now  
 before us has  
 come down  
 from an-  
 cient times.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα  
 ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἀρχαίων, μετὰ  
 10 ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὥς ἡ γένεσις δ  
 τῶν ἄλλων πάντων Ὀκεανὸς τε καὶ Τηθύς ρεύματα

1. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς] Rep. 330.  
 Ποι' ἐπεκτησάμην, ὦ Σ.; et alib.

2. αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται] 'They  
 spring up unbidden, wherever  
 each happens to have caught  
 the affluvia.'

3. ὅπόθεν ἂν τύχη—ἐνθουσιάσας]  
 Contrast with this Hegel, G. d.  
 Ph. p. 55. 'It is the very spi-  
 rit of this whole recital, that  
 the more developed Philosophy  
 of a later age, is really the pro-  
 duct of the previous labours of  
 the thinking mind: that it is  
 required and determined by  
 these earlier views, and has not  
 sprung of itself independently  
 from the ground.' (Nicht isolirt  
 für sich aus dem Boden gewach-  
 sen ist.) For the expression  
 αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται, cf. Rep.  
 520: αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται  
 ἀνίστησι τῇ ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείᾳ.  
 As in pp. 172 sqq. we had a  
 description of the man corre-  
 sponding to Protagoras' theory,  
 so here we have the men of  
 Heraclitus. The wildness and  
 the enthusiasm, at once specu-  
 lative and irrational, are Ori-  
 ental rather than Greek, and

are probably due rather to the  
 soil than to the germ. Com-  
 paratively little of this is to be  
 found in Heraclitus himself, al-  
 though for their abrupt quaint-  
 ness his sayings might be called  
 ῥηματιστικα αἰνιγματώδη.

5. οὐκ ἂν ποτε λάβοις λόγον]  
 Ar. Met. Γ. 4. 1006. a. γιλοῶν  
 τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθένος  
 ἔχοντα λόγον, ἢ μὴ ἔχει· ὅμοιοι γὰρ  
 φυτῶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἢ τοιοῦτος ἦδη.  
 K. 1063 a: μηθὲν γὰρ τιθέντες  
 ἀναροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὅλως  
 λόγον, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιού-  
 τους οὐκ ἔστι λόγος.

6. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας]  
 'But we must take the doctrine  
 out of their hands, and con it  
 over by ourselves like a geo-  
 metrical theorem.' The object  
 of παραλαβόντας is vague; nei-  
 ther λόγον in the sense just  
 used, nor ἀρχήν; but τὰ Ἡρα-  
 κλείτεια ταῦτα, ἃ τι τοιοῦτος.

8. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα] 'Well,  
 the theorem, as you call it.'  
 Compare with the repetition of  
 γι the double use of γάρ, διλά,  
 κ. τ. λ.

11. ρεύματα τυγχάνει] Sc. ὄντα,

p. 180. τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, αἵ σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, ἵνα καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν τὴν σοφίαν μάθωσιν ἀκούσαντες καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι τὰ μὲν ἐστάναι, τὰ δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δ' ὅτι πάντα κινεῖ-  
ται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμεν, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὐτὰναντία τοῦτοις ἀπεφάνησαν, Οἶον  
■ ἀκίνητον τελέθει, τῷ πάντι ὄνομ' εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα Μέλισσοι τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι ἐναντιούμενοι πᾶσι τοῦτοις διῶχυρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν  
αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν ᾗ κινεῖται. Τούτοις

But wise men formerly veiled their meaning from the multitude in poetry, not as these now, who make no secret of their views, and seek to win universal suffrage for them, and to convert men from the foolishness of common sense.

which is purposely (or instinctively) omitted. Ὀκείαντες τε καὶ Τηθύς are in apposition with ἡ γένεσις, and ῥήματα is predicate. ὡς, &c. expresses not what the poets said, but what they meant, depending partly on παρελλήφ.

3. σκυτοτόμοι] I. e. 'The meanest artificers.' Cf. Prot. 324. : ὡς μὲν—εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται—καὶ χαλκίως καὶ σκυτοτόμον συμβουλευόντος τὰ πολιτικά : alib. They do not inquire whether they are understood or not.

7. οἶον] MSS. οἶον. But the words of Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. f. 7. a. are decisive : ἀκίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνῶ καὶ μόνον ὡς πάντων ἐξηγήμενον.

8. τελέθει, τῷ παντί] So all the MSS. Buttm. conj. τ' εἶμεναι, τῷ παντί. This is gathered from the quotations of Simplicius, and is probably right.

10. ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ] 'All Being is One, and standeth self-contained, not having any space in which it moves.' The nearest approach to this latter assertion in the fragments of Parmenides is in the lines—

(78—85 Mull.) Οὐδὲ διαμετρήν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὅμοιον, οὐδέ τι τῇ μάλλον τό κεν εἴργου μὴ ἐνέχεισθαι, οὐδέ τι χειρότερον πᾶν δι' ἅλόν ἐστιν ἴσους τῷ ; ἐννεύει πᾶν ἐστίν, ἔδω γὰρ ἵσται πηλέει. Αἰτὰρ ἀκίνητον μέγαλον ἐν πέραςι δισμών ἐστιν, ἀναρχον, ἀπανστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ διεσθέρη τῆλε μάλ' ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἅπως δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. ταῦτ' ἐν τούτῳ τε μένον καθ' αὐτό τε κείται.

He asserts, however, that Being is not without boundaries, else it would be imperfect.

Zeno appears to have said, that being was neither with nor without boundaries. Cf. Arist. de Xenoph. Gorg. et Melisso, c. 3 : 'Αἰδίων δι' ὅτα καὶ ἵνα καὶ σφαιροειδῆ, οὐτ' ἀπειρον, οὐτε πεπερασθαι.' Ἀπειρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι — τὸ δὲ ἐν οὐτε τῷ οὐκ ἵσται οὐτε τοῖς πόλλοις ὁμοιοῦσθαι. 'Ἐν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς ἐπὶ περασί.

The Eleatics did not abstract the idea of Being from that of extension, although its fulness destroyed the idea of space. It was here that the Atomists joined issue with them. To

Their vehemence almost makes us forget the opposite host, who say that the One Being which fills all things doth not move.

We find ourselves on the dan-

οδν, ὃ ἐταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ σμικρὸν p. 180.  
 γὰρ προϊόντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον  
 πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μὴ πῇ ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν,  
 δίκην δόσομεν ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαιίστραις διὰ p. 181.  
 γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ' ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες  
 ἔλκωνται εἰς τὰναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἐτέρους  
 πρότερον σκεπτέον, ἐφ' οὗσπερ ὠρμήσαμεν, τοὺς  
 ῥέοντας. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν τι φαίνονται λέγοντες, συνέλ-  
 ξομεν μετ' αὐτῶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, τοὺς ἐτέρους ἐκφυγεῖν  
 10 πειράμενοι. ἐὰν δὲ οἱ τοῦ ὅλου στασιῶται ἀληθέ-  
 στερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐ-  
 τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμφότεροι δ' ἂν φανῶσι b

Leucippus and Democritus the relations of body were not symbolical but real. They felt that they must account for motion. Hence their assertion of the existence of empty space, τὸ κενόν, or, in other words, τὸ μὴ εἶναι in the material sense.

2. εἰς τὸ μέσον] Viz. by having partly discarded and partly retained the principle, ἐπιστήμη αἰσθήσεως, — τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον μὴ παντάπασιν λέγοντες.

4. διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες] For the humour, cf. Rep. 474: τῇ δυνάμει τωδοξόμενοι δόσεις δίκην.

διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες] A game, like our French and English, was called διελκυστίνδα.

6. δεῦναι οὖν μοι] "I think therefore we ought first to examine the one faction, in the direction of whom we started, these wavering movers of unrest; and if we find any truth in them, we will join our efforts with theirs to pull us to them, endeavouring to shake the

others off. But if those who stand for the unbroken Whole of Being seem to speak more reasonably, we will desert to these again from the revolutionary violence of the movement party."

7. τοὺς ῥέοντας] They are humorously identified with their principle. Vid. supr. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται.

For a similar reference to a set of persons by an epithet, cf. Phileb. 46: οὓς εἰκομεν δυσχερεῖς. Soph. 248: τὸ εἶναι δὲ βελόν πρὸς τοῖς γηγενεῖς. Rep. p. 488: τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπικλειεστέων.

11. ἀπ' αὐτῶν] (ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. Παρ' αὐτοὺς ἀπ' αὐτῶν oett. ἀπ' αὐτῶν Bekk.) We pass from the image of the game to that of a civil war, in which the Heracliteans are the 'movement,' or revolutionary, party. There is probably a slight play on the word στασιῶται.

p. 181. μηδὲν μετριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι ἡμᾶς μὲν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπалаίους δὲ καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακότες. ὅρα οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προῖέναι κίνδυνον.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ διασκέψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον ἂν εἴη σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου. Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως περί, c ποῖόν τι ποτε ἄρα λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. 10 βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε· πότερον ἐν τι εἶδος αὐτῆς λέγουσιν ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο; μὴ μέντοι μόνον ἐμοὶ δοκεῖτω, ἀλλὰ συμμέτεχε καὶ σύ, ἵνα κοινῇ πάσχωμεν, ἂν τι καὶ δέῃ. καὶ μοι λέγε· ἄρα κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν τι χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβάλλῃ 15 ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρέφῃται.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ ἢ d μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, γηράσκη δέ, ἢ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ ἢ σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοιώ- 10

1. μηδὲν μέτριον] 'Nothing worthy of our reception.'

6. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν] 'No course is to be endured that would prevent us from determining, &c.'

8. σοῦ γε οὕτω προθυμουμένου] 'You, that were so reluctant to begin the discussion.' Cf. supr. p. 169 : οὐ μόντοι παρατρέψω γε ἐν προτίθεσσι οἷός τ' ἵσταμαι παρασχεῖν ἱκανόν σοι.

9. ἀρχή] This is the predicate; the subject being contained in what follows. Hence no article is required.

12. ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο] Parm. 138 : κινούμενός γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιόιτο ἀπ' αὐτοῦ γὰρ μόνου κινήσεως. No argument can be drawn from this about the comparative dates of the two dialogues: although the passage in which the distinction is elaborated, and not assumed, might naturally be supposed the earlier.

Aristot. Phys. Ausc. VIII. 3. § 3 : πρὸς οὗς, καίπερ οὐ διορίζου- τας ποῖαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν ἢ πᾶσας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπατηῆσαι.

gerous middle ground between these armies. With which side shall we go! Shall we

5 declare for the inviolable constitution of all things, or for the movement party! Let us examine the latter first, as we began with them.

Motion is their principle. Do they admit that motion is of two kinds, locomotion and change!

σιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἀρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κι- p. 181.  
νήσεως ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτῳ εἶδη  
5 κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν.

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθῳς γε λέγων.

On their  
granting  
this, we ask,  
Do you  
mean that  
all things  
move in  
both these  
ways? And  
they must  
say, Yes;  
or else it  
will be as  
true to say  
that things  
stand still,  
as that they  
move.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα  
ἤδη τοῖς τὰ πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν  
πότερον πᾶν φατὲ ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενόν  
10 τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μὲν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ δ' ἑ  
τέρως ;

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δι' ἐγῶγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οἶμαι  
δ' ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε μή, ὦ ἐταῖρε, κινούμενά τε [αὐτοῖς]  
15 καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἔξει  
εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἔστηκεν.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ  
κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν κίνησιν p. 182.  
20 αἰεὶ κινεῖται.

5. ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ περιφοράν] Coisl. τὴν μὲν ἀλλ., τὴν δὲ περιφ.—quod glossema capit. Stallb. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent *φορά*. The answer probably is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cf. *supr.* ὥς μιν ἡ περιφορά ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος.

Perhaps also the revolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolical of the Heraclitean cycle of elements. (Lassalle.) For *περιφορά* interchanged with *φορά*, see Rep. p. 528 : *ἐν περι-*

*φορά* ἤδη ἐν στερεῶν λαβόντες—ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, *φοράν* οὖσαν βάθους.

7. διαλεγώμεθα ἤδη] Imagining them, for the sake of our argument, to be less impracticable. ἰποτιβέμενοι νομιμώτερον αὐτοῖς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀποκρίσθαι. (Soph. 246.)

14. κινούμενά τε [αὐτοῖς] καὶ ἐστῶτα φανεῖται] Cf. Rep. 436 : ὥς οἱ γε στρόβιλοι οἷοι ἐστᾶσι τε ἄμα καὶ κινούνται. MSS. *ἐαυτοῖς*.

19. ἐνεῖναι] Almost all the MSS. have *ἐν εἶναι*. But the correction of the Bodl. MS. appears to be in an ancient hand.



## 2. ΘΕΟ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν τῆς θερμότητος ἢ  
λευκότητος ἢ ὅτου οὖν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν  
φάναι αὐτούς, φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τούτων ἅμα αἰσθήσει  
μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιούντος τε καὶ πάσχοντος, καὶ τὸ μὲν<sup>5</sup>  
πάσχον αἰσθητὸν ἄλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν ἐτι γίγνεσθαι,

Let us now  
recal their  
theory of  
sensations  
and quali-  
ties, which  
were said  
to fit be-  
tween the

2. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν] Cf. p. 149: 'Ἄρ' οὖν ἐτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν βῆσθαι;

3. οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν] Supr. pp. 156. 157. 159.

5. τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητὸν] αἰσθητὸν is inconsistent with the context, and with the language used elsewhere in the dialogue. Buttmann conjectured αἰσθητήν, to which Schleiermacher objected that τὸ πάσχον means the sensorium, and not the sentient subject. But the distinction between them is not clearly marked from the Protagorean point of view. Indeed the conception of a 'sensorium' nowhere appears, at least in this part of the dialogue. It is only in speaking of a particular sense that τὸ πάσχον means, for instance, the eye. (p. 157.)

In p. 159 it appears doubtful whether τὸ πάσχον means the tongue or Socrates, or more indefinitely the 'recipient.' And even if τὸ πάσχον is limited to the organ of sense, there is no reason why αἰσθητής should not be used of this. (Cf. Xen. Mem. I. 5: ἡ γλῶσσα γινώμην τοῦτον ἐναιργίσθη.)

The noun αἰσθητής appears to be suggested in p. 160, (if it is not coined on the spot,) by the use of ἐπιστήμην just before.

In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recal a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488. οἱ ἐπιμεινίσταται. Supr. 180. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα.) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present passage. (ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τι φαίνεται ὄνομα κ. τ. λ.) Apart from these considerations, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argument in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be allowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also be urged, that the masculine gender of αἰσθητής would impair the effect of the passage, in which every thing seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and impersonal.

The other conjectural reading, αἰσθανόμενον, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes, and it is quite possible that αἰσθητὸν may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist.

6. ἐτι] i. e. when we carry our analysis so far.

subject and  
the object.

τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιόν τι ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἢ p. 182.  
ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ  
μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον· κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκουε.  
τὸ γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκότης, θερμὸν b  
5 δὲ καὶ λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τὰλλα οὕτω. μέμνησαι  
γάρ που ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἐν  
μηδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἶναι, μηδ' αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ  
πάσχον, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγεγνο-  
μένων τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ  
10 μὲν ποιά ἅττα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ αἰσθανόμενα.

ΘΕΟ. Μέμνημαι· πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὰ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἑασωμεν, εἴτε c  
ἄλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν· οὐ δ' ἕνεκα λέγομεν,  
τοῦτο μόνον φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτῶντες· Κινεῖται καὶ  
15 ῥεῖ, ὥς φατέ, τὰ πάντα; ἢ γάρ;

1. ποιόν τι] MSS. ποιούντι.  
But the Bodleian margin has  
ποιόν τι, with marg. F, corr. E.

ἢ ποιότης] Two difficulties  
stand in the way of the recep-  
tion of any new 'term of art';  
the strangeness of the word,  
and the effort required to fol-  
low the generalization which it  
presupposes.

2. ἀλλόκοτος] 'Strange and  
uncouth.'

3. ἀθρόον λεγόμενον] 'The col-  
lective (i. e. general) expression.'  
This harmonizes with the lan-  
guage adopted above, p. 157. δεῖ  
δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ  
περὶ πολλῶν ἀθροισθέντων, ὃ δὴ  
ἀθροισματι ἀνθρώπων τε τίθεται  
καὶ λίθων καὶ ἑκαστον ζῶν τε καὶ  
εἶδος.

The conception of quality is  
of later growth than that of  
kind or form; this being less

abstract, and still retaining a  
tinge of metaphor.

8. ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων—αἰ-  
σθανόμενα] The construction al-  
ters as the sense develops itself;  
at first scarcely more is intended  
than γίνεσθαι ὅσα αἰεὶ γίγνεται:  
presently the genitive becomes  
the subject of the infinitive.  
'But out of both as they come  
together—they become, while  
producing sensations and sen-  
sible things, the one of a cer-  
tain kind, the other percipient.'

14. φυλάττωμεν—ἵνα μὴ ἀλφ  
ταύτη μίον] Cf. supr. p. 154: φυ-  
λάττων μὴ ἑναντία εἶπω. Infr.  
p. 183: ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἢ ἀπάκρισις  
ὁρῇ φανῇ. And, for the argu-  
ment, Cratyl. 439: 'Αρ' οὖν οἶόν  
τε προσειπὶν αὐτὸ ὁρθῶς, εἰ αἰεὶ  
ὑπερέρχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκείνῳ  
εἶσιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη  
ἀμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθύς

p. 182. ΘΕΟ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας ἅς διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, φερόμενά τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενα;

ΘΕΟ. Πῶς ὃ οὐ; εἰ πέρ γε δὴ τελέως κινήσεται.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἡλλοιοῦτο δὲ μὴ, εἴχομεν ἂν που εἰπεῖν, οἷα ἅττα ῥεῖ τὰ φερόμενα ἢ πῶς λέγωμεν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως.

d ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, τὸ λευκὸν ῥεῖν τὸ ῥέον, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὥστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου εἶναι ῥοήν, τῆς λευκότητος, καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλην χροῖαν, ἵνα μὴ ἀλφ ταύτῃ μένον· ἄρά ποτε οἶόν τέ τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν;

ΘΕΟ. Καὶ τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο γέ τι τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ αἰεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, αἶτε δὴ ῥέον;

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὅποιασούν, οἶον τῆς τοῦ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν; μένειν ποτὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ὄραν ἢ ἀκούειν;

ΘΕΟ. Οὐκοῦν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὄραν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ὄραν, οὐδέ τι ἄλλην αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ, πάντων γε πάντως κινουμένων.

ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γάρ οὐν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν αἴσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὥς ἔφαμεν ἐγὼ τε καὶ Θεαίτητος.

ΘΕΟ. Ἦν ταῦτα.

If the qualities moved without changing, we might give them names. But now, while each of them is moving between object and subject, it also changes, so that while you are naming it, it has become something else.

And the same argument applies to the sensations, and to Sensation, which we said was Knowledge. Therefore when we said Sensation was Knowledge, it would have been equally true to say, Not-knowledge.

γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπερβαίνει καὶ μετέχει οὕτως ἔχει;

12. τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα] To give the name of any color (to an object)—To use the

name of any colour so as to apply it rightly.

17. τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως] So far of αἰσθητά, now of αἰσθήσεις.

The principle of motion has proved a fallacious support, since according to it every answer, whether Yes or No, is, or rather becomes, equally true, except that both Yes and No are falsified while we are uttering them. A new dialect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only word for it

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστή- P. 182.  
μην ἀπεκρινάμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΟ. Ἐοίκατε.

p. 183.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τοῦ ἐπανόρθωμα  
5 τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδείξαι ὅτι πάντα  
κινεῖται, ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. τὸ δ',  
ὡς εἴκειν, ἐφάνη, εἰ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶσα ἀπόκρισις,  
περὶ οὗτου ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω  
τ' ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι,  
10 ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτοὺς τῷ λόγῳ.

ΘΕΟ. Ὅρθῶς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Πλὴν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ  
οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸ οὕτω λέγειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ  
ἂν ἔτι κοινοῖτο τὸ οὕτω· οὐδ' αὖ μὴ οὕτω· οὐδὲ γὰρ b  
15 τοῦτο κίνησις· ἀλλὰ τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς

4. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν] "Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first answer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both 'it is so' and 'it is not so,' or, if you choose, 'becomes so,' that we may say nothing that would bring them to a stand-still." Heind. compares Rep. X. 602: χαρίεις ἂν εἴη κ. τ. λ.

8. οὕτω τ' ἔχειν φάναι] In apposition to ἀποκρίσεις. While you are naming a quality, it is altered and slips away; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words Sense is knowledge, your theory

of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable.

12. Πλὴν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε] μὴ is changed to οὐχ, because the words are taken out of their hypothetical connexion. Compare the language of the Parmenides, e. g. p. 158: ἔν τε ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ μήτε ἐν μήτε πολλά.

13. οὐδέ γάρ] "For when we think of 'so,' there is no motion in it: nor yet in 'not so.'"

15. ἀλλά τιν' ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον] Cf. supr. 157. Soph. 253: τῷ τε εἶναι καὶ περὶ πάντα ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χαρίεσ καὶ τῷ ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ μυρίοις ἐτί-  
ραι, ἔν ἀκρατίε δυντε εἰργασθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εἶναι

p. 183. τὸν λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τὸ οὐδ' ὅπως. μάλιστα δ' οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἀρμόττοι, ἄπειρον λεγόμενον.

ΘΕΟ. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς. 5

ΣΩ. Οὐκ οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὐπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ πάντ' ὅανδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ φρόνιμός τις ᾗ ἐπιστήμην τε αἰσθῆσιν οὐ συγχωρησόμεθα κατὰ γε τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μέθοδον. εἰ μὴ τί 10 πῶς ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ὅδε λέγει.

at present is, in no way.

Thus we are rid, not only of Protagoras, but also of the theory of sense, so far as it is based on motion.

ἄλλων δίνονται τῶν ἐξελεγχόντων, κ. τ. λ.

(15.) φωνή] "Dialect."

Arist. Met. I. 4. 1008. a: οὔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὐτ' οὐχ οὕτως λέγει, ἀλλ' οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως. καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἀμφω ὅτι οὐδ' οὕτως οὐτε οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ μή, ἦδη ἂν εἴη τι ὀρισμένον.

Aristotle points out (1), that it does not follow, because quantity is wholly relative, that quality need be so also; (2) that it is not the quality, but the subject of it, which changes.

Sensations are wholly shifting and relative. They could not be the objects of the mind, unless we perceived resemblance and difference in them. In every act of sense, therefore, there is a universal element, and the mind gives to it its own stamp of unity.

Arist. Met. T. 1008. a: καὶ γίνεσθαι δὴ τὸ Ἀναξαγόρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρώματα ὅτις μηδὲν διηβῶς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δόριστον οὐν εἰκασίς λέγειν, καὶ ἀόριστος τὸ ἐν λέγειν, περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὅπως λέγουσιν τὸ γὰρ δύναται ἐν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχεῖα τὸ

ἀόριστόν ἐστιν.

2. τὸ οὐδ' ὅπως—ἄπειρον λεγόμενον] With most of the Greek philosophers the Infinite was a purely negative idea.

At this point sensation appears to be annihilated. And yet if we view the dialogue as a whole, the impression we receive from it is rather this:—Sensations are purely relative to the individual, and infinitely diverse: taken alone, therefore, they cannot be the objects of knowledge and thought: but it is not denied that they are the occasions of thought and the conditions of knowledge. (p. 186. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐστὶ ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.)

3. οὕτως ἂν αὐτ.] Viz. οὐδ' ὅπως.

6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἐταίρου] This τε is answered to by ἐπιστήμην τε—, καὶ is expegetic.

Aristotle, Met. Γ. 1009. a, expresses the same sense of relief, καὶ τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένον ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀπράττον καὶ καλλιστότερον τῇ διανοίᾳ ὀρίσασθαι.



ΘΕΟ. "Αριστ' εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες· τούτων γάρ p. 183.  
περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινό-  
μενον κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ τοῦ Πρω-  
ταγόρου λόγου τέλος σχοίῃ.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρὶν γ' ἂν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Σωκράτης τε  
καὶ σὺ τοὺς φάσκοντας αὐτὸ πᾶν ἐστάναι διέλθῃτε, d  
ὥσπερ ἄρτι προῦθεσθε.

ΘΕΟ. Νέος ὢν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους  
ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας; ἀλλὰ  
10 παρασκευάζου ὅπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις  
λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάνπερ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μέντ' ἂν  
ἤκουσα περὶ ὧν λέγω.

Themistotus  
desires now  
to hear the  
opposite  
theory (that  
of rest) dis-  
cussed. But  
Socrates  
declines  
doing so.  
'Parmeni-  
des, whom  
I once saw  
in his old  
age, inspires  
me, for his  
glorious  
depth, with  
reverence

ΘΕΟ. Ἰππίας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς  
15 λόγους προκαλούμενος· ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, περὶ γε ὧν κε-  
λεύει Θεαίτητος, οὐ πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι;

ΣΩ. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς  
20 λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυρόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶ-  
μεν, ἦττον αἰσχύνομαι ἢ ἓνα ὄντα Παρμενίδην. Παρ-

4. σχοίῃ] The optative de-  
pends on συνθήκας. As it was  
agreed I should, when the dis-  
cussion of Protagoras' argument  
should be completed.

14. Ἰππίας εἰς πεδίον] "You  
challenge cavalry to an encoun-  
ter in an open plain."

Schol.: Ἰππίας προκαλεῖσθαι  
εἰς πεδίον, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν τισι  
βελτίσι καὶ ἐπιστημονικτέροις  
αὐτῶν εἰς ἔριν προκαλουμένων.  
Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῃ καὶ Μένων-  
δρος Καταψευδομένῃ. γράφεται δι

καὶ Ἰππον εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖσθαι  
ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς δ' βούλεται τις προκα-  
λοῦντων. The latter interpreta-  
tion is alone suitable here.

18. Τί δὴ οὖν] Either 'in what  
respect?' or 'for what reason?'  
The former is preferable. Comp.  
Rep. p. 449: Τί μάλιστα, ἔφη,  
ὑμῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε; Σί, ἢ δ' οὐ. Ἐπὶ  
ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα; Ἀπορρήθ-  
μειν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη.

19. ἐστὸς] So Bodl. (though  
rather doubtfully) with Vat.  
Ven. II.

p. 183. *μενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ μοι ἅμα [εἶναι] δεινός τε. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνν νέος πάνν πρεσβύτη, καὶ μοι ἐφάνη βάθος*

p. 184. *τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιώμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἶπε πολὺ πλεον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὐ ἔνεκα ὁ λόγος ὠρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί ποτ' ἐστίν, ἄσκειτον γένηται ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπεισχωμαζόντων λόγων, εἴ τις αὐ-*

and awe. I fear, therefore, lest we should mistake his words, and still more his thoughts, and lest the crowd of discussions which would

1. τὸ τοῦ Ὀμήρου] Π. III. 172 : αἰδοῖός τί μοι ἔσσι, φίλε ἑκνρή, δεινός τε. (Post ἅμα Zitt. Ven. Π. Par. C. εἶναι inserunt. Stallb. This is very possibly right.)

2. *συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ*—τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνν νέος πάνν πρεσβύτη] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides? Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he had conceived it; or do they refer to a fact or to a supposition which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217 : οἶον (δὲ ἐρωτήσεων) καὶ Παρμενίδη χρωμένῃ καὶ διεξίοντι λόγους παγκάλους παραγενόμενῃ ἡγὼ νέος ὢν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε δευτος πρεσβύτου. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated reference helps to mark the Parmenides as belonging to this series of dialogues. The same conception of the time at which Parmenides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Eleatic stranger,

(his professed disciple), Soph. 237 : Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ἀ παῖ, παυσὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν—ἐπεμαρτύρατο—ἔδε ἐκάστοτε λόγους.

3. βάθος τι] "A magnificent depth of mind." Schol. φαίνεται καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης σημειῖναι τὸν Παρμενίδην.

4. οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα] It is remarkable to find in Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the grammatical sense and the real drift of an author.

7. ἄσκειτον γένηται] "Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry."

8. ἐπεισχωμαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (sup. 177.) to that of a disorderly crowd of discussions. Compare Philebus, p. 62 : βούλει δὴτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ' ὄχλου τις ἀθροόμενος καὶ βιαζόμενος, ἡγήθεις ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀπὸ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ἑαυτοῦ καθαρὰ τὴν ἐνδεσσίαν; See also Shakespeare, Rape of Lucrece: 'Much like a press of people at a door throng her inventions, which shall go before.' For the use of the verb, see Rep. p. 500 : ἐπεισχωμαζόντες—said of the bad philosophers.

enter in  
should  
cause the  
question  
about  
Knowledge  
to be end-  
lessly de-  
ferred.

Transition  
from *sees*  
to *opinion*.

We there-  
fore return  
once more  
upon our  
old track,  
and ask,  
With what  
do we see  
and hear  
what is  
white or  
shril!

Do we see  
and hear  
with our  
eyes and  
ears or  
through  
them?

Not with,  
but through.

τοῖς πείσεται ἄλλως τε καί, ὃν νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει p. 184.  
ἀμήχανον, εἴ τέ τις ἐν παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι' ἂν  
πάθοι, εἴτε ἰκανῶς, μηχανόμενος τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης  
ἀφανιεῖ. δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὦν κυεῖ ὁ  
5 περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ  
ἀπολύσαι.

ΘΕΟ. Ἀλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν  
εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἰσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην  
10 ἀπεκρίνω. ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ' ἐρωτῇ· τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ  
μέλανα ὄρᾳ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα  
ἀκούει; εἴποις ἂν, οἶμαι, ὅμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων ο  
καὶ μὴ δι' ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ  
ἀγενεές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελεύθε-  
ρον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀνάγκη ἐπι-  
20 λαβέσθαι τῆς ἀποκρίσεως ἣν ἀποκρίνει, ἢ οὐκ ὀρθή.

2. εἴ τε τις κ.τ.λ.] The reasons  
given here for avoiding a criticism  
of Parmenides and the Eleatic  
doctrine are not such as would  
prevent its being discussed in  
another dialogue. It would  
therefore be a mistake to argue  
from them against the genuine-  
ness of the Sophista. Compare  
with the expression *ὃν νῦν ἐγεί-  
ρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον*— Rep. p.  
450: οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐκ ἰσχυρὸν λόγον  
ἐπεγείρετε.

4. ὦν κυεῖ] Bodd. Vat. Ven. II.  
ἐν. Perhaps rightly.

6. ἀπολύσαι] "To deliver."

8. Ἐτι τοίνυν] As usual, the

transition to a new hypothesis  
is not made without reference  
to the last.

16. Τὸ—εὐχερὲς] 'Facility about  
words and phrases rather than  
minute criticism.' Cf. Polit. 261:  
*ὃν διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν  
ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς  
τὸ γῆρας ἀσφαλέσει φρονήσας*.  
Cf. Arist. Met. 995 a: *τοὺς δὲ  
λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνα-  
σθαι συνείρεν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολο-  
γίαν*· ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦ-  
τον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβο-  
λαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀπλεῖθε-  
ρον εἶναι τισι δοκεῖ.

p. 184. σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθότερα, ᾧ ὀρώμεν, τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμούς, ἢ δι' οὗ ὀρώμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκούομεν, ὦτα, ἢ δι' οὗ ἀκούομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δι' ὧν ἕκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς.

d ΣΩ. Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὃ τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἢ διὰ τούτων οἶον ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον ἢ ἐκείως.

ΣΩ. Τοῦ δέ τοι ἔνεκα αὐτά σοι διακριβούμαι, εἴ τι νι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφικνούμεθα λευκῶν τε καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων  
e ἐτέρων αὐ τινῶν. καὶ ἔξεις ἐρωτώμενος πάντα τὰ τοι-  
αῦτα εἰς τὸ σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ  
λέγειν αὐτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ  
πολυπραγμονεῖν. καὶ μοι λέγε· θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ  
καὶ κούφα καὶ γλυκέα δι' ὧν αἰσθάνει, ἄρα οὐ τοῦ  
σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης; ἢ ἄλλου τινός;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου.

We are not each of us a sort of Trojan-horse-full of faculties. There is one pre-siding nature, in which they all meet. It is this *will* which we see *through* our eyes and hear *through* our ears. But we cannot see and hear *through* the same organ.

6. Δεινὸν γάρ που] 'Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perched, as in a sort of Trojan horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, *will* which, *through* these as instruments, we perceive the various objects of sense?'

7. ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις] The plural is caused by ἡμῖν. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Trojan horse.—Man cannot be re-

garded as a bundle of separate faculties having no higher unity: that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term 'organ of sense' perhaps originates with this passage.

12. Τοῦ δέ τοι ἔνεκα] It is with a view to this that I am so exact with you, namely, to the inquiry whether, &c. τοῦδε has a double reference to *εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν*—*αἰσθητά* and to *εἴ τι τι* κ. τ. λ.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ ἐβελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ δι' ἐτέρας  
δυνάμεις αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δι' ἄλλης ταυτ' p. 185.  
αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι' ἀκοῆς, δι' ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι' ὄψεως,  
δι' ἀκοῆς;

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐβελήσω;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τι ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν  
διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ' αὖ διὰ τοῦ ἐτέρου  
περὶ ἀμφοτέρων αἰσθάνοι ἂν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

10 ΣΩ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χροᾶς πρῶτον μὲν  
αὐτὸ τοῦτο περὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ διανοεῖ, ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω  
ἐστὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρου μὲν ἕτερον,  
15 ἐαυτῷ δὲ ταυτόν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἐκάτερον δὲ ἓν; b

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν,  
20 δυνατός ἐστι ἐπισκέψασθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν δια-  
νοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ δι' ἀκοῆς οὔτε δι' ὄψεως οἷον τε τὸ  
κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τόδε τεκμή-  
25 ριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν· εἰ γὰρ δυνατόν εἴη ἀμφοτέρω

There are  
some things  
which we  
perceive  
about the  
objects of  
both senses,  
e. g. that  
they are  
both, that  
they are  
different  
from each  
other, and  
each the  
same with  
itself. That  
both are  
two, and  
each is one.  
That they  
are like or  
unlike.

Through  
what do  
you per-  
ceive these  
things? If  
I had asked  
through

1. ἃ δι' ἐτέρας δυνάμεις] The  
object of one sense cannot be  
perceived by another. There-  
fore if I perceive anything  
about the objects of two dif-  
ferent senses, it cannot be  
through either of them.

23. τὸ κοινόν] That which re-  
gards them both. You can re-

fer any particular sensation to  
its proper organ. Can you do  
so in the case of these common  
perceptions?

Cf. Rep. p. 522: Οἷον τοῦτο τὸ  
κοινόν, ὃ πᾶσι προσχρᾶται—ἐπι-  
στήμας—τὸ ἐν, τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ  
τρία διαγινώσκειν.



p. 185. σκέψασθαι, ἄρ' ἐστὸν ἀλμυρὸν ἢ οὐ, οἶσθ' ὅτι ἔξεις  
ο εἰπεῖν ᾧ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε ὄψις οὔτε ἀκοή  
φαίνεται, ἀλλὰ τι ἄλλο.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, ἢ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης.  
δύναμις;

ΣΩ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις τό  
τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ τὸ  
ἔστιν ἐπονομάξεις καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἡρω-  
τῶμεν περὶ αὐτῶν; τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις  
ὄργανα, δι' ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον  
ἕκαστα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὁμοιό-  
τητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταυτόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον,  
d ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον  
δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τᾶλλα 15  
ὅσα τούτοις ἔπεται, διὰ τίνος ποτὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος  
τῇ ψυχῇ αἰσθανόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Ὑπέρευ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ  
ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν 20  
ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλὴν γ' ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ'  
εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ  
o ἐκείνοις, ἀλλ' αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινὰ μοι  
φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὥς ἔλεγε 25

what do  
you per-  
ceive that  
they are  
salt, you  
would have  
said the  
tongue.

Through  
what do  
you per-  
ceive being  
and not-be-  
ing, same-  
ness and  
difference,  
unity and  
plurality,  
odd and  
even!

6. τό τ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ  
ἐπὶ τούτοις] Which is common  
not only to all the senses, but  
to all things.

8. ἃ νῦν δὴ ἡρωτῶμεν] Viz. as  
Theaetetus understands it, ὁμοι-  
ότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταύ-  
τόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἓν τε καὶ  
τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν, re-

ferring to what has just pre-  
ceded.

9. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the  
objects of sense.

22. ὄργανον ἴδιον] The Bodl.  
MS. has ὄργανίδιον.

25. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ] The en-  
thusiasm with which Socrates  
accepts Theaetetus' acknowledg-

Theaetetus  
answers,  
that these  
are perceiv-  
ed through  
no special  
bodily or-  
gan, but by  
the mind  
itself, sur-  
veying

what is common to all.

Socrates receives his answer with delight.

There are something then which the mind itself perceives without the help of the body.

Being is the most universal of these.

Θεόδωρος, αἰσχροῦς· ὁ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλὸς τε p. 185.  
καγαθός. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα  
συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, εἰ φαίνεται σοι τὰ μὲν  
αὐτὴ δι' αὐτῆς ἢ ψυχῇ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ  
σώματος δυνάμεων. τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι  
ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φαίνεται γε.

p. 186.

ΣΩ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν; τοῦτο γὰρ  
μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὦν αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχῇ καθ' αὐτὴν  
ἐπορεύεται.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, καὶ τὸ ταύ-  
τον καὶ ἕτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ment of the truth that the mind has its perceptions, independent of sense, belongs to the most interesting aspect of Greek Philosophy. "Gradually it threw off the garment of sense; it revealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their first freshness: they were not ideas but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race; objects not of speculation only, but of faith and love." (Jowett.) Comp. as another instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265: οὐκ μὴν βλή-  
πων εἰς σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἰ-  
σθαί σε κατὰ γὰρ θεὸν αὐτὰ γέγε-  
σθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς ἐνόμικα. Καλῶς γε ὦ Θεάϊγχε. καὶ εἰ μὲν  
γὰρ σε ἠγοῦμαι τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπαιτα  
χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι,  
νῦν δὲ τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθούς ἀναγ-  
καίως ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολο-

γεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοὶ καταμαθάνω  
τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρ'  
ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσσειν ἐφ'  
ἄπερ νῦν ἔλαττομαι φῆς, ἴδω· χρό-  
νος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γέγονε' ἄν.

2. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] Ad calū  
ex præcedd. mente repetendum  
εἶναι, quæ notatu dignum est  
ellipsis, quum post hæc πρὸς δὲ  
τῷ καλῷ non inferatur nomina-  
tivus, verbo ei vel addito vel  
subaudiendo, velut infertur  
Sympos. p. 195 c. Νέος μὲν οὖν  
ἵσται, πρὸς δὲ τῷ εἴφ ἀπαλότ-  
Heind. Præter hoc pulchrum,  
quod in te laudavi. Stallb. The  
latter is right.

'Not only beautiful, but you  
have done me a kindness'—  
Cf. Eurip. Hec. 382. Καλῶς μὲν  
εἶπας, θεῖατερ, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῷ λύπη  
πρόσσειται.

8. τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάν-  
των παρέπεται] i. e. ἐπὶ πάσι κοι-  
νὸν ἵσται. It will serve therefore  
as a sort of crucial instance.

p. 186. ΣΩ. Τί δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν ;

The Good and Beautiful are also thus perceived.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἀλλήλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη β ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ μέλ- 5 λοντα.

ΣΩ. Ἐχε δὴ ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκληρότητα διὰ τῆς ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ τὴν μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν καὶ ὃ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἐναντιότητος αὐτὴ ἢ ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλ- λουσα πρὸς ἀλλήλα κρίνειν πειράται ἡμῶν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι ο φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα

All such ideas the mind immediately contemplates, surveying with a view to the future the present and the past, e. g. The quality of hardness is perceived through the touch. But that it is, that it is opposite to

3. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] In this and similar phrases the article retains its demonstrative force, as is evident where the words are separated ; e. g. Euthyd. 303 : ἐν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο μεγαλοπρεπέστερον. Soph. Œd. Col. 746 : ἐκ δὲ τῶν μάλιστα' ἐγώ.

4. πρὸς ἀλλήλα σκοπεῖσθαι] Viz. as opposites.

Themetetus is probably thinking of the recent argument in which ἀγαθόν, ἐφελίμων, μέλλον, were identified. Throughout this dialogue we can hardly be said to rise to the conception of an existence or a goodness above time, except almost mythically in p. 177. That goodness in its actual working

is always relative, is asserted Rep. 457 : καλλίστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελίξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐφελίμων καλόν, τὸ δὲ βλαβερὸν αἰσχρόν.

ἀναλογιζομένη] 'Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.'

11. Τὴν δέ γε οὐσίαν] Sc. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the consciousness of his reader.

13. ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα] Returning upon (reviewing) the sensations, it perceives the Being of their objects, and comparing these together, perceives their opposition, and the Being of this again.

softness, and that this opposition is, the mind itself seeks to decide, returning over its sensations, and comparing them.

The one power belongs to all live creatures from their birth: the other is slowly attained, and only by some men. Sensation does not reach being, there-

διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει· p. 186.  
τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς τε οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφέλειαν μόγισ καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται οἷς ἂν καὶ παραγίγηται.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάσασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μὴδὲ οὐσίας;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀδύνατον.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου ἐπιστήμων ἔσται;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μὲν, ὡς εἴκει, δυνατόν ἄψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

1. ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει] 'Ex-tend to the mind.' Cf. Tim. 64: τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν εἰκίνητον—καὶ βραχὺ πάθος—διαδίδωσιν—ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνημον—τὸ δ' ἐναντίον ἰδραίων δν—ἀναισθητὸν παρίσχει τὸ παθεῖν.

Phileb. 33: τίς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἐκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβινύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῇ ἐκείνην ἰόσαντα, τὰ δὲ δι' ἀμφοῖν ἴοντα, καὶ τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθίττα ἰδίον τε καὶ κοινὸν ἐκατέρω.

2. ἀναλογίσματα] 'But what the mind discovers by reflecting upon these.' The idea of proportion (τὸ ἀνάλωγον) does not seem to enter into the verb ἀναλογίζομαι and its derivative noun.

6. ᾧ μὴδὲ οὐσίας] Ad dat. hunc φ repetendum est ὅς τις (potestne illud verum assequi quod ne οὐσίαν quidem assequi

potest?), ut declarant illa mox: Ζύμωαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἰσθησῶ; Ἀνάγκη. Ὡς τε, φάμεν, οὐ μίτις τινι ἀληθείας ἀψασθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας. Heindorf.

But in the present connexion φ is probably masculine. 'Is it possible for him to reach truth who misses being?' There is a transition in the next question from the subject to the object, from αἰσθανόμενος to αἰσθητόν. 'But can one have knowledge of that, the truth of which he misses?'

12. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ] Something very different from syllogism is meant, and more nearly analogous to generalization. Cf. Phaedr. 249: Δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπου συνίναί κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθησῶν εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναρπύμενον.

p. 186. ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ταῦτόν ἐκείνόν τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οὖν δὴ δίκαιόν γε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῃ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὄραν, ἀκούειν, ὁσφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι;

e ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;

ΣΩ. Ξύμπαν ἄρ' αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. ὦν γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἄψα-  
σθαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἰσθησίς  
τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη ταυτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστα  
γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ὄν αἰσθήσεως  
ἐπιστήμη.

fore it falls  
of truth :  
therefore  
it is not  
knowledge.

This lies  
not in our  
impressions,  
but  
in that  
which the  
mind col-  
lects from  
them.

Sensation,  
therefore,  
has no  
share in  
knowledge.  
They are  
wholly dis-  
tinct.

15

We have  
found what  
knowledge

12. Οὐδ' ἄρ' ἐπιστήμης] The gen. is governed by μέτεστιν alone. ἀληθείας and οὐσίας are governed partly by μέτεστιν, partly by ἀψασθαι.

16. μάλιστα γε νῦν καταφανέστατον] For the double superl., cf. Rep. 331 : Ἀλλὰ γε ἐν ἀπὸ ἐνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε βεῖναι ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νῦν ἔχοντι, & Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμιάτων εἶναι.

17. καταφανέστατον γέγονεν] The criticism of sensation is now complete. We see it clearly, as relative, shifting, momentary, inseparable from physical conditions: we have placed ourselves above it, and proceed to explore the region next beyond, that of opinion.

To recapitulate the criticism of ἐπιστήμη αἰσθησίς. 1. Certain presumptions are raised against the saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον, as that it makes all beings equally wise, and that it implies that we can at once know and not know the same thing. 2. Protagoras is convicted out of his own mouth, for in confirming the opinion of other men he confutes himself. 3. There is at least one sphere of knowledge which is above sense, the foresight of consequences, the perception of what is good. 4. And within the sphere of sense, if sensation depend on motion, and motion include change, no quality can have a



is not. We set out to find what it is. Yet we have gained something. We shall not seek for it any more in sensation, but in whatever that is called, when the mind is by itself engaged with being. Opinion is the name for this.

II. Knowledge is true opinion.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἡρχόμεθα p. 187. διαλεγόμενοι, ὥα εὖρωμεν τί ποτ' οὐκ ἔστ' ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰσθήσει τὸ παράπαν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι, ὃ τί ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, δοξάζειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶε, ὃ φίλε. καὶ ὄρα δὴ νῦν 10 πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι β μᾶλλον καθορᾶς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ λέγε αὖθις τί ποτ' ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα· κινδυνεύει δὲ 15 ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, καὶ μοι τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω. εἰ γὰρ μὴ φανῇ προϊούσιν, ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὃ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύμως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ὠκνεῖς ἀποκρίνεσθαι.

name of its own. 5. The mind receives impressions from without through certain bodily organs; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impressions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind.

We have made sensation objective, and have risen to the consciousness of that which contemplates and pronounces upon sensations.

5. ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι] 'But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind when engaged alone with being.'

The form of expression is partly influenced by the words τί οὖν ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδωκε ὄνομα κ. τ. λ.

10. πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας] As if in a mathematical demonstration.

13. Δόξαν] δόξα follows naturally upon αἰσθήσει. Charm. p. 158, 9: δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι εἰ σοι πάρεστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦσαν αὐτῇ, εἴπερ ἔστιν αἰσθῆσιν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἂν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη ὃ τί ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη.

17. Ἄλλο τι] Not adverbial here.

87. εἴαν γὰρ οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὐρήσομεν ἐφ' ὃ ἔρχόμεθα, ἢ ἦττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν· καὶ τοι οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί φῆς; δυοῖν ὄντιον [εἰδέοιον] δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἐτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆς δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε· τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἔτ' ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;

d ΣΩ. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ-  
λάκις, ὥστ' ἐν ἀπορίᾳ πολλῇ πρὸς ἑμαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς  
ἄλλον γεγενῆσθαι, οὐκ ἔχοντα εἰπεῖν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τοῦτο  
τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν  
ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον εἰσώσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα  
ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον.

4. [εἰδέοιον] MSS. ἰδίαν.

8. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] 'To take up a thread of the previous argument.'

Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκεῖν ἐκάστω τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι, (φαντασία being συμπλοκὴ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως), yet the same question returns upon us in regard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connexion between the present inquiry and the foregoing. Cf. Cratyl. 429: 'Ἄρ' ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀρα τοῦτο σοὶ δύναται ὁ λόγος; συγχωρὶ γὰρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὃ φιλεῖ Κρατύλει, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλιν.

See also Euthyd. 284, 286,

where the ἀπορία (ὅτι ψεύδεσθαι, ἀντιλέγειν, οὐκ ἔστιν) is ascribed to the followers of Protagoras amongst others.

13. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ' ἡμῶν] 'This experience of the human mind.'

16. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι] Though the past discussion has been "wiped out," this still remains "to trouble the mind's eye."

18. ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον] i. e. Not with reference to sensation and motion, but in a more abstract way. The 'manner' has something in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression, compare Soph. 245. τοῦτε δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας πῶς θεατίον.

10

But, still to return upon a former track,

15

Is false opinion possible?

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ πέρ γε καὶ ὅπη- p. 187.  
 γοῦν φαίνεται δεῖν; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ  
 Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὥς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοι-  
 οῖσδε κατεπείγει.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθῳς ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἀπὸ και- e  
 ροῦ πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον γάρ που  
 σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν; ψευδῇ φαμέν  
 10 ἐκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καὶ τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῇ,  
 τὸν δ' αὖ ἀληθῆ, ὥς φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γὰρ δῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τότε γ' εἰς τὴν ἡμῶν περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 188.  
 καθ' ἕκαστον, ἥτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μαθηάνει  
 15 γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὥς ὄντα χαί-  
 ρειν λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι· νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον  
 ἐστὶν οὐδέν.

1. In re-  
 gard to  
 every thing  
 one of two  
 alternatives  
 is true of  
 us. Either  
 we know it,  
 or do not  
 know it.

6. πάλιν ὥσπερ ἵχνος μετελθεῖν]  
 We seemed to ourselves to be  
 launching into a wholly new  
 inquiry, but we have fallen into  
 the same track by a different  
 route. Cf. Aristot. Eth. I.:  
 μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν  
 ἀφίκεται. Aesch. Prom. 864. ταῦτόν  
 μετελθεῖν τῶν πάλαι λόγων ἵχνος.

4. ἥτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι]  
 This takes up the thread of  
 reflection introduced above, p.  
 165: ἄρ' οὐκ ἔτι τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδέναι  
 τι τοῦτο δ' οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι; It was  
 one weakness of the 'sensational'  
 doctrine that it led to this con-  
 tradiction. The same opposition  
 considered in the abstract is now  
 used to prove the impossibility  
 of falsehood in opinion.

The discussion which follows  
 probably bears some relation  
 to the notions of Gorgias, and

perhaps of Antisthenes. At all  
 events it would seem to be a  
 fragment of Eleaticism; being  
 exactly parallel to the difficul-  
 ties raised by Zeno against the  
 possibility of motion. It runs  
 parallel also to the subtleties of  
 the later Megarians.

6. νῦν γὰρ ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν  
 οὐδέν] Because we choose to  
 dwell on the absolute alterna-  
 tive, knowledge or ignorance.  
 Cf. *supr.* p. 158. μὴ ὑπολάβω-  
 μεν—.

Plato thus hints at the true  
 solution of the difficulty, viz.  
 the conception of a gradual  
 process, which is afterwards  
 presented under the image of  
 the impressions on wax, &c.

The doctrine of recollection,  
 developed in the Meno and  
 Phædo, is also held in reserve.

p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ' οὐδὲν  
λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἤδη ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν  
ἢ ὧν τι οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα γε μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ  
b εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὐ;

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα  
οἶεται οὐ ταῦτα εἶναι ἀλλὰ ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν οἶδε, καὶ  
ἀμφοτέρω εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφοτέρω;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἡγείται αὐτὰ εἶναι  
ἕτερα ἅττα ὧν μὴ οἶδε, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι τῷ μήτε Θεαί-  
τητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδοῖται εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν  
ὡς ὁ Σωκράτης Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης;

c ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἂν;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλ' οὐ μὴν, ἃ γέ τις οἶδεν, οἶεται πού ἃ μὴ  
οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' αὖ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἃ οἶδεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τέρας γὰρ ἔσται.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν ἂν τις ἔτι ψευδῇ δοξάσειεν; ἐκτὸς  
γὰρ τούτων ἀδύνατόν πού δοξάζειν, ἐπεὶ περ πάντ' ἢ  
ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται  
δυνατὸν ψευδῇ δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Ἀρ' οὖν οὐ ταύτη σκεπτέον ὁ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ  
τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἴοντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ εἶναι  
d καὶ μὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις;

19. αὐτὰ] Cf. Phaed. 99: δ δὴ  
μοι φαίνονται — ὡς αἰτίων αὐτὸ  
προσαγορεύειν: and see p. 155 n.  
20. Τέρας] Supr. p. 163: τέρας

γὰρ ἂν εἴη ἐλέγεις. Phaed. 101. alib.  
23. ἐν δὲ τούτοις] 'And under  
this alternative.'  
27. εἶναι] So the Colialinian MS.

(The inter-  
mediate  
processes  
of learning  
and forget-  
ting may  
be left out  
of sight as  
beside our  
present ar-  
gument.)  
In thinking,  
therefore, I  
must think  
of some-  
thing which  
I know, or  
which I do  
not know.

But I can-  
not know  
and be ig-  
norant of  
the same  
thing.

Therefore  
I cannot  
think  
falsely, for  
I cannot  
think one  
thing which  
I know to  
be another  
which I  
know, else  
I should  
know it  
and not  
know it.  
Nor what  
I do not  
know to be  
something  
else which  
I do not  
know, for  
what I  
know not  
cannot be  
present to

my mind.  
Nor what  
I do not  
know to be  
what I  
know, nor  
what I  
know to be  
what I do  
not know.  
And what  
other case  
(under the  
above al-  
ternative)  
is conceiv-  
able!

2. The path  
of know-  
ledge being  
thus hem-  
med in, we  
try the path  
of being.  
To think  
that which  
is not, is  
to think  
falsely.  
But can I  
think of

ΣΩ. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν ἢ ὅτι ὁ τὰ μὴ ὄντα περὶ ὅτου οὖν p. 188.  
δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ' ὥς οὐ ψευδῇ δοξάσει, κἀν ὅπως οὖν  
ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γ' αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Πῶς οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰάν τις  
ἡμᾶς ἀνακρίνῃ· Δυνατὸν δὲ ὅπως οὖν ὁ λέγεται, καὶ τις  
ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ὄν δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του  
εἴτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό; Καὶ ἡμεῖς δὴ, ὥς ἔοικε, πρὸς  
ταῦτα φήσομεν· Ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῇ οἴηται οἰόμενος. ο

10 ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως,

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἴ τις ὁρᾷ μὲν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἔν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ.  
ἢ σὺ οἶε ποτὲ τὸ ἐν ἐν τοῖς μὴ οὖσιν εἶναι;

1. Μὴ ἀπλοῦν δ] "May it not  
possibly be simply thus:" μὴ  
expresses *surprise*—"I should  
not wonder if." Cf. Phaed. 67.  
μὴ οὐ θεμλόν δ. Ibid. 69.: μὴ  
γὰρ οὐκ αὐτῇ δ ἢ ὁρθῇ ἀλλαγῇ  
κ. τ. λ. μὴ σκιαγραφία τις δ ἢ  
τοιαύτῃ ἀρετῇ. Crit. 48: μὴ—  
ταῦτα—σκέμματα δ: and see Ast.  
Lex. sub v. For ἀπλοῦν in this  
sense, v. supr. 147: ἀπλοῦν ἐλ-  
πίω. Symp. 184. Polit. 306:  
πότερον οὕτως ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ τοῦτο,  
ἢ—ἔχει διαφορὰν—. Aristot.  
Eth. N. V. 9. 9: ἢ οἰδὲ τοῦτο  
ἀπλοῦν.

6. δ λέγεται] Which is assert-  
ed. Buttmann and Bekker conj.  
λέγεται, which seems probable,  
but not necessary. Cf. Phaed.  
77, where there is a similar  
doubt.

14. Εἰ] Interrogative.

16. εἰ ἔν γέ τι ὁρᾷ] The con-  
verse argument is used Rep.  
478, where it is asked, 'What  
is opinion concerned with?'  
ἢ οἶόν τε αὐτὸ δοξάζειν μὲν δοξάζειν  
δὲ μηδέν: 'Αδύνατον. 'Αλλ' ἔν γε  
τι δοξάζει δ δοξάζω; Nai. 'Αλλὰ  
μὴν μὴ οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἔν τι, ἀλλὰ μηδέν  
ἀρβόταν' ἐν προσαγορεύεται. Πάν-  
γι. This close relation between  
the ideas of unity and being,  
derived from Parmenides, ap-  
pears frequently. See esp.  
Soph. 238: ἀπάγχῃ τόν τι λέγοντα  
ἐν γε τι λέγειν. The mind can-  
not recognise being except  
where it finds its own impress  
of unity.

Ar. Met. 1006. b.: οἰδὲν γὰρ  
ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοούμενα ἐν.



p. 188. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὃν τι ὁρᾷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἄρα τι ἀκούων ἐν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὃν ἀκούει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ ἀπτόμενος δὴ του, ἐνός γέ του ἄπτεται καὶ ὄντος, εἴπερ ἐνός ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἐν τι δοξάζει ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δ' ἐν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ὄν τι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρῶ.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὃν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὃ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν.

b ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλο τι ἄρ' ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλο ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐ [τε] γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον <sup>25</sup> ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδὴς ἐστὶ δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγορεύομεν ;

19. περὶ τῶν ὄντων] Arist. Met. Γ. 2. 1004 : ἀπόφασιν δὲ καὶ στήρησιν μᾶς ἐστὶ θεωρεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν, οὐ ἢ ἀπόφασιν ἢ ἢ στήρησιν (ἢ

γὰρ ἀπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκείνο ἢ τινα γένει κ. τ. λ.)

25. MSS. οὐ γάρ. γε seems required, but γάρ is right. Cf. p. 190.

28. Ἄλλ' ἄρα ὧδε γινῆ.] 'But

what is not, either absolutely or with reference to any thing ! I cannot see, and yet see nothing. And that which I see, being one thing, must have existence. For unity and being are inseparable. The same is true of hearing and touch.

And of thought also.

18 To think what is not is to think nothing, and to think nothing is not to think.

False opinion, if it exists, must be something different from this.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς ;

p. 189.

3. Can it then be a transference of thought : i. e. When I think one existing thing to be another ! Theaetetus believes this must be the true falsehood.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῇ φαμέν εἶναι δόξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὐ τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἀνταλλαζόμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὁν μὲν αἰὲ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ' ἑτέρου, καὶ ἀμαρτάνων οὐ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδῇ δοξάζων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθοτάτά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν γάρ τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάζει ψευδῇ.

ΣΩ. Δῆλος εἰ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ οὐ δεδιώς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μάλιστα ;

Socrates claims moderation for not pressing this contradiction in terms, and passes on.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους δὲ ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἶόν τε ταχὺ βραδέως ἢ κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἄλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἄλλα κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι ἐαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θάρσῃς, ἀφήμι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ὡς φῆς, τὸ τὰ ψευδῇ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε.

may it be supposed, then, that the following occurrence is what we express by this name ! 'What ?' 'That what we call false opinion is really a sort of transference of opinion.'

2. Ἀλλοδοξία] This seems to have been a prevalent conception. Vid. Arist. Met. Γ. 5. 1010. a. : φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἑκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ἐπὶ τῇ πληγῇ, κτεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέοντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας, ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτά. He ascribes this application of

Homer to Democritus, de An. I. 2. Cf. Herod. I. 85 : ἀλλογώσας τὸν Κροῖον.

φαμέν] In apposition with the preceding verb, introduced by ἔδε.

14. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους] Rep. 382 : τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεύδος, εἰ οἶόν τε τοῦτο εἶπέν. Phil. 23 : Ἄρα οὐ τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν.

18. ἵνα μὴ μάτην θάρσῃς] Sapp. 163 : ἵνα καὶ αἰδέσῃ. He refers to the boldness with which Theaetetus now answers, Sec p. 187.

p. 189. ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ὡς ἕτερον καὶ μὴ ὡς ἐκείνῳ τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ' ἡ διανοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν ἥτοι ἀμφότερα ἢ τὸ ἕτερον διανοεῖσθαι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κάλλιστα.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὃ περ ἐγὼ καλεῖς ; 10

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν ;

ΣΩ. Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. ὥς γε μὴ εἰδώς σοι ἀποφαίνομαι. τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη, οὐκ

p. 190. ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ ἀποκρινομένη, καὶ φάσκουσα καὶ οὐ φάσκουσα. ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαίξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἥδη φῇ καὶ μὴ διστάξῃ, δόξαν ταύτην τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ' ἐγῶγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῶ

When I take one thing for another, I must have either one or both things in my mind, either at once or in turn.

Now thought is the mind's self-dialogue, in question and answer. When it has agreed with itself upon a final answer, we call this its opinion.

2. ὡς ἐκείνῳ] Referring to the first *ἕτερον*.

8. Ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει:] The bearing of these words is not quite clear. Perhaps they are meant to introduce the analysis of thinking, in which things are present to the mind at first successively, afterwards in one view.

Compare with this account of thinking Phileb. pp. 38, 39, where the mind not only talks with itself, but has a writer and a painter within it. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῶς ——— α. τ. λ. Soph. 263 : Οἰκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταῦτ' ἄν πλὴν ὃ μὲν ἑστὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀντι-

φωνῆς γιγνόμενος α. τ. λ.

14. τοῦτο γάρ μοι] Plato was probably thinking of *Odyssæe* 19. 224 : *ἑρῶ, ὅς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἥτορ*. Compare the *φάσματα* in the beginning of the dialogue. 'The semblance it presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in question and answer with itself.'

16. *ὅταν δὲ ὀρίσασα*] 'But when it has come to a determination, whether slowly, or having flown rapidly to its conclusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.'

καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, οὐ μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον p. 190.  
οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὐτόν. σὺ δὲ τί;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κἀγώ.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζῃ, καὶ  
5 φησὶν, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἀναμνησκου δὴ εἰ πάποτ' εἶπες πρὸς σε-  
αυτὸν ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τό τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν ἐστιν  
ἢ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον, ἢ καί, τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον,  
10 σκόπει εἰ ποτ' ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτὸν πείθειν ὡς παν-  
τὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, ἢ πᾶν τοῦναντίον  
οὐδ' ἐν ὑπνῷ πάποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν

Opinion is  
a silent  
proposi-  
tion.

To think  
this to be  
that, is to  
say, This  
is that.

Now who  
ever said  
to himself,  
'Surely fair  
is foul,' or  
'wrong is  
right,' or  
'odd is  
even'!

8. παντὸς μᾶλλον—παντάσῃ  
ἀρα—ἀνάγκη] The dramatic force  
of such particles is noticeable: cf.  
Phil. 38: αὐτὸν—ἀνέροι' ἦν ἰδε-  
τίποτε ἀραῖσσι τὸ παρά τὴν πέτραν—

The Greek language from  
Homer downwards was pecu-  
liarly apt to suggest the above  
reflections on the nature of  
thought. Διαλεκτικὴ was its  
proper development. The fol-  
lowing remarks of Col. Mure  
(Lit. of Greece, B. II. c. xiv.  
§ 1.) on the self-dialogue of  
Homer, apply in some degree  
to all Greek literature. "Ex-  
clusively proper to Homer is  
his power of dramatizing, not  
merely action, but thought;  
not merely the intercourse be-  
tween man and man, but be-  
tween man and himself, be-  
tween his passions and his  
judgment. The mechanism of  
which the poet here chiefly  
avails himself is to exhibit the  
person under the influence of  
excited feelings as communing

with, or, as Homer defines it,  
addressing his own mind; dis-  
cussing the subject of his soli-  
tude under its various aspects  
as a question at issue between  
his judgment and himself. The  
conflicting feelings are thus, as  
it were, personified; while the  
current of the language, often  
the very sound of the words, is  
so nicely adapted to the turns  
of the self-dialogue, that the  
breast of the man seems to be  
laid open before us, and in the  
literal sense of the term, we  
read his thoughts as they fit  
through his bosom."

12. ἐν ὑπνῷ—ἐν γαῖοντα ἢ  
μαιόμενον] Note the liveliness  
with which fresh touches are  
thrown in. It must be remem-  
bered here that sensible per-  
ception is excluded from con-  
sideration for the present, as  
well as learning and forgetting.  
Everything is either known or  
unknown: present to the mind,  
or not present.

p. 190. ὥς παντάπασιν ἄρα τὰ περιττὰ ἄρτιά ἐστιν ἢ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ο ΣΩ. Ἄλλον δέ τινα οἶε ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν, ἀναπείθοντα αὐτόν, ὥς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἶναι ἢ τὰ δύο ἓν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δι' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφοτέρᾳ γε λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν ὡς τὸ ἕτερον ἑτερόν ἐστιν. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα

Or, 'the cow must be a horse,' or 'two is one.'

Therefore when I mistake this for that, I cannot have both in my mind.

11. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ] Several of the MSS., including Bodl. and Coisl., have ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταῦτόν ἐστι περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, where ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει evidently refers to p. 190: ἦτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει. This cannot be adopted without rejecting περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου as confusing the sentence. The drift would then be, 'You must not dwell upon the words as regards things alternately presented to the mind, seeing that the word ἕτερον, as far as the word goes, is the same as applied to both.' This would be an imperfect way of developing the distinction thrown out above, and unlike Socrates, who, especially in this dialogue, always waits for Theaetetus to follow him. And it is equally necessary to 'let the word alone,' whether the objects are conceived alternately or both at once. And it may be asked, What difference is there in this respect between saying ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ τοι καλὸν αἰσχρόν, and ὡς τὸ

αἰσχρόν καλόν! The words ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει must therefore be rejected as a mistaken gloss.

If the words ἐπειδὴ—ταῦτόν ἐστι are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου must either be omitted or transposed. But it is possible that this explanation has also crept in from the margin, and this suspicion is strengthened by the fact that the Bodl. p. m. wrote ἐστίν. We should thus revert to the reading of several MSS. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. περὶ is often used rather vaguely, e. g. Rep. p. 538. καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. καὶ is a little difficult. It seems to belong to the whole sentence rather than to any particular word. Cf. Soph. CEd. Tyr. 44. ὡς τοῖσιν ἐμπείροισι καὶ τὰς συμφορὰς ζώσας ὁρῶ μάλιστα τῶν βουλευμάτων. Ant. 280. παῦσαι πρὶν ὀργῆς καὶ μετῴσασαι λέγων. CEd. Col. 1582. τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὅδη καποθαρμύσαι πρίπου. See Eileudt's Lex. Soph. sub voce καί, C. 4.

"Now as regards the word 'this or that,' you must ἐπὶ let it alone." Or more dis-



περὶ τοῦ ἐτέρου· [ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἐτέρῳ p. 190. κατὰ ῥῆμα ταυτόν ἐστι.] λέγω γὰρ αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα δὲ δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν καλὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. 'Αλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐὼ τε καὶ μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἀμφὼ μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικεν.

But if I think only of the one, I cannot think the one to be the other, for I cannot have in my mind that of which I am not thinking.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ, οὐδέποτε δοξάσει τὰ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφάπτεσθαι καὶ οὐ μὴ δοξάζει.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐτ' ἄρ' ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι ἐγχωρεῖ ἄλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὀρεῖται δόξαν εἶναι ψευδῇ τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι· οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὐσα δόξα.

This transference, therefore, is also inconceivable.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φανήσεται ὄν, πολλὰ ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ ἄτοπα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ποῖα δὴ;

tinctly, 'But, I must add, you will have to let the word alone.' The version of Ficinus led some critics to conjecture *ei kai soi dokei*. But this, as Buttmann observes, would not harmonize with Theætetus' reply. Cf. Euthyd. 301, where the word is dwelt upon. *τίνα τρόπον, εἶφη, ἕτερον ἐτέρῳ παραγεγομένον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον ἂν εἴη;* Ἀρα τοῦτο, εἶφη ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς;—ἀλλ' ἔγωγε οὐδ' ἂν

παῖδα φῆμιν τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν.

17. οὔτε γὰρ ταύτη] The clauses, though connected outwardly by γάρ, are rather parallel than consequent, as in p. 152.

22. παλλὰ—καὶ ἄτοπα] e.g. that it is impossible to distinguish the sophist from the true philosopher; and the other difficulties mentioned at large in the Sophists.

- p.190. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθῶ σκο-  
πῶν. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ ἂν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀποροῦ-  
μεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ' ἐὰν  
p.191. εὗρωμεν καὶ ἐλεύθεροι γενώμεθα, τότε ἤδη περὶ τῶν  
ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων, αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γε-  
λοίου ἐστῶτες· ἐὰν δὲ πάντα ἀπορήσωμεν, ταπεινω-  
θέντες, οἶμαι, τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες  
πατεῖν τε καὶ χρῆσθαι ὃ τι ἂν βούληται. ἥ οὖν ἐτι  
πόρον τινὰ εὕρισκω τοῦ ζητήματος ἡμῶν, ἄκουε.

We are  
in great  
straits.  
But we  
dare not  
face the  
conse-  
quences of  
failure un-  
til we have  
turned  
every  
stone.

5. αὐτοὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἐστῶ-  
ντες] 'When we are ourselves  
free from the absurdity,' 'ex-  
empt from the ridicule.'

7. παρέξομεν—πατεῖν] Gorg.  
476: γινώσκεις τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ  
λατρῶν παρίχων ἀποκρίνου. alib.  
There is probably an allusion to  
Soph. Aj. 1142 seqq.: 'Ἦδὲ  
ποτ' εἶδον ἀνδρ' ἐγὼ γλώσση θρα-  
σύν ναυτὰς ἐφορμήσαντα χειμῶνος  
τὸ πλεῖν· ᾧ φθόγγ' ἂν οἶα ἀν εἴρει  
ἡνία' ἐν κακῇ χειμῶνος εἴχετ', ἀλλ'  
ἰφ' εἵματος κρυβεῖτε πατεῖν παρείχε-  
τ' ἐβέλοντι ναυτίλων.

The argument from p. 187 to  
p. 191 may be thus condensed.

We no longer search for  
knowledge in sensation, which  
is neither true nor false, but in  
opinion, where the mind is en-  
gaged with its own objects by  
itself. But here an old difficulty  
meets us in another form. It  
seemed that sensation could  
not be false, because it was re-  
lative to the subject. It now  
seems as though opinion can-  
not be false, because we cannot  
separate a thinking subject  
from knowledge and being.  
What I do not know cannot be  
present in thought. Neither  
can I lay hold in thought on

that which is not. But can I  
take one thing which is for an-  
other which also is? Thought  
being silent speech, if I lay  
hold of both, (i. e. if both are  
present to the mind,) I cannot  
mistake them; e. g. No one  
ever said to himself, Good is  
evil. And if only one is pre-  
sent to me, I cannot discourse  
about them, e. g. if I am think-  
ing only of the good, I cannot  
say, Good is evil. We are in  
great straits. For the result  
at which we seem in danger of  
arriving is contradictory to  
most important facts.

We must not appeal to these,  
however, until we have extri-  
cated our minds, if possible,  
from this metaphysical tangle.  
For logical and metaphysical  
difficulties are not to be solved  
"ambulando," but by a higher  
criticism of the forms of  
thought which have occasioned  
them.

In what follows, we are  
brought gradually back from  
the simple to the complex,  
from the more abstract to the  
more concrete. We are com-  
pelled to image to ourselves,  
what was discarded at a former

We said it was impossible that I should think what I do not know to be what I know, else I should be ignorant of what I know.

But perhaps it is possible in a certain way; e. g. Theaetetus knows Socrates, and yet may

ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον.

p. 191.

ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογήσαι, ἥνίκα ὁμολογήσαμεν, ἃ τις οἶδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ψευσθῆναι· ἀλλὰ πῃ δυνατόν. b

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ἥνικ' αὐτὸ ἔφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ὅτι ἐνίσις· ἐγὼ γινώσκων Σωκράτη, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὁρᾶν ἄλλον ὃν οὐ γινώσκω, φήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἶδα; γίγνεται γὰρ δὴ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ οἶον λέγεις.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὐτοῦ, ὅτι ἃ ἴσμεν, ἐποίει ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὧδε· ἴσως πῃ ἡμῶν συγχωρήσεται, ἴσως δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐν

stage of the inquiry, a process between the relativeness of sense and the absoluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of motion returns upon us in a higher form.

The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clearness into contact with the new. This is to think falsely.

6. τοιοῦτον εἶναι] Sc. αὐτό.

13. ἀλλ' ἴδε·] This is the punctuation of the Bodleian MS., which seems better than that usually followed. καὶ ἴσως, the reading of the later MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes thus in-

troduced before ἀλλὰ—without any particle of connexion with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 430: σμικρὰ μὲν τὰδ', ἀλλ' ὅμως ἄχα, δὲ αὐτῷ.

Æd. Col. 1615:

σκληρὰν μὲν, οἶδα, παιδεῖ· ἀλλ' ἐν γὰρ μόνον

τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ' ἔπος μοχθήματα.

Eur. Alc. 353:

ψυχρὰν μὲν, αἶμαι, τέρψην· ἀλλ' ὅμως βάρος

ψυχῆς ἀπαντλήσιν ἐν.

Supr. p. 171: εἰκός γε ἄρα—ἀλλ' ἡμῶν ἀναγκή— Compare also the frequent *asyndeton* with *πάντως*. For ἴσως—ἴσως δέ cf. Apol. p. 18: ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χεῖρων, ἴσως δέ βελτίων ἐσσι—

14. συγχωρήσεται—ἀντιτενεῖ] Cf. Soph. 254: εἰς ἃρα ἡμῶν πῃ παρεικάθη τὸ μὴ ἐν λέγουσιν ὡς ἴστω ὅτως μὴ ἐν ἀθέοις ἀπαλλάττειν.

p. 191. τοιούτῃ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα  
 ὁ λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἴ τι λέγω. ἄρα ἔστι  
 μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὐθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ' οὗ ;

ΣΩ. Θές δὴ μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν  
 ἐνὸν κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον, τῷ μὲν μείζον, τῷ δ' ἑλαττον,  
 καὶ τῷ μὲν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου,  
 δ καὶ σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἔστι δ' οἷς με- 10  
 τρίως ἔχοντος.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίθημι.

ΣΩ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν

mistake  
 another  
 whom he  
 sees but  
 does not  
 know, for  
 Socrates  
 whom he  
 knows.

II. a. Hy-  
 pothesis of  
 the waxen  
 block.  
 We return  
 therefore  
 in part to  
 the concep-  
 tion of a  
 process,  
 which may  
 be de-  
 scribed by

(14.) ἀλλὰ γὰρ] 'But we must  
 risk the chance of failure, for,'  
 &c.

3. μαθεῖν] The tense is no-  
 ticeable. Whatever difficulty  
 may attend the conception of  
 the process of learning and for-  
 getting, (μαθάνειν, ἐπιλανθάνε-  
 σθαι), it is certain that things  
 are learnt and forgotten (μαθεῖν,  
 ἐπιλελῆσθαι.) In what follows  
 the process itself is imagined  
 rather than analysed.

7. Θές] Cf. Phileb. 34 : θέ-  
 ται τὸν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν—παθημά-  
 των τὰ μέν. alib—. The image is  
 not unlike Locke's illustration  
 of the different kinds of me-  
 mory. Hum. Und. B. II. 10.  
 §§ 4, 5 : 'The brain in some  
 retains the characters drawn  
 on it like marble, in others  
 like freestone, and in others  
 little better than sand.' Ib. 29.  
 § 3. 'If the organs or faculties  
 of perception, like wax over-  
 hardened with cold, will not

receive 'the impression of the  
 seal from the usual impress-  
 wont to imprint it, or like wax  
 of a temper too soft, will not  
 hold it when well imprinted ;  
 or else, supposing the wax of a  
 temper fit, but the seal not ap-  
 plied with sufficient force to  
 make a clear impression—in  
 any of these cases the print left  
 by the seal will be obscure.'

8. κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον] Plato's  
 image is not the common one  
 of a waxen tablet, but of a  
 'block of wax,' such as was  
 used for sealing. ἐκμαγεῖον is  
 used first of the whole mass,  
 afterwards of those parts of it  
 which have received the partic-  
 ular impressions.

13. τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρὸς]  
 Aesch. Prom. 461 : μήμηρ δ'  
 ἀπάντων μουσομήτορ' ἐργάτιν.—  
 Plat. Euthyd. 275 : καθάπερ  
 οἱ ποιηταὶ δέονται ἀρχόμενοι τῆς  
 διηγήσεως Μούσας τε καὶ Μνημο-  
 σίνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι.

means of  
the follow-  
ing image.

Each of us  
has in his  
mind a  
block of  
wax, on  
which he  
receives  
the stamp  
of those  
sensations  
and percep-  
tions which  
he wishes  
to remem-  
ber. That  
which he  
succeeds in  
stamping is  
remember-  
ed and  
known so  
long as the  
impression  
lasts, but  
that of  
which the  
impression  
is rubbed  
out, or is  
imperfectly  
made, is

Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, ὃ τι ἂν p. 191.  
βουλευθῶμεν μνημονεύσαι ὧν ἂν ἴδωμεν ἢ ἀκούσωμεν  
ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν, ὑπέχοντας αὐτὸ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι  
καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα  
5 ἐνσημαινομένους. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῇ, μνημονεύειν  
τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, ἕως ἂν ἐνῇ τὸ εἶδωλον αὐτοῦ· ὅταν  
δ' ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἶόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπὶ λει- 9  
λῆσθαι τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ τοῖνυν ἐπιστάμενος μὲν αὐτά, σκοπῶν δέ  
τι ὧν ὁρᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἄθρει εἰ ἄρα τοιῷδε τρόπῳ ψευδῇ  
ἂν δοξάσαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ δὴ τινι;

ΣΩ. Ἄ οἶδεν, οἴηθεις εἶναι τυτὲ μὲν ἃ οἶδε, τοτὲ δὲ  
15 ἃ μὴ. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὐ καλῶς ὠμολο-  
γήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδύνατα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διο- p. 192.

1. ἐς τοῦτο — ἀποτυποῦσθαι] 'To stamp them upon this, as if we were taking on it the impressions of seal-rings.'

3. ὑπέχοντας αὐτό] Holding it (the wax) to receive our perceptions and thoughts, we stamp them there, as if taking the impression of a seal. The infinitives are med., because the impressions are taken from our own sensations for our own use.

4. ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνσημαινομένους] For the image of the seal, cf. Phaed. p. 76, where it is used of the mind impressing its idea of Being upon things.

6. ὅταν δ' ἐξαλειφθῇ] Ven. Π. corr. δ δ' ἂν. Bodl. et Vat. δι

omittunt. The Bodl. however, has δ' in the margin by a later hand. The common reading is sufficiently probable: the regularity of the sentence is broken by the introduction of ὅταν δ', so that instead of δ δ' ἂν we have ὅταν δέ. Cf. supr. p. 159. δ δ' — ὅταν.

10. αὐτῶν] Viz. δ ἂν ἴδῃ καὶ ἀκούσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἐννοήσῃ. (supr.)

Although I know what is present to me in sensation, i. e. though I may have in me a previous impression of the same thing, yet I may mistake it, i. e. fail to identify it as the original of that previous impression.

18. ἐξ ἀρχῆς] A priori.



p. 192. ριζομένους, ὅτι ὁ μὲν τις οἶδε σχὼν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον  
 ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι  
 ἑτερόν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἔχοντα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθα-  
 νόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὁ γε οἶδεν αὐτὸ, οἰηθῆναι  
 εἶναι ὁ μὴ οἶδε μῆδ' ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα· καὶ ὁ μὴ  
 οἶδεν, ὁ μὴ οἶδεν αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ μὴ οἶδεν, ὁ οἶδε· καὶ ὁ  
 αἰσθάνεται γε, ἑτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἶ-  
 ναι· καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ  
 αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὁ μὴ αἰσθάνεται,  
 ὧν αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ἔτι γε αὐτὸν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται  
 καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι αὐ-  
 τὸν ἑτερόν τι ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ ἔχει αὐτὸ ἐκεί-  
 νου τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι  
 ἐκείνων, εἰ οἷόν τε. καὶ ὁ οἶδε καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων  
 τὸ μνημεῖον ὁρθῶς, ὁ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδύνατον· καὶ ὁ 15

forgotten  
and not  
known.

For what I  
know in this  
way I may  
mistake,  
sometimes  
what I  
know,  
sometimes  
what I do  
not know.

Mistake is  
impossible  
between  
things both  
of which  
are thus  
known but  
not present  
to sense,  
nor indeed  
is it possi-  
ble in  
any case  
without  
sensation.

4. ὁ γε οἶδεν] i. e. not sup-  
posing him to have a sensible  
perception of it.

6. καὶ ὁ αἰσθάνεται γε] i. e. not  
supposing him to know it.  
Both the above cases are dis-  
tinguished from that in which  
a thing is both known and  
perceived.

11. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν  
αἴσθησιν] He holds the stamp  
left by the former sensation in  
a line with the present sensa-  
tion, so that the two impres-  
sions coincide. Vid. inf. 194.  
καταστρεφόμενον μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος.

14. ἔχων τὸ μνημεῖον ὁρθῶς]  
Cf. the common expressions  
ὁρθοῖς ὁμοῖαι, ἕξ ὁρθῆς φωνῆς.

The above statement may be  
put shortly thus: Mistake is  
impossible—1. Between things  
not perceived by sense, when  
we know both or one or neither  
of them. 2. Between things

not known, when we have a  
sensible impression of one or  
both or neither of them. 3.  
Still more impossible, if that  
may be, between things, (a.)  
both of which are known, both  
perceived by sense, and the  
knowledge of each of which is  
identified with its proper sen-  
sation: (b.) One of which we  
know and also perceive sensi-  
bly, and identify the know-  
ledge of it with the sensation:  
(c.) Both or either of which  
we neither know nor perceive  
sensibly.

The only cases left in which  
mistake is possible are (1.)  
when one thing is known and  
another perceived sensibly; or  
(2.) when two things are known  
and also present to sense, but  
we fail to connect knowledge  
and sensation rightly.

Still less when two things are known and present to sense, and when the sensation and the old impression coincide : or when neither is present to the mind at all. But when something, either known or unknown, is present to sense, and the mind brings the sensation over-against the old impression of a different thing—then the mind mistakes.

οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταυτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται' p. 192.  
καὶ ὃ αὐτὸ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ ο  
αἰσθάνεται· καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε·  
καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται.  
5 πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία τοῦ ἐν αὐτοῖς  
ψευδῇ τινὰ δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὲ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦσδε, εἴ  
πὲρ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐν τίσι δὴ ; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον  
μάθω· νῦν μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ἔπομαι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἐν οἷς οἶδεν, οἰσθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ' ἅττα εἶναι  
ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται· ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται  
δέ· ἢ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὐτὸ καὶ αἰσθάνεται.  
15 νεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλείον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε.

15 ΣΩ. Ὡδε δὴ ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεό-  
δωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαί-  
τητον κατὰ ταυτά, ἄλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς,  
ἐνίοτε δὲ οὐ, καὶ ἄπομαί ποτ' αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ' οὐ, καὶ  
ἀκούω ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ δ'  
20 αἴσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ  
ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἥττον καὶ ἐπίσταμαι αὐτοὺς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

2. καὶ ὃ αὐτὸ μὴ οἶδε] In order to exhaust every conceivable case, the converse or negative of each of the foregoing cases, in which knowledge and sense were combined, must be fully stated.

5. ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμία] Cf. sup. ἀδυνατώτερον ἐτι λέειναι εἰ οὐκ αἶν. The gen. is governed by ἀδυναμία. ὑπερβάλλει is abs. 'All these cases are beyond every thing in regard to the impossibility of any man's

thinking wrongly in any of them.'

8. ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω] 'For perhaps if you state them, I may perceive your meaning better.'

12. ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται] Subaud. ὅττα.

14. ἀπελείφθην] For this use of the aorist when a person reflects on his own state, cf. Soph. Aj. 678 : ἔφριξ' ἔρωτι περιχαρὴς δ' ἀνεπτόμαν. alib.

p. 192. ΣΩ. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὦν βούλομαι δη-  
λῶσαι, ὡς ἔστι μὲν ἃ οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ  
αἰσθάνεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι  
μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Ἴδὲ δῆ, εἴαν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπῃ. Σωκράτης  
p. 193. ἐπιγινώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Θεαίτητον, ὅρᾳ δὲ μηδέ-  
τερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν 10  
οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοξάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ  
Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ἀληθῆ γε.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοῖνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν ὦν  
ἔλεγον. 15

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν γάρ.

ΣΩ. Δεύτερον τοῖνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γινώσκων  
ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γινώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέ-  
τερον, οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτῷ οἰηθείην, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὃν μὴ  
οἶδα. 20

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθῶς.

b ΣΩ. Τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γινώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθα-  
νόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἕτερόν τιν' εἶναι  
ὦν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ' ἐξῆς νόμιζε  
πάλιν ἀκηκοίναί, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτε ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ 25  
Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γινώσκων οὔτε  
ἀγνοῶν ἄμφω, οὔτε τὸν μὲν, τὸν δ' οὐ γινώσκων.  
καὶ περὶ αἰσθήσεων κατὰ ταῦτά, εἰ ἄρα ἔπει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐπομαι.

ΣΩ. Λέιπεται τοῖνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ἐν τῷδε, 30  
ὅταν γινώσκων σὲ καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἔχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ  
o τῷ κηρίῳ ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σφῶν ἄμφω τὰ σημεία,

False opinion is the wrong union of thought and sensation.

διὰ μακροῦ καὶ μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ p. 193. οἰκείον ἑκατέρου σημείον ἀποδοὺς τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς τὸ αὐτῆς ἔχνος, ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις, εἴτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδύμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημείον, ἥ καὶ οἶα τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρέουσας, ταύτων παθὼν διαμάρτω· τότε δὲ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδὴ δοξάζειν.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες· θανμασίως ὥς λέγεις τὸ τῆς δόξης πάθος.

ΣΩ. Ἐτι τοῦνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων

1. προθυμηθῶ] 'I endeavour to assign the right impression of memory to the right visual impression, and to make this stand in its own foot-print, so as to fit, that recognition may take place; and then failing to do so, and bringing the ideas crosswise like men who put their sandals on the wrong feet,'—

2. ἐμβιβάσας προσαρμόσαι] So. τὴν ὄψιν. These words and the following (ἵνα γένηται ἀναγνώρισις) suggest an allusion to Choeeph. 203—210. καὶ μὴν στίβοι γε κ. τ. λ.

5. παραλλάξας] Cf. for the metaphorical use of this word (which here retains something of its literal sense) Tim. 72. οἷοις γὰρ ἔνουν ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς, ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ὑπὸν—πειρηθεὶς—ἡ διὰ νότον ἢ διὰ τινα ἐνθουσιασμόν παραλλάξας.

6. ἡ καὶ οἶα] 'Or my mind errs being affected in the same way as the sight is affected in looking at a mirror, shifting as

it does, so that right becomes left.' Vision is conceived of as flowing from the eye to its object. Cf. Tim. p. 43.

7. δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ μεταρρέουσας] 'Shifting, right-side to left.' The words have given some trouble. Buttmann conjectured μεταφερούσας, Heindorf says "medelam a libris expecto." Stallb. conj. δεξιὰς εἰς ἀριστεράν. But may not δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά be an adverbial expression, originating in apposition? Thus: ἡ ὄψις μεταρρεῖ δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά (i. e. τὰ δεξιὰ αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ ἀριστερά)—when the case of ὄψις changes δεξιὰ remains unchanged. Compare ἄνω κάτω στρέφων, Phædr. 278; and esp. Soph. Ant. 340. ἀλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἰς ἔτος, where some MSS. have ἔτος εἰς ἔτος μέτρον repugnans, showing that a similar difficulty had been experienced there.

10. ὥς] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. et x. cett. φ. 'Your description tallies wonderfully with one's experience of what Opinion is.'

p. 193. τὸν μὲν πρὸς τῷ γινώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ, τὴν δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχω, ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον καὶ μου τότε οὐκ ἐμάνθανες.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

5

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὴν ἔλεγον, ὅτι γινώσκων τὸν ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν αὐτοῦ ἔχων, οὐδέποτε αἰήσεται εἶναι αὐτὸν ἕτερόν τινα ὃν γινώσκει τε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν αὐ καὶ ἐκείνου ἔχει κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἦν γὰρ 10 τοῦτο ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ φαμέν τὴν ψευδῇ δόξαν γίνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γι-  
p. 194. γινώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἢ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν 15 ἔχοντα ἄμφω, τὸ σημεῖον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ιέντα παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ καὶ ἀμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεύδους ἄρα ὠνόμασται.

2. τοῦ ἑτέρου] Vis. of the former.

6. Heind. would insert ε before γινώσκων : but for the transition from the 1st to the 3rd person, when the nom. is indefinite, cf. inf. 196. οἰηθεί-  
μεν—οἰηθείη.

9. ἐν γινώσκῃ] This is the Bodleian reading, which seems preferable. The reference of ἐκείνου is thus made more distinct.

10. ἦν γὰρ τοῦτο;] 'We agreed to this!'

16. τὴν αὐτοῦ αἴσθησιν] Translate, adopting Stallbaum's conjecture, ἀκρίτου, 'Or having some other sensible perception

of both, to fail in holding your previous impression of each person over against your present sensation of him.'

Or, retaining the common reading, τὰ σημεία—ἐκείνου, 'Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.' But it must be confessed that this is not so good.

17. ἀλλ' οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον] We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the movement of the mind and of the remoteness of sensible things from our notions of them.



ΘΕΑΙ. Εικότως γε.

p. 194-

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅταν τοῖνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἰσθησις τῶν  
σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπουσίας αἰσθήσεως τῇ  
παρούσῃ προσαρμόσῃ, πάντα ταύτῃ ψεύδεται ἢ διά-  
5 νοια. καὶ ἐνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ οἶδέ τις μηδὲ ἐπῆ-  
σθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε ψεύδεσθαι ἢ  
οὔτε ψευδὴς δοῖσα, εἴ τι νῦν ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν. περὶ  
δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις  
στρέφεται καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἢ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς  
10 γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεία  
συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθῆς, εἰς  
πλάγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδῆς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται;

ΣΩ. Ἔτι τοῖνυν καὶ τάδε ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ο  
15 ἔρεῖς. τὸ μὲν γὰρ τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ  
ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ' οὔ;

The cause  
of this lies  
in the na-  
ture of the  
waken

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα τοῖνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίνεσθαι. ὅταν  
μὲν ὁ κηρός του ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ  
20 λεῖος καὶ μετρίως \* ὠργασμένος ᾗ, τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν

3. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπουσίας αἰσθ.]  
Sc. σημείων.

4. προσαρμόσῃ] Sc. ἢ δύναιτο.

5. ἐπῆσθετο] The corr. of the  
Bodl. is in the ancient hand.

8. ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις] Here,  
and here alone, opinion turns  
and twirls about, becoming true  
and false alternately.

ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις στρέφεται  
καὶ ἐλίπτεται ἢ δόξα] Cf. Rep.  
479: ἐπὶ τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ  
νόημα — μεταξύ που κυλιδεύται  
α. γ. λ.

11. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους]  
τίπος is here the present sen-  
sation, which we endeavour to

fit into the former impression,  
(ἀποτύπωμα.) τίπος can scarcely  
be 'the form of the object.'  
This would be inconsistent  
with the previous use of the  
word, p. 192.

18. φασί] This need not  
imply a reference to any con-  
temporary doctrine. It rather  
indicates the half mythical tone  
which Socrates has assumed.

20. ὠργασμένος] 'Tempered.'  
This word has been restored  
from Timæus and Suidas, the  
latter of whom quotes this pas-  
sage. MSS. εἰργασμένος.

τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων—

p. 194 αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς  
 κέαρ, ὃ ἔφη Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ κηροῦ  
 d ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα  
 ἐγγιγνόμενα καὶ ἱκανῶς τοῦ βάθους ἔχοντα πολυχρόνιά  
 τε γίγνεται καὶ εἰσὶν οἱ τοιοῦτοι πρῶτον μὲν εὐμαθεῖς, 5  
 ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθή-  
 σεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ  
 καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὄντα ταχὺ διανέμουνσιν ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν  
 ἕκαστα ἐκμαγεία, ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ  
 οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἡ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

6 ΣΩ. Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἦ, ὃ δὴ  
 ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής, ἡ ὅταν κοπρῶδες  
 καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἡ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἡ σκλη-  
 ρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρὸν, εὐμαθεῖς μὲν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γί- 15

block,  
 which may  
 be either  
 too shallow,  
 or too hard  
 or too soft,  
 or too nar-  
 row, or im-  
 pure,  
 whence the  
 impressions  
 are either  
 imperfect  
 or faint, or  
 short-lived,  
 or crowded,  
 or coarse  
 and dim, so  
 that it is  
 difficult for  
 the mind  
 to make  
 each sensa-  
 tion corre-  
 spond to its  
 proper foot-  
 print.

ἐνσημαινόμενα—καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα  
 ἐγγιγνόμενα] The thread of the  
 sentence is resumed in an al-  
 tered form. Cf. Polit. 295. πᾶν  
 τὸ τοιοῦτον—ξύμβαον—γίγνεται δὲ  
 —γίγνεται τῶν τοιούτων—. Phaed.  
 69. χαρίζομαι δέ.

2. κέαρ] The Homeric form  
 is κῆρ. But Plato avoids bring-  
 ing poetical words too abruptly  
 into his prose. See above, p.  
 173, and n.

6. τῶν αἰσθήσεων] The gen.  
 depends on παραλλάττουσι, like  
 τοῦ σκοποῦ above.

7. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ  
 ὄντα—καλεῖται] There is here a  
 similar irregularity to that just  
 noticed. The sentence begins  
 as though it were to be σαφῆ  
 γὰρ—ὄντα (sc. τὰ σημεῖα) ταχὺ  
 εὐρίσκειται, or something of the  
 kind: but the thought grows  
 as we proceed: and σαφῆ—ὄντα

is left as a sort of accusativus  
 pendens. What follows is to be  
 construed thus: ταχὺ διανέμουνσιν  
 (οἱ τοιοῦτοι ταῦτα) ἃ δὴ ὄντα κα-  
 λείται, ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἐκμα-  
 γεία. 'Such persons quickly dis-  
 tribute things (as we term them)  
 each to the place of its own  
 former impress upon the block.'

9. ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται] The  
 later part of the dialogue does  
 not forget the earlier part.

12. λάσιον—κέαρ] Il. B. 851:  
 Πυλαμένηος λάσιον κῆρ. II. 554:  
 Πατροκλῆος λάσιον κῆρ.

13. ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής] To  
 appreciate the irony here, it is  
 necessary to compare Soph.  
 p. 234, where the parallel is  
 drawn between the man who  
 'creates' every thing and the  
 man who knows every thing;  
 as well as Rep. B. X. p. 596,  
 sqq.

γνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρόν, τάναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον p. 194-  
καὶ τραχύ, λιθῶδές τιτι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσσης  
ἐμπλεων, ἔχοντες, ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεία ἴσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ  
δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ σκληρά· βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ἐνι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ  
5 καὶ οἱ τὰ ὑγρά· ὑπὸ γὰρ τοῦ συγχέεισθαι ταχὺ γίγνε- p. 195.  
ται ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς πᾶσι τούτοις ἐπ' ἀλλήλων  
συμπεπτακότα ἢ ὑπὸ στενοχωρίας, ἐάν του σμικρὸν  
ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον, ἐτι ἀσαφέστερα ἐκείνων. πάντες οὖν  
οὔτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι  
10 ὁρώσω ἢ ἀκούσω ἢ ἐπινοῶσω, ἕκαστα ἀπονέμει

1. λάσιον] 'Shaggy.' Here, as in the case of βλοσυρός, we experience what is a frequent difficulty in Plato, that of determining the precise ethical meaning with which he adapts an Epic word.

2. λιθῶδές τι] The difficulty of the MS. reading is, that it presents as one case what were spoken of above as two, (λάσιον — ἢ — κοπρώδεις), 'Those in whom it is shaggy and rugged, a gritty substance filled with an admixture either of earth or dung.' This is not an insuperable difficulty in a writer like Plato. But the correction λιθῶδές τι (Ficin. Heusd.) is extremely probable; 'In whom it is shaggy and rugged and stony, or full of the admixture of earth or dung.'

8. ψυχάριον] Cf. Rep. 519: ὡς δρμὸν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον.

10. ἢ ἐπινοῶσω] Cf. sup. 191. ἢ εἰσὶν ἐπινοήσωμεν. It may be asked, whether these expressions do not provide for the difficulty that is raised afterwards about 11 and 12? The answer probably is, that the difficulty, which is brought into

full light afterwards, is here silently anticipated. (Compare the introduction of ἀγαθόν and καλόν in p. 157.) ἐπινοῶσω however does not necessarily imply an abstract object of thought. As we dwell upon the image we have raised, we find that it is too simple to express more than the relations of sense and memory, and instead of multiplying κύματα πλάσματα, a fresh image is introduced in Plato's usual manner. The touches of humour have led some critics to suppose that Plato is alluding to contemporary opinions. But may he not be laughing at himself?

The description of the act of recollecting in the Philebus, p. 34, is worth comparing with the present passage. 'Ὅταν δὲ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκασχι πάθος ἢ ψυχῇ, ταῦτ' ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος αὐτῇ ἐν ἑαυτῇ δὲ τι μέγιστα ἀναλαμβάνη, τότε ἀναμνήσκουσαί σου λέγομεν. ἢ γὰρ; Π. μ. οὐκ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολίσσασα μνήμην εἴτε αἰσθήσειε εἴτ' αὖ μαθήματος· αὐθις ταύτην ἀναπόλησθαι ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ζύμπαστα ἀναμνήσεις καὶ μνήμας

95. ταχὺ ἐκάστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς τέ εἰσι. καὶ ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί τε καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ παρανοοῦσι πλείστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὐ οὔτοι ἐψευσμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. 6

ΣΩ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δὴ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς.

ΣΩ. Ἦδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὁμολογήσθαι ὅτι 10  
παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρω τούτῳ τῷ δόξᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Δεινὸν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὥς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει  
καὶ ἀηδὲς εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολεσχής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ' εἶπες; 13

c ΣΩ. Τὴν ἐμαντοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς  
ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ ἂν τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα,  
ὅταν ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ  
δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἡ δυσπαλάλακτος ἀφ' ἐκά-  
στου λόγου; 15

ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις;

που λέγομεν. The former and simpler process corresponds to the search for the impression upon the wax; the latter to the hunt in the aviary for a missing bird.

(10.) ἑκάστοις] Sc. τὰ ὄντα.

1. ἐκάστοις] Sc. τοῖς ἐκμαντοῖς. ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες] 'Misappropriating,' i. e. 'Assigning wrongly.'

3. καλοῦνται αὐ οὔτοι] αὐ refers to supr. καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὔτοι καλοῦνται. ἀμαθεῖς is the opposite of σοφοί: ἴψ. τ. ὅπως, being in-

serted expegetically.

13. Δεινὸν τε] The old editions had γε. The abruptness of the reading in the text is better than such a meaningless connexion. Socrates breaks out, after a pause, with an expression, the relevancy of which does not at once appear.

18. ὡς αἶνω τοὺς λόγους ἔλκῃ τις] Compare with this expression, which frequently occurs, the still livelier image supr. p. 191. ἐν ᾧ ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λόγον βασανίζειν.

But, when we consider it, the hypothesis is not adequate to the phenomena.

e. g. The numbers eleven and twelve are not objects of sensation, but of thought, i. e. they are impressions on the waxen block, and yet in adding 7 and 5 people sometimes take eleven instead of twelve.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅ τι p. 195- ἀποκρινούμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηται με· ὦ Σώκρατες, εὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῇ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὗτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοαῖς, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συν- δ  
ἀφει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν; Φήσω δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, καλλωπιζόμενος ὥς τι εὐρηκότων ἡμῶν καλόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ αἰσχροὶν εἶναι τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσεις, λέγεις ὅτι αὐτὸν τὸν ἀνθρώπον  
10 ὃν διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν δ' οὐ, ἔππον οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὐτὸν οὔτε ὁρῶμεν οὔτε ἀπτό-  
μεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ' οὐδὲν αἰσθανό-  
μεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὁρθῶς γε.

15 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν, φήσεις, τὰ ἔνδεκα, ἃ μὴδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ο διανοεῖται τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἂν ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὐτὸν διανοεῖται; Ἰθὶ οὖν δῆ, σὺ ἀποκρίνου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἀποκρινούμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ἂν τις ἢ  
20 ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι ἐν τῇ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε περὶ αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οἶει τινὰ πῶποτε αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ  
πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρώπους ἑπτὰ καὶ p. 196.  
25 πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μὴδ' ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ'

9. Οὐκοῦν, φήσεις, λέγεις ὅτι αὐτὸν  
'Is it not then part of your hypothesis, he will say, that on the other hand.' If mistake arises upon the wrong union of sensation and thought, thought cannot be mistaken when unaccompanied by sensation. The opposition between these two

cases is expressed by αὐτὸν. Socrates proceeds to what Bacon would call a negative instance. MSS. φησὶ.

11. ἐν αὐτῷ 'Which again,' i. e. 'as well as the man.'

15. Bodl. φησὶ with Vat. Ven. II. cett. φησὶ.

23. οὐκ ἔστιν] If the sentence



96. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ, ἃ φαμεν ἐκεῖ μνημεῖα ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῇ ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ εἶναι δοξάσαι, ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέφατο λέγων πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ ἐρωτῶν πόσα ποτ' ἐστί, καὶ ὁ μὲν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἔνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἡ δὲ πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ ἔνδεκα· ἐὰν δέ γε ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπῇται, ὁ μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶει. καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τί τιποτε† γίγνεται ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ δώδεκα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ ἔνδεκα οἰηθῆναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐοικέ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνέκει λό- 15 γους; ὁ γὰρ τοῦτο παθὼν, ὁ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἶεται εἶναι ὃν αὐτὸς οἶδεν. ὁ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ

had proceeded regularly, it would be followed by σκεψάμενος—εἰπεῖν.

1. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ] The insertion of the article does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be right.

ἐκεῖ] Sc. ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ.

μνημεῖα] 'Records.'

3. εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων] The question is resumed with εἰ, depending on λέγων, which has broken the regularity of the sentence. 'I mean to ask if —.' The Bodleian MS. has ἡ, with Heindorf and Bekker.

4. λέγων πρὸς αὐτόν] Socrates refers to his own description of the process of thinking, *supr.* p. 189, 190.

8. ἐὰν δέ γε] Theætetus is permitted to enlarge a little

upon his own subject. We seek to identify the sum of 7 and 5, of which we have thought (ἐπινοήσαμεν) with the corresponding number in our minds: and by mistake we identify it with 11 instead of 12.

The statement of this case shews the inadequacy of the figure we have adopted. For where are the 7 and 5 and the sum of them of which we think? They are not in sensation: must they not then be in the waxen block? The former difficulty returns—we have taken one thing which we know for another thing which we know.

11. ποτε] Heind. conj. τότε.

15. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους] 'The discussion has returned to its first stage.'

ἡναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῇ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ p. 196:  
αὐτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἄμα. c

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ' ὅτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ  
5 ψευδῇ δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἰσθησιν παραλλα-  
γὴν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ' ἦν, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δια-  
νοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἦτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδῆς  
δόξα, ἣ ἂ τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων  
πότερα αἰρεῖ;

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀπορον αἶρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος d  
οὐκ εἴσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντα γὰρ τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπι-  
χειρήσαιμεν ἀνασχυντεῖν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

To meet  
this diffi-  
culty, we  
venture to  
say what it  
is to know,  
—(a daring  
step, as we  
are still  
seeking the  
definition  
of Know-  
ledge.)

15 ΣΩ. Ἐβελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖον τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὸ  
ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον;

ΣΩ. Ἔουκας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ  
λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ἐπιστήμης, ὥς οὐκ εἰδόσι τί  
20 ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐπειτ' οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδὼτας ἐπιστή-

1. ἡναγκάζομεν — ἀναγκάζοιτο] 'It was by this very argument we tried to make the non-existence of false opinion inevitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the same person should know and be ignorant at once.'

4. Δλ' ὅτιοῦν] 'Any thing but this.' Most MSS. give Δλό τι οἶν.

11. ἀμφότερα] Viz. τὸ εἶναι ψευδῇ δόξαν κ. ἃ τις οἶδεν οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ εἰδέναι. The

distinction here indicated is analogous to that noticed by Aristotle between ἐπίστασθαι and θεωρεῖν; which is his favourite example of the difference between εἶς and διίργεια. Vid. Eth. N. I. 8. διαφέρει δ' οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν χρήσει τὸ ἀριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν. The tendency to this distinction appears in Sophocles Ant. 1278. ὃ δισπόθ', ὅς, ἔχων τε καὶ κεκτημένος, κ. τ. λ.

97. μην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷόν ἐστιν; ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλα ἐσμέν ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γινώσκωμεν καὶ οὐ γινώσκωμεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα, ὥς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἔτι ἐπιστήμην ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ βούλει, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρόντι κεκρήμεθ' αὐτῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὥς προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στερόμεθα ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτων ἀπεχόμενος;

2. ἀνάπλεω τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] 'Infected with logical imperfection.'

τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] In other words, we have felt our way hitherto, not by abstract definition and inference, but (as it is expressed Rep. 533) τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀκαυροῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. We first ventured the hypothesis αἰσθησις ἐπιστήμη. This was rejected, but the difficulties we met with pointed to a further hypothesis, ὅτι ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν. Here again we are met by fresh difficulties, but the discussion of them leads to a fresh hypothesis, that we may know, without having knowledge in hand.

3. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν] We are haunted throughout by a difficulty respecting the search for knowledge akin to that respecting its first definition. Can we know it, and yet not know it? To inquire about it implies ignorance of its nature, and yet how can we use the name even in inquiry without knowing the meaning of the name? p. 147.

ἢ οἷε τίς τι συνήσκι εἶναι δοξα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστὶ; 210. καὶ παντάπαστι γε εὐθεὶς ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην δόξαν φάσαι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης.

10. Ἀλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὃ 2.] Compare what was said of being, p. 156. τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἰσχυροῦς, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς πολλά καὶ ἄρτι ἡσυχάζομεθα ὑπὸ συνήθειας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ.

That there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and absolute being is the postulate of Plato's mind. That he himself or any man had wholly grasped either, is more than he dares to say. The sacredness of this belief, which it would be impious to relinquish, appears also in Theaetetus' answer: τοῦτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένης ἵσταται σοὶ πολλή συγγνώμη. For a similar feeling in regard to the practice of virtue, cf. Rep. 407. ὃ δὲ δὴ πλοῦσιος, ὅς φαμεν, οἷδιν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἔργον προκείμενον, οὐ ἀναγκαζομένην ἀπέχεσθαι ἀβίωτον. Apol. 38. ὃ δ' ἀπεξέταστος βίος οὐ βιωτὸς ἀνθρώπῳ.

ΣΩ. Οὐδένα ὦν γε ὃς εἰμί· εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλο- p. 197.  
γικός, οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη  
ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ' ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπλητ-  
τεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμέν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν  
οἷόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι; φαίνεται γάρ μοι προὔργου  
τι ἂν γενέσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν νῆ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπε-  
χομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη.

ΣΩ. Ἀκήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι;

To know is  
not to have,  
but to pos-  
sess, know-  
ledge.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως· οὐ μέντοι ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι μνη-  
μονεύω.

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμης που ἔξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι.

b

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴ-  
15 πωμεν ἐπιστήμης κτῆσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν;

ΣΩ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν· ὃ δ' οὖν δοκεῖ ἀκούσας  
συνδοκίμαζε.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐάν πέρ γε οἷός τ' ᾧ.

This dis-  
tinction is  
illustrated  
by a new  
image.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταῦτ' οὖν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι  
τὸ ἔχειν. οἷον ἱμάτιον πριάμενός τις καὶ ἐγκρατὴς ὦν  
μὴ †φοροῦ† ἔχειν μὲν οὐκ ἂν αὐτὸν αὐτό, κεκτῆσθαι  
δέ γε φαῖμεν.

1. ὦν γε δε εἰμί] Cf. Phædr.  
243. ὥσπερ ἂν ᾗ δε εἶ.

εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός] The  
apodosis is omitted, and the  
construction changed, because  
from supposing himself ἀντιλο-  
γικός, Socrates proceeds to ima-  
gine the effect of the presence  
of such a man upon the dis-  
cussion.

2. τούτων τ' ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι]  
Not exactly with Heind. Stallb.  
'abstinere nos jubeatur,' but  
(sub. δέω) 'would have dwelt on  
the necessity of abstaining,' or,

possibly, (throwing an emphasis  
on ἡμῖν) 'Would have professed  
to abstain.'

12. ἐπιστήμης—ἔξιν] Euthyd.  
277. τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι—ἄλλοι τι ἔξιν  
ἐπιστήμην ἔδω ἰστί; Phæd. 76.

21. ἱμάτιον] Stallb. attempts  
to defend the optative without  
εἰ (which has only slight au-  
thority), from Rep. 549. ἄριστος  
εἶν, which is not quite parallel,  
(and there is MS. authority for  
ἄν.) The comparison of p. 193.  
Σωκράτης γινώσκει κ. τ. λ. sug-  
gests the conjecture φορεῖ.

p. 197. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως γε.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατόν οὕτω κερ-  
κτῆμενον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴ τις ὄρνιθας ἀγρίας,  
περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, θηρεύσας οἴκοι κατασκευασά-  
μενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. τρόπον μὲν γὰρ ἂν πού  
τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς ἀεὶ ἔχειν, ὅτι δὴ κέκτῃται.  
ἦ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τρόπον δέ γ' ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ  
δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ  
ἐν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποίησατο, λαβεῖν  
καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσάμενος ἣν ἂν ἀεὶ  
ἐθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφίεναι· καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν,  
ὅποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι  
ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι πλάσμα,  
νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκάστη ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα  
παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας οὔσας  
χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ' ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας  
διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχῃσι πετομένας.

II. B. Hy-  
pothesis of  
the cage full  
of birds.

The mind is  
like a cage,  
empty at  
birth, which  
we fill by  
degrees  
with what  
we learn.  
Whatever  
knowledge  
then is  
caught by  
us, is  
known so  
long as it  
remains in  
this cage.  
And yet  
before we  
have it in  
hand, there  
is a further  
chase re-  
quired.

3. μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ'] This opposi-  
tion between minute parts of a  
sentence is very characteristic  
of the Greek idiom.

ὥσπερ] The apodosis is to be  
sought in Πάλιν δὴ κ. τ. λ.

16. κήρινόν τι] 'We established  
in the mind a sort of moulded  
form of wax.'

19. τὰς μὲν κατ' ἀγέλας] The  
distinction indicated is proba-  
bly that between, 1. individuals  
in the aggregate (πολλὰ ἀθρο-  
σθέντα, p. 157.); 2. intermedi-  
ate abstractions, as the virtues,

numbers, &c.; 3. the highest  
abstractions, as Being, Good-  
ness, resemblance, difference,  
&c. Little is thought, however,  
of any process of abstraction, as  
appears from the interchange of  
the terms *μημίον* and *διασῆμα*  
in what precedes.

20. κατ' ὀλίγας] e.g. The vir-  
tues, arts, &c.

ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν]  
e.g. τὴν οὐσίαν—τοῦτο γὰρ  
μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρίπτεται,  
p. 186.



ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δὴ. ἀλλὰ τί τούντεῦθεν; P. 197.

ΣΩ. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων, φάναι χρή, εἶναι τοῦτο<sup>6</sup>  
τὸ ἀγγεῖον κενόν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστήμας  
νοῆσαι· ἦν δ' ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ<sup>6</sup> ξίς  
δὲ τὸν περίβολον, φάναι αὐτὸν μεμαθηκέναι ἢ ζεύρηκέναι  
τὸ πρᾶγμα οὐ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι  
τοῦτ' εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω.

ΣΩ. Τὸ τοῖνον πάλιν ἦν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστη- P. 198.  
10 μῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αἰθίς ἀφίεναι,  
σκόπει τίνων δέεται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὅν τὸ  
πρῶτον, ὅτε ἐκτάτο, εἴτε ἐτέρων. μαθήσει δ' ἐντεῦθεν  
σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν γὰρ λέγεις  
τέχνην;

To apply  
this to the  
case of  
number:

13 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου  
τε καὶ περιπτοῦ παντός.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπολαμβάνω.

ΣΩ. Ταύτη δὴ, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχει-  
10 ρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῃ πα-  
ραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ καλούμεν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν,  
παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μαθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ τῷ κε-  
15 κτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περισπωμένῳ ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

2. φάναι χρή, εἶναι] Although φάναι χρή is introduced parenthetically, the sentence receives an indirect turn from it.

3. ἀγγεῖον] 'Receptacle.'

13. ἀπὸ τούτου] From this point

of view, viz. where I am already standing.

19. ὑποχειρίους] 'Under (in the power of) his hand.' But not necessarily *προχείρουν*, 'in hand.'

p. 198. ΣΩ. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεύθεν ἤδη πρόσσχεσ τὸν νουν.  
ἀριθμητικὸς γὰρ ὢν τελέως ἄλλο τι πάντας ἀριθμοὺς  
ἐπίσταται; πάντων γὰρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσὶν αὐτῷ ἐν τῇ  
ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μῆν;

ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοὶ ἂν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐ-  
τὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα ἔχει  
ἀριθμὸν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ ἀριθμεῖν γε οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ  
σκοπεῖσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὢν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ὁ ἄρα ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς  
οὐκ εἰδώς, ὃν ὠμολογήκαμεν ἅπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι.  
ἀκούεις γάρ που τὰς τοιαύτας ἀμφισβητήσεις.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστε-  
ρῶν κτήσει τε καὶ θήρᾳ ἐρούμεν, ὅτι διττὴ ἦν ἡ θήρα,

The arith-  
metician  
has know-  
ledge of  
every num-  
ber in his  
mind.

Yet in cal-  
culating he  
searches  
for what he  
knows, as  
it were put-  
ting his  
hand into  
the cage.

1. τῷ δὴ ἐντεύθεν] δι δὴ, the reading of the Bodl. and its two companions, has probably slipped in from ἔξωτα δι δὴ above.

6. ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὐτὰ] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. A., which omits αὐτὰ: the reading ἐντὸς is a conjecture of Cornarius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτὰ is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting αὐτό for αὐτὰ. But there is no real flaw, for τὶ is cogn. accusative, and ἀριθμοὶ τὶ = cast up a sum. The second accusative in the plural of the things which constitute the sum

is therefore perfectly admissible; and it is also pointed, referring to αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτὰ above. Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of the things about him?

As in the Parmenides, where unity is negatived, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Knowledges themselves) appear in loose bundles which fly as we approach them.

11. πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει δὲ] 'What such-and-such a sum amounts to.'

18. ἦ] The past tense implies 'We found it to be—'

ἡ μὲν πρὶν κεκτήσθαι τοῦ κεκτήσθαι ἕνεκα· ἡ δὲ κε- p. 198.  
κτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν ἅ πάλαι  
ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστήμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ  
μαθόντι καὶ ἠπίστατο αὐτά, πάλιν ἔστι καταμανθάνειν  
ταῦτα ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου  
καὶ ἰσχυόντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ' οὐκ  
εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἡρώτων, ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὀνό- e  
μασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμῆσων  
ἢ ὁ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ τι ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικὸς,  
ὡς ἐπιστάμενος ἄρα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πάλιν ἔρχεται μα-  
θησόμενος παρ' αὐτοῦ ἅ ἐπίσταται;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

15 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἅ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώ-  
σεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμῆσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν  
γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμὸν ἐπίστασθαι;

p. 199.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ' ἄλογον.

We shall say  
then that  
it is impos-  
sible for  
him not to  
know what  
he knows,  
i. e. not to  
possess  
what he  
possesses,

ΣΩ. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων  
οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἔλκων τὸ ἐπίστασθαι  
καὶ μαθάνειν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὠρισάμεθα ἕτερον μὲν τι τὸ  
κεκτήσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μὲν  
τις κέκτηται μὴ κεκτήσθαι ἀδύνατόν φαμεν εἶναι,  
ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὃ τις οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναί, ψευδῇ

6. πρόχειρον δ'] The way in which the language is humoured to meet each image is very noticeable. As we say, 'at his fingers' ends.'

9. τοῦτο] A sort of cogn. accusative, as ταῦτα is very frequently used. 'This was my drift in asking,' &c.

19. ὥστε οὐδέποτε] 'So that it results in no case that a man is

ignorant of what he knows, but still that he may get hold of a wrong notion in regard to it; for he may not have in hand the knowledge of the particular thing in question, but another instead, when in hunting up some particular knowledge from his stock (τοῦ δὲ κέκτηται) he gets hold of the wrong one by mistake as they fit

3. μέντοι δόξαν οἶόν τ' εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν; μὴ γὰρ  
 ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἶόν τε, ἀλλ' ἐτέραν αὐτ'  
 ἐκείνης, ὅταν θηρεύων τινὰ ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην δια-  
 πετομένων ἀνθ' ἐτέρας ἐτέραν ἀμαρτῶν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα  
 τὰ ἔνδεκα δώδεκα φήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἔνδεκα ἐπιστή-  
 μην αὐτὴ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἶον  
 φάτταν αὐτὴ περισσεύει.

but yet he  
 may mis-  
 take one  
 thing that  
 he knows  
 for another  
 that he  
 knows,  
 when, fail-  
 ing in this  
 after-  
 search, he  
 takes the

across him : that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve,—in other words, the rock-pigeon that was caged within him instead of the dove.

1. μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν] These words are put emphatically forward in antithesis to μὴ κακῶσθαι. When hunting for some particular knowledge amongst what he possesses and knows, he catches one for another as they fly about : e.g. the arithmetician makes a mistake in regard to number when he seeks in the tribe of numbers for that which = 7 + 5, and takes hold of 11 instead of 12.

The germ of the present metaphor appears in the Euthydemus, pp. 290, 291. θηρευτικοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶ καὶ οὗτοι (οἱ λογιστικοί) κ.τ.λ. αὐτοὶ γὰρ (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τοῖς αἰθῆρουσαν, ὥσπερ, οἶμαι, οἱ ὀρνυνοθήροι τοῖς ὀρνυνοτρόφοις παραδιδάσκον — ἀλλ' ἡμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι, ὥσπερ τὰ παῖδια τὰ τοὺς κορύμβους διώκοντα, δεῖ φέμεθα ἑκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἰτία λήψασθαι· αἱ δ' αὖ ἐπεξίψουσιν. Compare also Arist. Met. I. 5. 1009 b. τὸ γὰρ τὰ πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζυγεῖν αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

3. ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] The difficulty of

the sentence lies in these words. They probably refer to δ καίτηται—δ εἶδε above. For it is difficult to imagine that ἀπ' αὐτοῦ and περὶ αὐτοῦ above do not refer to the same thing. If this be so, the meaning is, that he makes a mistake concerning some general subject, e.g. concerning number in general, when he takes one particular thing contained in it for another. τοῦτου therefore means, 'of this particular thing,' viz. which he is in search of. For a similar use of τοῦτου, without anything to which it immediately refers, cf. supr. 180. καὶ τοῦτου ζητῆς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκε. Infr. p. 202. τὸν μὴ δυνατόν — ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τοῦτου.

4. ὅτε ἄρα — φήθη εἶναι, — λαβών] We pass from εἶναι to δεῖ ἄρα, because reference is now made to the actual case supposed. The participle λαβών is exepexegetic to the verb understood in what precedes. He has hold of something else : that is, in the above case, taking the knowledge of eleven for that of twelve. As if ἔχειν — οἶόν τε were τάχ' αὖ ἔχον. Or the nominative is due to a kind of attraction from the intervening clauses.

wrong  
knowledge  
in-hand.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον.

p. 199.

ΣΩ. Ὅταν δέ γε ἦν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβη, ἀψευ-  
δεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν τότε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι  
ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθετο  
3 ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν  
μοι συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίσταςθαι  
ἀπηλλάγμεθα· ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτήσθαι οὐ-  
10 δαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή.  
δευότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαι μοι  
δοκεῖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδὴς γε-  
15 νήσεται ποτε δόξα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δῆ;

But, if it is  
Knowledge  
that he has  
in hand,  
how can he  
mistake it?  
How can  
Knowledge  
be the oo-

ΣΩ. Πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο δ  
αὐτὸ ἀγνοεῖν, μὴ ἀγνωμοσύνη ἀλλὰ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπι-  
στήμῃ· ἔπειτα ἕτερον αὐ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ ἕτερον  
10 τοῦτο, πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενο-

8. ἐπίστανται] So the Bodleian with all the other MSS. except pr. Ven. II. This is hardly sufficient authority for the change to ἐπιστάται. The transition from sing. to plur. is not more remarkable than that from the 3rd pers. to the 1st. It may be accounted for by the fact that Socrates is speaking generally, and no longer with reference to the case supposed above.

11. παραφαίνεσθαι] As it were, 'looking in at the window.'

17. τό τινος] These words depend immediately on δευότερον, in common with εἰ ἡ τῶν—δόξα:

but πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία has also reference to them.

18. ἀγνωμοσύνη] Used here in its most literal sense, 'from being unacquainted.'

τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ] Viz. which he possesses, εἰ τι δὲ ἔχει τι καὶ κίετται, referring to ἔχοντα.

20. πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία α. τ. λ.] The clause which follows is a more particular statement or explanation of that which precedes. Compare the structure of Rep. p. 445. τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τοῦ-  
του φ' (ᾧμεν φύσεται ταπεινότητος καὶ διαφθορομένης βιωτὴν ἀρα ἴσται, εἰάν περ τις ποῖῃ δ' ἐν βουλῇ δὴλο



p. 199. μέντης γνῶναι μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ πάντα; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδέν καὶ ἄγνοϊαν παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλό-  
τητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα  
ποιήσει.

omission of  
error!

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς  
ὄρνιθας ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, εἶδει δὲ  
καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομένας  
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὸν θηρεύοντα τοτὲ μὲν ἐπιστήμην  
λαμβάνοντα, τοτὲ δ' ἀνεπιστημοσύνην τοῦ αὐτοῦ περί  
ψευδῆ μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ  
ἐπιστήμῃ.

Perhaps  
there were  
ignorances  
lying  
about  
amongst  
the know-  
ledges, and  
he has  
taken one  
of them.

ΣΩ. Οὐ ῥαδίόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ἐπαινεῖν σε.  
ὁ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεισαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς  
p. 200. λέγεις· ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῇ  
μὲν, φῆς, δοξάσει. ἡ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐ δὴ πού καὶ ἡγήσεται γε ψευδῇ δοξάζειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ τοῦ  
ὧν ἔψευσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Ἐπιστήμην ἄρα οἴησεται τεθηρευκῶς ἔχειν,  
ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον.

25

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν  
πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκείνος  
b γελάσας φήσει· Πότερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας

But if he  
has the ig-  
norance in  
hand, how  
can he mis-

πλὴν τούτου ὁπίθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ  
ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγῆσεται κ. τ. λ.

26. ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ πάρεσμεν  
ἀπορίαν] Cf. Phil. 13. πάλιν εἰς

τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὃ Πρά-  
ταρχε.

27. ὁ—ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκείνος] Supr.  
pp. 166. 197.

take it for knowledge! After taking a long circuit, we are again at fault.

Unless we have recourse to the image of another sage or waxen block, containing the knowledge of the knowledges and ignorances, and go on thus to infinity, "in wandering mazes lost."

The truth is, we have no right to be searching for false opinion until we have

τις εἰδώς, ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν p. 200. οἶδεν, ἐτέραν αὐτὴν οἶεται τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν; ἡ οὐδετέραν αὐτοῖν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἐτέραν ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν; ἡ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, τὴν δ' οὐ, ἣν οἶδεν, ἣν μὴ οἶδεν; ἡ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγείται; ἡ πάλιν αὖ μοι ἐρεῖτε ὅτι τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστήμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ἐτέροις τισὶ γελοίοις περιστρεφῶσι ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρξας, ἕως περ ἂν κεκτῆται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προ-  
10 χείρους ἔχῃ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθήσεσθε εἰς ταῦτόν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ποιοῦντες; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινόμεθα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ  
15 ἔχω τί χρὴ λέγειν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπιπλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῇ δόξαν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, ἐκείνην ἀφέντες; τὸ δ' ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γινῶναι, πρὶν ἂν τις ἐπιστήμην  
20 ἰκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς λέγεις οἶεσθαι.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην; οὐ γάρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω.

8. γελοίοις περιστρεφῶσι] It would be rash to infer from this that the image is not Plato's own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of absurdity? Rep. 354. οὐ μόντοι καλῶς γε εἰστίμασι δι' ἑμαυτὸν Διὰ δὲ διὰ σέ. Prot. 340. εἰμὶ τις γελοῖος ἱερός.

The value of such inferences must depend on the tone of the

particular passages from which they are drawn.

16. εἰ λόγος] Either this particular argument, or rather the discussion in the form of an imaginary disputant.

18. τὸ δὲ] Sc. ψευδὴς δόξα τί ποτ' ἐστίν.

24. γάρ πω is said to be the reading of Ven. II., and is probably right. (Cett. πω.)

p. 200. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦκιστα, εἴνπερ μὴ σύ γε ἀπαγορεύσῃς.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ, τί ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες ἦκιστ' ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν;

e ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν· οὐ γὰρ ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ἀναμάρτητόν γε πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γίνονται.

ΣΩ. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, 10 ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο εἰάν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν,

p. 201. τάχ' ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήναι τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὴ δῆλον οὐδέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως λέγεις· ἀλλ' ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.

1. ἀπαγορεύσῃς] Vat. Coisl. Zitt. The Bodl. has ἀπαγορεύς with an erasure.

8. καὶ τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide.

10. εἰ τὸν ποταμὸν] The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported to have said, Go on, and you will find. For the expressions αὐτὸ δείξει, τάχ' ἂν αὐτὸ φήναι, cf. Philob. 20. προῦν δ' ἐνι σαφέστερον δείξει. Protag. 324. αὐτὸ σε διδάξει. Cratyl. 403. τοῦτό γε ὀλίγον αὐτὸ λέγει ἐνι πηγῆς ἔκστασις ἐκπεπρωμένης ἐστίν. Hipp. Maj. 288. εἰ δ' ἐπιχαρήσῃς ἵστασι παταγίσσας, αὐτὸ δείξει. The Scholiast says: Δείξειν αὐτό. ἐνι τῷ ἐκ πείρας γιγνσκομένῳ. κατέδει-

των γὰρ τῶν εἰς ποταμὸν πρὸς τὸ διαπερᾶσαι θρετό τις τὸν προηγούμενον εἰ βάθος ἔχει τὸ ὕδωρ. εἰ δὲ ἔφη, αὐτὸ δείξει.

The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncertain.

See above, πλεῖς δὲ ἐπιφύεσσαν—τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον; and compare Rep. 454. εἰν γέ τις εἰς πολυμύθησαν μακρὰν ἡμέραν εἰάν τις εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλσας μίσειν, ὅπως γε καὶ οὐδὲν ἦτον.

12. ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον] Those fording the river were feeling the bottom with their feet. Compare the way in which Justice 'turns up' in the Republic, 433. Πάσαι, δ' μακάρι, φαίνεται πρὸ ποταμῶν ἡμῶν κυλινδούμεναι.

found knowledge. And, though we can attempt nothing better than our last answer, perhaps if we return and examine it, the object of our search may show itself.

15

A brief examination is sufficient here.

The rhetoric of the law-courts proves that true opinion is not knowledge.

For in cases where the evidence of the senses is alone sufficient,

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ; καὶ τίς αὐτῇ;

p. 201.

ΣΩ. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσι ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς. οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποι-  
οῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται. ἡ σὺ οἶε δεινούς τινες οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες β  
ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἢ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τοῖς δὲ δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;

3. ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν] The irony is almost as transparent as in Polit. 266. γίνεται τῇ τῶν ὅτων γεννησιότητι καὶ ἄμα ἐν χειριστάῳ. Cf. Phædr. 260 sqq. Gorg. 462. alib. μεγίστων is masc. antec. to οὓς. (ἡ om. Bodl. Vat. Δ. Ven. Π.)

8. πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν] κατεπει- γει γὰρ ὕδωρ ρίον. Supr. p. 172.

Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge that it is true opinion. We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of judicial evidence, a true opinion may be formed by the judges without the possibility of Knowledge; since in questions of fact nothing short of personal observation ensures certainty. The definition 'Knowledge is true opinion,' is therefore inadequate.

The question returns, Are the above conceptions and images Plato's own, or is he repeating in them some contemporary theory? The comparison of other dialogues and the close examination of the passage itself tend to the conclusion that

although they may have been suggested to him from without, they may be fairly regarded as his own creation. See especially the passage of the Philebus, in which, after certain men have been brought forward as 'soothsayers' or 'allies,' there follows the analysis of the pleasure derived from Comedy, which is one of the most original and 'modern' passages in Plato. The image of the 'impressions' on the wax has not only been revived in speculation, but perpetuated in common language. And to that of the aviary has probably been less fortunate only from its greater boldness and subtlety.

In what follows the Bodleian MS. gives τοῖς with Vat. Δ. Ven. Π. This is better than τοῖς, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. 'Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose being robbed or otherwise assaulted the hearers were not eyewitnesses?'

p. 201. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πείσαι μὲν.

ΣΩ. Τὸ πείσαι ὃ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μὴν;

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ, <sup>5</sup> ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντας, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὁρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;

c ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἂν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταῦτ' οὖν ἦν δόξα τε <sup>10</sup> ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὁρθὰ ποτ' ἂν

the court may be brought to give a true verdict. The judges, then, in such a case have true opinion without knowledge.

3. πείσαι μὲν] The implied antithesis is διδάξαι ὃ εἶ. Cf. Rep. 475. Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, διὰ ἐμοῖσιν μὲν φιλοσόφοις. Τοῦτο δ' ἀληθινόν, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις; Soph. 240. Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ' εὐκλὲς μὲν.

13. καὶ δικαστήρια] Several MSS. read δικαστήριον. These words have been rejected by the critics, except Buttmann, who conjectured καὶ δικαστική, very aptly for the sense, if the word can be made to signify 'worthy of a good judge.' See the words εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν—ἐρθεῖ ποτ' ἂν δικαστὴς ἄσπερος ἐδόξαζεν. It is in Plato's manner thus ostensibly to restrict himself to the case in point. Cf. p. 152. Ἐν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις. p. 204. Ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσοις ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἴσιν.

Possibly καὶ δικαστοῦ ἀξία may be the true reading. Cf. Apol. 18. δικαστοῦ γὰρ αὕτη ἀρετή. And see Phileb. 13., where the Bodl. has πειρόμεθα for πειρασόμεθα. Ib. 36, where παραφροσύνας in the same MS. is a correction for πάσαις ἀφροσύ-

ναις, which the first hand wrote. But it is after all conceivable that δικαστήρια may be the feminine of an adj. not found elsewhere, except in the neuter substantive δικαστήριον.

To resume the argument from p. 195.

Viewing the mind as a receptacle of impressions (or ideas), we said that to think falsely was to fail in identifying present impressions with the ideas already existing in the mind. And thus it seemed impossible to be mistaken about these ideas themselves apart from impressions from without. But in fact we do mistake in things independent of sensation. E. g. an arithmetician who possesses the knowledge both of 11 and 12, will sometimes say that the sum of 7 and 5 is 11. We resort therefore to a less simple conception of knowing, and to a more complex image. To know is to possess knowledge. We may possess it without



III. Thes-  
tetus now  
remembers  
to have  
heard that  
true opin-  
ion, unless  
accompan-  
ied with  
an account  
of its ob-  
ject, is not  
knowledge.

Socrates  
identifies

δικαστῆς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν p. 201.  
ἄλλο τι ἐκάτερον εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὁ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του  
ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ' ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν  
μετὰ λόγου ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ d  
ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος,  
οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει,  
ἐπιστητά.

ΣΩ. Ἡ καλῶς λέγεις. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα

having it in hand. We there-  
fore image to ourselves false  
opinion thus. We have caught,  
as it were, (in learning) various  
species of knowledge, some greg-  
arious, some noble and solit-  
ary, (i. e. abstract), and have  
caged them in the mind, like  
birds. We try to take in hand  
one of these birds which we  
possess, and as they flutter  
about, we take hold of another  
instead of it. But then, if we  
have this one in hand, how can  
we mistake it for the other?  
How can Knowledge be the  
means of error? Perhaps (The-  
stetus suggests) there were ig-  
norances flying about amongst  
the knowledges, and we have  
taken one of them. But if  
I have an Ignorance in hand,  
how can I take it for a  
Knowledge? Must we imagine  
another cage or waxen block  
to contain the Knowledge of  
the knowledges and ignor-  
ances? This would be endless.

4. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθὴ δό-  
ξαν] Cf. Meno, p. 97, 98. καὶ γὰρ  
αἱ δόξαι αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσων μὲν χρό-  
νον παραμένουσιν, καλὸν τὸ χρεῖμα,  
καὶ πάντα τὰ γὰρ ἐργάζεται. παλὺν

δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθίλουσι παραμένειν,  
ἀλλὰ δραστητύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς  
τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοὺ  
ἀξιοὶ εἶσιν, ὥς ἂν αὐτὰς δόξα  
αἰτίας λογισμῶ. — ἰπιδὰν δὲ δε-  
θῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστήμης γί-  
γνονται, ἔπειτα μύημοι· καὶ διὰ  
ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη ὀρ-  
θῆς δόξης ἐστὶ, καὶ διαφέρει διαμῶ  
ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. See the  
whole passage. Polit. p. 309.  
τὴν — ὅπως οὖσαν ἀληθὴ δόξαν  
μετὰ βεβαιώσεως. Symp. 202.  
ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἐστὶ τι μεταξὺ  
σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας; τί τοῦτο; τὸ  
ἄρθα δοξάζειν καὶ ἄντι τοῦ ἔχειν  
λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ εἰσθ', ἔφη, ὅτι  
οὐτ' ἐπίστασθαι ἴστω· ἀλογον γὰρ  
πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη; οὐτε  
ἀμαθία· τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνει  
πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία; ἔστι δὲ δὴ που  
τοιούτων ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρο-  
νήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Rep. 506. οὐκ  
ᾔσθησαι τὰς ἀντι ἐπιστήμης δόξας,  
ὥς πᾶσαι αἰσχροί; ὅς αἱ βέλτισται  
τυφλαί· ἢ δοκῶσί σοι τὶ τυφλῶν  
διαφέρειν ἔδδεν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων  
αἱ ἀντι τοῦ ἀληθούς τι δοξάζοντες;

7. οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων] i. e.  
using this strange term ἐπιστητά.  
infr. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα.  
ἐπιστητός, like αἰσθητής and ποιό-  
της, was a novel word, formed  
on the analogy of αἰσθητός.

p. 201. καὶ μὴ πῇ διήρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταυτὰ σύ τε καὶ γὼ ἀκηκόαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μέν-  
τάν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγὼμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμι.

ΣΩ. Ἄκουε δὴ ὅναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ  
ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἰονπερεὶ  
στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τᾶλλα,  
λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνο-  
μάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν  
οὔθ' ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθ' ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἥδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ

p. 202. μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθισθαι, δεῖ[ν] δὲ οὐδὲν προσ-  
φέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκείνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ  
αὐτὸ οὐδὲ τὸ ἐκείνο οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον  
οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσοιστέον, οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα.

the saying  
thus quoted  
with what  
he himself  
has heard  
from cer-  
tain "as in  
a dream;"  
viz. that  
the ele-  
ments of all  
things can-  
not be ex-  
pressed in  
a proposi-  
tion, but  
can only  
be named.  
You can-  
not give  
them any  
attribute,  
since  
even such  
common  
predicables

1. εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταυτὰ σύ τε καὶ γὼ ἀκηκόαμεν] Had they both heard from the same source? Or is Plato here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, weaving together two distinct theories? See Introduction.

5. ὅναρ] Cf. Phileb. 20. Λόγων ποτὶ τινων πᾶσαι ἀκούσαι ἄναρ ἢ καὶ ἑρρηγοῦς τῶν ἐννοῶν.—Phaed.

61. Ἄλλα μὴ κατὰ ἐξ ἀκοῆς περὶ αὐτῶν λέγω.

6. ἰδούκουν ἀκούειν] 'I heard in my dream.'

οἰονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα] The metaphor is not lost sight of. Infr. 203. τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε καὶ συλλαβᾶς. ἢ οἷον ἀλλοσι ποιβλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἂ λέγομεν.

9. προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν] 'But it is impossible to go on to predicate any thing of it (the element), either affirmatively or negatively. For in so doing there is added the idea of existence or non-existence: but nothing must be added,

seeing that you can only speak of the element by itself.'

14. οὐδὲ τοῦτο] This has given needless trouble. Heindorf thought the article was required as with the other words, and inserted it. Buttmann objected to τοῦτο being so far separated from ἐκείνο, and ingeniously conjectured οὐδὲ τὸ τό. Both objections are obviated by observing that αὐτὸ, ἐκείνο, ἕκαστον, μόνον, occur in the preceding lines. For this reason they are put first, and with the article, and οὐδὲ τοῦτο—οὐδ' ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα is added afterwards. Cf. supr. p. 157. τὸ δ' εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαρετικόν—οὐ δεῖ—ὅτι τὶ ξυγχωρεῖν ὅτι του οὐτ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι τότε οὐτ' ἐκείνο. ὅτι ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἄναρ ἢ τὴν ἰστίην. Accordingly in the reference to this passage, p. 205, (which Buttmann must have overlooked) the article is introduced,—οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο.

as "this" and "that" are separable from the things to which they are applied. As the elements are combined in Nature, so definition is a combination of names. That which is named is the object of Sensation; the combination of these elements is

ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, p. 202. ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων λέγεσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὅτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἄλλ' ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον· ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχων· τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκεκριμένα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλεκέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν· εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστας τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γινώσ-

1. περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι] Cf. supr. 198. ἵστας δι' ὅντας διὰ πάντων ὅσην ἐν τύχῃσι πεποιμένους. Rep. 402. τὰ στοιχεῖα—ἐν ὅποις—περιφερόμενα.

2. εἴπερ ἦν δυνατόν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι] αὐτό is not emphatic. 'If it could be spoken of,' λέγεσθαι is the emphatic word.

7. ἔσθ] i. e. 'When we come to them.'

9. ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν] Cf. Sophist. 262, where it is described more accurately as συμπελέων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασι. See the whole passage.

A passage of Aristot. Metaph. H. 3. is closely parallel to this. He has just shown that sensible reality (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) consists of matter or potentiality (ὕλη, δύναμις), and form or actuality, (μορφή, ἐνέργεια). ὅταν ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένης καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαιδεύοντες ἠγόρευον, ἔχει τινα και-

ρὴν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἔστιν ἐρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ἔρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν) ἀλλὰ ποῦν μὲν τί ἔστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἀργυρον τί μὲν ἔστιν, αἶ, ὅτι δ' οἷον καπνίτερος. ὅσοι οὐσίαν ἔστιν μὲν ἦν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἔρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, εἰναι τε αἰσθητὴ εἶναι τε νοητὴ δ'· ἐξ ἧν δ' αὐτὴ πρός τινος οἷα ἔστιν, εἴπερ τι κατὰ τινος σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ δριστηνός, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν. See Introduction.

Locke's 'simple ideas' are not very different from the meaning of στοιχεῖον here.

12. καὶ ῥητὰς] There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical use of the word. Cf. Rep. 546. πάντα προσήγορα καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλλα ἐπέφηναν. But the immediate reference is to ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ, 'Capable of expression.'

14. ἀληθεύειν—περὶ αὐτό] 'Is exercised truly with regard to it.'

p. 202. σκειν δ' οὐ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ  
δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου·  
προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα  
γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν. Οὕτως  
σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.

ΣΩ. Ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτην, δόξαν  
ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

d ΣΩ. Ἄρ', ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ 10  
εἰλήφαμεν ὁ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες  
πρὶν εὐρεῖν κατεγήρασαν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέ-  
γεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ εἰκὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ 15  
ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς  
δόξης ; ἐν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.

2. περὶ τούτου] Sc. οὐδ' ἂν μὴ  
δύνηται δοῦναι λόγον.

3. δυνατόν—ταῦτα πάντα] Sc.  
δοῦναι τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. It  
is a curious form to use in re-  
ferring to such a simple thing.  
Possibly γινώσκω and ἀληθεύω  
are included.

Contrast with this Arist.  
Phys. Ansc. I. 1. (who points  
out that the elements, or simple  
ideas, are known not by sensa-  
tion, but by analysis ; and that  
definition distinguishes, while  
the name signifies an undivided  
whole.)

"Ἔστι δ' ἡμῶν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλον  
καὶ σαφὲς τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον·  
ὑστέρων δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώ-  
ριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, δια-  
ροῦσι ταῦτα.—Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ  
τὴν αἴσθησιν, γνωριμώτερον. Τὸ δὲ

καθόλου, ὅλον τί ἐστι. Πολλὰ γὰρ  
περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου.  
Πέποιθε δὲ ταῦτ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον  
ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον.  
"Ὅλον γὰρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαί-  
νει, ὅλον δ' ἐκείνος· ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐ-  
τοῦ διακρίνει εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

10. νῦν οὕτω] i. e. 'In a casual  
conversation.'

11. καὶ] Is to be taken with  
the whole clause as if it were  
ὁ καὶ—. For instances of this  
hyperbaton, see Ellendt. Lex.  
sub voce καὶ, C. 4.

15. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] The definition  
itself, whatever may be said of  
the theory that has been put  
forward. Heindorf's conjecture,  
εἰκὸς γ' αὖ τοῦτο, would give a  
different turn to the sense. 'It  
is natural to suppose that we  
have said well.'

alone the  
object of  
Know-  
ledge. For  
that im-  
pression  
deserves  
not to be  
called  
knowledge,  
which can-  
not be ex-  
pressed in a  
proposition.

Knowledge  
then is true  
opinion  
giving an  
account of  
itself. This  
is our third  
answer.

Can we  
prove it  
true?

1. The an-  
swer may  
be a true  
one, and  
yet the

theory on which we have based it may be unsound. This therefore is examined first.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ πᾶν δὴ;

p. 202.

ΣΩ. Ὁ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα· ὥς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.

5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;

ΣΩ. Ἰστέον δὴ· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα δὴ.

10 ΣΩ. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς. ἡ οἷι ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἂ λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰς ταῦτα.

It soon appears that we were right in saying the element cannot be defined.

ΣΩ. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλ- p. 203.

15 λον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γράμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον· ἄρ' αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον ἔχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως.

ΣΩ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους 20 γοῦν εἴ τις ἔροιτο τὴν πρώτην συλλαβὴν οὕτωςί᾽ ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι σῶ, τί ἀποκρινεῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τούτου ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς;

2. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] 'To be the cream of the whole theory.'

6. ὥσπερ—ὁμήρους] So that if we put them to the torture, we shall bring him (τὸν λόγον) to terms.

7. τὰ παραδείγματα] Cf. Polit. 277, 278, where the same example, that of letters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example—Ὅτι τῶν στοιχείων ἐκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥῆσι-

ταις τῶν συλλαβῶν ἱκανῶς διαισθάνονται—μετατιθέμενα δ' εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγμάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥῆσις συλλαβάς ταῦτα ταῦτα πάλιν ἀγορεύει.

ἐκεῖ] Sc. the person from whom Socrates and Theaetetus heard the theory 'in a dream.' Cf. supr. Θεαι. εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας.

14. μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῖς] This is done presently, p. 206.

p. 203. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγώ γε.

b ΣΩ. Ἴθι δὴ, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σῖγμα λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα ; καὶ γὰρ δὴ, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σῖγμα τῶν ἀφώνων ἐστί, ψόφος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώτ- 5 τῆς· τοῦ δ' αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνν εὖ ἔχει τὸ λέγεσθαι αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ὧν γε τὰ ἐναργέστατα αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπτά φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει, λόγον δὲ οὐδ' ὄντιν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτ' μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἐταῖρε, καταρθώκαμεν περὶ 10 ἐπιστήμης.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα.

c ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβὴν, ἅρ' ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Εἰκός γε.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ ἀμφότερα στοιχεῖα, καὶ ἐὰν πλείω ᾖ ἢ δύο, τὰ πάντα, ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγонуῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν.

2. But is it therefore unknown ?

15

First, How is the complex related to it ?

5. οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώτ- τῆς] This mode of definition reminds us of the Antisthenean saying quoted by Aristotle— ποῦν μὲν τί ἐστιν ἰσχύεται καὶ διδάσκει κ. τ. λ. ; and also of Euclides' objection to definition by comparison.

8. ἐναργέστατα] Bodl. ἐναργίστατα sed exem.

14. ἀποδεδείγμεθα] Heindorf conjectured ἀποδεδέγμεθα, for which MS. authority (Coisl. et Par. E. ex corr.) has since been found ; and it has been received by Bekker. But Stallbaum rightly defends ἀποδεδείγμεθα in the sense 'we have declared

our opinion ;' in which sense the πρὶ παρ. is used by Xenophon and Lysias. Vid. supr. 180. ἀποδεικνύμενον. Compare, however, infr. p. 205. ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι. But this refers to a part of the theory which is deliberately received in the words τοῦτο μὲν—καταρθώκαμεν.

16. τὴν συλλαβὴν] Arist. Met. H. 3. οὐ φαίνεται δὲ ἡρῶσιν ἢ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὐσα καὶ συνδύσσει.

The word συλλαβὴ is used probably not without the consciousness of its etymology.



e. g. Is the syllable the same with the letters of which it is composed? If so, they must be equally known with it.

ΣΩ. Ὅρα δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σίγμα καὶ αῖ. ἀμφοτέρᾳ p. 203.

ἔστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι

ὃ γινώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφοτέρα γινώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν;

5 ΣΩ. Τὸ σίγμα καὶ τὸ αῖ ἅρα γινώσκει.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἐκάτερον ἄρ' ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον εἰδὼς ἀμφοτέρα γινώσκει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἐκάτερον γινώσκειν, ἔπερ ἀμφοτέρᾳ τις γνώσεται, προγινώσκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπαντα ἀνάγκη τῷ μέλλοντί ποτε γνῶσθαι συλλαβὴν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχίσεται.

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης.

Or is it something by itself resulting from them?

ΣΩ. Οὐ γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρὴν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν· καὶ τάχα γ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι.

ΣΩ. Σκεπτέον, καὶ οὐ προδοτέον οὕτως ἀνάνδρως μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

13. ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχίσεται] Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Phæd. 89. Τήμερον, Ἰφὴ, καὶ γὰρ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ γούρας, ἐάντερ ἡμῶν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνάμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ' ἂν εἰ σὺ εἶην καὶ μὴ διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἴσχαρον ἂν ποησαίμεν ὥσπερ Ἀργεῖοι, μὴ πρότερον κομήσειν πρὶν ἂν ἐκλήσῃ

ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίον τε καὶ Κίβητος λόγος.

18. εἶδος, ἰδέαν] εἶδος is here rather more concrete, ἰδέα more abstract; but ἰδέα is used for εἶδος a few lines below. Generally, εἶδος is more logical, implying distinction; ἰδέα more metaphysical, implying unity. See Appendix C.

p. 204. ΣΩ. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκά-  
στων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη ἢ  
συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἐν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις  
ᾗσιν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δὴ;

ΣΩ. Ὅτι οὐ ἂν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα  
μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γε-  
γονὸς ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταυτὸν  
b καλεῖς ἢ ἕτερον ἐκάτερον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις  
προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι 15  
ἕτερον.

ΣΩ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή· εἰ δὲ καὶ  
ἡ ἀπόκρισις, σκεπτέον.

ΘΕΑΙ. Δεῖ δέ γε δὴ.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν διαφέρει ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός, ὡς 20  
ὁ νῦν λόγος;

1. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν μία ἰδέα] There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to conjecture *μῖαν ἰδέαν*: *ἔχέτω ὡς = ἵστω δ*—. Cf. Rep. 547. τὰ δ' ἐμοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνονται, ἐν τῇ γνωστῇ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις δρᾶσθαι.

'Let it be then as we have now put it, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of each combination of harmonious elements.' The words 'Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς' take up the thread of τὰχ' ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχει. In the conjectural reading the words *ἔχέτω—μῖαν ἰδέαν*

would of course refer to *ἰδέαν μῖαν αὐτὸ ἰαντοῦ ἔχον*.

For *μία ἰδέα = εἶδος ἰδέαν μῖαν ἔχον*, cf. Euthyphr. 6. τὸ εἶδος φ' πάντα τὰ δσια δσιά ἐστιν; εἴησθα γὰρ που μὴ ἰδέε' τά τε ἀόσια ἀόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ δσια δσια. Infr. 205. *μία τις ἰδέα—συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη*.

19. Δεῖ δέ γε δὴ,] Sc. καὶ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὀρθὴν εἶναι.

20. τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός—τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν] Cf. Ar. Met. Δ. 26. 1024. a. ὕδωρ γὰρ καὶ δσα ἔγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμοὶ πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ' ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἀν μὴ μεταφορῇ πάντα δὲ λέγεται, ἐφ' οἷς τὸ πᾶν ὡς

In that case it cannot have parts: unless we regard everywhole in the same way as something different from all its parts, resulting from them.

With a view to this we venture to assert that the Whole is different from the All.

But can we go so far as to distinguish *All*, in the singular, from *All*, in the plural? It is evident that "all of six" is the same as "all six."

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

p 204.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δῆ; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἔσθ' ὃ τι διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὴν λέγωμεν ἓν, δύο, τρία, τέταρα, πέντε, ἕξ, καὶ ἂν δις τρία ἢ τρις δύο ἢ τέτταρα οὕτως τε καὶ δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον λέγομεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ταῦτόν.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

10 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. †Πάλω† δ' οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

15 ΣΩ. Ἡ ἄλλο τι ἢ τὰ ἕξ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ἐφ' ἑνί, ἐπὶ τούτοις πάντα ὡς διαρρημένοι· πᾶς οὗτος ἀριθμός, πᾶσαι αὐταὶ αἱ μονάδες.

5. ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἓν] The words ἢ πέντε καὶ ἓν, which were introduced by Comarius, are anticipated in the simple enumeration ἓν, δύο, &c. They do not occur in the Bodleian or any other MS.

10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ' ἐκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν.] So far the MSS. give a meaning perfectly clear and natural. The words which follow are not so clear. The only way in which it seems possible to construe them as they stand, is by laying an unnatural stress on ἓν. "Again, while we speak of all (in the plural), is there no one thing of which we speak?" This is brought out more distinctly by C. F. Hermann's conjecture, οὐχ ἓν.

But this sense of πάλω as a mere particle of transition, = τί δέ; is hardly admissible in Plato (contrast p. 197. πάλιν δέ, ὅσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἀριθμοῖς τι κ. τ. λ. — νῦν αὖ — περιστερεῖται κ. τ. λ. infr. p. 205. πάλιν δέ, ὅπερ ἀπὸ ἐπεχείρου — Cf., however, Phil. 14. πολλοὺς εἶπας πάλιν.) And this objection is not obviated by substituting the awkward expression πᾶν τὰ ἕξ for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous line. For 'Do we not repeat something when we say τὰ πάντα' would not be a satisfactory rendering. The present passage is one in which a reader of Plato will expect extreme clearness and minuteness of logical sequence. To put πᾶν τὰ ἕξ in the beginning of the argument would be to assume bluntly that which it is intended to prove, viz. that an aggre-

4. ΣΩ. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἐν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί,  
 ὁ τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Ὡς δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὁ τοῦ πλείθρου  
 ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλείθρον ταυτόν· ἡ γάρ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὁ τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ  
 στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως; ὁ γὰρ  
 ἀριθμὸς πᾶς τὸ ὅν πᾶν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐστίν.

But all  
 (plural) im-  
 plies num-  
 ber, and  
 number im-  
 plies parts.

gate may be regarded as one thing. With this object it is necessary to reason from the plural to the singular, and to do so by gentle steps. The above argument might lead to the substitution of τὸ πᾶν for τὰ πάντα. But the objection against πᾶν would still remain: and there would be needless obscurity in the logical inversion by which, after reasoning from the number, we should then reason to it. 'In counting six, we said 'all six' (in the plural.) Again, in speaking of *all*, in the singular, is there nothing which we express? 'There must be.' 'And is not this six?' 'Yes.' The desirable sequence is restored if for πᾶν (which is itself a source of difficulty), we read πᾶς, (which in the MS. character could be changed into something very like πᾶν by the repetition of ν.) The passage may then be rendered, 'Have we not, then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?' 'Yes.' 'But while speaking of them all, is there no one thing *all* of which we

express?' 'There must be.' 'And is that any thing but the six?' 'Nothing.' Compare with the resumption of the last admission in τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, Soph. 328. οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσέπτεν περὶ μένους ἐναντία τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡλεγον; Φαίει. Τί δέ; τοῦτο προσέπτεν οὐχ ὡς εἰς διλεγόμεν; After ἀνάγκη, we must understand πᾶν τι λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192. οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐφαρτηθεῖ — ἀλλ' οἷόντ' ἔσθ' (sc. πᾶς τις) κ. τ. λ. alib. For what has been said of minute sequence, compare, amongst other passages, supr. 164. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ κ. τ. λ. 188. Ἦ οὖν καὶ ἀλλοθί που κ. τ. λ.

1. Ταῦτόν—προσαγ. We give the names πᾶν and πάντα to the same thing.

4. λέγωμεν. Several MSS. have λέγωμεν. If λέγωμεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole.

10. ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς] i. e. ὁ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς ἑκάστου ἐστὶ τὸ ὅν πᾶν ἕκαστον. 'The number of each taken altogether is each real thing

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

p. 204

ΣΩ. Ὁ δὲ ἐκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη  
ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

Therefore  
all (sing-  
ular) also im-  
plies parts.

5 ΣΩ. Ὅσα ἄρα ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη;

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τὰ δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖ-  
ται, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ πᾶς ἀριθμὸς τὸ πᾶν ἔσται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

Therefore,  
if all (sin-  
gular) and  
the whole  
are differ-  
ent, the  
whole is  
without  
parts.

10 ΣΩ. Τὸ ὅλον ἄρ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν γὰρ ἂν  
εἴη, τὰ πάντα ὂν μέρη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Μέρος δ' ἔσθ' ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἡ  
τοῦ ὅλου;

15 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ παντός γε.

But this  
is absurd.

ΣΩ. Ἀνδρικῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ p. 205.  
οὐχ ὅταν μὴδὲν ἀπῇ, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Ὅλον δὲ οὐ ταύτῳ τοῦτο ἔσται, οὐ ἂν μὴ-  
20 δαμῇ μὴδὲν ἀποστατῇ; οὐ δ' ἂν ἀποστατῇ, οὔτε ὅλον  
οὔτε πᾶν, ἅμα γενόμενον ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ αὐτό;

taken altogether,' or 'each taken altogether so far as it exists.' *ἐκάστων* would be more convenient, but we cannot venture to say that *ἐκάστων* is wrong. τὸ ἐν—*ἐκάστων* = *ἐκάστων*, δ' ἔστιν. Cf. Rep. 490. αὐτῷ δ' ἔστιν *ἐκάστων* τῆς φύσεως. But it must be admitted that the text becomes more uncertain in the last few pages of the dialogue.

2. δ' δι' *ἐκάστων* ἀριθμῶν] The word ἀριθμῶν implies plurality. Hence *ἐκάστων*, unless it is corrupt. We are now reasoning

from singular to plural, as before from plural to singular.

16. ἀνδρικῶς μάχει] Viz. for the θέσις he has chivalrously taken up, p. 204. παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἔπερον.

17. αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστίν] Is this very thing *all*, just as above, *ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν*. πᾶν, being predicate, does not need the article.

21. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ] Viz. ὅλον = ὅδ' ἂν μὴδὲν ἀποστατῇ = πᾶν.

τὸ αὐτὸ] Viz. οὐχ ὅλον = οὐ πᾶν.

μ. 205. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ἄλλον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὅτι οὐ ἂν μέρη ᾖ, τὸ ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἔσται ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε.

ΣΩ. Πάλιν δὴ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ συλλαβὴ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα ἔστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς μέρη ἔχειν ἐαυτῆς τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταυτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γένηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' ; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα συλλαβῆς μέρη ἔστί, ἔχεις ἄλλ' ἅττα εἰπεῖν, ἃ μέρη μὲν ἔστι συλλαβῆς, οὐ μέντοι στοιχεῖα γ' ἐκείνης ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύτης συγχωροίην, γελοῖον που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπ' ἄλλα ἰέναι.

ΣΩ. Παντάπασι δὴ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν λόγον μία τις ιδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη.

3. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from p. 204. Ὅτι εἰ ἂν ἡ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι.

6. Πάλιν δὴ—ἀνάγκη] This was said before, pp. 203, 204. προηγούμενοι τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπαντα ἀνάγκη τῇ μέλλουσι ποτε γινώσκεισθαι συλλαβῆς, —οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐδεῖν εἶναι.

8. ἡ ταύτων οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι] ταύτων οὖσαν αὐτοῖς was proved (p. 203.) to follow from their being parts. For the turn of the sentence, compare Rep. 490. ἦγαίτο δ' αὐτῇ εἰ καὶ ἔχει, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθειαι, ἣν διέκειν αὐτὸν πάν-

τως καὶ πάντῃ ἴδει ἡ ἀλήθεια δοτι μὴδ' αὖ μετῴκει φιλοσοφίας ἀληθιότης. ib. 503. ἐλέγομεν δ', εἰ μὴ μόνον, δαῖν—τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μὴ' ἐν πόντοις μὴ' ἐν φάβοις—φαίνεσθαι ἐκβαλλοντας ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατούντα ἀποκριτέον. ib. 525. διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπείρου εἶναι γινώσκων ἐξαπαδύνει ἢ μηδέποτε λογισματῇ γινώσκειν.

21. συλλαβή] The absence of the article marks our familiarity with the word, and also gives it a certain indefiniteness: as in the expression πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. Cf. Rep. 369. Γίγνεται τοῖον—ποῖος—ἐπειδὴ κ. τ. λ.

We cannot therefore view the whole as different from the all. But, if the whole is all the parts, the complex, if distinct from its elements, is not the whole of which they are the parts.

And it can have no other parts.

Therefore it can have no parts.



ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

p. 205.

But that which has no parts is uncompounded, i.e. an element, and therefore unknown.

ΣΩ. Μέμνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν πρώτων οὐκ εἶη λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, 5 διότι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον εἶη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχει προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, ὡς ἕτερα καὶ ἀλλότρια λεγόμενα, καὶ αὕτη δὴ ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μέμνημαι.

10 ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονο-δ ειδέσις τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι; ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὀρῶ ἄλλην.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταῦτόν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ 15 εἶδος ἐκεῖνον, εἴπερ μέρη τε μὴ ἔχει καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

If then the complex is an aggregate of simple parts, they and it are equally known and describable. If it is one and without parts, it and the element are equally indeterminate and unknown.

ΣΩ. Εἰ μὲν ἄρα πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐστὶ καὶ ὅλον τι, μέρη δ' αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἰετὶ 20 λαβαὶ γνωστὰ καὶ ῥητὰ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπεὶ περ τὰ πάντα μέρη τῷ ὅλῳ ταῦτόν ἐφάνη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα.

ΣΩ. Εἰ δέ γε ἓν τε καὶ ἀμέρες, ὁμοίως μὲν συλ- 25 λαβή, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον ἢ γὰρ αὐτὴ αἰτία ποιήσῃ αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν.

ΣΩ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ὅς ἂν λέγη

10. Ἦ οὖν ἄλλη τις] 'And is not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompounded) the cause of its having a simple form without parts?'

15. εἶδος] Used here without

reference to the sense in which it occurs above. Cf. p. 148. εἰ εἶδος περιλαβόν.

27. μὴ ἀποδεχόμεθα, ἐκ δὲ λέγει] For ἐκ δὲ without antecedent, (which is not unfrequent), cf.

p. 206. συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχείων δὲ τού-  
των.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ γάρ, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθόμεθα.

ΣΩ. Τί δ' αὖ; τουναντίον λέγοντος ἄρ' οὐ μάλ-  
λον ἂν ἀποδέξαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύννοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ  
τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσει;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον;

ΣΩ. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μαθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ  
στοιχεῖα ἐν τε τῇ ὄψει διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ  
ἐν τῇ ἀκοῇ αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον, ἵνα μὴ ἡ θέσις  
σε ταραττοὶ λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Ἐν δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μὴν  
ἢ ἄλλο τι ἢν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἐκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακο-  
λουθεῖν, ποίας χορδῆς εἴη ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὁμο-  
λογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο.

ΣΩ. Ὡν μὲν ἄρ' αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροὶ ἐσμεν στοιχείων  
καὶ συλλαβῶν, εἰ δὲ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ  
εἰς τὰ ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργε-  
στέραν τε τὴν γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέρα  
τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μά-  
θημα, καὶ εἰς τις φῆ συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν, ἄγνω-  
στον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχείον, ἐκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν  
ἡγησόμεθ' αὐτόν.

Therefore  
it is untrue  
to say that  
the com-  
plex is  
known, but  
the simple  
unknown.

And we  
have expe-  
rience to  
the con-  
trary: for  
we learnt  
our letters  
before we  
could read,  
and our  
notes be-  
fore we  
could play  
the lyre.

From this  
it appears  
that the  
element is  
more  
known  
than the  
syllable,  
the simple  
than the  
complex.

Soph. Ant. 35. Δλ' δε ἂν τοῦτω  
τι δρῇ, φόνον προκίεσθαι δηλοῦν-  
των ἐν πόλει.

1. γνωστὸν] ἄγνωστον Bodl.  
sed a erasum.

8. ὥς οὐδὲν ἄλλο] 'That in  
learning you continued doing  
nothing else but endeavouring  
to distinguish, &c.' Cf. Men. 80.  
ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτὸς τε ἀπορίεις.

24. ἴκοντα ἢ ἀκοντα παίζειν]  
'That he is either playing with  
us, or talking nonsense.'

The tendency of the present  
passage is to rise from the con-  
ception of elementary objects  
of sense (simple ideas of sensa-  
tion) to that of abstract ideas,  
(universals, predicables), as the  
true elements of Knowledge.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κομῶδῃ μὲν οὖν.

ρ

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτου μὲν ἔτι. κἀν ἄλλαι φανεῖν c

Cf. Ar. Met. B. I. 995 b. πότερον αἱ ἐρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γίγν' ὅταν ἢ εἰς ἃ διακρίνται ἐν-πάρχοντα ἕκαστον.

This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of the example of letters, elementary sounds, etc. to represent the Ideas and the mode of becoming acquainted with them.

The following passage of Rep. p. 402. is an instance of this :—

Ὅσπερ δὲ α— γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἱκανῶς εἰχόμεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λαθάνειν ἡμᾶς δόξα ὅτι ἐν ἅπασιν οἷς ἵστί περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὐτ' ἐν σμικρῇ οὐτ' ἐν μεγάλῃ ἡγιάζομεν αὐτά, ὅς οὐ δέοι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προῶνθι μὲν διαγγέλλεσθαι, ὅς οὐ πρότερον ἵσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως εἶχομεν. Ἀληθῆ. Οἰκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ἰδασιν ἢ ἐν κατῴτοις ἐμφαίνοντα, οὐ πρότερον γινώσκοντα, πρὶν ἢ αὐτὰ γινώμεν, ἀλλ' ὅτι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τα καὶ μελίστη; πωτάτωσι μὲν οὖν. Ἀρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικῶν πρότερον ἵσόμεθα, ὅτε αὐτοὶ, ὅτε οὐ φαμὲν ἡμῖν παιδευτῶν εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἢ τὰ τῆς συμφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοκρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐθαρσία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γινώσκοντες καὶ ἴδοντες ἐν οἷς ἵσμεν αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμικροῖς μήτε ἐν μεγάλοις ἀγιάζομεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰόμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελίστη;

At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, so far as each of them can be regarded

as one individual thing, are also the objects of Knowledge.

Cf. Ar. Met. a. 994. b. ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναρροῦσιν αἱ οὕτως λέγοντες (viz. τὸ ἀπειρον λ.) οὐ γὰρ οἷον τε εἰδέναι πρὶν ἢ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα διθῆναι.

To resume the argument from p. 201. Theætetus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge : and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given—they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Knowledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of any thing. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable *σ* an account can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its constituents *σ* and *ω*. But is the syllable known, the letter unknown? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts, unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distin-

ρ: ποῖα ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ· τὸ δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπι-  
 λαθώμεθα δι' αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, ὅ τι δὴ ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ  
 μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγεγόμενον τὴν τελε-  
 ωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν  
 σημαίνειν; τριῶν γὰρ ἐν τί μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνων δὴ;

d ΣΩ. Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἶη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάνοιαν  
 ἐμφανῇ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὄνο- 10  
 μάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν  
 ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν. ἢ οὐ  
 δοκεῖ σοι τὸ τοιοῦτον λόγος εἶναι;

5 This need  
 not, how-  
 ever, affect  
 the truth of  
 our third  
 answer.  
 What is  
 meant  
 in it by  
 'giving an  
 account?'  
 One of  
 three  
 things.  
 Either,  
 III. a. The  
 reflexion of  
 thought in  
 speech.

guished from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself unknown; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own memory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them.

Though the theory is rejected, we gain from it the notion of a simple idea and of a complex whole.

(2.) *καὶ ἄλλα φανερῶν ἀποδείξεις*] The train of thought, here broken off, is resumed in the Sophist, where the *ἀσώματα εἶδη* are treated as elements, and combinations of them are shown to be possible.

6. *τί ποτε βούλεται*] The sub-

ject is either *δ ταῦτα λέγω*, (cf. *infr.* τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην *δ εἶν σκοποῦμεν*), or *δ λόγος*, viz. τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγεγόμενον τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι.

τὸν λόγον σημαίνειν] *id. qu. r. l. εἰπὼν. σ.* 'What are we to understand by this λόγος?' Three meanings are put forward as possible: 1. Expression in words. 2. Analysis. 3. Definition.

11. *ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον*] Cf. *Phileb.* 38. *Ἐὰν τις γ' αὐτῷ παρῇ, τὰ τι πρὸς αὐτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν παρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἂν πάλιν φάτγεται, καὶ λόγος δὲ γέγοναι αὐτῶς δ' τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν;*

12. *ἐκτυπούμενον*] 'Imaging.' Compare also the saying of Democritus, *λόγος ἔργου σκῆψ*.

For τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος ῥοήν, cf. *Tim.* 75. *τὸ δὲ λόγων ἔμα ἔξω βίον καὶ ὑπερτοῦν φροῦήσσει κίλιστον καὶ ἄριστον πάντων καμάτων.* *Soph.* 263.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε. τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν p. 206.  
φαμέν.

But this is  
not peculiar  
to those  
who know.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θάπτον  
ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἐκάστου  
αὐτῷ, ὃ μὴ ἐνέος ἢ κωφὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς· καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι  
τι ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανού-  
νται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπι-  
στήμης γενήσεται.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

10 ΣΩ. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥαδίως καταγιγνώσκωμεν τὸ μη-  
δὲν εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν  
σκοποῦμεν. ἴσως γὰρ ὃ λέγων οὐ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ  
τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀπόκρι-  
σιν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ. p. 207.

Or, III. B. 15  
The enu-  
meration of the elem-  
entary parts  
of the com-  
plex whole.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;

ΣΩ. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσιόδος περὶ ἀμάξης λέγει τὸ  
ἐκατὸν δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν  
δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ· ἀλλ' ἀγαπῶμεν  
ἂν ἐρωτηθέντες ὃ τί ἐστὶν ἄμαξα, εἰ ἔχοιμεν εἰπεῖν  
20 τροχοί, ἄξων, \* ὑπερτερία, ἄντυγες, ζυγόν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνν μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ὁ δέ γε ἴσως οἶοιτ' ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ  
σὸν ὄνομα ἐρωτηθέντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ  
συλλαβὴν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ b

3. Οὐκοῦν] Ven. Π. and an-  
other MS. give οὐκοῦν αὐ.

10. καταγιγνώσκωμεν] 'Accuse  
in our minds.'

τὸ μηδὲν] 'Utter nonsense.'

16. Οἶον καὶ Ἡσιόδος] Op. et.  
D. 454. Νήπιος, οὐδέ τὸ αἰδ', ἐκα-  
τον δέ τε δούραθ' ἀμάξης.

Cf. Arist. Met. B. 3. 998. b.  
ἕτερος δ' ἴσται ὃ διὰ τῶν γενῶν  
ὁρισμὸς καὶ ὃ λέγων ἐξ ἧν ἴσται

ἐνπαρχόντων.

20. ὑπερτερία] The Bodleian  
with the other MSS. has ὑπερ-  
τηρία.

22. Ὁ δέ γ' ἴσται οἶον ἂν ἡμᾶς]  
The apodosis is deferred, as is  
so often the case when an illus-  
tration is introduced with ὥσ-  
περ. It is finally resumed with  
οὕτως τοίνυν— Cf. Rep. 402.  
ὥσπερ ἄρα—γραμμάτων περί—

p. 207. λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικούς εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τε καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαιτήτου ὀνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημῶν οὐδὲν λέγειν, πρὶν ἂν διὰ τῶν στοιχείων μετὰ τῆς ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνει τις, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς 5 πρόσθε που ἐρρήθη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐρρήθη γάρ.

ΣΩ. Οὕτω τοῖνυν καὶ περὶ ἀμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν ὀρθὴν ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνά-  
c μενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, 10 λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε καὶ ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἀμάξης οὐσίας γεγενῆσθαι, διὰ στοιχείων τὸ ὅλον περᾶναι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες ;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοί, ὦ ἐταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ 15 στοιχείου διεξοδὸν περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μείζον ἔτι ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό μοι λέγε, ἵν' αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν.

d ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀλλὰ πάντ' ἀποδέχομαι.

ΣΩ. Πότερον ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὄντινόν 20 ὄπουσιν, ὅταν τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν τοῦ αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ εἶναι, τότε δὲ ἑτέρου, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τότε μὲν ἕτερον, τότε δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Εἴτα ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μα- 25

But I may perform this rightly

—'Αρ' οὐκ, δ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικῶν κ. τ. λ.

3. τὸ δ' οὐκ εἶναι] 'Whereas it is impossible.' Cf. p. 157. τὸ δ' οὐ δεῖ, and note.

5. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθε] p. 206. ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μαθήσαν διηγεσθαι κ. τ. λ. is most probably referred to.

15. Εἰ σοί] ei is interrogative, depending on τοῦτό μοι λέγω.

21. τὸ αὐτὸ ὅτε μὲν—] e. g. thinking τ to be the first letter both of τ and θε.

22. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τότε μὲν] e. g. thinking the first letter of θε at one time θ, at another τ.



in the case of Theotitus' name, and yet mistake in the first syllable of Theodorus', which is the same in both.

θήσει κατ' ἀρχὰς σαυτόν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας p: 207. αὐτά ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τοτὲ μὲν εἰς τὴν προσήκουσαν, τοτὲ δὲ εἰς ἄλλην τιθέντας συλλαβὴν ;

ΣΩ. Ταῦτα λέγω.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ Δί' οὐ τοῖνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γε πω ἡγοῦμαι ἐπίστασθαι τοὺς οὕτως ἔχοντας.

This is not to know the syllable.

10 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ; ὅταν ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον γράφων τις θῇτα καὶ εἰ οἴηται τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, καὶ αὐτὸς Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ p. 208. εἰ οἴηται τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ἄρ' ἐπίστασθαι φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων  
15 συλλαβὴν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἄλλ' ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα μήπω εἰδέναι.

ΣΩ. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλαβὴν καὶ τρίτην καὶ τετάρτην οὕτως ἔχειν τὸν αὐτόν ;

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράφει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἐξῆς γράφῃ ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δῆ.

25 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὦν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξάζων, ὥς φαμέν ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγον γε ἔχων μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν γὰρ

2. αὐτὰ] 'What I have described.'

20. Οὐδέν γε] 'Certainly not.'

γε assents to the meaning of the question. Cf. Phil. 38. Οὐδέν γε. Ἄλλ' ἔπειρ ἀκούω λέγω.

p. 208. διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὠμολογήσαμεν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθῆ.

ΣΩ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἐταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὐπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Κινδυνεύει.

ΣΩ. Ὅναρ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες ἔχειν τὸν ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἥ μήπω κατηγορῶμεν; ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτό τις αὐτὸν ὀριεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἓν γέ τι ἔφαμεν λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὀρίζομενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅρθως ὑπέμνησας· ἔτι γὰρ ἐν λοιπόν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἰδῶλον, τὸ δ' ἄρτι λεχθέν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον· τὸ δὲ δὴ τρίτον τί λέγεις;

ΣΩ. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημείον εἰπεῖν ὧ τῶν ἀπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οἶον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν;

ΣΩ. Οἶον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίον περί ικανὸν οἶμαι σοὶ εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐστι τῶν κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

7. *διὰ*—[ἐπλουτήσαμεν] Cf. Polit. 277. *κινδυνεύει* γὰρ ἡμῶν *ἱκανοὶ* οἷον *διὰ* εἰδὼς *ἀπαντα*, πάντ' αὐτῶν *ὥσπερ* ἵπταρ *ἀγνοεῖν*. 278. *ἵνα* ἵπταρ αὐτ' ὀκείρατος ἡμῶν γίγνηται.

8. *ἐπιστήμη* λόγον] λόγος is used here in a double sense.  
1. Definition of Knowledge. Cf. p. 149. *ἐπὶ* λόγῳ *προσσεπέειν*.  
2. That 'account' of a thing which (with right opinion) constitutes Knowledge. The play

of words may be preserved, "when we thought we had found the most indubitable 'account' concerning Knowledge."

9. *εἰς*] Viz. the nameless author of our theory.

17. *ὅπερ* ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν] The two former were inferences from different meanings of *λέγειν*;—to express and to enumerate. See p. 206. *τὸν* γοῦν αὐτὸν *ἀρῶντα* *λέγειν* *φαμέν*.

Or, lastly, III. γ. The power of adding a mark which distinguishes it from all other things. I. e. Definition by the characteristic difference, or by the sum of the distinctive elements.

ΣΩ. Λαβὲ δὴ οὐ χάριν εἴρηται. ἔστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι p. 208.  
 ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἐκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς  
 ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὥς φασί τινες, λήψει·  
 ἕως δ' ἂν κοινοῦ τινὸς ἐφάπτη, ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται  
 5 ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ᾖ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Μανθάνω· καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἔχειν λόγον ὅ  
 τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν.

ΣΩ. Ὃς δ' ἂν μετ' ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὅτουσιν τῶν  
 ὄντων τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ αὐτοῦ,  
 10 ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται οὐ πρότερον ἢν δοξαστής.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτως.

Even this  
disappoints  
us on a  
nearer  
view.

ΣΩ. Νῦν δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἐγωγε  
 ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγραφήματος γέγονα τοῦ  
 λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν· ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη  
 15 πόρρωθεν, ἐφαίνεταιό τί μοι λέγεσθαι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς τί τοῦτο;

ΣΩ. Φράσω, εἰάν οἷός τε γίνωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἐγωγε p. 209.  
 ἔχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, εἰάν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν σὸν  
 λόγον, γινώσκω δὴ σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω μόνον.

20 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος  
 ἐρμηνεία.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως.

ΣΩ. Ἡνίκ' οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ὢ τῶν

3. τινε] Probably the Megarians. See Introduction.

9. αὐτοῦ.] This punctuation appears preferable when it is observed that there has been a tendency in the last few pages to accumulate genitives.

10. δοξαστής] Cf. p. 160. ἐπιστήμων ἂν εἴην, ὥσπερ αἰσθητής.

13. σκιαγραφήματος] The image is a familiar one. Cf. Phaed. 69. μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη

ἀρετή. Rep. 365. 603.

16. Πῶς εἰ τοῦτο] 'What do you mean! and why is it so!'

19. δέ] According to the hypothesis.

21. ἦν] Is, according to the hypothesis.

24. ὃ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, τοῦτων οὐδενός] It occurs to Socrates while speaking that the 'Difference' of one person from another is not one but many.

p. 209. ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ διανοίᾳ;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διανοούμεν, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει.

b ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀνάγκη.

ΣΩ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὄντινόν; θεὸς γάρ με διανοούμενοι ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ἢ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμούς καὶ στόμα καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ἔσθ' ὃ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἔσχατον;

ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ;

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἐὰν δὴ μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥίνα καὶ ὀφθαλμούς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἑξ- ὀφθαλμον, μή τι σὲ αὐτὸ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἢ ἐμάντων ἢ ὅσοι τοιοῦτοι;

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἐώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ' ἐμοὶ ἐνημνημαμένη κατάθῃται, καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως

5. ἢ τις ἄλλος ἔχει] The verb is attracted by τις ἄλλος.

13. τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν] The phrase Μυσῶν ἔσχατος is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The editors (under protest from Buttmann) read τὸ λεγόμενον. There seems no reason for this. Cf. *supr.* οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες. Arist. Eth. N. VIII. 3. διὰ γὰρ τοὺς λεγομένους ἄλας συναλωῶσαι. In the examples quoted by the

Scholias the proverb is used to express contempt. Here it means only remoteness.

22. μνημεῖον — ἐνημνημαμένη] Cf. pp. 191, 196. This is an instance of the way in which a theory which is rejected is still permitted and intended by Plato to leave an impression on the mind.

23. κατάθῃται] So Bodl. with Vat. Ven. II.

5 For unless I can distinguish Thmetatus from Socrates and every one else, how can I be said to have a right opinion of him? If then by the comprehension of a true account is meant "right opinion of the distinctive difference," this is a necessary part of right opinion.

ἐξ ὧν εἰ σύ, [καὶ ἐμέ.] εἰς αὐριον ἀπαντήσω, ἀνα- p. 209.  
μνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἀληθέστατα.

ΣΩ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα δ  
5 ἂν εἴη ἐκάστου πέρι.

ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται γε.

ΣΩ. Τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί  
ἂν εἴη; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει ἢ διαφέρει  
τι τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις.

10 ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς;

But if it  
means,  
"Know-  
ledge of  
the distinc-  
tive differ-  
ence," the  
term  
Knowledge  
remains  
still unana-  
lysed.

ΣΩ. Ὡς ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων δια-  
φέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν  
ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἡ  
ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπῇ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν  
15 ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν  
καλοῖτο δικαιότερον· τὸ γάρ, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσ-  
λαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γεν-  
ναίως ἔοικεν ἐσκότῳ μένῳ.

1. καὶ ἐμέ.] Bodl. εἰ σὺ ἐμέ καὶ:  
Vat. Δ. εἰ σὺ ἐμέ καὶ: Ven. Ξ. et  
pr. Π. εἰ σὺ ἢ ἐμέ καὶ (Bekk.  
Stallb.): cett. εἴση ἐμέ καὶ: Ven.  
Ξ. γρ. οἴση ἐμέ. ἢ is awkwardly  
remote from its antecedent, and  
sets aside τᾶλλα ἐξ ὧν εἰ σύ,  
which answers to ἐξέφθαλμον in  
the previous sentence. And the  
ἢ may have originated in the  
similarity of sound between ἢ  
and ὅ, as in p. 200. many MSS.  
read αὐτὴν for αὐτοῖς. Heindorf's  
conjecture, δ, referring to μνη-  
μίων, is unsatisfactory, because  
it is rather the object of sense,  
which, by fitting the μνημίων,  
would be said to remind. Hence  
δ ἐμέ καὶ would seem a fair emen-  
dation. But the above is chosen  
as the simpler, and as accounting

more naturally for the corrup-  
tion. If it is right, the sentence  
must be supposed to revert by  
a conversational licence to the  
indicative mood. See p. 149,  
ποιεῖν καὶ — ἀμβλίσκουσιν, and  
note. Schleiermacher's con-  
jecture, ἢ, leaves the subject of  
ἀναμνήσει doubtful. That of the  
Zurich editors, εἴσει σὺ ἐμέ καὶ  
ἐμέ, introduces an abrupt and  
awkward inversion. And the  
use of οἶδα in this sense is very  
questionable.

14. ὑπέρου—περιτροπῇ] ἐπὶ τῶν  
τὰ αὐτὰ ποιούντων πολλάκις καὶ  
μηδὲν ἀνυόντων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως  
τι πραττόντων. μέμνηται δὲ αὐτῆς  
Φιλήμων ἐν Ἡρώσει καὶ ἐνταῦθα  
Πλάτων. (Schol.) οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι,  
i. e. λῆρος ἂν εἴη.

p. 209. ΘΕΑΙ. †† εἴ γε δὴ τι νῦν δὴ ὥς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου;

ΣΩ. Εἰ τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κελεύεις, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἥδ' ὑ χρῆμ' ἂν εἶη τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν περὶ ἐπιστήμης λόγου. τὸ, p. 210. γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστίν. ἦ γάρ; 5

ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθεῖς, ὥς ἔοικε, τί ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἀποκρινεῖται ὅτι δόξα ὀρθὴ μετὰ ἐπιστήμης διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη κατ' ἐκείνων.

ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν.

ΣΩ. Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὐηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ' ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε ἄρα αἰσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετ' ἀληθοῦς 15 b δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἶη.

ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

1. εἴ γε δὴ] So the MSS., except Vat. Δ., which has εἰ δέ. The Bodleian continues without punctuation from ἐσκοτωμένῃ, and accents as above. But the accents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible some words may have slipped out? such as τί οὖν δὴ; εἴ γε δὴ τ— 'Well, what then! For I presume your question just now implied that you had something to say.' The reading of Vat. Δ. admits of being rendered, however, 'Well, but if,— what were you just now going to say, when you asked the question?' Most of the editors give εἰσὶν. The question referred to is τὸ οὖν προσλαβεῖν ——— τί ἂν εἴη; This is a little

difficult; and Badham, retaining Εἰ δέ, most ingeniously conjectures εἰ νῦν δὴ ὥς ἔτερον ἐπύθου, i. e. 'what was the suppressed alternative implied by the use of μὲν?' But this is hardly required. Theætetus very properly recalls Socrates from his unwonted discursiveness.

3. ἥδ' ὑ χρῆμ' ἂν εἶη τοῦ] The genitive is due to a sort of attractive ethical force in ἥδ', cf. ἀποπρὸς τῆς συμπελολογίας above. Soph. Phil. 81. ἀλλ' ἥδ' ὑ τοι κτήμα τῆς νύκτος λαβεῖν.

'An amusing sort of creature must be our fairest of the accounts of knowledge!'

8. ἀποκρινεῖται] Sc. ὁ λόγος.

13. φάναι] ἐκείνων sc.



Though  
Thetetus  
has brought  
forth more  
than he  
knew was  
in him, the  
art of So-  
crates has  
hitherto re-  
jected all.  
But he is  
cured of  
thinking  
that he  
knows what  
he does not  
know.

ΣΩ. Ἡ οὖν ἐτι κυυμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, p. 210.  
περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἥ πάντα ἐκτετόκαμεν;

ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι' ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον  
ἐν ἐμαυτῷ διὰ σέ εἴρηκα.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν  
τέχνη ἀνεμαϊά φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τρο-  
φῆς;

ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. Ἐὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπι- ο  
10 χειρῆς γίνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἴαν τε γίγνη, βελτιώ-  
νων ἔσει πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν, εἴαν τε κενὸς  
ᾖ, ἦττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος,  
σωφρόνως οὐκ οἴομενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον  
γὰρ μόνον ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλεόν δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ  
15 τι οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι ἄν-  
δρες εἰσὶ τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιεῖαν ταύτην  
ἐγὼ τε καὶ ἡ μήτηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν  
γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι d  
καλοί. νῦν μὲν οὖν ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ  
20 βασιλέως στοὰν ἐπὶ τὴν Μελήτρου γραφὴν, ἣν με  
γέγραπται· ἔωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαν-  
τῶμεν.

3. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δι' ἔγωγε πλείω] καὶ πλείω, 'even more,' καὶ μὰ Δι' ἔγωγε is interposed.

9. Ἐὰν τοίνυν] I.e. 'The power of rejection is one of the greatest powers in thinking.'

19. τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν] Indictments for impiety were

laid before the ἄρχων Βασιλείς, who was the representative of the ancient kings in their capacity of High-Priest, as the Rex Sacrificulus was at Rome. (Smith's Dict. of Ant.) It is at this point that the Euthyphro is supposed to open.

## APPENDIX A.

### *On some peculiarities of style and idiom in Plato.*

‘Αλλ’ οὐ πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θαιήτης ἐν ἔμοι δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἢ ἡ σιμότης αὐτῇ τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἰάρακα διάφορόν τι μνημῖον παρ’ ἔμοι ἐσημνησμένη κατέσθαι. Theæt. p. 209 c.

The words of Socrates, it is said in the *Euthyphro* (pp. 11, 15), are like the works of Dædalus; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato's style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, reappearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of light and aspect.

The reader of the *Theætetus*, for example, is disappointed, if he looks for perfect consistency with the Republic, or if he expects to find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished;—the figures are erased,—and yet further discussion is made, not without reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doctrine of sense, for instance, is wholly negatived, and yet it cannot be said that we are not intended to gather something from it.

Plato's metaphors are ‘living creatures’ rather than figures of speech; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities; he recurs to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no expression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled, it is with some additional or altered feature: if a conception is resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made, or the argument is carried farther. Thus the photograph, as it has been called, of the connexion is apt to be blurred, from the thought moving as we read. Even in the same passage, where an ordinary writer would

be contented with referring to an example or illustration just adduced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one, which perhaps gives a new direction to the current of thought. A fair instance of this occurs in *Theæt.* p. 168, where Theodorus says: 'It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse me and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the *Lacedaemonians* do. You are rather to be compared to *Sciron*: for they tell one either to strip or go away; but you are rather like *Anteus* in your way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you have stripped him. (like *Sciron*) and compelled him to wrestle with you (like *Anteus*).'

The argument itself (*ὁ λόγος*) is continually personified and is spoken of under a Protean variety of figures.

It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away 'like a tale.' More frequently it has power over us, like a general commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives, while it rolls its successive waves over us, or like a wind which carries us we know not whither. Sometimes 'its name is legion,' and it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves from the driving shower. The Argument talks with us, it goes through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair treatment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help, it has a father, and guardians of its orphanhood.

This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole of Plato's writings, is closely connected with their conversational form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of language.

The observation of both these elements of Plato's style is of importance to the student, because it saves him from the necessity of resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon each occasion of grammatical perplexity.

I. *Conversationalisms.* In Plato we often meet with irregularities of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dialogue more easy and lively and natural.

a. *Changes of construction.* The following are a few out of several instances in the *Theætetus*:

(1.) p. 144. τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθὴ ὄντα—πρῶτον αὐ εἶπαι—ἐγὼ μὲν οὐτ' ἂν

ἐξέπρη γένεσθαι ὅτε ἀπὸ γεγονότων. Theodorus begins by simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon his previous anticipations and experience to account for it.

- (2.) p. 153. ἡ δ' ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἔξει—ἐκταί τε μαθήματα κ. τ. λ. cf. p. 173. σπουδαὶ δ' ἐταιρειῶν ἐπ' ἀρχάς—οὐδ' ὅσα πρῶτον προσίσταται αὐτοῖς.

The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds.

- (3.) p. 167. ποιηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῇ αὐτῆς.

Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the reflexive pronoun, as if *ψυχῇ* were the subject of *δοξάζοντας*: a transition from the persons who think to the mind which thinks.

- (4.) p. 173. οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε φῆσαι (δὲ λόγος) . . . ἐθέλουσι ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. He passes from what the argument would say, to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite plural.

To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of nouns: e. g. Theset. p. 147 ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσῃ, without *περί*: just as we might say in conversation, 'the mud-question,' for 'the question about the mud.'

β. Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun *αὐτός*, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this.

- e. g. p. 155. εἰάν σοι ἀνδρῶν—τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν—συν-ἱερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν.

Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Thesetetus occurs p. 171, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῇ τιναστίᾳ λέγοντι ἐνγχυρῇ ἀληθῇ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται.

γ. Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression.

- e. g. p. 153. Ἐπεὶ οὖν σοι λέγω πνεύμας τε καὶ γαλήνας καὶ θύα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύουσι, τὰ δ' ἔτερη σώζει.

- p. 172. τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήῃ ἐπὶ σχολῇ ποιῶνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κακῶσι, εἰάν αὐτοὺς δ' ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμῶς, ἀρίστη.

p. 199. μή γάρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οὐκ ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἑτέραν ἀντ'  
ἐκείνης, διὰ τοῦτο—ἀλλ' ἑτέρας ἐτίμων ἀμαρτάν λάβῃ, διὰ ἃ καὶ τὰ ἐν-  
δεκά δόδοικα φέρεται εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἐνδεκά ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν  
δόδοικα λαβάν, τὴν ἐν ἐκαστῷ οἷον φέρεται ἀντὶ περισσεύειν.

An occasional consequence of this faleness of expression is the de-  
ferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after ὥστεν :  
e. g. Rep. 402 "ὥστεν ἄρα ———. "Ἄρ' οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐ-  
τως κ. τ. λ. Theæt. p. 207. ὥστεν ἄν—οὕτω τοῖσιν κ. τ. λ.

δ. Also connected with the conversational form of Plato's writ-  
ings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the im-  
perfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a  
saying of Aristotle's that Dialectic deals tentatively with those sub-  
jects on which Philosophy dogmatizes, (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ  
ἃν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ); and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induc-  
tion. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the respond-  
ent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example  
(the example often covering more ground than seems quite fair,) and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular  
to universal.

The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode  
of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later age,  
but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry  
is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative  
and inductive spirit.

An instance occurs in the Theætetus p. 159, when it is argued  
that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is  
wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was  
fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus  
ironically adopted, appears from Protag. p. 350, where Socrates is  
checked for it by Protagoras, who says, "Ἐγὼγε ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ  
οἱ ἀνδρείοι θαρράλαιοι εἰσὶν, ἀμολόγησα· εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρράλαιοι ἀνδρείοι,  
οὐκ ἠρωτήθην· εἰ γὰρ με τότε ἤκου, εἶπον ἂν διὰ οὐ πάντες.

And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to  
cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensibly limited with per-  
suasive modesty: as in Theæt. p. 152. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταύ-  
τῳ ἂν τε θερμαῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. — Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος  
δοῦναι.

Ib. p. 204. Ταῦτόν ἄρα ἂν γὰρ τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, τό τε πᾶν  
προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἀπειρα.

e. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the  
poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power  
of 'saying any thing.' Just as there is a freedom of expression

possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid.

II. This leads us to the *Poetical use of language*. Plato's words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is Sophocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature.

a. Poetical use of single words.

(1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (*πρὸς ὁμιλίαν ποιῶν*).

p. 150. *ἄναργός ἐστι* for *δῆλον ἐστι* ('as clear as day').

p. 154. *ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα*.

p. 156. *συνεκρίπτοντα καὶ γενναμίην*.

p. 160. *μὴ πταίω τῇ διανοίᾳ*.

p. 162. *διωλίγιος φλυνρία*.

p. 165. *σφαλὲς γὰρ ἦτον ἀσχημονήσει*.

p. 169. *μὴλ' εἰς ξυγκρόφωσιν*.

p. 171. *ταύτην ἄν—ἴστασθαι τὸν λόγον*.

p. 172. *ἀνάγκη ἔχων ἐπιδιδίαι* (wielding coercion).

p. 202. *ταῦτα—περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι*.

To which may be added the 'hypocoristic' use of diminutives.

p. 149. *φαρμάκια*.

p. 195. *ἴαν του σμαρίν ἢ τὸ ψυχάριον*.

(2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes spiritualised.

p. 149. *μαίαις γενναίαις καὶ βλασυρῆς*.

p. 162. *ἄξιος οὐδ' ἰνὸς μόνου*.

p. 174. *πολὺ βδάλλεσθαι*.

p. 189. *τοῦτε γὰρ μοι ἰδεάλλεται διανοουμένη*.

p. 194. *Ὅταν τοῖσιν λάσιδν του τὸ κίερ ἦ*.

(3) Playing upon a word.

p. 150. *εὐρημα*. Cf. Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 1108.

p. 152. *τὴν ἀλήθειαν*.

p. 181. *τοὺς βέοντας*.

p. 194. *τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίερ*.

p. 208. *ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον*.

Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i. e. when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning.



p. 149. *ὅτι ἄλλοις οὕτω τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχεν.*

p. 152. (perhaps) *συμφερίσθων* (let them march one way).

p. 161. *τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιβεκτίων.*

p. 193. *ὅσπερ οἱ ἱμνοὶν ὑποδοίμενοι παραλλάξας.*

p. 198. *πρόχειρον δ' οἷα εἶχε τῇ διαταίᾳ.*

(5) Poetical use of particles: e. g. the frequent use of *ἄρα*, helping to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard, the occasionally difficult reference with *γάρ* (p. 152. *ὅλα γάρ*—and note), the hyperbaton of *καὶ* (p. 154. *καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε*. p. 190. *ἐπείθεν δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα*—), and generally the dramatic liveliness, with which successive clauses are contrasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person. Speech thus becomes literally a 'self-dialogue.' See especially p. 155, *ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ἕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι*: and p. 190, *ὅτι πάντες μᾶλλον—ὡς πάντες μᾶλλον—ὡς πάντες* *ἄρα—ὡς ἀνάγκη*—, with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are introduced.

Compare Phil. 38. *τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πόλιν τοῦθ' ὁρᾶναι φασταζόμενον ὑπὸ τινι δέντρῳ.*

β. The same poetical energy shows itself in the expansion of some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects the general tendency of the Greek language.

(1) Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form of exegesis) deserves to be reckoned among the more salient peculiarities of Plato's style. One example from the *Theaetetus* will suffice to indicate what is meant.

p. 175. *πάντων αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφά ἀποδιδώσιν—διιγγιῶν τε ἀφ' ἡφ' ἡλίου κρημασθεῖς—ἀθροιστῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων—γέλωντα—παρίχει κ.τ.λ.—*where another writer would probably have inserted *γάρ*.

Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun such as *τοῦτο* (p. 189 ad fin.) or *δ* (p. 158.) Compare the use of *τὸ δέ*, e. g. p. 157. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in apposition to the sentence, which may be viewed as an extension of the 'cognate accusative.' Instances of this are p. 153, *ἐπὶ τοῦτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα κ.τ.λ.*; p. 161, *τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.* (Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred to would fall grammatically under this head.)

(2) Attraction. E. g. where a main verb was to be expected, we find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another participle, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle.

p. 173. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐδ-  
σάμενοι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπόμεθα; where we should have  
expected διέλθωμεν.

p. 150. τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προϊού-  
σης τῆς συνουσίας θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιιδόντες, ὥς αὐτοῖς τε καὶ  
τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσιν: where, but for the proximity of ὥς—  
ἐπιιδόντες would probably have been ἐπιιδόσασιν. See also  
λαβών, p. 199. which but for ἔσαν—λάβῃ would be λαβόντα.

γ. To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself  
in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of anti-  
thesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly  
so in Plato.

p. 150. ἐμοῦ δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ' ἄλλων πεισθέντες.

p. 151. ἐνίοις δὲ ἐγὼ, καὶ πάλιν αὐτοὶ ἐπιιδόσασιν; where the sub-  
jects of the two verbs are opposed.

p. 197. εἰ δυνατόν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ κ. τ. λ.

δ. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in  
adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument.

E. g. p. 152, where we are gradually led from the example of  
the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the  
position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See  
also pp. 158, 159, where, as the argument proceeds, (ἔτερον)  
διὸν τοῦτο διὰ ἐκείνου is substituted for διὰς ἐταφόν.

ε. The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity  
of Plato's style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is  
especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from  
poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding  
prose, and, (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to  
something like a metrical cadence.

(1.) p. 173. In the quotation from Pindar, φέρεται is probably  
substituted for πίπεται (see note on the passage), the words τὰ ἐπί-  
πεδα γυμνητροῦσα are inserted, and τῶν ὄντων ἐκάστου διὸν is added at  
the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the sen-  
tence, so as to embellish it without interrupting its harmony.

p. 194. The substitution of the Attic κίεω for the Homeric κῆρ  
is probably due to a similar motive.

(2.) Dithyrambic and lyric cadences are more frequent in some  
other dialogues than in the Theætetus. See especially Sympos. pp.  
196, 197, the close of Agathon's speech, especially the last few

lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: Phædr. 238, 241, *alibi*: Rep. 546, 7; 617, 8; and several places of the *Timæus*, e. g. p. 47, *ὅν δ' ἐμὰ φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος ἀν' ὀρηγαὶ μέτην*. With such passages may be compared Theæt. 175, 6, *οἳ δὲ γ' ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβίοντες ὀρθῶς ἐμνησθαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εἰδαμένους βίον ἀληθῆ*.

The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inversion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis,

p. 158. *οἱ μὲν θεοὶ πάντων εἰνται εἶναι*.

p. 160. *κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι*.

ζ. A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato's dialogues, of which the *Theætetus* is acknowledged to be a prominent example.

There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism:—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part:—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted.

And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and interpenetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to mark the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another.

An instance of this is the way in which the reader is prepared for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as p. 157, *ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν*. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, p. 144, *ἐπισπεψάμεθ' ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς ἂν λέγει*, of the conclusion arrived at p. 179, *σοφώτερόν τε ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι*, &c. &c.) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wisdom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, p. 167, and presses for solution as an element of the common opinion of men, p. 170, *καὶ ἐν γὰρ τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις*—*παρὰ σφίσιν*.

These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in pp. 171, 2, of the 'semi-Protagoreanism' of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is expedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the

enemy's lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bearing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words p. 177, *πλὴν εἰ τις τὸ δογμα λέγοι· τοῦτο δέ που σκόμπ' ἂν εἴη πρὸς τὸ λέγομεν οὐχί; κ.τ.λ.* At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began.

A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion.

Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, pp. 184-187, and from 'true opinion' to 'true opinion giving an account of itself,' p. 201.

And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry proceeds. See p. 194, *ἀ δὴ ὅντα καλεῖται*, compared with p. 152, *ἀ δὴ φάμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὁρθός*: and p. 209, *μημίον παρ' ἑμοὶ ἐνηχημασίη κατέθηται*,—an application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block.

Plato's philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests.

The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art,—or rather of Nature conscious of itself,—which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to the parts and to the whole.

His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle surrounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind.

## APPENDIX B.

### μή ού.

§ 1. THE most familiar use of μή ού is after verbs of fearing and the like, with the subjunctive\*: where a fear is expressed that something is *not*, or will *not* be; e. g. Plat. Men. p. 89. *πρὸς τί βλάψω δυσχεραίνεις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπιστῆς, μή οὐκ ἐπιστήμη εἴ ἢ ἀρετή;*

But there are other cases of a different kind, in which μή ού has only the force of a single negative.

These are, (1) With a conditional participial clause depending on a negative sentence, e. g.

Hdtus. II. 110. *ὁ δὲ οἱ πεποιῆσθαι ἔργα οὐδ' ἀπὸ Ζεφύστρι τῇ Αἰγυπτίῃ. . . . οὐκ ἔδεικεν δίκαιον εἶναι ἰσθάναι ἔμπροσθε τῶν ἐκείνου ἀναθημάτων, μή οὐκ ὑπερβαλλόμενον τοῖσι ἔργοισι.*

Hdtus. VI. 106. *εὐσέπῃ δὲ οὐκ ἐξελεύσεσθαι ἔφασαν, μή οὐ πλήρους ὄντος τοῦ κύκλου.*

Soph. Œd. Rex, 220. *ὁ γὰρ ἂν μακρὰν ἔχεντος αὐτόν, μή οὐκ ἔχων τι σύμβολον.*

(2.) With an infinitive or participle dependent on a negative sentence, when the clause so introduced explains or supplements that which is denied. What is so explained has of course something in it of a privative meaning. The commonest instances are those of verbs of refraining, being able (to avoid), admitting (a negative), and denying; e. g.

Soph. Œd. Col. 361. *ἤκει γὰρ οὐ κενή γε, τοῦτ' ἐγὼ σαφῶς ἔξοιδα, μή οὐχὶ δεῖμ' ἐμοὶ φέρονσά τι.*

Soph. Œd. Rex, 1088. *οὐ τὸν Ὀλυμπευ ἀπείρων, & Κεβαίρων, οὐκ ἔπει \* \* \* μή οὐ σέ γε κ. τ. λ.*

\* To the same head should probably be referred the use after *αἰσχύνουμαι* with the infinitive, mentioned by Rost (Grammatik, p. 764.); of which I

have been unable to find an example. But for the converse, see Plat. Gorg. p. 461. *ἢ σχύῃσθαι μὴ προσεμολογήσθαι.*

Soph. Antig. 540. μή—μ' ἀτιμάσῃς τὸ μὴ οὐ θανεῖν τε σὺν σοι—

Æd. Col. 572. ξέρον γ' ἂν οὐδέν' ὄσθ', ὅσπερ σὺ νῦν ὑπεκτραποίμην  
μὴ οὐ συνεκσώζεις.

Plat. Phæd. 72. τίς μηχανή μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα ἀναλωθῆναι εἰς τὸ τε-  
θνήσκει;

Ib. 88. οὐδέν τι προσήκει θάνατον θαρβύοντι μὴ οὐκ ἀσότης θαρβεῖν.

Ib. ἐκείνο μηκέτι συγχωροῖ, μὴ οὐ ποιεῖν αἰτήρ—.

Symp. 197. τίς ἰσχυροτέρηται μὴ οὐχὶ Ἐρωτος εἶναι σοφίας;

Gorg. 461. (l. c.) μὴ προσομολογήσαι—μὴ οὐχί. Ibid. τίνα οἶσι  
ἀπαρτήσεσθαι μὴ οὐχί—;

(3.) With the infinitive or participle after *αἰσχρὸν ἔστι*, and some other expressions of reproach.

Plat. Theæt. p. 151. αἰσχρὸν μὴ οὐ παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυμείσθαι δ τί  
τίς ἔχει λέγειν.

Plat. Soph. p. 219. τὴν θηρευτικὴν διλογίαν μὴ οὐ τέμνει διχῶ.

Plat. Symp. πολλὰ ἄνθρωποι μὴ οὐχ ἔν τε καὶ ταῦτόν ἡγίεσθαι τὸ κάλλος.

Plat. Phæd. 85. μὴ οὐχὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐλέγχω—πάνου μαλθακοῦ  
ἀνδρός.

Soph. Æd. Rex, δυσάλητος γὰρ ἂν εἴην, τοιάδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρων  
ἄνθρωποι.

## § 2.

1. There is a simple and obvious explanation of the two passages of Herodotus, which may perhaps be found with some modification to apply to the other cases above mentioned.

Both in II. 110. and VI. 106. the clause introduced with *μὴ οὐ* expresses not a merely hypothetical condition, but a condition which was also a fact. It is not merely said that Darius should not stand before the image if his deeds were inferior, it is also asserted that they were inferior. The Spartans did not say that they would not come unless it was full moon, but that they would not come on the ninth day, because the moon was not then full.

The same explanation applies to Soph. Æd. Rex, 220. *Œdipus* says, not 'that he could not have made the investigation, unless he had had some clue:' but that 'not having any thing to guide him, it was impossible for him to conduct the investigation by himself.'

In all these instances therefore *οὐ* is clearly significant: not destroying the negative force of *μή*, but strengthening into a subordinate assertion what might otherwise be understood as an hypothesis. It gives a degree of objective reality to the clause, and brings it into prominence as an integral part of the predication.



But why is this only done when the whole sentence is negative? For instance, why could not the priest have said, 'δεῖν αὐτὸν προσκυνοῖεν τὰ ἱεῖναι ἀσκήματα, μὴ οὐκ ἐπεμβαλλόμενον τοῖσι ἔργοις'?

The answer is probably to be sought (1) in the tendency of negative particles in Greek to multiply themselves,—which acts here in two ways, the negative turn of the sentence leading the mind onwards to a further negative, and the negation in the principal clause making it necessary to strengthen the subordinate but independent negative expression:—(2) in the indefiniteness of the negative sentence, which makes the necessity of avoiding ambiguity to be more distinctly felt.

2. These last remarks apply equally to the second case, that of negative sentences, (or interrogative with negative meaning,) to which a negative clause is appended, explanatory of that which in the chief clause is denied. But it is less easy here to determine the exact significance of οὐ. The subordinate clause in this case does not run parallel to the whole sentence, but to a part of it, i.e. it corresponds, not to what is negatively asserted, but to what is denied. Still it is a fair hypothesis that it is not merely subordinate, but that it enters into the predication. It is co-ordinate with the predicate, if we do not include in that term the negative particle. It is a fact consistent with this hypothesis, that what is thus introduced with μὴ οὐ is generally dwelt upon with some emphasis, and is often more important to the sense than the preceding verb, which has something of an auxiliary character. Thus Plato *Phæd.* 72, *τίς μηχανή μὴ οὐχὶ πάντα ἀναλωθῆναι*, might be more briefly expressed thus,

*πῶς οὐ πάντα ἀναλωθῆσεται;*

and *ib.* 88. *οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρρόντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνόητως θαρρῆναι*, is nearly equivalent to *οὐδεὶς δὲ θάνατον θαρρῶν οὐκ ἀνόητως θαρροίη*.

It is not necessary for the validity of an hypothesis of this kind to show that where οὐ is omitted, (as in *Soph. Œd. Rex*, 1388. *οὐκ ἂν ἐσχόμεν τὸ μὴ πολεῖσαι τοῦμόν ἄθλιον δέμας*. *Philoct.* 348. *οὐ πολὺν χρόνον μ' ἐπισχον μὴ με ναυστολεῖν ταχύ*), the clause is purely subordinate, though the case would be considerably strengthened if this could be proved. And though an account could be given of both the above instances, (in the first the remoteness from fact of an imaginary act in past time, in the second the emphasis being on *ἐπίσχον*, and his 'not sailing' being in this case so purely imaginary), still it is better, especially when dealing with poetical instances, not to seem to strain them to our theory. It is noticeable that *οὐδὲν καλύει* is generally followed by the infinitive without either μὴ or μὴ οὐ. It is in effect an affirmative expression.

3. The last case is in form nearly analogous to the first, with this difference, that the clause introduced with *μή οὐ*, instead of being co-ordinate with the predicate, is itself the subject of the sentence. Here *μή* indicates that the expression is hypothetical, while *οὐ* shows that what is thus supposed is conceived of objectively, and as taking place in the region of fact. The supposition generally refers to the case which is immediately before the speaker, and it is usually a supposition of something not *done* in that case. Here a 'negative instance' comes to our aid. Soph. Œd. Rex, 12. *δυσάλητος γάρ ἂν εἴην τοιάνδε μὴ οὐ κατοικτείρων ἴδραν*. But ib. 76. *τηρικᾶσ' ἐγὼ κακὸς μὴ δρῶν ἂν εἴην πάνθ' ὅσ' ἂν δηλοῖ θεός*. Again, Plat. Soph. l. c. *ἄλογον μὴ οὐ τέμνουν*. But, where it is a mere abstract supposition, *πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία—γινώσκει τὴν ψυχὴν μηδεῖν*. (Theæt. 199.) *οὐκ ἄλογον μὴ—δεῖν*, (Phæd. 62.)

What has been already said of the tendency of negatives in Greek to suggest negatives must be applied to this case also. Thus: *καλόν ἐστι, μὴ—αἰσχρόν ἐστι μὴ οὐ—*.<sup>b</sup>

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§ 3.

Although the MS. authority for *οὐ* in Theæt. 153. a. is weak, (Par. C. E. Flor. a. c. Palat. Coisl. ex em. Ven. Π. ex em. Par. B. ex em.), yet the comparison of similar passages, especially Phæd. 88. *οὐδενὶ προσήκει θάνατον θαρρόυντι μὴ οὐκ ἀνοήτως θαρρύνειν*, tends strongly to confirm the reading which has been retained in the text. According to Hermann, the omission of *οὐ* in such cases is a frequent error: and, after what has been said above, it may perhaps be added, that the use of *μή οὐ* is in harmony with the general vividness and reality with which the whole passage is conceived.

<sup>b</sup> It is possible that the use of *μή* should have been placed under this *οὐ* after such expressions as *οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην*, *οὐδεμία μηχανή*, *τίς μηχανή*, rather than the foregoing head.

## APPENDIX C.

### *εἶδος, ἰδέα.*

§ 1. The words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender.

*εἶδος* seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd. II. 20 τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου means simply the nature of the disease, but in II. 21 τοιαύτη ἦν ἐπὶ πάντων τὴν ἰδέαν, should be translated, 'was such in its general phenomena.' Here *ἰδέα* calls up a picture, while *εἶδος* simply designates a class or kind of thing. So πᾶσα ἰδέα—θανάτου Thuc. III. 81 is not 'every kind of death,' but 'death in every form.'

§ 2. The word *εἶδος* occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theæt. p. 157. ἀνθρώπων τε τίθενται καὶ λίθων καὶ καὶ ἰκστου ζῶον τε καὶ εἶδος, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus I. 94. τὰ—τῶν παγνίων εἶδεα.

A more philosophical application of the same use occurs p. 181, where we have the δύο εἶδη κινήσεως.

§ 3. But it occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. *εἶδος* then means a class, or species, as that to which particular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theætetus, p. 148. ταύτας πολλὰς οὐσας ἐπὶ εἶδει περιλαβες. p. 205. εἰς ταῦτα ἐμπίπτουσαν ἢ συλλαβὴν εἶδος ἐπέτιψεν.

§ 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word *εἶδος* ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he frequently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ant. Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philosophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to *ἰδέα*. Or if we choose to put it so, *εἶδος* expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; *ἰδέα* implies also the colour and the whole appearance. *εἶδος* is a colourless *ἰδέα*. See Theæt. p. 203. ὅτι γε γὰρ οὐκ εἶδος, ἰδέαν

μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον. And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that εἶδος is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another; ἰδέα rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theæt. l. c. we have ἐν τι γιγνόντι εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων<sup>c</sup>. Again, p. 204. μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἐκάστων τῶν συναρμοσθέντων στοιχείων γιγνομίνη. Ib. ἐν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν. p. 205. μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἀν εἴη. 205. καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα. Cf. supr. p. 184. εἰς μίαν τιὰ ἰδέαν—συν-τείνει.

It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adaptation of the ordinary use, than of technical phraseology. Plato may perhaps be teaching the doctrine of ideas by example; but he does not avowedly give to the words the 'second intention' with which they are used in many passages to express the eternal forms of Being. There is also an intermediate transition noticeable in the use of ἰδέα, from the abstract to the concrete, i. e. it passes, by a kind of *synecdoche*, from meaning the sum of the attributes to mean that to which they belong. So in Thuc. l. c. πᾶσα ἰδέα θανάτου=θάνατος πάσης ἰδέας. And in Theæt. l. c. μία ἰδέα is used synonymously with ἐν εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔχον. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe generally, that the word εἶδος tends to a use at once more logical (ἕτερον εἶδος, διττὰ εἶδη, κατ' εἶδη διϊστάς, κατ' εἶδη τρέμειν) and more concrete: (the ἰδέα is spoken of as inherent in it): the word ἰδέα to one more metaphysical, (εἰς μίαν ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἔργον τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, μίαν ἰδέαν διὰ πολλῶν πάντη διατεταμένην ἰκανῶς διαισθάνεται,) more abstract, and at the same time more figurative.

The word ἰδέα is a fair symbol of the union of reason and imagination in Plato.

<sup>c</sup> Cf. Rep. p. 544. ἢ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἢ τις καὶ ἐν εἶδει διαφανεῖ τινι κείναι.

## APPENDIX D.

ὦ θαυμάσιε, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ μέλει.

These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in translating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connexion. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as δαιμόνι, δαιμονίη, ἦθις, in Homer (Il. VI. 407, 486, 518, 521. cf. Plat. Rep. 344. ὦ δαιμόνιε θρασύμαχε) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ μέλει, in Aristophanes.

In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or countenance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conversation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respectful, ironical or familiar.

ὦ θαυμάσιε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, 'I wonder at you.' The most decided instance is in the Phædo, p. 117. οἶόν, ἴφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. 'What are you doing! I am amazed at you.' It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has nothing to do with the person addressed: e. g. Cratyl. 439, where it indicates Socrates' intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation ὦ μακάριε (see Aristoph. Nub. 167.) to express Socrates' own delight at some great discovery: e. g. Rep. 432, where Justice is discovered; Phæd. 69, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life.—So when Hamlet says, 'O good Horatio, I'll take the ghost's word for a thousand pound,' the address is prompted

not this time by Horatio's worth, but by the relief caused to his own mind by the discovery of the king's guilt. Thus in *Theæt.* p. 151. *ὁ θαυμάσιος* can hardly be rendered except by a note of admiration. 'Do you know that many have been ready to bite me!'

Nearly the same is true of *ὁ δαιμόνιος*, p. 180, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. 'Disciples, my good sir!' 'Disciples, did you say?' While in p. 172 it wears quite a different expression, conveying really Socrates' admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. 'Ah! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar!'

The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in *ὁ εἰραῖος*, *ὁ φίλος*, *ὁ φίλος εἰραῖος*, acquires, in *ὁ μέλος*, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. *Theæt.* p. 178. *Νῶ Δία, ὁ μέλος*, 'My dear fellow! I should rather think he did.'

The use of quaint adjurations and addresses in Shakspeare affords an interesting illustration of this feature of Plato's style.

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


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